"Light Infantry & smoothbore accuracy L C18th & E.C19th" Topic
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Cdr Luppo | 15 Jan 2021 12:36 p.m. PST |
for Perpendicular order, i have shared some elements yesterday at that link, focused on the plate # 2 and the comments by ROGUET from LSM 23, about "de la colonne double" link - salut thierry ; ) - |
Art | 15 Jan 2021 1:30 p.m. PST |
G'Day JF, Back to your original question on this thread in regards to combatant a la debandade during 1793 to 1794. How to create a module to permit the French success for that limited time en debandade, that ended by 1794. '…our enemy finally understood the weakness and the vises of this system…By 1794 it was all over…all that was gained from untrained troops a la debandage was now contrary to their initial success.' I have figures that are considered en debandade mounted on wide oval bases to represent a mob of men moving in a certain direction… According to Guibert; 'The generals did not establish their principles on anything. They did not even occupy themselves with tactics (minor tactics and grand manoeuvres).' Since we know that the early body of troops formed a la debandage; were untrained. It may be assumed that this formation was nothing more than an inexperienced rabble of skirmishers, with inadequate skill in such a role. Colonel George Hanger suggests that this limited knowledge also affected their use of concealment and cover. Best Regards Art |
42flanker | 16 Jan 2021 1:59 a.m. PST |
Well, Art you must be reading my mail. Yes, thanks. The notion of troops advancing en debandade circa 1793-95 was an important element of my OP question (although as I stated it also embraced the activities of light troops or troops otherwise engaged in petit guerre from earlier decades). I do ask myself though, and perhaps you can help, when in 1794-95 a body of French troops was described in allied accounts as 'tirailleurs' advancing in support of light cavalry, and were drawn as records suggest from units listed as: 3e bataillon de chasseurs-tirailleurs 5e bataillon de chasseurs francs - do we assume that from a combination of aptitude, training and experience, these light infantry units consisted of men who were more likely to be effective skirmishers, and that with the weapons at their disposal they could expect to deliver effective fire when attacking allied troops to their front. If that was the case, and here's the nub of my question in the OP, how is it that so few casualties were suffered by allied troops in the action I described in my earlier post during an exchange of fire lasting an hour or more. Was this a question of training and discipline; limitations in weaponry- or were the French simply not trying very hard? The allied dispatches described inflicting a bloody reverse that day. The French 4e division mouvements referred to "reconnaissances" that saw "vigorous" fighting. No surprises there. |
von Winterfeldt | 17 Jan 2021 12:41 a.m. PST |
they would be armed with the usual fusil d'infantrie and they would use the usual cartridge as for the rest of the infantry, so no better armament compared to the Prussian Schützen, Jäger or Austrian Grenz Scharfschützen or other Jäger units. Indeed such large scale skirmishing, used by both sides – just read about the attack on the camp of Famars where it wasn't done by the Allies to contain the amount of surprise, wouldn't cause a lot of physical damage but it certainly kept a battle dragging on and exhausting units so that those who kept fresh reserves might have the upper hand when bringing them into play. |
Art | 17 Jan 2021 2:48 a.m. PST |
G'Day JF Le 5ème bataillon Franc du Nord and the 3ème bataillon de tirailleurs formed part of the Demi-brigade de Tirailleurs. La demi-brigade de Tirailleurs était formée de: O 3e bataillon de chasseurs francs du Nord également appelé bataillon de chasseurs du Petit-Capucin O 5e bataillon de chasseurs francs du Nord O 3e bataillon de tirailleurs which was composed of the following: 3e régiment d'infanterie belge devenu 28e bataillon d'infanterie légère, 4e bataillon d'Anvers, chasseurs de Seine-et-Oise. O 4e bataillon de tirailleurs which was composed of the following: 15e bataillon belge, 23e bataillon belge, 24e bataillon belge From août au septembre 1794, Le 5ème bataillon Franc du Nors, was among the besiegers of the town of Grave, it occupied the left bank with the 3ème bataillon de tirailleurs in front of the city. During about three months that the siege lasted, the two bataillons sent almost daily detachments to skirmish the Dutch posts which were in the palisades of the city. So we know that that the 5e and 3e were together for some time. Without knowing the action that you are referring to, my view is rather limited… Best Regards Art |
Brechtel198 | 21 Jan 2021 10:55 a.m. PST |
Regarding the topic of instructions for French light infantry in period regulations the following from John Lynn's The Bayonets of the Republic, which refers to the Armee du Nord, is noted: 'Two basic drill manuals guided the tactical exercises of French battalions-both prescribed a rather formal tactical system. The more important of the two, Reglement concernant l'exercise et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie du 1er aout 1791, ordered a fairly stiff manual of arms, a normal marching pace of seventy-six steps per minute, and a quick step of 100 per minute…The other drill regulation, a simplified version intended for use by volunteer battalions, was commonly called the Instruction de M Noailles, after the chairman of the committee that composed it. In most ways the two manuals shared the same tactical system, except that the Instruction directed that troops form line in only two ranks.'-217. 'When reports and orders spole of instruction, maneuver, and exercise, they generally referred only to the set-piece skills of the parade ground, since the looser tactics of the skirmisher did not regularly appear on the agenda of training camps. Even special light infantry units underwent the same course of close order drill learned by the heavy infantry. Light infantrymen, or tiraillerus, probably received more practice in marksmanship than did line infantrymen. But French military opinion held that the light infantryman could best learn the techniques of open order combat through actual experience, not formal instruction.'-217-218. 'Although the English and Prussians regularized light infantry tactics through instructions and drill books, the French generally held tirailleur tactics to be unsuited to official regulations. Commenting upon the Reglement du 1er aout 1791, which said almost nothing about the use of tirailleurs, Jean Colin wrote: 'It was found, not that it was necessary to stop the use of tirailleurs, but that it was absurd and a nuisance to draft regulations to fix the number and mode of action of these enfants perdus.' The light infantry expert General Le Couturier expressed the common opinion, 'It is in effect so simple that intelligence can take the place of rules, and that some wise advice, given in writing and verbally, is worth more than artistically composed and descriped maneuvers.' Ru;es were few, and a tirailleur was expected to improvise.'-268-269. 