"Men Against Fire: How Many Soldiers Actually Fired" Topic

…Their Weapons at the Enemy During the Vietnam War

"In a squad of 10 men, on average fewer than three ever fired their weapons in combat. Day in, day out — it did not matter how long they had been soldiers, how many months of combat they had seen, or even that the enemy was about to overrun their position. This was what the highly regarded Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, better known as S.L.A. Marshall, or ‘Slam,' concluded in a series of military journal articles and in his book, Men Against Fire, about America's World War II soldiers. Marshall had been assigned as a military analyst for the U.S. Army in both the Pacific and Europe. The American, he concluded, comes ‘from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable….The fear of aggression has been expressed to him so strongly and absorbed by him so deeply and pervadingly — practically with his mother's milk — that it is part of the normal man's emotional make-up. This is his great handicap when he enters combat. It stays his trigger finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a restraint upon him.'

Marshall's claims did not go unchallenged, but despite the disagreements they were widely accepted as truth both within the nation's military and by those writing about the war and its American fighting force. Marshall continued in his role as analyst and self-proclaimed military historian before, during and after the Korean War, authoring many more books and frequently appearing as a guest lecturer at Fort Leavenworth and other installations around the United States. It is not an exaggeration to say that he was more or less a living legend by the mid-1960s. Largely due to his influence, noncommissioned officers and officers sent to Vietnam at the beginning of the American buildup were concerned that their soldiers and Marines would not fire at the enemy…"
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Amicalement
Armand

I really find that hard to believe at the sharp end.

Perhaps for an entire unit, since there are a lot of non-combat personnel in many larger orgs, and a huge logistical tail, but for a squad or platoon on the front lines in a firefight, I imagine there was an awful lot of firing going on by almost all present in the area.

Now, whether much or any of that was aimed fire is another discussion.

SLA Marshall just made up hos research – allegedly.

His conclusions do gel with what many anecdotally experienced. It is hard to kill or injure another human being who is not a direct threat to you.

I gather the training changed post WW2 and this became less of an issue from 1960 onward.

The article is well thought out and points out some very obvious reason why some soldiers did not use their weapons e.g. fear of hitting comrades ahead or the need to be a commander of riflemen.

But my recollection of such tales was that the strangest problem was when units were in very close combat or even overrun. All too often, human nature, an instinct, is to then react passively and curl up in a ball, almost paralysed. The NCOs and more experienced men would fight on, but the rest were not cowards. It is just that even the need for self defence is overcome by sheer horror, unless highly trained and veterans.

But I stress that is purely a received memory of what I read years ago.

Read "On Killing" by LTC Grossman … link

I gather the training changed post WW2 and this became less of an issue from 1960 onward.

Yes we were trained to shoot at outlines of human targets. Not round targets. We learned, we don't want someone who was good at shooting at circles. But shooting at and killing humans …

The human plastic Targets would pop up … you shoot … continue and repeat. We were trained to be killers not target shooters. And yes, generally on a tactical level killing large numbers of the enemy and often. Is the best way to get you and your comrades home alive. The enemy are just targets to be serviced …

I myself thought most troops after 9/11 would have no problem engaging/killing the "bad guys" … I thought if a still a Company Cdr and I showed footage from the 9/11 attacks would get my troops motivated to kill the enemy. Or go a little beyond, etc.? Which in places like A'stan or Iraq you generally can't tell the "bad guys" from the non-combatants. Until they start shooting at you. By that time it would be too late. I think my guidance would be, when in doubt, you probably should take the shot. See the movie "American Sniper" …
Similar to Vietnam in some respects.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Yes

But I am talking about the extremes of combat. Charlie is through the wire, the Zulus are in the camp, Custer's men have no hope. There is some suggestion that any physical barrier makes a difference ( a wall, a hedge, a pile of sandbags or mealie bags), but, in the last few seconds, however weird it seems, the human reaction is to freeze, curl up in a foetal position and not defend yourself. There is not the slightest concern about taking another human life. It is not morality, it is paralysis.

