"Napoleon's Marshals." Topic
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Tango01 | 30 Mar 2021 4:23 p.m. PST |
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SHaT1984 | 30 Mar 2021 10:31 p.m. PST |
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USAFpilot | 31 Mar 2021 9:33 a.m. PST |
I didn't know that Berthier was in America during the siege of Yorktown. I wonder how far Napoleon would have risen with out him. He was the ultimate staff officer. 👍 |
IronDuke596 | 31 Mar 2021 9:46 a.m. PST |
A very good series and well worth one's attention. |
SHaT1984 | 31 Mar 2021 2:50 p.m. PST |
>>I didn't know that Berthier was in America during the siege of Yorktown. Well its certinly in every bio! BTW, the fakish Anthony Hopkins accents just annoying too.. like trying to add credence to something that is, ahhh… for amateurs i guess, |
USAFpilot | 01 Apr 2021 1:03 p.m. PST |
I watched the rest of the videos, thought they were great. Saw a lot of Napoleonic artwork I had never seen before and I liked the computer animations battles showing troop movements. After watching them I have even more respect for the Marshals, all very brave men. |
SHaT1984 | 01 Apr 2021 3:07 p.m. PST |
>>I have even more respect for the Marshals, all very brave men. well, except Bernadotte… |
Brechtel198 | 01 Apr 2021 3:34 p.m. PST |
Berthier was on Rochambeau's staff in America from 1780-1783. He was also selected for de Segur's staff corps in after returning to France at the end of the war and was probably one of the officer's working on the staff manual when the staff corps was abolished. |
Brechtel198 | 01 Apr 2021 3:36 p.m. PST |
I wonder how far Napoleon would have risen with out him. He was the ultimate staff officer. Berthier was one of the great chiefs of staff in military history. He organized and ran what would become the Imperial staff and was the one indispensable marshal. Napoleon remarked after Waterloo that if Berthier had been there he wouldn't have lost. |
Bagration1812 | 01 Apr 2021 3:38 p.m. PST |
Reading the chapter in Elting's Swords about the marshal's was one of the main inspirations a much younger me had for the period. The story of Lannes and the scaling ladder, Davout getting off his stretcher at Borodino with his guts hanging out and more rendered the guys larger than life for me and have kept me hooked for 30+ years. Whatever issues I have with Swords now, that chapter and the stories in it have been reread at least a dozen times. True badasses. Same is tru of their contemporary opponents. Bagration, Raevsky, Yermolov, Blucher, etc. |
Brechtel198 | 01 Apr 2021 3:38 p.m. PST |
Bernadotte was physically courageous, but was not a reliable subordinate. His abandoning of Davout in 1806 was both moral cowardice and treachery. He would finally be relieved in 1809 for insubordination. |
Brechtel198 | 01 Apr 2021 3:42 p.m. PST |
If Davout's 'guts [were] hanging out' at Borodino that would have been his last battle. Davout was wounded at Borodino, but it was from a near-miss from an artillery round, which killed his horse and left him 'stunned and badly bruised.' It was common shell and not a roundshot that exploded. Davout refused to leave the field. |
Brechtel198 | 01 Apr 2021 3:43 p.m. PST |
Reading and studying Napoleon's marshals is only half the story. The performance and exploits of the general officers that didn't make marshal is also a study in expertise and courage. |
Mike the Analyst | 01 Apr 2021 4:02 p.m. PST |
Hmm my post seems to have disappeared. Key points, Napoleon and Davout were not expecting to run into such a large proportion of the Prussian army. A dragoon division had been assigned to Davout. That would have made a big difference at Auerstadt. Has anyone seen any order reassigning the dragoons to Murat. It seems likely that Murat took it upon himself to order the dragoons on the road to Jena. Interesting these dragoons appear to have delayed the march of Bernadotte's corps. |
Bagration1812 | 01 Apr 2021 8:02 p.m. PST |
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von Winterfeldt | 01 Apr 2021 11:16 p.m. PST |
The Dragoons were with Bernadotte then. BelliardUne partie de la cavalerie de Murât n'avait pu prendre part à la bataille que fort tard dans la journée. Le général Belliard écrivait à Murât d'Appolda. le 14 octobre 1806, à huit heures du soir : a … La division Sahuc et la brigade Lasalle sont arrivées extrêmement tard par les difficultés d'un défilé qu'on trouve en {sic) de Dornburg avant de déboucher dans la plaine. Ce malheureux défilé, on ne peut plus difficile, a tellement retardé la marche que malgré tous les soins qu'a pu prendre le Prince de Ponte Corvo, ce n'est qu'à deux heures qu'il a pu déboucher dans la plaine et encore avec une seule division… J'ai avec moi un officier prussien prisonnier, il dit que le Roi était à l'armée et qu'il la commandait, il se trouvait à la droite en opposition à Sa Majesté, c'est lui-même qui ordonna la charge d'infanterie contre notre cavalerie… Le Roi qui a parlé à cet officier lors de la retraite, avait l'air fort abattu Lettres et Documents Pour Servir A L'Histoire de Joachim Murat 1767 – 1815, tome 4, Paris 1910, page 390, foot note 2