'It is worth surveying the official regulations and instructions that bore on light infantry practices, but not much can be expected. The only time tirailleurs received tactical consideration in the Reglement du 1er aout 1791 was in the procedure for forming square on the march. It stated that when a marching column of several battalions was threatened by cavalry, if the commander so wished he could detach skirmishers to keep the cavalry at a distance. The 1792 Reglement provisoire sur le service de l'infanterie en campagne provided more information concerning open order tactics. This Reglement contained a paragraph on the use of tirailleurs in battle, directing them to seek out and harass enemy gun crews.'-269. 'Specifically from the Nord, there remain field instructions that devoted some attention to light infantry. In his August 1793 'Instruction' General Houchard stipulated a few details concerning the deployment of his sixty-four tirailleurs in battelion. He also supplied some advice concerning outposts. General Jean-Baptiste Kleber's 'Instruction' of 21 May 1794 constituted an attempt to coordinate a force of nine battalions in a diversion against Mons. March protection loomed largest in his 'Instruction,' yet light infantry received only two sentenced that counseled commanders to employ light infnantry as scouts and advanced guards.'-269. So, it appears that the development of the French tactical system where large numbers of light infantry employed in open order as tirailleurs and to be a fire support element when attacking or being employed as a 'corps principal' was not covered in existing regulations or instructions but was instead a 'learned' skill for both light and line infantry. Quod Erat Demonstrandum. |
Brechtel198 | 21 Jan 2021 11:14 a.m. PST |
Indeed such large scale skirmishing, used by both sides – just read about the attack on the camp of Famars… Do you have a source for this? Phipps does not mention 'large scale skirmishing' when talking about Famars. |
Brechtel198 | 21 Jan 2021 11:15 a.m. PST |
they would be armed with the usual fusil d'infantrie and they would use the usual cartridge as for the rest of the infantry, so no better armament compared to the Prussian Schützen, Jäger or Austrian Grenz Scharfschützen or other Jäger units. Even though the French infantry had an excellent French-made rifle available to them, they preferred the musket which was easier to load and had a higher rate of fire. Rifle-armed light infantry are not necessarily better than those armed with muskets. An exception to that might be the Swiss. |
SHaT1984 | 21 Jan 2021 2:55 p.m. PST |
Since we know that the early body of troops formed a la debandage; were untrained. It may be assumed that this formation was nothing more than an inexperienced rabble of skirmishers, with inadequate skill in such a role. Colonel George Hanger suggests that this limited knowledge also affected their use of concealment and cover. The single most sensible and demonstrable statement ever made I feel. And frankly, without beig discourteous, I'd always thought this the most obvious. Despite all the rhetoric of 'rules and regulations' how did 'volunteers and conscripts' learn anything? They were rushed into formations and battles with little regard to anything of their well being. Who, looking at 'humanity', can honestly say that French 'mobs' of volunteers were any different to their ancestors a 1000 years before; middle-ages or current third world 'Arabian', African and Asian continents, or as we have seen in recent weeks, different to 'undisciplined' mobs in so-called civilised communities now? Their effectiveness was/is the mob mentality and brutality it conveys, self preservation instincts in mobs while the wilder psychopaths get hyped beyond all means of control. Trying to 'codify' in retrospect is like swatting flies- by the time you have planned an action they are already in another place. |
Brechtel198 | 21 Jan 2021 4:17 p.m. PST |
And from it came an outstanding tactical system that defeated every European power at least once. |
Chad47 | 22 Jan 2021 2:34 a.m. PST |
Slightly off topic, but have just finished ‘the Army of the French Revolution' by Baudet. It gives an extremely detailed view of the early French army and its recruitment, etc. and its subsequent growth in experience and ability. It provides a clearer appreciation of the background to the ‘mob' picture of the army than I have read elsewhere. |
42flanker | 22 Jan 2021 7:30 a.m. PST |
@Art- many thanks for your information regarding 5ème bataillon Franc du Nord and 3ème bataillon de tirailleurs. I would have responded earlier but I was unavoidably detained. The action to which I was referring was the first battle of Geldermalsen, 5th Jan 1795 after Salme's 4e Division had moved from Grave to the Bommel district to head a renewed French probe across the Waal on 4th Jan. On 5th Jan cavalry and light infantry of the division made a reconnaisance in force towards the village of Geldermalsen, the evidence indicating that this force consisted of the 5e Chasseurs Francs and 3e tirailleurs in support of the 8e hussards. |
von Winterfeldt | 23 Jan 2021 2:54 a.m. PST |
@Chad47 I cannot find the book you recommend by Baudet, do you have a link for a review of book seller? |
Chad47 | 23 Jan 2021 4:03 a.m. PST |
VW I purchased my copy from Amazon. The full title is The Army of the French Revolution From Citizen Soldier to Instrument of Power Author: Jean Paul Bertaud Translated by R R Palmer Published by Princeton Legacy Library Hope this helps Chad |
42flanker | 23 Jan 2021 4:08 a.m. PST |
Try 'Bertaud', perhaps,- 'Army of the French Revolution' Jean Paul Bertaud, 1st 1988 link |
Brechtel198 | 23 Jan 2021 4:21 a.m. PST |
The book is less expensive here: link Here it is on the publisher's website: link |
Brechtel198 | 23 Jan 2021 4:30 a.m. PST |
An excellent book on the French infantry from the end of the old Royal Army to the 'restoration' is: Avantages d'une Bonne Discipline by JB Avril. The tables for the Revolution show the complicated reorganizations of the infantry for the period-an excellent reference. link |
Chad47 | 23 Jan 2021 5:21 a.m. PST |
Brechtel198 Thanks but my French is not good enough. It is over 50 years since I studied it at school :( |
von Winterfeldt | 23 Jan 2021 6:36 a.m. PST |
Bertaud yes, this is a well known book, but you stated Baudet? |
Brechtel198 | 23 Jan 2021 10:13 a.m. PST |
Thanks but my French is not good enough. It is over 50 years since I studied it at school… Following the units in the tables in the book should not be difficult at all. Give it a try… |
Chad47 | 24 Jan 2021 2:30 a.m. PST |
VW Sorry. :( Brechtel198 Ok. Will give it a go |
Chad47 | 24 Jan 2021 4:31 a.m. PST |
Brechtel198 Took your advice and found the tables you referred to. It will take me a while to digest the information. Many thanks. Chad47 |
Brechtel198 | 24 Jan 2021 5:03 a.m. PST |
I have found the information more than helpful. Let us know how you get on with the information. |
von Winterfeldt | 24 Jan 2021 6:37 a.m. PST |
German units when being commanded to support Nabulieone's mad Spanish adventure recorded with distaste when they had to hand in their rifles and rifled carbines to receive a smooth bore musket and right they were. Without any doubt a rifle or a rifled musket is a much superior weapon for accuracy and shooting at individual targets. This is proven frequently when light infantry equipped with smoothbore muskets encountered on their own – rifled units. |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 8:55 a.m. PST |