Training overcomes that. Let me ask those who were trained to face that horror. Is this a serious concern?

Any physical barrier between you and incoming fire should give you an edge. May be even make you more confident and braver, etc.

Is this a serious concern?

Comes down to training, experience, motivation and leadership. You are part of a unit trained to fight and operate as a team. It's more important to do your job. That could save your comrades' lives. Plus take those lives of your enemy. If the unit holds and works together, most in cases they will fire, move, etc.

As well as the basic survival instinct kicks in. However, sometimes that all does not happen. Unit starts taking losses. One guy turns and run it could be contagious. So that is where all those factors I mentioned comes into play. Highly trained and skilled units generally do their jobs no matter what. E.g. you almost will never see elites like Rangers, Commandos, Special Forces, Paras, Marines, FFL, etc., fall apart. Their training, unit pride, survival instincts etc., kicks in and they won't waiver.

In certain situations like after 9/11 the troops that were in the military and those that joined after may have been looking for payback, etc. Those troops will be highly motivated to hunt down and kill the enemy.

Even some units after they take losses actually get more motivated, angry, etc., become even more deadly. After having seen their comrade get hit, etc.

As well as some lower quality units when they take losses will not be effective, break, run, etc.

SLAM made a case, after field studies, that the weapon carried or used, had a major part in the user firing it.

The deadlier the weapon (i.e., auto fire vs. single shots, crew weapon vs. solitary weapons, quality of training and leadership, etc.) would be more conducive to the weapon being used.

Frankly, it only makes sense. A unit, be it a squad or company under fire, will go to ground and "disappear" to most of the members of the unit. What motivates an individual to make weapon use choices when doing so risks being killed or wounded?

As to Legion 4's comment, there are a number of studies and recollections that pointed out Americans' lack of killer instinct in the early war campaigns of WWII such as North Africa where it was only after a period of time experiencing casualties that U.S. soldiers started to "hate" their enemy. I suspect that Legion 4's thoughts on it are correct in his ideas and memories of training.

I'll also agree with deadhead's idea of what happens when troops panic or give up. Visited Little Big Horn this past summer, and it was apparent by viewing the markers where the soldiers' bodies were found that one could "see" where small units maintained their formations and command structure and fought to the end vs. many other locations where it was apparent that the unit (small platoons or companies as identified) were killed while in flight, as well as a number of Native American recollections about the battle mentioning that the soldiers were fleeing, firing wildly and without much effect.

I think there is a difference between various kinds of engagement.

You have desperate, close range situations when firing first will mean life or death.

You have general engagements – a standard firefight for fire superiority.

You also have situations when a soldier must kill a helpless enemy who is no threat an may be unaware they are in danger. Snipers being a good example of this.

There are many factors that might deter someone from firing in each situation, and they vary.

In the first situation, it may be pure terror. People just freeze and do not fire.

In the second, it may seem futile to fire when you cannot see a target, and firing draws return fire. A lot of lower level leadership is directing this fire.

The third situation is different again. The soldier risks nothing by shooting to kill an easy target, but does not. They do not fire at all, or shoot to miss deliberately.

This last situation is, I think, something deep in our evolutionary psychology. When animals fight, they seldom risk or inflict serious injury. When human hunter gatherers go to war – there is a lot of posturing and showing of force and very little killing.

I've heard/read a few places that a tiny proportion of people can kill when they themselves are not in danger. I've heard figures ranging from 2% to 5%.

I suspect some high performing units somehow concentrated more of these 'stone cold killers'. The tiny groups of US paratroops who were active early on D-Day [when quite a lot just hid] probably included more men who were spoiling for a fight and ready to kill if they got the chance. Hence they punched well above their weight.

This is a topic that fascinates me. Sadly solid data is hard to find.

Most of what you said in valid or at least to a point.

You also have situations when a soldier must kill a helpless enemy who is no threat an may be unaware they are in danger. Snipers being a good example of this.