more food for thought by an article by Rovert Ouvrad and no his is by no means a Nabulieon hater should give some food for thought Ce même jour (on est le 13 octobre) Napoléon pense toujours que les Prussiens sont à Erfurt, et qu'il va les attaquer à Weimar le 16. Un peu plus tard, des renseignements indiquent qu'ils sont, à tout le moins, en mouvement. Il écrit alors à Murat : Le rideau est enfin tiré, l'ennemi commençant de retraiter sur Magdebur., Mettez-vous en marche le plus rapidement possible, avec le corps de Bernadotte, en direction de Dornburg. Mais Murat, conformément aux ordres reçus, a envoyé une grande partie de sa cavalerie reconnaître la plain de Leipzig. Les dragons de Milhaud, les hussards de Lasalle et de Milhaud ne seront pas à l'appel le 14 ! Dans la nuit du 13 au 14, Davout, Bernadotte et Murat sont à Naumburg. Ils y reçoivent, de Berthier, les ordres que celui-ci a écrit dans la journée, à 15 heures, en termes identiques. L'Empereur, Monsieur le Maréchal, apprend, à une lieue de Iéna, que l'ennemi fait face à Maréchal Lannes, avec environ 50.000 hommes. Le Maréchal pense même qu'il sera attaqué cette nuit. Si, cette nuit, vous entendez une attaque, vous devrez manœuvrer sur l'ennemi et le contourner par sa gauche. S'il n'y a pas d'attaque ce soir, vous recevrez cette nuit des ordres pour demain. A ce moment, Bernadotte est déjà en route pour Dornburg, suite à l'ordre qu'il a reçu précédemment par Murat[8] A la nuit, il fait prendre les bivouacs à ses troupes dispersées entre Naumburg et Dornburg. Nous arrivons maintenant au 14 octobre. A 3 heures du matin, Davout reçoit de nouveaux ordres, écrits à Iéna, la veille, à 10 heures du soir :[9] Au bivouac sur les hauteurs d'Iéna, à dix heures du soir. Le maréchal Bernadotte avait reçu l'ordre de se rendre à Dornburg. Il est très nécessaire qu'il s'y soit rendu. Mais si cependant il se trouvait à Naumburg, ce serait une raison de plus de se mettre en route pour exécuter les dispositions suivantes, qui est (sic) de vous rendre à Apolda avec tout votre corps d'armée pour tomber dans les derrières de l'ennemi, si l'on se bat, comme tout porte à le penser. D'Apolda, vous vous porterez partout où se trouvera le feu. L'ennemi a laissé voir aujourd'hui une nombreuse armée, la gauche appuyée à une lieue de Iéna et la droite à Weimar. Par votre mouvement vous tomberez droit sur ses derrières. Vous entendrez probablement la canonnade qui vous portera à activer votre marche, mais vous aurez soin de marcher toujours en ordre de manière à pouvoir recevoir des charges de cavalerie. Vous suivrez, pour faire cette manœuvre, la route qui vous conviendra, mais l'important est de prendre part au combat. Si le maréchal Bernadotte se trouvait avec vous, vous pourriez marcher ensemble. Mais l'Empereur espère qu'il sera dans la position qu'il lui a indiquée à Dornburg.[10] Lorsque vous serez à portée d'être entendu d'Iéna, vous tirerez quelques coups de canon, ce qui sera le signal si nous ne sommes pas forcés de commencer plus tôt. Mais Bernadotte[11] n'est pas, en tous les cas son corps d'armée – avec Davout. En fait, les deux corps d'armée sont de part et d'autre de Naumburg, celui de Bernadotte s'étirant entre Naumburg et Dornburg. De toute façon, Bernadotte n'a reçu aucun ordre contremandant celui qui lui impose de se rendre à Dornburg [12] Davout, après avoir rencontré Bernadotte, est décidé à marcher sur Apolda, par le nord plutôt que par Dornburg, dont la route est d'ailleurs déjà suffisamment encombrée par les soldats de Bernadotte [13] Davout et Bernadotte ne recevront plus de nouveaux ordres, jusqu'au matin du 15. Tels sont les faits. Et pourtant, le 21 octobre, Bernadotte va recevoir une lettre de Berthier, par l'intermédiaire duquel, à propos d'un autre évènement, Napoléon tire une première salve : Sa Majesté, qui est très-fâchée que vous n'ayez pas exécuté ses ordres, vous rappelle à ce sujet que vous ne vous êtes point trouvé à la bataille d'Iéna; que cela aurait pu compromettre le sort de l'armée et déjouer les grandes combinaisons de Sa Majesté, et a rendu douteuse et très-sanglante cette bataille, qui l'aurait été beaucoup moins. Quelque profondément affecté qu'ait été l'Empereur, il n'avait pas voulu vous en parler, parce qu'en se rappelant vos anciens services il craignait de vous affliger, et que la considération qu'il a pour vous l'avait porté à se taire. Mais, dans cette circonstance où vous ne vous êtes pas porté à Kalbe, et où vous n'avez pas tenté le passage de l'Elbe, soit à Barby, soit à l'embouchure de la Saale, l'Empereur s'est décidé à vous dire sa façon de penser, parce qu'il n'est point accoutumé à voir sacrifier ses opérations à de vaines étiquettes de commandement.