G'Day JF, Hans-Karl, Dave, Eric, et al During 1793-1795, it was common for the French division to march with an avant-garde, brigade de flanc (left) brigade de flanc (right), while the great body of troops (main body) were formed en colonne par bataillon or colonne d'attaque par bataillon, with an appui mobile. The brigade de flanc may consist of; a small detachment of infanterie, cavalerie, consisting of 100 men, or entire battalions-regiments (both arms), and it may or may not be supported with artillery. The communication within the division was the mission of the troupes legeres ( cheval or pied ). JF: In regards to your posting: The French originally wanted to wait at the Waal, but the need for supplies forced the French to reconnoiter towards Tuyl and Geldermalsen. The action at Geldermalsen was either caused by the French avante-garde or brigade de flanc, so it is correct to say it was a reconnaissance's that saw vigorous fighting. I think it was the brigade de flanc, because of the position of the French Division, and the French say that the only 8 pounder in the body of troops was lost as well. French Commanders needing new recruits to fill their ranks did not hide their large casualties, or that they lost an action in their reports. There are even times when the Commanders gave a commendation to the enemy commander's victory in his report, such as the case at Grand-Reng. The success of the Coalition was due to the fact that the Austrians, Prussians infantry, British-Hanoverians were trained (as for Dutch Republic, it was in a poor condition and lacked motivation), and the Republican armies were not trained. Neither the l'infanterie nor the troupes legeres were instructed to execute evolutions, manoeuvre, or musketry while on a field of battle, and this is to include en tirailleur. The French were only able to send their men (l'infanterie et troupes legeres) out en combatant a la debandade during 1793 to 1794-95. There were exceptions where leaders trained their men; among them were Schauenbourg, and Dampierre who trained their battalions. What is important about General Schauenbourg correspondence is that he gives us an insight to the daily instruction he executed in the springtime of 1793, but he also gives an evaluation of all the officers in each battalion. Overall, they were poor to less than mediocre at best, and he continually had to repeat his orders to them. He even had a plan to save the grenadier companies when l'assemblee nationale gave thought of abolishing the grenadiers due to equality, and luckily that it never came about. Dampierre at the Battle of Jenappes; was formed en colonne d'attaque par bataillon, and ordered by Genral Dumouriez that all commanders were to deploy their bataillons en combatant a la debandade. Dampierre instead of assaulting en debande, deployed his battalions en colonne d'attaque. "Je fus chargé d'attaquer avec l'infanterie; nous marchâmes en colonne centrale jusqu'à un quart portée du canon. Alors, comme nous perdions du monde, les généraux Dumouriez et Beurnonville m'ordonnèrent de faire déployer des colonnes. J'avoue qu'il est impossible de mieux exécuter un mouvement aussi compliqué et sous le feu très vif et très rapproché de 40 bouches à feu. Le mouvement se fit comme à une manœuvre de paix (1); je le commandai à 200 pas en avant de ma troupe, du côté de l'ennemi. Aussitôt que les huit bataillons eurent achevé le déploiement, je les fis marcher en avant et battre la charge…" Unfortunately even after this success, Dampierre states that Generals still fought en combatant a la debandade'…meaning that evern with the success Dampierre achieved; all future battles had the colonne par bataillon or colonne d'attaque par bataillon arrived on the field of battle, then the men would be sent en debandade. In the beginning of the Revolution, the cadre from the bataillon asked for "des hommes de bonne volonte pour aller tirer éparpillés", where they were herded in the genal direction. When the bataillons were at a distance, but pursuing, it was normal for the bodies to "poursuivi au baionnette au reins" for a good distance, then once a position was determined, they would deploy en debandade. According to the Duc d'Orléans Louis Philippe; during the battle of Jemappes, the commander of the National Guard battalion called Deux-Sevres was killed. Once the battle was over, Louis Philippe formed the battalion without arms, where he set about to re-elect a new lieutenant colonel to replace the admirable commander who fell on the field of battle. The entire battalion proclaimed; "no, no, no more elections, we shall not conduct them anymore, appoint him yourself." The Duc d'Orleans replied; "But I can't, it's against the law." Which the battalion replied; "So what? We want to be well led like the troops of the line. Choose us a good commander." Finally, the Duc d'Oreans decided that the affair had to come to an end, so he chose the 1st captain of their battalion, Captain Pelletier and made him the new lieutenant colonel of the battalion. The battalion let out a cheer for the General in giving them a worthy commander. Pelletier would later become a brigadier general and fall at the Battle of Marengo. At the siege of Maastricht, in February of 1793, the Duc de Orleans had one battalion in his division where all the officers had been drawn from lot. The lieutenant Colonel was very limited in military knowledge. One night the Duc de Orleans had this officer dine with him for dinner, and the Duc noticed that the lieutenant was embarrassed to be in his presence. Sometime later when the division had to repel a sortie from the Dutch garrison, the lieutenant colonel made such a mess of his command that his whole battalion routed in its own confusion. The Duc informed the lieutenant colonel that he was incapable of being a lieutenant colonel and command a battalion. Which the lieutenant colonel started to weep, and replied that; "I know that only too well, but pity me, General. It is not my fault if I have the misfortune to be a lieutenant colonel. I was a house servant in a furnished lodging, and as there are no longer any travelers or anyone in Paris, I was dying of hunger and I had myself enrolled in this battalion; but only to be a private, nothing else, I assure you. I was led to the Luxemburg Gardens where the battalion was assembled, and there I was presented with a hat full of pieces of paper and told: ‘Put your hand in there and take out a bit of paper immediately.' I did as I was ordered, and here was written in big letters on the paper I had drawn, lieutenant Colonel. Then I was told: ‘There you are, a lieutenant colonel and our commander. Go and get our epaulets! Citizens I told them, that is impossible because I don't have a penny in my pocket, but they wouldn't listen, and these epaulets you see here were given me against my wages. Everything I have told you is the honest truth, and I beg you, General, not to send me to prison" The Duc then replied;" No, you shall not go to prison, but just try to learn your job and do better next time." In which the lieutenant colonel replied; "Oh I‘ve had enough, please remove these epaulets and put me in the ranks." whereas the Duc replies; "Very well, we shall see later, meanwhile command your battalion as best as you can." In 1792 the troops posted at the camp at Châlons-en-Champagne (36km from Valmy), were nothing more than a wild mob without any military rule or bearing. Even though