If he [or she] is the enemy armed and not surrendering. It's a target to be serviced. Kill them before they kill you or worse your failure to do your "job" costs the life or lives of you friends/comrades.

Day 1 we learned at Infantry training. Your mission is to kill capture and destroy enemy personnel and equipment.
Pretty simple concept. I know sometimes in the past I may have been criticized for maybe being too blood thirsty, gung-ho, etc., with some of many comments, etc.

I was trained and served with many Officers and NCOs who fought in Vietnam when I was in the 101. Whether on purpose of just by being around them/training/being trained by them, etc., you picked up some of their concepts and experiences, etc. And even predilections. From them being in combat in some very tough situations with the 101, 1st Cav, Rangers/LRRPs, etc., etc.

They knew they may have to go to combat with you in charge. Better to train and prepare us to do our. Effectively and efficiently. Which in the Infantry was pretty clear.

When learning how to set up an ambush. We learned the tactics and techniques to make sure everyone and everything in that ambush Kill Zone does not make it out alive/functioning.

Unless of course you need to take a POW or two for intel purposes. But other than those two, everyone is dead. You check the bodies dead or dying for intel, e.g. maps, code books, journals, letters, etc., etc.

And on the way out you call in FA or CAS on that Kill Zone and areas around it. You want to accomplish your mission and bring back all your troops. Again save for POWs for Intel, the enemy are expendable targets.

As I have said before I and my comrades were trained by some of the best. And no lolly-pops, rainbows or unicorns were anywhere in there. You do your job, accomplish your mission and in many cases that included kill the enemy in large numbers and often. That is how were trained by those Vets of the 101, 1st Cav, etc. They were no-BS kind of guys.

You are a predator, a hunter, not a victim …

I suspect some high performing units somehow concentrated more of these 'stone cold killers'. The tiny groups of US paratroops who were active early on D-Day [when quite a lot just hid] probably included more men who were spoiling for a fight and ready to kill if they got the chance. Hence they punched well above their weight.

Yes, I think that goes along with what I was saying. And Yes, there are some who are "stone cold killers". Especially after their comrades become KIA, WIA, etc.

Again I will use my example of after 9/11 … Payback is a mother. Killing as many of those that are or supported those that attacked your country. And killed your people, your friends, comrades, etc.

As we saw in e.g. in A'stan, we we rapidly defeated much of AQ and the Taliban. Shortly after 9/11. Inflicting heavy losses.

And even now that hunt continues. Their leaders have to know. They are living on borrowed time. E.g. UBL, his son, AZH, Baghdadi, Soulimani, and a long list of sub-commanders and minions.

You are trained to react. Kill, capture and destroy enemy personnel and equipment … the standing order is simple.

Interesting discussion. I think much of it boils down to a risk-reward decision for each individual. Is there some type of reward I'm going to get by sticking my head up to shoot and risk getting hit? Am I in immediate danger? In an exteneded medium/long range firefight where you cannot identify individual targets it may not be worth the risk.

If you look at some videos of VN and current firefights not everyone is shooting, some are walking around, some observing and some smoking a cigarette. Now if the signal went up for an FPF most likely everyone would respond as trained. If you look to your left and right and people are ducking for cover more than shooting you'll most likely do the same.

If a group was going to advance and the squad leader called for "covering fire" I'd expect most would shoot. I'd expect most would shoot if a clear target presents itself as there is a greater chance of a reward. Then there are the accounts of new guys just shooting into the air because they feel it might "scare" the enemy away.

Then there is the theory that only 20% do the real fighting and the rest are just kind of along for the ride to support the real fighters.

I think there are too many psychological aspects to really model it other than making small arms volume of fire somewhat variable.

Wolfhag

And we know some guys just like to blow up stuff and kill things … for whatever reasons …

Young men love to destroy stuff, especially if allowed to. Can't see this stopping most from firing weapons at least if it's just spray and pray. But we know absolutely most soldier's do not kill a opponent, some kill more than one, some might a hundred but the percentage that does is very small.