[14] Cette lettre est suivie d'une deuxième, le 23 : Je reçois votre lettre. Je n'ai point l'habitude de récriminer sur le passé, puisqu'il est sans remède. Votre corps d'armée ne s'est pas trouvé sur le champ de bataille, et cela eût pu m'être très-funeste. Cependant, après un ordre très-précis, vous deviez vous trouver à Dornburg, qui est un des principaux débouchés de la Saale, le même jour que le maréchal Lannes se trouvait à Iéna, le maréchal Augereau à Kahla, et le maréchal Davout à Naumburg. Au défaut d'avoir exécuté ces dispositions, je vous avais fait connaître, dans la nuit, que, si vous étiez encore à Naumburg, vous deviez marcher sur le maréchal Davout et le soutenir. Vous étiez à Naumburg lorsque cet ordre est arrivé; il vous a été communiqué, et cependant vous avez préféré faire une fausse marche pour retourner à Dornburg, et, par là, vous ne vous êtes pas trouvé à la bataille, et le maréchal Davout a supporté les principaux efforts de l'armée ennemie. Tout cela est certainement très-malheureux. Les circonstances se sont offertes depuis de donner des preuves de votre zèle; il s'en offrira d'autres encore où vous pourrez donner des preuves de vos talents et de votre attachement à ma personne. En fait, on l'a bien vu, « d'ordres précis » il n'y avait point eu, qui aurait enjoint Bernadotte d'être à Dornburg le même jour que Lannes devait être à Iéna[15]. Napoléon, ici, ment, consciemment ou non. Bernadotte ne pouvait être à Dornburg à cette date, puisque c'est le 13, à 9 h 00, qu'il y est envoyé, par le biais de l'ordre envoyé à Murat. Mieux : le 14, il doit se trouver à Naumburg, avec Davout. Enfin, Murat n'arriva pas à Naumburg avant le 13. Contrairement à ce qu'écrit Napoléon, Bernadotte n'est pas « retourné à Dornburg », puisque, conformément aux ordres reçus par l'intermédiaire de Murat, il était en train de s'y rendre. Enfin, lorsque Bernadotte est accusé d'avoir laissé Davout face au plus gros de l'ennemi, Napoléon raisonne totalement a posteriori, car, lorsqu'il ordonne à Davout de se rendre à Apolda, il n'a aucune idée de la répartition des forces prussiennes[16] Par ailleurs, Bernadotte n'aurait-il pas dû « marcher au canon », comme il lui est souvent reproché ? Mais de quels canons aurait-il dû s'agir ? Car enfin, s'il a entendu les canons d'Auerstaedt, il doit avoir, aussi, entendu ceux de Iéna. La distance, entre Dornburg et Iéna est à peu près la même que celle séparant Dornburg d'Auerstaedt, et, de surcroît, il sait que c'est à Iéna que se trouve le gros de l'armée de Napoléon[17], alors qu'il ignore ce que Davout va rencontrer. Reste la dernière critique faite à Bernadotte, sa « lenteur »[18] à se déplacer jusqu'à Apolda, même si, in fine, son corps d'armée rejoignit bien, en temps voulu, la position que Napoléon lui avait assigné, c'est-à-dire le 14 entre 10 et 11 heures, à Apolda. S'il avait alors continué sa marche, la bataille de Napoléon s'étant déplacée. Certains estiment qu'il n'aurait pu atteindre le champ de bataille que vers 12 h 30 au plus tôt, 16 h 00 au plus tard, alors que la victoire était déjà acquise à 13 heures.[19] En conclusion, Bernadotte exécuta l'esprit et la lettre des ordres qu'il avait reçus, conformément au concept développé dès le 12 octobre, à Auma, par Napoléon, dans l'optique d'une bataille le 16 octobre, et non le 14. S'il peut, au maximum, être critiqué pour sa lente progression entre Dornburg et Apolda, alors il faut également critiquer l'Empereur, pour sa fausse appréciation de la position prussienne, et pour avoir envoyé des ordres ambigus et contradictoires. Deux mois plus tard, Napoléon appelle Bernadotte au commandement de trois corps (le sien, celui de Ney et celui de Bessières) pour former l'aile gauche de la Grande Armée qui va effectuer la première phase de la campagne de Pologne…. N'est-ce pas là la preuve que l'Empereur ne croyait pas lui-même aux accusations portées – y compris par lui-même – contre Bernadotte, et que celui-ci n'avait été qu'un bouc émissaire destiné à masquer les erreurs du Chef. ________________________________________
[1] « A Iéna, Davout s'est battu seul contre l'armée prussienne, mais ce ne fut pas de ma faute. Bernadotte était en mesure de le soulager, mais je crois que dès cette époque il trahissait, quel que fût son motif : républicanisme ou simple jalousie de ce que Soult et Davout avaient de plus beaux corps d'armée. » Cahiers de Sainte-Hélène – Général Bertrand, tome II, p. 176. [2] A l'appui de ceci le fait que Bernadotte avait été, au contraire de Davout, un temps proche des Jacobins, et qu'il sortait du rang, ce qui n'était pas le cas de Davout. Cela suffit-il à engendrer une éventuelle mésentente ? En tout cas, une telle animosité n'existait pas dans les années 1804 et 1805, ni dans la période précédent le 14 octobre. [3] « À noter que du fait d'un conflit de personnes le corps de Bernadotte (20 000 hommes) erre lors de la journée du 14 et ne participe ni à la bataille d'Iéna ni à celle d'Auerstaedt » Wikipedia – Sur Internet, 2006. [4] « Napoléon s'enquiert des conditions de la bataille. Il devient sombre. Il devine que Bernadotte, loin d'aider Davout comme il l'aurait dû, n'a pas participé au combat. Ce Gascon n'en fera jamais d'autres ! s'exclame Napoléon. Il marche dans la salle. Il faudrait faire fusiller Bernadotte. Mais c'est le mari de Désirée Clary, le beau-frère de Joseph. » Max Gallo, Napoléon, tome 3, 1997. [5] Il s'agit là d'une constante dans la manière de commander de Napoléon – au moins à cette époque là. Si le secret des opérations avait plus de chance d'être gardé, aucun des protagonistes n'avait de moyen d'avoir une vue d'ensemble. [6] Louis-Michel-Antoine Sahuc (1755 – 1813). Par ordre du 12 octobre, la division de dragons Sahuc a été mise sous les ordres de Murat. [7] Ces deux lettres, de 4 h et 8 h 30, ne démontrent-t-elles pas l'importance du seul corps d'armée de Davout, dans l'esprit de Napoléon, pour la manœuvre d'encerclement des Prussiens ? [8] Tard dans la matinée, en effet, des reconnaissances prussiennes ont fait état de la présence de Français, à Dornburg [9] Ce texte ne figure pas