the camp never came under bombardment or attack, several times it would be found that mobs would flee back to Paris, declaring that the generals were all traitors who were going to deliver them to the enemy because they were patriots. We find that the French understood that not all their cavalry was not suited to this new manner of warfare: "La cavalerie proprement dite, par la manière dont nous faisons actuallement la guerre, est rarement dans le cas de se rendre utile. Destinee a combattre en masse et a culbuter par son choc des escadrons, elle ne peut guere etre employee que dans les batailles rangees; on en livre rarement." While it took the Austrians longer to realize the key to defeating the mob en combatant a la debandade, the crucial tactical principle was to keep their infantry formed, and not let the French en debandade bound behind, or turn their flanks, therefore forcing the Coalition forces to retire. The battle of Grand-Reng, is a perfect example of how the British cavalry hemmed the French en debandade in, and then soundly defeated the French. It has been posted using Lynn as the source: O "On the night before the battle of Hondschoote a combined assault by French troops in close order and in open order. Sergeant Jean Fricasse commented on the assault on the village of Grand-Reng that the troops ‘were put in line before the village, and a great quantity of tirailleurs were sent forward who took the village in the first assault." -If this is Lynn's translation, then he is wrong. Sergeant Jean Fricasse never wrote that the French fought in close order and in open order, nor were they put in line before the village. Here we see that Lynn does not understand la langue militaire de France, and most emphatically doesn't realize the difference between the principles of Rompement en bataille – en bataille – l'ordre de bataille. O "The French of course were launching something of a revolution not only politically but in warfare with levee en masse and the use of columns covered by skirmishers" -A collapse of military science, trained army, to one of an untrained mob en combatant a la debandade and the soldiers should be given credit for being forced to operate in such a manner… O "The French tactical system and how it evolved beginning with the tactical maneuvers and experiments in Normandy in the mid-1770s. there was no equivalent during the AWI" -True but misleading…all the evolving of the French tactical system and tactical maneuvers in 1770 came to naught…none of that was applied from 1792 – 1795…the end result was forcing untrained men to be asked at first, by the cadre of the bataillon for "des hommes de bonne volonte pour aller tirer éparpillés". O "During this time, as Lynn points out, the French deployed far more specialist troops during 1794 in the Armee du Nord than line[ 4:1]" -All troupes legeres were untrained and acted as a rabble en debandade, but if they were troupes legeres by name, they were charged with details and missions, commonly tasked to the troupes legeres. Wargame Possibilities: I think to properly play a game in 1792 to 1794-5; the game table must be able to permit the French to be able to have enough room on the flanks to permit the French en debandade, to be able to bound behind, or turn the Coalitions flanks, therefore forcing the Coalition forces to retire. If you are playing at a scale of …say 1:60…the French en debandade have no fire power. Coalition piquets and skirmishers would fall back due to being out manoeuvred or weight of numbers against them, and the Coalition casualties would be from cannonade or cavalerie. Best Regards Art |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 2:03 p.m. PST |
Kevin, I know you are using John Lynn's book; The Bayonets of the Republic, for the majority or your sources, on the Revolution period, but as I have already mentioned, Lynn may be able to understand French, but he doesn't understand la langue militaire de France. On page 286 in The Bayonets of the Republic, he is referencing light infantry as enfants perdus in regards to regulations. He is using Jean Colin as his source, but when I read that he wrote the military term of enfant perdu as being light infantry, I knew he was not using Jean Colins. Jean Colins would never have used that term incorrectly, because he knows what the military term means, and has used it correctly in his writings. In the langue militaire de France there are three categories of Enfants: De Corps, Perdu, Trouve A good example of Enfant Trouve would be the Pupilles de la Garde. In the 1790's the enfant perdu was a type of agregation apart from a bataillon such as d'eclaireurs, detachment, or une compagnie franc. Later on, in 1805 the voltigeurs would be known as the enfant perdu, but this still did not include the light infantry. There is also another meaning for enfant perdu, and it has the same meaning that the British use: that of forlorn hope which might be a band of soldiers or other combatants chosen to take on a military operation, such as a suicidal assault where the casualties would be expected to be high. With that said, such soldiers were rarely suicidal or foolhardy: 'British troops of the forlorn hope at the 1812 Siege of Badajoz carried a large bag 1.5–1.8 m by 0.61 m in diameter, stuffed with hay or straw, which was thrown down into the enemy trenches to create a cushion and prevent injury as they jumped down'. |
McLaddie | 24 Jan 2021 2:38 p.m. PST |
The term 'forlorn hope' was a term applied to skirmish actions way before Napoleonic times: (Austin Woolrych, Battles of the English Civil War Pan Books Ltd, London; 1969). It is part of the description of the Royalists as they took up position for the battle on Marston Moor: "The second feature was the obstacle, a long ditch or drain, which divided the Moor from the fields. It was close behind this that Rupert stationed his cavalry, and such infantry as he had with him, to deny the Moor to his opponents. From about eh center eastwards, the ditch was apparently deep and lined by a hedge, but it was shallower and less formidable towards its western end, where it curved round to peter out near the junction of Kendal Lane with the Tockwith-Marston Road. Rupert lined this ditch with musketeers, choosing his own and Lord Byron's regiments of foot for the task. Such a screen was often thrown out before an army's main front; it was known as a 'forlorn hope', and its job was to harass and disrupt an enemy attack as far as it could before falling back on its main body. Posted as it was in this instance, it made the ditch a nasty obstacle to tackle – especially for the cavalry – before coming to grips with the main royalist forces close behind it." [p.67] A 'forlorn hope' seems to have been applied to any body of troops detached from their formed battalion for a combat mission in the 1600s and early 1700s. It is clear why it would be applied to skirmish actions. It is also understandable how the term 'enfant perdu' could develop multiple meanings by the late 1700s. [The French are fond of nouns having several meanings. *smile*] |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 2:52 p.m. PST |