I think it's important to discriminate between the behaviour that training, military culture and experience of combat might lead to and what people would do naturally.

Training in WW2 and Vietnam was not up to modern standards and there was a high percentage of draftees in both WW2 and Vietnam [more in WW2].

For the US at least, there was no great hatred for Germans in 1941 [unlike for Japanese] though this will have developed with experience of combat. Likewise, hatred grew in Vietnam and often led to war crimes on a scale most Americans still do not appreciate and many deny.

From a wargaming/simulation perspective, green troops would lack an edge and under perform in their first few encounters with the enemy. If the system constantly feeds in replacements with lower levels of training and often low aptitude for combat – as was the case in WW2 and Vietnam – this is going to be a factor.

Many of these 'cherries' would become casualties before becoming effective infantrymen. Some might learn super fast and others never. Then there was the issue of the jaded 'short-timers' who felt they had done their part and someone else should step up.

I think it is significant that at several times, the US have sought to delete belt fed automatic weapons from their squads and rely on semi-automatic or full-automatic rifles- only to reintegrate them rapidly once involved in combat.

Good points!… thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

From a wargaming/simulation perspective, green troops would lack an edge and under perform in their first few encounters with the enemy.

Yes in some games it takes into account of Green, Veteran and Elite troops …

hatred grew in Vietnam and often led to war crimes on a scale most Americans still do not appreciate and many deny.

It could have been much worst and the number of such events were small compared to what the VC and even NVA committed at times.

Many of these 'cherries' would become casualties before becoming effective infantrymen. Some might learn super fast and others never.

The learning curve can be steep at times.

I think it is significant that at several times, the US have sought to delete belt fed automatic weapons from their squads and rely on semi-automatic or full-automatic rifles- only to reintegrate them rapidly once involved in combat.

There is no such thing as too much firepower …

"It could have been much worst and the number of such events were small compared to what the VC and even NVA committed at times."

Even if true that does not excuse crimes committed by US forces and their allies.

But let's not derail this thread with a topic we have covered very well before.

Funny enough the thread was less about soldiers committing atrocities, than about what is almost the converse.

A reluctance to use their weapon at all.

I still think the original article linked was concerned about front line soldiers, exposed to a firefight, Skarper's freezing and never firing their weapon at all, even when facing a direct personal threat.

I do not think it was really about the huge tail of any army, the inevitable REMs who were never called upon to use a weapon (and counted their blessings).

Even if true that does not excuse crimes committed by US forces and their allies.

Did I say I excused it ? NO …

Do I believe the VC & NVA committed more war crimes than the US/ROKs/SEATO ? Yes … Very much so … in much larger numbers and not just the against the US troops or civilians[e.g. missionaries, USAID, etc.]. But many, many more to the villagers in the small hamlets and vills all over Vietnam. Plus in places like Hues, Saigon, etc.

But let's not derail this thread with a topic we have covered very well before.

But yet here we go again …

Moving on …

Much of what you posted deadhead is generally true.

I still think the original article linked was concerned about front line soldiers, exposed to a firefight, Skarper's freezing and never firing their weapon at all, even when facing a direct personal threat.

Read "On Killing". Based on stats from WWII and Korea. In some pitched battles before Vietnam, maybe only about 15% actually fired their weapon.

However, as I posted previously on this thread. In Vietnam with the improved training techniques. Of teaching troops to shoot at outlines of humans as they pop up. And not just shooting at round targets. The firing rate went up to well over 95%. IIRC the figures/stats.

Regardless more US troops were engaging the enemy than in other war. And as I said that is the way I was trained, when I started ROTC in '75.

As a Plt Ldr or Co Cdr, once coming under fire, with well trained troops, they'd return fire, etc. And the leader, i.e. me, would try to call in mortars, FA, CAS, etc. One of a leaders primary functions in situations like that. And if need be fire the M16 that the Ldr is carrying as well.