dans le registre d'ordres de Berthier. Il a pu être retrouvé par M. Girod de l'Ain, et publié en 1968, dans sa biographie de Bernadotte. Il est cité intégralement dans la biographie de Davout, de Daniel Reichel (op. cit.). Même de nos jours, cependant, de nombreux historiens ne font état que du résumé de ces ordres, présentés dans le Journal du 3e corps (op. cit.) [10] Souligné par l'auteur du présent ouvrage. Dans le Journal du 3e corps, cette phrase est citée comme étant un post-scriptum de Berthier, avec la différence qu'on lit « vous pourrez marcher », alors que l'ordre est « vous pourriez marcher », formulation qui laisse plus de place à l'interprétation, ce qui est d'ailleurs fréquent, laissant aux subalternes le choix de la bonne option quitte à les critiquer sévèrement s'ils choisissent la mauvaise…. [11] Remarquons ici que Bernadotte ne reçoit aucun ordre directement de Berthier, mais soit pas Murat, soit par Davout. . Etrange, pour le moins. [12] Cela est incompréhensible de la part de Berthier, si la coopération ente Bernadotte et Davout apparaissait indispensable. [13] Mais les deux sont à peu près de même longueur. [14] Napoléon fait-il ici allusion au bruit selon lequel Bernadotte n'aurait pas accepté, s'il avait rejoint Davout à Naumburg, de ne pas passer le premier à l'attaque ? Notons que Bernadotte, maréchal, était plus ancien. [15] Il s'en trouvait d'ailleurs alors (le 12) à 6 km. [16] Même si, par une sorte de prescience, Bernadotte avait effectivement fait demi tour, on peut s'interroger, compte tenu de la distance et de l'heure, de savoir s'il fût arrivé avant que Davout n'en eut fini, comme ce fut le cas, avec les Prussiens. [17] Le „son du canon" pouvait se faire entendre de façon très irrégulière, selon les conditions atmosphériques du moment, entre près de 100 kms et à peine 5 kms. Le brouillard, qui fut présent ce jour-là sur les deux champs de bataille, a sans doute joué un grand rôle. [18] C'est par ailleurs faire peu de cas de la difficulté de la route, en particulier aux alentours de Dornburg. [19] L'intervention de Rüchel ne changeant rien à la situation.
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Mike the Analyst | 02 Apr 2021 3:32 a.m. PST |
Many thanks von Winterfeldt, lots of useful material there. I understand that earlier in the campaign Bernadotte was criticized for not following an order precisely which may have influenced his desire to get to Dornburg which is where he was ordered to. When I was younger I followed the theory that Bernadotte had abandoned Davout but the more I see about this the more I consider that Bernadotte took the best course of action available. Napoleon did not have good intelligence on the movement of the Prussian army. Had he known he would have issued more precise orders to address the threat to Davout. |
Brechtel198 | 02 Apr 2021 3:57 a.m. PST |
Pedantic much, Kevin? You posted inaccurate information on Davout. Correcting inaccuracies is pedantic? Good grief. |
Murvihill | 02 Apr 2021 6:57 a.m. PST |
Everything Bernadotte did in his entire life is colored by the fact that he sided with the allies in 1813. Even now I doubt you'll get more than 1/4 of the armchair historians out there to be objective about him. |
Au pas de Charge | 02 Apr 2021 8:41 a.m. PST |
Bernadotte does come across as a self serving rat with a laundry list of excuses. |
von Winterfeldt | 02 Apr 2021 9:01 a.m. PST |
neither Davout, nor Bernadotte, nor Nabulieone were aware that the Prussian main army was in sort of retreat towards Naumburg area. Bernadotte had his orders, his objective was Apolda, to cut the line of retreat of the supposedly main army, this he did – and also when the retreating main army, orignally retreating towards Weimar area, where cut because of Bernadotte. The Prussian king wanted to re – units his beaten army with that of Hohenlohe and Rüchel, about whose fate he was unaware. The march from Dornburg, and crossing the Saale there to Apolda is not easy, two small bridge and steep banks, I welcome all to visit the Saale river at this area to see who deeply cut the valleys are. In case, Bernadotte would have decided to cross behind Davout of Naumburg – what then, how and where to deploy his units? Also Nabulieone expressed that he could, in case it suited the Prince de Ponte Corvo to follow Dabout he expected him to be at the Naumburg area. And yes, Bernadotte's entire life is not only coloured that he sided with the Allies, but that he was not a brown nosing officer all hailing Nabulieone and they had a difficult relationship, after all Bernadotte married Desiree Clary – and not Nabulieone who wanted to be engaged with here as well. Also in 1813, due to his cautious leadership – he recieved bad press by the Prussians as well, yes his Northern Army, the Nord Armee – went from victory to victory. Please read also an article by John Cook link to quote Elting's observation, in his Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, that Bernadotte's "near treasonous behaviour" compromised Napoleon's operational plan and "upset his calculations" is absurd. Napoleon's calculations were flawed from the outset when he made the mistake of believing that the entire Prussian army was concentrated at Erfurt. If Foucart is correct Bernadotte was never in a position to influence the outcome of the battle.