G'Day Bill, I hope you are having cold weather at your place…because I am burning up over here…snow…ice…sounds great…ahhh ;-) Anyway…you will notice that I wrote: In the 1790's…not before or after…. Of course the French military term enfant perdue can be found much early than that, as well as after it as well. I am trying to keep this topic during the 1790's. Nevertheless in the 1790s enfant perdue means just as I have explained it. I also mentioned that it had another meaning that was similar to the British. If forlorn hope applies to any skirmish action in English as you say…OK…cool…I have no issues with that..but enfant perdue is a French military term and used incorrectly by Lynn ;-) Lynn should have used the term light infantry…but he also messes up on other French military terms…-sorry if I have upset those who are a fan of Lynn… But I feel your pain, because a few days ago, I had to listen to officers trying to translate a mission in English into French, and couldn't decide what the proper French term for a certain mission was…over an hour I had to listen to that debate over the name of a mission ;-) Best Regards Art |
Brechtel198 | 24 Jan 2021 3:34 p.m. PST |
Thanks very much, Art, I am familiar with the term 'enfant perdus' as well as other military French terms. Lynn has done quite a bit of work on the French army, not only of the Revolution, but of Louis XIV's army. I am not a 'fan' of John Lynn and know him only by his work. The material that I posted quoting from him was from the perspective of French infantry regulations and what they had or did not have regarding skirmishing tactics. |
McLaddie | 24 Jan 2021 3:39 p.m. PST |
Yes, Art, I noticed. You did write, Later on, in 1805 the voltigeurs would be known as the enfant perdu, but this still did not include the light infantry. It is also of interest that a good deal of what was written about a la debandage and 'how to deploy skirmishers,' both actions and in what instructions were provided, all referred to line troops, not chasseurs or other specialist infantry. This is true right up to Davout's 1811 instructions. |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 3:56 p.m. PST |
G'Day Bill, Actually I use the term a la debandade more than the French…but I use it correctly as an aid nonetheless ;-) Because even the French just referred to it as en tirailleur most (nearly all) of the time. I could have done the same…but I wanted the readers to realize I was referring to a mob…soldiers untrained. en Tirailleur is a term "militaire common" and was used like the term en colonne, and if you want, I can start using en tirailleur ;-) Best Regards Art |
Brechtel198 | 24 Jan 2021 4:15 p.m. PST |
I have never, except for here, seen voltigeurs referred to as 'enfant perdus.' And I submit that it used incorrectly here. 'a la debandade' is also used incorrectly too many times, as it is here. En tirailleur is much more correct. Of course, we can also use the terms in English: skirmishers and open order. |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 4:27 p.m. PST |
Kevin, Thank you for your post You have a good day |
Cdr Luppo | 24 Jan 2021 4:58 p.m. PST |
there is an eventual nuance of volunteers (volontaires) with enfants perdus for dangerous actions or isolated actions. also a nuance about infantry used in *direct conjunction* with a Line of Battle as tirailleurs (system) or used for a more specific job, isolated actions, scouting, etc. ENFANT > CHILD (general term). Word all LATIN, derived from infans, or infars, not to speak. It was synonymous with FANTASSIN and SOLDIER and analogous to the word INFANTRY. ENFANT PERDU—Sort of CHILDREN, or rather SOLDIERS OF LIGHT INFANTRY, who have also been called infantry; because ENFANT, FANTASSIN, INFANTRY, belong to a common etymology. so if it's about regulations and Colin … best regards |
Whirlwind | 24 Jan 2021 11:38 p.m. PST |
@ Art, Trying to follow your very interesting posts, but there are a couple of points I am not clear on in your criticism of Lynn: It has been posted using Lynn as the source:O "On the night before the battle of Hondschoote a combined assault by French troops in close order and in open order. Sergeant Jean Fricasse commented on the assault on the village of Grand-Reng that the troops ‘were put in line before the village, and a great quantity of tirailleurs were sent forward who took the village in the first assault." -If this is Lynn's translation, then he is wrong. Sergeant Jean Fricasse never wrote that the French fought in close order and in open order, nor were they put in line before the village. Here we see that Lynn does not understand la langue militaire de France, and most emphatically doesn't realize the difference between the principles of Rompement en bataille – en bataille – l'ordre de bataille. If Lynn is wrong, what should the translation be? I know you are using John Lynn's book; The Bayonets of the Republic, for the majority or your sources, on the Revolution period, but as I have already mentioned, Lynn may be able to understand French, but he doesn't understand la langue militaire de France.On page 286 in The Bayonets of the Republic, he is referencing light infantry as enfants perdus in regards to regulations. He is using Jean Colin as his source, but when I read that he wrote the military term of enfant perdu as being light infantry, I knew he was not using Jean Colins. Jean Colins would never have used that term incorrectly, because he knows what the military term means, and has used it correctly in his writings. In the langue militaire de France there are three categories of Enfants: De Corps, Perdu, Trouve…in the 1790's the enfant perdu was a type of agregation apart from a bataillon such as d'eclaireurs, detachment, or une compagnie franc. Later on, in 1805 the voltigeurs would be known as the enfant perdu, but this still did not include the light infantry…you will notice that I wrote: In the 1790's…not before or after…. Of course the French military term enfant perdue can be found much early than that, as well as after it as well. I am trying to keep this topic during the 1790's. Nevertheless in the 1790s enfant perdue means just as I have explained it…Lynn should have used the term light infantry…but he also messes up on other French military terms…-sorry if I have upset those who are a fan of Lynn… To try and parse this, you mean that enfant perdu had a particular meaning in the Revolutionary period, which was different from that used before and after? You are saying that Lynn is unaware of this and this materially affects his analysis and it is not a point of pedantry; if so, what is the material point? You are also saying that when Colin writes, he does appreciate this difference, although he was not contemporary. How is the particular usage of the 1790s known? |
Art | 24 Jan 2021 11:58 p.m. PST |
G'Day Eric ENFANT:
DE CORPS – (1.) Enfant d' homme de troupe et (2.) Enfant d'officier PERDUS - TROUVE - ENFANT (enfants) perdu (F), ou compagnons perdu, comme les appelle Philippe De Cleves (1520,A)-p9099 …les enfants perdus ainsi associés en compagnies ainsi associes en compagnies ressemblaient d'abord a nos compagnies actuelles de voltiguers, mais n'avaient pas d'analogie avec nos grenadiers d'aujourd'hui. Telles sont les revolutions perpetuelles de la chose militaire et de la langue. Pendant le siècle dernier, on employa a peu pres dans le meme sens qu'enfants perdu le mot volontaires. (Mais avant en 1667): …enfin l'amagame de ces grenadiers forma les compagnies de grenadiers… …De nos jour, les franc tireurs d'infanterie peuvent etre regardes comme une renaissance d'enfant perdu…(et pourquoi?) Best Regards Art Hello Whirlwind…it has been quite a while indeed since we last chatted…sorry I posted this just seconds after your posting. As for Sergeant Jean Fricasse's comment…he wrote "en bataille" which does not necessarily mean to put troops in line. It has more than one meaning, and how you interpret it changes the disposition. He could also be saying that the bataillons were still en colonne par bataillon or colonne d'attaque par bataillon en bataille, which would have been the normal practice. Hope this helps Best Regards Art |