Remember … "Kill, capture and destroy, enemy personnel and equipment" …

I do not think it was really about the huge tail of any army, the inevitable REMs who were never called upon to use a weapon

We spell that as "REMFs", you can figure it out. And probably many in Vietnam never fired their weapon in anger, etc. E.g. my one friends was a USAF Radar operator. Very
important job. But AFAIK never fired his weapon.

But with there really being no front lines per se. Airfields, rear areas, etc., did come under fire at time. The VC were known to sneak up on an airfield, fire a bunch of mortar rounds and withdraw. And sometimes they even hit something !

Remember seeing footage of a Bob Hope USO show going on somewhere in Vietnam. The place was full of troops, etc. Off in another section of the base, the VC did one of their small shoot & scoot mortar attacks. Bob Hope looked in that direction and said, "There are critics everywhere!". The troops went crazy laughing !!!

I'm of the view that US crimes [and ARVN/ROK crimes for which the US must bear some responsibility] were at least as severe as those committed by NLF/PAVN forces. I suspect on a question of pure scale it was several times greater.

However, it's impossible to document the crimes fully. Many of the US/ARVN/ROK crimes are proven beyond reasonable doubt. The perpetrators have confessed and impartial observers have investigated and gathered conclusive evidence. But many times more remain unconfirmed.

A good book, by Nick Turse is 'Kill Anything That Moves'. There is even an audiobook of it on youtube.

It's been harder to investigate the crimes of NLF/PAVN, though I don't doubt they were common and horrific.

Anyway. You have the right to believe as you do. I broached the topic [it was on my mind due to the other active thread in the WW2 Discussion board] but it has no particular bearing on this thread.

I can't recall where I read it but the author was a believer in the 80/20 rule that 20% do 80% of the fighting. His theory/findings were that the 20% were more savvy so were able to survive longer. So if a squad of 10 soldiers has 2 that were doing most of the fighting the squad could still function at almost 100% efficiency even if 2-4 of the 80% were KIA/WIA as they were not doing much anyhow. Thinking about it that's about the performance I would have expected from the squad I was in and we had one guy that was totally worthless and expendable and we'd be better off without him.

That makes an interesting validation for certain units to take more "hits" than others but losing just one of the real fighters really degrades performance.

Wolfhag

I'm of the view that US crimes [and ARVN/ROK crimes for which the US must bear some responsibility] were at least as severe as those committed by NLF/PAVN forces. I suspect on a question of pure scale it was several times greater.

I'm not so sure if you can put much blame on the ARVN or ROKs. They ran independent ops many times with no US attached. But yes the VC/NVA crimes were many times greater than what the US committed.

However, it's impossible to document the crimes fully. Many of the US/ARVN/ROK crimes are proven beyond reasonable doubt. The perpetrators have confessed and impartial observers have investigated and gathered conclusive evidence. But many times more remain unconfirmed.

Maybe …

the crimes of NLF/PAVN, though I don't doubt they were common and horrific.

That I can agree with …

You have the right to believe as you do.

Yes, and I do and will …

We don't agree and I doubt we ever will on this.. But we've gone off on a tangent too much so I won't elaborate.

Wolfhags points on the thread topic make sense to me. In my rules when I roll for a ‘hit' on a unit it may or may not have an effect. I rationalise this as hitting a key squad member or a hanger on.

We've all I'm sure been in teams or work crews and noticed how 2-3 people do all the work and 7-10 at best support or even hinder at times.

I have heard similar Wolf. Not everyone is a hunter/killer.

Skarper wrote -
"We've all I'm sure been in teams or work crews and noticed how 2-3 people do all the work and 7-10 at best support or even hinder at times."

We called it the "20/80 Rule", i.e. – 20 percent of the people do 80 percent of the work; the other 80 percent do the remainder.

B

Re SLA Marshall …..
See his first book, "Island Victory – The Battle of Kwajalein Atoll, from official interviews with all the men who fought" first published by Infantry Journal in Oct 1944. He did not make his data up. In the above book, it all came from the numerous on scene interviews conducted on the island with the officers, non-coms and private soldiers fresh out of action.