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Mike the Analyst | 02 Apr 2021 11:59 a.m. PST |
vW whilst I have visited Jena and Auerstadt there wasn't time to follow Bernadotte's route. The drop down to the Saale appears to be problematic. I think I have seen a source describing difficulties in safely getting the guns down the sloping road, having to reverse the teams to provide braking. There appears to be a steep slope from the Saale to the high ground above Dornburg which is accessed by a zig-zag road. The best analysis I have seen regarding Bernadotte is in Titeux, Bernadotte and the Manouvre de Jena. This does exonerate his part in the actions of the 14th. |
von Winterfeldt | 02 Apr 2021 12:10 p.m. PST |
Titeux is an excellent source of course, I just checked also out the cavalry because they give sort of more independent view about this and Belliard has no reason to complain to exculpate Bernadotte but just states what they experienced. It all shows that the Prince de Ponte Corvo was a good scapegoat to cover up the fails of Nabulieone/Berthier tandem and the Boney fawners just jump onto the band waggon of Bernadotte bashing – because it is so trendy. |
SHaT1984 | 02 Apr 2021 3:43 p.m. PST |
>>Everything Bernadotte did in his entire life is colored by the fact that he sided with the allies in 1813. Not mine, but is affected by the constant groaning of the ships timbers. Very well, because vW says, I'll adjust my opinion henceforth of that time and his options. 1) I am assuming you know, that he knew, of those potential problems and they weren't a convenient excuse afterward- just checking? 2) On Cook- "due largely to the bizarre movements of the Prussian army". Has anyone actually plotted these on a map to show? I've not much resource and have a cognitive difficulty with German towns, not sure why, to show such is true. and___ 3) Cook says "None of them are told anything about the enemy or Napoleon plans for bringing the Prussians to battle". I cannot see how such a definitive statement can be made. He already alluded to a 'verbal' instruction. Can it be doubted that the commander of the advance guard/ Cav Reserve Corps would question any ADC bringing order from either the EMG or N. about the background/ meaning of the substance of them? If I may observe- all the problems ascribed to the 'Allies' command in 1805 seems to have coalesced into the same (or at least similar) dysfuntion within the 'unified' Prussian command of 1806. However under another 'leader' with little actual martial experience. And a further question- how much of N. enmity against Bernadotte was because of the 'arrogance' and greater victory Davout contested than his own? Yes Mike, were it within my power to travel more to 'named' places and routes as I did pour over the 1814 battlefields and marches (there are still plenty of roadside buildings in France with balls stuck in the walls) I would do so… Be well people, the scourge continues____ regards dave |
138SquadronRAF | 03 Apr 2021 6:34 a.m. PST |
I felt it was unfair to Berthier, especially regarding the 1809 Campaign. Reading Gill it is obvious that Berthier was issuing orders based on situation he understood from the situation on the ground. Napoleon, in Paris was also issuing information that were based on an incomplete understanding on the Austrian dispositions. The performance and exploits of the general officers that didn't make marshal is also a study in expertise and courage. I'd agree with Kevin here. His book "Once There Where Titans" shows the depth of ability in the French army general officers of the period. If you haven't read this one I do recommend it to you. Indeed, I have recommended that if you want to understand how the French army worked and were new to the period that you read "Titans" and Elting's "Swords around the Throne." |
Brechtel198 | 03 Apr 2021 7:18 a.m. PST |
Titeux was a royalist and it greatly influences his work. His material on both Bernadotte and Dupont is nothing but excuses for the myriad errors both committed in command and leadership and was influenced by his royalist viewpoints. He champions them because they both failed Napoleon and the troops they commanded and led. |
Brechtel198 | 03 Apr 2021 7:20 a.m. PST |
I feel those books – like Elting – Swords – take me on a fairy tale… Tripe. Letting personal feelings enter into historical inquiry is a nonstarter. If you believe in what you are saying so strongly, why don't you write a detailed study yourself instead of posting insult and inaccurate accusations about authors, especially when you don't use specifics. |
Brechtel198 | 03 Apr 2021 7:22 a.m. PST |
neither Davout, nor Bernadotte, nor Nabulieone were aware that the Prussian main army was in sort of retreat towards Naumburg area. And…? The point is that when the Prussians were found and what they were doing, everyone reacted to it positively except for Bernadotte. And Bernadotte did not participate in either action on 14 October? Perhaps you can explain why? |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 4:34 a.m. PST |
'Le Miserable Ponte Corvo'-Davout That comment perfectly sums up Bernadotte's execrable performance on 14 October 1806. '…in 1806 [Bernadotte] deliberatey disobeyed orders, waiting between Napoleon's battle at Jena and Davout's at Auerstadt, hoping one or the other would meet disaster.'-John Elting, Swords Around a Throne, 127. Berthier's postscript to to Napoleon's 2200 13 October order to Davout (received by Davout at 0300 14 October) read: 'If…Bernadotte is with you, you can march together, but the Emperor hopes that he will be in the position assigned him at Dornburg.' When Bernadotte received his copy of this order, sent to him by Davout, he was not in Dornburg, but still in Naumburg. He was supposed to be in Dornburg already, but was late. He then decided to go to Dornburg and not march with Davout. 'Meanwhile, between these two desperate battles, Bernadotte had sauntered leisurely from Naumburg to Dornburg. All during the march, he could hear the roar of Davout's fight behind him, but resolutely kept his back to it, firmly silencing Sahuc when the latter proposed countermarching his dragoons to Davout's assistance. Reaching Dornburg at 1100, he slowly and awkwardly crossed the river and got his artillery up the hill road to the plateau west of the town.'-Vincent Esposito and John Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Map 65. 'Bernadotte reached Apolda toward 1600, but did nothing except to write to Berthier, claiming that his arrival there had saved Davout.'-Esposito/Elting Atlas, Map 66. Napoleon faulted Bernadotte for a ‘false march' and failure to engage anyone. A false march meaning that he meandered between two battlefields and did nothing to find, fix, and fight the Prussians. You can also take a look at what Rapp and Savary quoted Napoleon as saying. The three quotes are as follows: 'However, according to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal passages of the Saale, on the same day as Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In case you had not executed these orders, I had informed you during the night that, if you were still at Naumburg, you should march with Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumberg when these orders arrived; it was communicated to you; but, nevertheless, you preferred to make a false march in order to turn back to Dornburg, and in consuence you did not find yourself in the battle, and Marshal Davout bore the principal efforts of the enemy's army.'