Whirlwind | 25 Jan 2021 11:28 a.m. PST |
Art, Many thanks for clarifying "en bataille". If you have time, could you please clarify this sentence for me: Later on, in 1805 the voltigeurs would be known as the enfant perdu, but this still did not include the light infantry Do you mean by this sentence that Voltigeurs were known as enfants perdus but that did not (in 1805) include all light infantrymen (e.g. Chasseurs from Light regiments)? |
Cdr Luppo | 25 Jan 2021 12:11 p.m. PST |
Good day Art, yes for sure the "enfants perdus" goes back to 1504 or almost ; ) the entry for enfant d' homme de troupes is the most detailed entry. the one for Officier is really short in contrast : ) about franc tireurs .. perhaps because they are not really linked to "the service des tirailleurs" in itself .. but for others tasks "Pendant le siècle dernier, on employa à peu près dans le même sens qu'Enfants perdus le mot VOLONTAIRES." (period 1740-1841 ?) "We also speak by extension of a maverick to qualify a person acting independently, outside structures." (On parle également par extension d'un franc-tireur pour qualifier une personne agissant de façon autonome, hors des structures.) so outside the empire of the "regulations", 1791 regs or before, 1791 regs or latter ! they are (enfants perdus) outside the "cadre" of the regulations, which is logic when you consider the object of those regs and the kind of tasks they have to accomplish as an aside, the quote from Colin's book : it's about tirailleurs (system-LoB) and not "enfants perdus" – enfants perdus" being used as the global origin of light infantry – la souche – (tirailleurs), there are 2/3 following pages in Colin book making that very clear. "The first ordinances of the old monarchy (1703–1755) made no mention of skirmishers, and this should come as no surprise, as these embryonic regulations described only the most basic movements. That of 1764, written by Marshal de Broglie, and the first somewhat complete that we have had, specifies that when going into combat, a half-section of each half-battalion will be deployed as skirmishers; but from 1776, this mention disappears for a century. It was found, not that the use of skirmishers should be stopped, but that it was absurd, that it was harmful to regulate it, to fix the number and the mode of action of these lost children." "Les premières ordonnances de l'ancienne monarchie (1703–1755) ne font pas mention des tirailleurs, et il ne faut pas s'en étonner, car ces règlements embryonnaires ne décrivaient que les mouvements les plus élémentaires. Celle de 1764, rédigée par le maréchal de Broglie, et la première un peu complète que l'on ait eue, spécifie qu'en allant au combat, une demi-section de chaque demi-bataillon sera déployée en tirailleurs ; mais dès 1776, cette mention disparaît pour un siècle. On a trouvé, non pas qu'il fallait cesser l'usage des tirailleurs, mais qu'il était absurde, qu'il était nuisible de le réglementer, de fixer le nombre et le mode d'action de ces enfants perdus." best regards ; ) |
42flanker | 25 Jan 2021 12:48 p.m. PST |
Thanks for your answer. I confess I wasn't clear whether your notes on divisional deployment were generic or in specific reference to Salme's 4eme in Jan 1795. Two additional questions did occur to me. I was wondering what the French term for ‘main body' might be, and what position the ‘appui mobile' occupied in the divisional formation. 1) The main prompt for the renewed campaign in the winter of 1794 appears to have been pressure from the government in Paris as a result of lobbying by the exile Dutch 'Patriot' general Herman Daendels whose sources in the Netherlands reported the widespread opposition to the House of Orange and the imminent collapse of the Staddhouder's authority. Daendels had taken advantage of C-in-C Pichegru's absence in Brussels on sick leave to get support for an initial assault across the Maas onto the Bommlewaard which failed. Pichegru, still convalescing, hurried back to resume command and taking advantage of the great freeze that in mid-December descended on northern Europe, authorised a second assault which was spectacularly successful. As dawn broke on 27th December 1794 Osten and Daendel's brigades dashing across the frozen Maas onto the Bommelerwaard and into the fertile Altena district to the west, found storehouses full of stockpiled provisions as well as liberating stocks of genever in the cellars of Bommel. In the next two weeks there were numerous reports of attacking French troops being roaring drunk. After the rapid capture of Bommel, a battalion of Dutch-Belgian light infantry picked their way across the pack ice in the Waal and established a bridgehead on the northern Waaldijk at Tuil. This was evacuated three days later in the face of a powerful allied counter attack on the morning of the 30th December. Pichegru, resentful of Daendels' intriguing, and distrustful his eagerness to press forward towards Utrecht and thence to Amsterdam, pulled Daendel's brigade out of the line and assigned them to clearing-up operations in the rear. They were replaced at Bommel by Jean Baptist Salme's 4e Division, fresh from the capture of Grave 25 miles to the east. Following a precipitate allied withdrawal from the Waal on 3rd Jan. Pichegru, fearing a sudden thaw, was not yet prepared to commit to a full scale advance across the frozen Rhine delta. Hence, Salme's troops were restricted intially to reconnaissance. It was evident nonetheless that the main objective of the French remained the high road to Utrecht, laid open by the freezing of the Rhine delta. It fell to the brigades of Major General David Dundas' ‘Right Flank' command to screen this line of advance, with the British Third Brigade (12th, 33rd, 42nd & 78th) positioned in depth on the river Linge at Geldermalsen, holding the river crossing there. The French attack at Geldermalsen on the 5th January was the action to which I referred previously, in which so few British casualties were recorded. 2) It was actually at the second battle of Geldermalsen on 8th January (after a subsequent retreat to the line of the river Lek/Nederijn on 6th Jan) in which a brass 8 pdr was reported captured by troops of Cathcart's 6th Brigade when they clashed with French troops attacking allied outposts along the Linge. The captured 8 pdr was lost when the ice broke as it was being manhandled back across the frozen Linge. Further guns were evidently brought up by French reinforcements. During the course of the battle the British suffered their most serious casualties of the midwinter campaign with heavy losses both to enemy ‘grapeshot' and to fire from sharpshooting tirailleurs, notably among officers, all recorded for the first time in this campaign. On both 5th & 8th January French attempts to envelop a British brigade line were held off by musketry and battalion guns. On the second occasion,in addition to the first appearance of French artillery, the fact that the opposing forces confronted each other from the proximity of opposing s on either side of a narrow waterway, and that outnumbered British troops deployed atop the rather than behind it, probably contributed to the heavier casualties on that occasion. . |