B

Blutarski,
The Pareto Principle 80/20 rule is actually somewhat "scientific":
link

From what I've read about this is that the 80% did contribute in some way by assisting the wounded, getting ammo, water, spotting, following in the advance, etc.

In an intense firefight, the only thing you can see is the guy to the left and right of you. If they are both ducking and not firing you'll probably do the same. If they think it's safe enough to shoot you probably will too. It's the Squad Leaders job to get a few shooting to show that the rest can shoot too.

I think another individual variable is do you really think it is worthwhile to shoot? If the enemy is far enough away to not be a threat and you can't spot a target to shoot at (the vast majority of the time) maybe it's better not to expose yourself as nothing is going to be gained.

Skarper listed some of the other situations.

I also recall reading that the SL would take guys that were reluctant to shoot and put them on a weapons team. If your buddy is next to you it's harder to shirk your duties.

How you reflect the psychological effects of small unit actions is interesting.

Wolfhag

I think there was for a time doubt about SLAM having had the time to conduct the number of interviews he claimed.

I'm not sure this is still an issue.

Hi Wolfhag,
I never knew of the Pareto Principle. Our "20/80 Rule" evolved (half in jest, to be honest) from our own immediate workplace observations. It is interesting to learn that a broader empirical foundation exists.

B

One point I recall coming across re participation of men in combat, was that crew-served weapons were/are far more likely to fire in the action. I've read various theories that seek to explain the phenomenon – influence of the team as a group; likelihood that the weapon would be under immediate command/influence of a superior.

Your thoughts?

B

Wolf +1

Yes, many don't want to show weakness and fail to do their job being the weak link and letting the "tribe" down. Plus in many cases survival instinct kicks in. But no matter what you will have some who demonstrate just the opposite. Breaking and running and that could be come contagious. Just like at times when one man shoots, everybody shoots. Or not …

Again good capable leadership is an important factor. And in some cases it may not be the highest rank there. In some cases, the lower ranks will rise to the occasion.

The concept of developing a team effort and unit bonding is still very important … as always. So everybody in the unit works together to accomplish the mission and do their job. Even if that job is not very "pretty" …

Blutarski,
My thoughts? It goes back to the definition I like for suppression: it degrades a unit's ability to observe, communicate, move and fire. The greater the enemy volume of fire the more it degrades everything. Studies have shown that when enemy small arms fire slackens or lifts the defenders recover from suppression very quickly but not so quickly from HE concussion. I look at a unit "rallying" when they have fallen back out or the enemy LOS, not while under fire.

I allow infantry units to Hunker Down being almost immune to direct small arms fire but cannot return fire unless they pass an Aggressiveness Check first. However, if the enemy shifts their fire the Hunkered Down unit can pop back up any time to move or shoot.

A German intel report said that a mistake US troops made was not to keep the entire enemy front under fire so they'd just laterally move to another spot and then pop back up to shoot or ambush them. Another dirty German trick was to have two MG shooting, one with tracers and one without. The one with tracers would purposely shoot over the heads of the US troops giving them a false sense of security to pop up and shoot and then immediately be shot by the MG without tracers.

Another variable is leadership. On Guadalcanal Chesty Puller was already a combat vet, most of his men were not. When they first came under fire they were pinned down and would not move. Puller calmly, while smoking his pipe, walked up and down the line telling guys there was nothing to be afraid of. I read another account a Marine officer trying this on Tarawa and got killed right away, that didn't help anything. The leadership rules I'm using allows the player to have a leader use his modifiers for various reasons but when he does he takes a causality check and 2nd LT's are twice as likely to be KIA/WIA.

I read an account of the night battle of Edson's Ridge (Bloody Ridge) on Guadalcanal. At some points during the battle single Marines tried to sneak away in the dark. They were met by officers and NCO's who said, "Get back to your hole and die". Another WWI British account of an officer coming back to his trenches seeing people fleeing to the rear. His efforts to turn the tide were fruitless until frustrate, he picked up a shovel and smashed a man running by him in the face killing him, it worked.