-quoted in Foucart, II, 243. Napoleon told Rapp at Jena: 'Bernadotte has behaved badly. He would have been enchanted to see Davout fail in that affair, which does him [Davout] the greatest honor, all the more so because Bernadotte had rendered his position difficult.'-Rapp, Memoirs, 84. Savary said that Napoleon's remarks about Bernadotte were even more pointed: 'That is so hateful that if I send him to a court-martial it is equivalent to ordering him to be shot; it is better for me not to speak to him about it. I believe he has enough honor to recognize that he has performed a disgraveful action regarding which I shall not bandy words with him.'-Savary, Memoirs II, 292. Key in Napoleon's letter is that Bernadotte was to march with Davout if he was not already at Naumburg. Rapp quotes Napoleon as ‘Bernadotte has behaved badly.' And he further quotes Napoleon as saying that ‘Bernadotte had rendered [Davout's'] position difficult.' He said that because Bernadotte had left Davout alone. That can be definitely interpreted as Bernadotte abandoning Davout. And Savary quotes Napoleon as stating that Bernadotte ‘has performed a disgraceful action.' Seems to me the evidence is quite conclusive. As shown, Bernadotte should have stayed to support Davout because the orders were changed. Dornburg not having been reached, Bernadotte was ordered to march with Davout. Orders were changed on the evening of the 13th, and not ‘abandoned.' That marks another excuse for Bernadotte on your part. Sahuc evidently wanted to countermarch to support Davout because Davout was engaged in a fight and Bernadotte was not. Bernadotte's silencing of Sahuc is yet another indicator that Bernadotte did not want to support Davout. Napoleon wrote to Bernadotte on the 23d regarding his absence from both Jena and Auerstadt: 'However, according to a very precise order, you ought to have been at Dornburg, which is one of the principal passages of the Saale, on the same day as Marshal Lannes was at Jena, Marshal Augereau at Kahla, and Marshal Davout at Naumburg. In case you had not executed these orders, I had informed you during the night that, if you were still at Naumburg, you should march with Marshal Davout and support him. You were at Naumberg when these orders arrived; it was communicated to you; but, nevertheless, you preferred to make a false march in order to turn back to Dornburg, and in consuence you did not find yourself in the battle, and Marshal Davout bore the principal efforts of the enemy's army.'-quoted in Foucart, II, 243. Bernadotte's character is summed up neatly by Jack Gill in With Eagles to Glory: 'Success brought him prominence, but he ran foul of Napoleon in the Consulate years, his political aspirations, touchy pride and high slef-esteem coming between the two men and laying a foundation of suspicion and rancor, especially on Bernadotte's part, that would not dissipate. his perplexing behavior at the double battle of Jena and Auerstadt, where he failed to arrive on either battlefield, cast a shadow over his reliablility and by 1809, he had managed to make enemies of a number of the army's senior leaders, including Berthier.' Gill further characterizes Bernadotte as 'an eristic, ambitious, and untrsutworthy subordinate and comrade, too fond of intrigue and principally concerned with promoting hos own interests.' Bernadotte also apparently unreasonably feared 'an 'unseen hand' operating against him at headquarters' a trait he shared with the renegade Jomini. Regarding the proclamation after Wagram that got him into trouble, Gill states that 'Bernadotte's order, issued on 7 July at Leopoldau, was even more bombastic than most documents of its ilk and seemed almost calculated to offend the Frnech Army and confirm the Prince of Ponte Corvo's reputation as an untrustworthy braggart.' Finally, Gill makes some interesting conclusions on Bernadotte's final relief: 'Bernadotte's relief, however, was the result of a combination of factors and his Order of the Day, was only the proximate cause, the straw that broke the Emperor's patience. His patience had been tried severely in 1806 when many of Napoleon's subordinates urged the most draconian penalties for Bernadotte's failure to contribute to the dual victory of Jena-Auerstadt. The incident planted seeds of distrust that sprouted three years later. In 1809, Napoleon and Berthier must certainly have wearied of Bernadotte's jeremiad; his continual complaints, even if based in fact, often resembled excuses for inaction and were inconsistent with the hyperbolic plaudits he hadned the Saxons immediately after Linz and Wagram. Furthermore, his performance in the campaign had been uninspiring. While encamped around Linz, he inflated Austrian strength and evinced litgtle interest in pressuring the enemy in Bohemia as Napoleon had repeatedly directed. At Wagram, he showed himself to be sluggish and testy. He demonstrated tremendous personal courage and made every effort to conserve the lives of his troops, but his tactical performance was poor and soldiers were needlessly sacrificed in uncoordinated, unsupported attacks on both the 5th and 6th; the abandonment of Aderklaa was a particularly egregious error. Having failed to accomplish his missions, he haughtily attempted to blame his mysterious enemies in Imperial Headquarters and even Napoleon himself.' This certainly sounds like an officer who was not doing his duty and was not trusted by his peers and subordinates in the French army. I wonder what Dupas' comments were about being assigned to Bernadotte in 1809? |
ConnaughtRanger | 04 Apr 2021 5:10 a.m. PST |
Remind me again – who appointed the Marshals? |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 5:37 a.m. PST |
Napoleon's promotion of the marshals and establishment of the marshalate (and they were 'marshals of the Empire' not 'marshals of France') did not create 'a superior military grade but a personal title of honor to be granted distinguished generals of division…' 'Napoleon obviously did not pick his first marshals for their military ability alone, or even for their personal loyalty to him. At least half of his appointments were based on the need to include representatives of all the famous armies of Revolutionary France.' Some had served with Napoleon in the Armee d'Italie, others had been with him in Egypt. And there was a Jacobin/republican element that had to be reconciled to the new government. Brune, Bernadotte, and Augereau were in that group. Ney, Mortier, and Soult had served in the famous Armee de Sambre-et-Meuse. Jourdan had commanded the Armee du Nord and Moncey had commanded the Armee des Pyrenees Occidentals. Kellermann was from the Armee des Alpes, Perignon the Armee des Pyrenees Orientales, and Lefebvre the Armee de Sambre-et Meuse. The marshals were chosen for different reasons. All, however, had distinguished themselves in one action or army and those who had not served with Napoleon also had to be included on the list. Some were undoubtedly mistakes, such as Bernadotte, Oudinot, Marmont, and Macdonald. John Elting explains it very well in the chapter on the marshalate in Swords Around a Throne, pages 123-155. Phipps Armies of the First French Republic gives excellent background material on the future marshals and Georges Six gives detailed service records of them and the other French general officers in his Dictionary. All three books are highly recommended. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 5:41 a.m. PST |