42flanker | 25 Jan 2021 5:33 p.m. PST |
Oh Lord love us. The expletives deleted (above) referred to embanked retaining structures erected on either side of waterways, which in Dutch would be known as a dijk and in English as a . Nothing to do with lesbian women of a notably masculine demeanour. Or urinals. |
John the OFM | 25 Jan 2021 7:42 p.m. PST |
I've only seen the term "enfants perdu" refer to a Forlirn Hope. You know, the guys carrying the petard on which they are hoisted. |
John the OFM | 25 Jan 2021 10:33 p.m. PST |
Forlorn… Baah. Autocorrect. |
42flanker | 26 Jan 2021 7:16 a.m. PST |
Verloren Hoop (Dutch >C16th) verloren 'lost' hoop 'hope'/'troop' |
42flanker | 26 Jan 2021 7:28 a.m. PST |
‘An Universal Military Dictionary,' Charles James, 1802 'ENFANS perdus Fr. forlorn hope. with consists of soldiers detached from several regiments, or otherwise appointed to give the first onset in battle, or in an attack upon the counterscarp, or breach of a place besieged; so called (by the French) because of the imminent danger to which they are exposed.' p191-92 FORLORN-hope, in the military art, signifies men detached from several regiments, or otherwise appointed to give the first attack in the day of battle; or at a siege, to storm the counterscarp, mow t the breach, &c. They are so called from the great danger they are unavoidably exposed to. PERDU, a word adopted from the French, signifying to lie flat and closely in wait, it likewise means the forlorn hope A corps PERDU Fr. desperately. A coup PERDU, Fr. at random Coup PERDU, Fr. random shot |
McLaddie | 27 Jan 2021 12:34 p.m. PST |
Since we know that the early body of troops formed a la debandage; were untrained. It may be assumed that this formation was nothing more than an inexperienced rabble of skirmishers, with inadequate skill in such a role. Colonel George Hanger suggests that this limited knowledge also affected their use of concealment and cover. The single most sensible and demonstrable statement ever made I feel. And frankly, without beig discourteous, I'd always thought this the most obvious. Despite all the rhetoric of 'rules and regulations' how did 'volunteers and conscripts' learn anything? They were rushed into formations and battles with little regard to anything of their well being. Who, looking at 'humanity', can honestly say that French 'mobs' of volunteers were any different to their ancestors a 1000 years before; middle-ages or current third world 'Arabian', African and Asian continents, or as we have seen in recent weeks, different to 'undisciplined' mobs in so-called civilised communities now? Their effectiveness was/is the mob mentality and brutality it conveys, self preservation instincts in mobs while the wilder psychopaths get hyped beyond all means of control. SHaT1984: I've been gone for a time, so I haven't had wherewithall to respond. I think you are being unfair with your comparisons between mobs and the French volunteers, mob mentality compared to their thinking during 1793-94. First off, this ‘mob' has 1. Chosen [voted on] officers and a command hierarchy down to squads, 2. A combat mission, though very general. 3. Some weeks with a formal organization and identity, within a large army. Most mobs enjoy none of these things. Certainly, a lack of control by the higher ups was a general complaint, one that was voiced by most nations' officers about skirmishing, one reason they wanted to restrict their deployment. The French officers reported they would order an attack and watch the ‘mob' units disappear over the rise or into a forest and not see them until the end of the day. However, that doesn't mean they were without effect. The aide to Prussian General Knobelsdorf described the skirmisher dynamics at the beginning of the Prussian involvement in the French Revolution, thirteen years before Jena. He wrote in May of 1793 that the French were:
". . .still badly trained; but they were not only our equals, but our superiors in the woods where the soldier doesn't keep in his ranks, executes none of the evolutions of the drill manual and, covered by the trees, needs do nothing apart from firing his musket. Our men, accustomed to fighting in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy." [ p. 208 Paddy Griffith, The Art of War of Revolutionary France. So, the mob found some ways to be effective and did know how to use cover. The other thing that is obvious is they would remain untrained and unexperienced for only so long… 1795 to be exact. As an aside, note the Prussian officer's conclusion in early 1793: "Our men, accustomed to fighting in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy." The Prussians, even at this early stage realized they had to go skirmish, avoiding just being targets. Which they did, noted by several officers including Scharnhorst later when arguing for the continued use of line troops as skirmishers. |
McLaddie | 27 Jan 2021 12:51 p.m. PST |
Regarding the topic of instructions for French light infantry in period regulations the following from John Lynn's The Bayonets of the Republic, which refers to the Armee du Nord, is noted:… [quote cut]So, it appears that the development of the French tactical system where large numbers of light infantry employed in open order as tirailleurs and to be a fire support element when attacking or being employed as a 'corps principal' was not covered in existing regulations or instructions but was instead a 'learned' skill for both light and line infantry. Quod Erat Demonstrandum…. Kevin: Lynn was speaking of the Armeé du Nord in 1793-4 and you assume that seeing it ubsurd to issue instructions to a group of totally untrained recruits as some indication that no instructions were ever written, even when Lynn notes some for just one year and just one of several French armies. You seem far too willing to smear one army's experience in 1793 over twenty years of war. You also seem unaware of much that was written by the French military during this time. If this fire support element was not covered in ‘existing regulations or instructions,'[or needing instructions] what do you think General Schérer was instructing his Army of Italy to do in 1795? More about this in the next post. |
McLaddie | 27 Jan 2021 1:19 p.m. PST |
From the evidence, as shown below, the Austrians did not operate as the French did and did not employ tirailleurs en grande bande. In point of fact, the Austrians deployed skirmishers to protect the main body of infantry and kept them on a very short leash. They did not employ skirmishers to the extent that the French did and those that were employed, third rank or not, seldom matched the skill of the French tirailleurs. Kevin: No one has ever said that the Austrians ‘operated as the French did," though your claim the Austrians didn't employ en grande bande is unclear. They certainly didn't employ them as untrained masses sent out in 1793-74. If you are speaking of deploying one or more entire battalions, the Austrians did that too. As much? I don't know. How often did the French do it? As for skirmishers being the principal offensive force… when were they after 1973-74?