There is a British War Office report WO 291/471:
At 1-200 yards range the following weights of firepower are required versus targets in slit trenches. LN = light neutralisation 2.5% causalities per minute (reduces enemy fire), HN = heavy neautralisation 10% causalities per minute (completely suppresses target). Causality % has the shooter exposed and shooting for more than 1/3 of the time they are firing. Targets in trenches assumed to be exposing half a square foot to fire.

100 yards frontage, 250 rounds per minute LN, 1000 rpm HN.
or, in terms of units:

100 yards frontage, 1 section LN, 1 Pl + 1 sec HN
20 yards, 1 Bren group or rifle gp LN, 1 section HN
4 yards, 1 rifleman LN, 1 Bren of 3 rifles HN.

halve firepower against pillboxes.

Bear in mind this is against targets in trenches, against which a single rifle section can generate light neutralisation on 100 yard frontage. Against targets in the open?? I would suggest one section is quite capable of heavy neutralisation of all targets on a 100 yard frontage.

The study notes that a round passing within 3 feet of an individuual is clearly audible and can be presumed to generate 'suppression'.

Personally, I can see someone being reluctant to fire their weapon at an unseen enemy that is not an immediate threat. I've heard of squad leaders crawling up and down the line in a firefight kicking guys in the ass to fire their weapon, I've been kicked.

So much for my thoughts for today.

Wolfhag

Hi Wolfhag,
Good post, but I was actually wondering about your (and Legion 4's, for that matter) opinion re the tendency or likelihood of a crew-served weapon to actively participate in comparison to an individual infantryman.

B

Yes, the fact that there are 2 or more of you side by side certainly gives you some sort "comfort". Plus you know your heavy weapon will be very useful if not critical in supporting your comrades and in turn killing the enemy.

Killing the enemy in large numbers and often using all the assets available will certainly go a long way to bring you and your comrades home alive. And possibly in the long run winning the war/conflict.

Blutarski,
Yes, crew-served weapons do have a history of greater participation. It's easier to be a non-participant if no one is watching. Someone who is afraid to shoot will most likely be the first one to come to the aid of a wounded comrade as it takes him out of the battle or he may volunteer to make an ammo run. It's all about survival.

However, on a crew-served weapon, not everyone is exposed to danger or actually shooting. An MG team might have 4-6 members of which only the gunner and asst gunner are exposed.

On an anti-tank gun, you have the gunner and loader exposed. The other crew is feeding ammo to the loader or holding down the trailing arms. The gunshield is normally only big enough to protect two crewmen.

I think a lot of it is psychological. In a firefight, if the guy on your left and right is ducking a lot more than shooting you'll most likely do the same. If everyone is shooting back you might also think they really don't need your extra firepower.

There are times when a coward is brave and a brave man cowers, that's how you live to be an experienced veteran. You have to calculate your chances of survival. There can be times when your only chance of survival is to rise up and assault the enemy out of desperation. Sometimes it's the guy you least expect. It's hard to predict and individual leadership can be pivotal.

I can't recall where I read it but there have been accounts of green troops doing well and advancing under fire because they've never really been under fire before and aren't totally aware of the danger. Veterans may play it safe because they stayed alive long enough to learn the "Risk-Reward Survival Skills" to keep them alive in combat.

When the US Army Rangers parachuted directly onto the air strip in Grenada they were immediately pinned down and return fire was not successful in suppressing the enemy. After a while, a lowly enlisted Ranger stood up and shouted, "I've had enough of this s---" and charged the enemy position. The rest of the unit (dozens?) on the airstrip did the same and they took the enemy position. It was probably the first time that young Ranger was under fire and most likely there were a number of senior NCO's that had VN combat experience that were following him.