When I was younger I followed the theory that Bernadotte had abandoned Davout but the more I see about this the more I consider that Bernadotte took the best course of action available. Not being engaged at all on 14 October was the best course of action for Bernadotte? |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 7:29 a.m. PST |
There is also excellent information on the marshals in Odeleben's and von Funck's memoirs. Both of these officers worked around the marshals and saw them first-hand. |
Bill N | 04 Apr 2021 7:40 a.m. PST |
I know the standard is for the most part how the men performed as marshals. However any list that doesn't put Massena in the top three is suspect. |
Bill N | 04 Apr 2021 8:34 a.m. PST |
Napoleon was one of those leaders who evaluated others based on what Napoleon would have wanted them to do under the circumstances. Even today this after the fact standard would be difficult to meet. In an era before we had nearly instantaneous communications, this would put a subordinate in a very difficult position. If he followed his last orders and those orders proved to be incorrect he was in trouble. If he deviated from his last orders based on what he thought was happening and needed to be done, and it turned out he made the wrong choice, then he was in trouble.. The mistakes on the eve of Jena were Napoleon's more than Bernadotte's. Napoleon misread exactly where the Prussians were and what they were about to do. He also was mistaken in how long it would take for Bernadotte to get into the position Napoleon wanted him at Jena. Napoleon's orders were based on these mistakes. In following the letter of Napoleon's orders when he received them, Bernadotte ended up taking himself out of a position to aid Davout without being able to contribute to Jena. Those who fault Bernadotte's performance on October 14 do so based on information unknown to both Napoleon and Bernadotte immediately prior to Jena. They fault Bernadotte based on his relationship with Davout, and they fault Bernadotte based on what he did after he became Crown Prince of Sweden. (The never of a sovereign taking into consideration the best interests of his subjects!) The questions I don't see asked is why Napoleon didn't put either Davout or Bernadotte in command of that wing, knowing they would be operating some distance from the Emperor, or why Napoleon paired Davout and Bernadotte. |
ConnaughtRanger | 04 Apr 2021 9:48 a.m. PST |
I am loathe to admit that much of my appreciation of the Marshalate in the round, as opposed to individual campaign histories, is from David Chandler's "Napoleon's Marshals". I now appreciate that he was a Brit, writing in English, so clearly knew SFA about the Napoleonic Wars. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 9:57 a.m. PST |
Napoleon was one of those leaders who evaluated others based on what Napoleon would have wanted them to do under the circumstances. Where did you come up with that one? Napoleon usually issued only mission-type orders telling his subordinates what he wanted done and not how to do it. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 9:58 a.m. PST |
David Chandler is the editor, not the author, of Napoleon's Marshals. And not all of the authors are British. David Chandler wrote one of the chapters. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 10:01 a.m. PST |
Those who fault Bernadotte's performance on October 14 do so based on information unknown to both Napoleon and Bernadotte immediately prior to Jena. They fault Bernadotte based on his relationship with Davout, and they fault Bernadotte based on what he did after he became Crown Prince of Sweden. Bernadotte is 'faulted' because he left Davout on his own and did not support him. Quite frankly, Bernadotte disobeyed his orders as already has been clearly shown. Making excuses for Bernadotte's insubordinate, or worse, behavior is, quite frankly, both ignorant and ludicrous. If Bernadotte had gone into action against any Prussians at all on 14 October would have shown him to be at least trying. His chosen course of action on 14 October was 'near-treasonous.' |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 10:28 a.m. PST |
The following on the marshals is taken from In the Wake of Napoleon: Being the Memoirs (1807-1809) of Ferdinand von Funck, Lieutenant-General in the Saxon Army and Adjutant-General to the King of Saxony. Edited by Oakley Williams, 101-103: 'Of the Marshals, Davout was the only one who always maintained strict and exemplary discipline, and, however much his despotic rule was the curse of every country he occipied, history will in due course do justice to his virtues. Above self-seeking as his character was, he never took the veriest trifle for himself or his establishment. He made prompt payment for everything beyond what was due him as a Marshal for his big household and Staff, and enforced the same conduct on the generals subordinate to him. He kept his supply officers strictly to heel. He never accepted table money or presents of any kind himself, and was careful to see that none of his subordinates did. He wrung the requirements of his forces sternly and inexorably out of the provinces, but he was equally inexorable in punishing every high-handed exaction; and a crust of bread thrown away might easily have a death sentence for its sequel. The provinces in which he held command always felt secure in his incorruptible sense of discipline. But his suspiciousness, that made him see an enemy of the Emperor in every non-Frenchman and always scented conspiracies, and his blind devotion to Napoleon, whose orders he carried out with relentless severity, made him hated everywhere.'* 'Other Marshals did not maintain the discipline, the loss of which they deplored, with the same measure of success. Murat was perha0s the kindliest of them; wherever he could, he tempered the oppression of the countries out of sheer humanity; but he also overlooked the excesses of his men when the privations they were undergoing amounted in his view to suffering. Soult, Suchet, General la Tour-Maubourg and many others stood for discipline; Ney and Bernadotte least of all. Victor endeavored to emulate Davout's severity, but was not qualified to enforce discipline as strictly as the latter. Mortier was well behaved but weak in intelligence and character, a mediocre commander, and lacked the personal prestige among his troops necessary to keep them in hand.' 