Regarding the French voltigeur companies the first were formed in March 1804 in the light infantry regiments, the line infantry getting them in September 1805. In some units this was merely making fact into law-the current practice in some infantry regiments was to have light companies which were used for both scouting and skirmishing. This practice was mentioned by Thiebault, Teste, and Coignet during 1796-1801, those companies being dubbed eclaireurs. And? My whole emphasis has been on the evolutionary nature of French light infantry tactics. Certainly some regiments had light companies…they also might deploy line troops in companies, or picked men, or other methods, but until 1804-5 various French forces were using a number of methods, like Ney's 1803 instructions on using the third rank. I am continually amazed how you uncritically quote Rothenberg as though quoting scripture. From Napoleon's Great Adversary by Gunther Rothenberg: 1792: ‘In the Austrian army, light infantry missions, scouting and skirmishing, commonly were entrusted to the Grenzer…'-33. Agreed, but they also had jager units at that time. ‘Trained in the rigid techniques of eighteenth century warfare, the army would be repeatedly mauled by the more aggressive and elastic forces of the French Revolution and Napoleon.'-38. A conclusion statement that tells you little and more than once doesn't match reports of Austrian and French officers from 1793 on. I have provided any number of examples in the past. 1792-1797: ‘The Austrian service remained tied to the regulations of 1769. Infantry remained rigidly divided into ‘light' and ‘line' units…'-50. ? And yet the 1769 regulations provided for the third line to be used as skirmishers. Coberg certainly wasn't ‘rigidly tied to any such divide in 1794. I find this particular quote ironic, as though it was only the Austrians who practiced this ‘rigid divide'. Here is General Schérer's Instuctions [in part] in 1795 for the Army of Italy: In the last days of the year 1795, Barthélémy Louis Joseph Schérer, general-in-chief of the Army of Italy, published an instruction for his army, because the theater of war was going to change and we were going to fight now in the plain:[…] The line infantry will always be formed in three ranks; […] I however except the case where a troop would have to defend an entrenchment or a height, an escarpment or a ditch, which would reduce it purely to the defensive. […] The light infantry will usually be formed in two ranks, because this weapon being mainly intended to fight by fire, to move with agility, sometimes even without order and scattered, to worry the enemy on its flanks and its rear, it It is natural that its usual order of battle should be shallower than that of the line infantry, intended to act mainly by its impulse, and to fight the enemy with bayonets. […] Most of the troops of Italy having never fought in the plain, and never having been in the position of supporting a cavalry charge, it behooves the genius of the nation and the bravery of the troops to prescribe a way of 'attack which promotes their courage and impetuosity, which relieves them of the difficulties of a forward march by observing an alignment very difficult to maintain when the front is very extended, and which removes any fear of being knocked down by a charge of cavalry. When the signal to attack is given, the 3 light infantry battalions, 150 paces [97.5 m] away from the front of the columns, will march forward with sustained fire. The 12 columns will follow them at the maneuver step [it is the same as the accelerated step or the redoubled step, all of 100 steps per minute], and when the light infantry will have arrived at 50 steps [32.5 m] from the front of the enemy, it will stop; if the enemy holds firm, it will redouble its fire; the columns tightened in mass by divisions, the first crossing the bayonet, the three others the high weapons will double the step while preserving their order of depth, will pass through the light infantry, which will come to place itself by platoons in the intervals, and will rush with bayonets on the enemy line. To resist a cavalry charge, these columns would simply squeeze the 4 divisions against each other. Source. This instruction can be found, unfortunately incomplete, on pages LXXIII-LXXV of: J. Colin. Tactics and Discipline in the Armies of the Revolution. Correspondence from General Schauenbourg. Paris, 1902. Clearly, General Schérer felt:
1. Line and Light infantry had distinct roles in battle, ‘rigidly divided.'So that division was a general attitude, not some backward view of just the Austrians. The view of skirmish value being fire, it is easy to see how that developed into using skirmishers as The fire arm. 2. Instructions for the army were necessary down to the paces for light infantry deployment and the role of light infantry in opening the battle. [Three battalions probably represented the legere for each division…usually.] 3. The support role [fire] of the legere was spelled out in detail, so it wasn't something that developed without instruction. 4. This rigid differentiation wasn't changed by Napoleon during the Italian campaigns from what I can see. Perhaps others know of if Napoleon changed any tactical instructions. It also should be noted that this organization, legere before line is seen in 1805, where three or more battalions of Legere, in their own brigade were deployed in front of the line formations just as Schérer instructeded. More about Rothenberg |
Whirlwind | 27 Jan 2021 1:20 p.m. PST |
@McLaddie, Key for me in that quote from the Aide to General Knobelsdorf doesn't indicate any particular aptitude from the French infantrymen, it indicates the specific disability of the Prussian infantrymen, unable to cast off their inculcated military training. |
McLaddie | 28 Jan 2021 12:27 a.m. PST |
it indicates the specific disability of the Prussian infantrymen, unable to cast off their inculcated military training. @Whirlwind: I think you are going two miles with two feet of information. The Prussian officers said of the LINE troops "Our men, accustomed to fighting in closed ranks on open ground, found it difficult to put themselves into this apparent disorder which was nevertheless necessary if they didn't want to be just targets to the enemy." Finding it difficult to carry out actions deemed necessary in 1793 doesn't equal them being "unable to cast off their inculcated military training" then or later. They had never done it, so why wouldn't they find it difficult to suddenly find it necessary? The fact is that the Prussians in 1793-5 did deploy line infantry as skirmishers in a number of situations. Scharnhorst notes this fact in his arguments for 3rd rank line troops to skirmish. |
Whirlwind | 28 Jan 2021 12:34 a.m. PST |
@McLaddie, Not really, you mistake my emphasis. I merely remark that the aide commented that the Prussian troops were relatively poor (at that specific point, for, as you say, very cogent reasons) not that the French were in any way particularly good. |
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