The 5th and 6th Marine Divisions at Iwo Jima were mostly new Marines that had never been under fire before but they had combat-experienced NCO's and did pretty well.

When you see a MOH or VC awarded to a Private or Lance Corporal there is a good chance it was his first battle. Maybe some people are just natural warriors that makeup that 20% and when they come under fire they feel right at home.

Wolfhag

Wolfhag… Chapeaux pour vous!…

Amicalement
Armand

After a while, a lowly enlisted Ranger stood up and shouted, "I've had enough of this s---" and charged the enemy position. The rest of the unit (dozens?) on the airstrip did the same and they took the enemy position. It was probably the first time that young Ranger was under fire and most likely there were a number of senior NCO's that had VN combat experience that were following him.

Yep that's the way it's done !

The motto of the US ARMY Infantry is "Follow Me !"

Legion,
I thought it was "Ranger's lead the way".

Wolfhag

Must admit I always thought "Follow me" was the Israeli Officer Corps motto. Very interesting contributions. Fascinating actually!

I thought it was "Ranger's lead the way".

That is the RANGER motto.

The Airborne motto is "Airborne All the Way!" [It is the 82d's Div motto as well, they were the US Army's first ABN DIV.]

Every Co., Bn, Bde, Rgt, Div and Corps has it's own motto. E.g. 2ID – "Second To None". My Bn of the 187 Inf Rgt in the 101 was "Rakkasan", My Inf Co. in the 187 was "the Battling Bastards"…

Many times it has to do with the unit's linage/history, i.e. my Bn in 3d Bde of the 2ID in the ROK, was 1st
Bn, 31st Inf was called the "Polar Bears". For it's time in Russia, 1918, after WWI fighting the "Reds"/Commies.

Must admit I always thought "Follow me" was the Israeli Officer Corps motto.

Not sure about that ? But I know it is the US ARMY Infantry motto. It is on the shoulder patch you wear when you are at the Infantry School at Ft. Benning, GA. And on a number of signs, buildings, etc. there. I still have some of my unit shoulder patches somewhere in my old Army stuff.

My favorite saying I saw over the door at the Inf Officer Basic Course HQ at Benning and Air Assault School at Ft. Campbell, KY. Was " Lead, follow or get the Hell out of the way !"

So after putting down my thoughts about this subject I think I going to use "GI Commanders" idea of rating troops with a Tactical Competence and Aggressiveness rating to replace the typical Elite, Veteran and Green ratings.

The Tactical Competence would determine their Immediate Action is taken when first being under fire, situational awareness, firepower, and time to perform actions. The Aggressiveness Rating would determine how likely they are to expose themselves to fire and advance under fire.

So a unit could have a low Tactical Competence Rating to reflect a "Green" unit and a high Aggressiveness Rating to reflect them being fanatical or overly aggressive.

Wolfhag

A one dimensional scale of troop quality is not going to be able to fit what we observe in combat very closely.

I'm not 100% happy with what I have in my system but, FWIW, here is what I do.

Troops are classed as Experienced, Trained or Green.

It is possible to improve troop quality [quite rare] or drop in troop quality during a game.

I give units a rating which I call 'COHESION' that abstracts how much experience the unit has had as a unit. Units with a lot of new replacements have low cohesion. Those who have been together a long time have high cohesion. Units with no combat experience but who have been selected and intensively and realistically trained can have high cohesion too. When a unit suffers casualties it may also suffer a drop in cohesion, reflecting a loss of a key unit member or a loss of faith in those who are leading the unit. This came from ASL's ELR rules, but I don't use the same mechanics.

I also have a 'MOTIVATION' rating. FANATIC, CONFIDENT, RELUCTANT, DEMORALISED. I stole the idea from Flames of War, but do not handle it the same way. You could have experienced troops who are demoralised due to a hopeless situation but still know how to survive on the battlefield.

I have experimented with special rules to reflect the traits of specific units. So the units who did not get pinned down as easily as more experienced units would get a modifier when trying to unpin. I'm not satisfied with this mechanic yet.