'Massena was the victim of an avarice that adopted any methods conducive to his own enrichment. This weakness impelled him, against his better judgment, to lenience; it was less the soldiery that plundered than, following his example, his generals and contractors. Marmont, too, stood for discipline where his own interests were not affected, by he had small sympathy for human suffering. Augereau at times held the reins slackly, but never as slackly as Ney; Macdonald was more humane but never strict enough. Bessieres, a man of fine character, did not always succeed in keeping the Guards, whom Napoleon himself spoiled, in hand; but he, like General Nansouty, set his face against looting and missed no opportunity of tempering public distress. Lefebvre was not a bad man, but coarse and underbred, and it usually depended on his mood whether he punished or approved the depredations of his troops. Gouvion St. Cyr stood for discipline; only ill-health and his many wounds prevented Oudinot from being as active as Davout in keeping his men in hand.'** *In 1813 when Davout was ordered to Hamburg and Napoleon's orders were to treat those in Hamburg of aiding the allies with great severity, it was Davout who 'moderated Napoleon's fury' and had Napoleon agree to back off on the most severe orders. see The Iron Marshal by John Gallagher, Chapter 13: link **Apparently Davout and Oudinot were friends until Oudinot's suppporting the Bourbons after the abdication in 1814. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 10:32 a.m. PST |
In following the letter of Napoleon's orders when he received them, Bernadotte ended up taking himself out of a position to aid Davout without being able to contribute to Jena. Incorrect. Bernadotte had already failed to obey 'the letter of the orders' in that he had failed to be in Dornburg on time. He was at Naumburg when he received a copy of Napoleon's orders, not Dornburg. He used that part of the order to get away from Davout and because of that Davout was left on his own and Bernadotte would not get into action at all on 14 October. |
ConnaughtRanger | 04 Apr 2021 10:56 a.m. PST |
"David Chandler is the editor, not the author, of Napoleon's Marshals. And not all of the authors are British. David Chandler wrote one of the chapters." Gosh, how could I have missed that? |
von Winterfeldt | 04 Apr 2021 11:51 a.m. PST |
interesting question The questions I don't see asked is why Napoleon didn't put either Davout or Bernadotte in command of that wing, knowing they would be operating some distance from the Emperor, or why Napoleon paired Davout and Bernadotte.
There wasn't usually a wing command in the operational art of 1806 and never did that well – even under Nabulieone's close control, see Russia 1812 or Germany 1813, dare I say also in Spain. There wasn't also any need to, both Marshals had their order according to Nabulieone's assesment of the situation, they could fullfil it either by crossing the Saale one after the other at Naumburg – or Davout at Naumburg and Bernadotte at Dornberg. There Nabulieone stressed that the expected that when Bernadotte received the order –the would be in the Dornberg area (which he wasn't because he stopped his corps due to the changing operational situation, no battle at Jena with just Lannes against Hohenlohe and waited for new directions to be able to be employed for the dynamic changes of the operational art. I would have to dig back into my references – I was even under the impression that both Davout and Bernadotte did meet and decided to march separately to be able to achieve their operational goals easier than being stacked behind each other and stretching their columns. Otherwise I see the Prince de Ponte Corvo as victim of the usual Nabulieone lies and mythmaking books like Swords. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 12:19 p.m. PST |
Bernadotte as 'victim'-now that's mythmaking of the highest order. Well done. By the way, what 'myths' are in Swords? |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 12:20 p.m. PST |
Gosh, how could I have missed that? I have no idea. Perhaps you could explain that cognitive lapse? 🤦♂️ |
ConnaughtRanger | 04 Apr 2021 3:09 p.m. PST |
Try as you might, Americans have a slightly better understanding of Serbo-Croat than sarcasm. |
Brechtel198 | 04 Apr 2021 4:12 p.m. PST |
Right back at you, genius. Good grief. 😂 |
Bill N | 04 Apr 2021 5:35 p.m. PST |
Bernadotte disobeyed his orders as already has been clearly shown. It is not clearly shown, EXCEPT in your and Napoleon's minds. It is in fact taking Napoleon's post action indictment as a correct representation of the facts that is " ignorant and ludicrous". Bernadotte had already failed to obey 'the letter of the orders' in that he had failed to be in Dornburg on time. On October 12 Bernadotte had been placed under orders to support or cooperate with Murat. The orders that Bernadotte received from Napoleon's headquarters on October 13 through Murat were to move on Dornburg. Because of these orders the morning of October 14 found Bernadotte's corps stretched out on the road between Naumburg and Dornburg. Napoleon assumed that the morning of October 14 would find Bernadotte at either Naumburg or Dornburg. He did not consider the third possibility that Bernadotte would be in transit between the two locations. He was at Naumburg when he received a copy of Napoleon's orders, not Dornburg. Bernadotte was personally in the vicinty of Naumburg when he received from Davout the orders that Napoleon had issued to Davout. His troops were not. It wasn't a loophole. It was Bernadotte's troops that Napoleon wanted and not just Bernadotte. Davout didn't have his full corps on the field until well into the action. If Bernadotte had countermarched to follow Davout his first troops would be arriving even later. The ugly truth is that it was Napoleon's misreading of the Prussians that resulted in Davout facing the main Prussian army alone. It would have been simple enough for Napoleon to have said in his orders of the morning of October 14 that if Bernadotte was not already in Dornburg that he should march with Davout. He chose to instead issue orders that permitted but did not require Bernadotte to march with Davout if Bernadotte was still in Naumburg. Plus because of earlier orders a portion of the Reserve Cavalry also missed out on Jena-Auerstedt. |
von Winterfeldt | 04 Apr 2021 11:29 p.m. PST |
Yes I agree, a good analysis, also I see nowhere that the Prince de Ponte Corvo did disobey any order – his order was to march to Apolda – this he achieved, he as well as Nabulieone himself, operated on the premises that the main army was confronting Nabulieone himself. This all will become evident when one just steps a bit beyond Eltings mythmaking writings and consult other authors, like Foucart, Titeux, Girod de l'Ain, Barton and the articles by John Cook as well as Robert Ouvrad. |
Brechtel198 | 05 Apr 2021 4:03 a.m. PST |
It would have been simple enough for Napoleon to have said in his orders of the morning of October 14 that if Bernadotte was not already in Dornburg that he should march with Davout. That's what the orders actually stated in the postscript by Berthier. |
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