"How in the world could Gen Gavin actually believe this?" Topic
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Korvessa | 10 Oct 2020 11:16 a.m. PST |
So while watching a Youtube presentation on Market-Garden, the presenter mentioned that Gavin thought there was 1000 tanks nearbyi the Reichsvald (or however you spell that). Here it is "cut & pasted" from another source: "On September 17, 1944, two regiments of the 82nd Airborne landed mere kilometers from the Reichswald which then became the front line. Allied intelligence had obtained information that the Germans were hiding 1,000 tanks in the woods making it a prime objective of the Americans to secure that flank. It turned out that the Reichswald was unsuitable for tanks and only a fraction of the alleged 1,000 tanks ever materialized. It was, however, a perfect staging area for the Germans from which to launch counter-attacks that caused the 82nd Airborne a lot of trouble. After Operation Market Garden had failed a stalemate followed, and both sides dug in for the winter. For months the fighting was limited to combat patrols and artillery duels as the focus shifted elsewhere." How could they possibly believe that? A quick check of tanks.net said the Germans only had about 600 for the Battle of the Bulge. If he actually believed this and deployed his troops accordingly, he should bare a lot of the criticism that is directed towards Monty. |
robert piepenbrink | 10 Oct 2020 12:26 p.m. PST |
Korvessa, I'd find myself another "youtube presenter" or take up reading books. Gavin was certainly under orders to secure the wooded hills to his east which were part of the Reichswald, and it hindered his ability to secure the bridges in his sector. He griped about those orders later. But no one was telling anyone on the Allied side that the Germans had enough tanks for three full-strength corps in the vicinity, because the whole operating premise of Market-Garden was that there were no German tanks in the way. Might want to try Kershaw, Beevor or Ryan instead of youtube. And let me know if you ever find Gavin actually saying someone told him there were 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald--and if so, who told him. "Allied intelligence" is neither a person nor an organization. |
Blutarski | 10 Oct 2020 12:32 p.m. PST |
Gavin had very little advance notice of Operation Market, so would have had to rely upon 21st AG to supply details on any expected enemy opposition. Retention of the Groesbeek Heights overlooking the Reichswald SE of Nijmegen was a paramount objective for 82nd AB, so Gavin could not just ignore the possibility of German tanks. As it was, Operations Veritable and Grenade (Feb-Mar 45) involved perhaps half a dozen British armored divisions fighting their way through the Reichswald against German opposition that included at least two (IIRC) German armored divisions. The Reichswald was arguably no more unsuitable for tank operations than was the Ardennes. Strictly my opinion, of course. B |
Korvessa | 10 Oct 2020 1:09 p.m. PST |
R.P. I realize these are all secondary sources but they are consistent: Because of the proximity of the 505th Parachute Infantry to the Reichswald, these men were particularly concerned about the report they had received in England that the Reichswald was a nest of German armor. They breathed more easily when the patrol returned with word that "no tanks could be seen." This was in keeping with information provided by Dutch civilians soon after the landings to the effect that "the report about the 1000 tanks in the Reichswald was false." – THE SIEGFRIED LINE CAMPAIGN by Charles B. MacDonald On September 17, 1944, two regiments of the 82nd Airborne landed mere kilometers from the Reichswald which then became the front line. Allied intelligence had obtained information that the Germans were hiding 1,000 tanks in the woods making it a prime objective of the Americans to secure that flank. – link The following are quotes from Gavin's own book, On to Berlin: Pg 147: …and the British were convinced that considerable German armor was in the forest (meaning Reichswald)… Pg 148: … in addition to the panzers in the Reichswald… Pg 149: General Browning particularly directed me not to attempt the seizure of the Nijmegan bridge until all other missions had been successfully accomplished and the Groesbeek/Berg-en-Dal high ground was firmly in our hands. I could not have agreed with him more… There's no way that Gavin would admit to something like this after the fact. So yeah, I tend to believe it. |
Korvessa | 10 Oct 2020 1:09 p.m. PST |
Blutarski: Tanks yes, but a 1000?! |
robert piepenbrink | 10 Oct 2020 3:17 p.m. PST |
Korvessa, secondary is one thing. No footnote or bibliography is something else altogether, and that exactly describes your link to an anonymous commentator. I can get you "consistent" internet sources in favor of any conspiracy you'd care to name, because they keep quoting each other. "Considerable German armor" in the context of an airborne drop might be a battalion. And, as your own quotes make clear, Gavin's superiors had given him a direct order to secure that high ground before seizing the Nijmegen Bridge. His agreement wasn't necessary, and his disagreement wouldn't have changed his orders. Nor would Gavin have had access to the raw intelligence on German OOB. You're saying someone TOLD Gavin there were 1,000 tanks, but you're still not saying who. MacDonald is footnoted. Does he give a source? Also note MacDonald says "report" not "assessment" which is a huge difference. Any Dutch civilian can say "there must be a thousand tanks in those woods!" That's a report. An assessment is when a trained intel analyst--possibly as Blutarski says in XXI AG, maybe in 1st Allied Airborne Army, maybe at SHAEF--puts together that report with all the other civilian reports, air recon, POW interrogations, decrypts and anything else he can come up with and says "the woods are assessed to contain between X and Y tanks, probably belonging to Formation Z." And I don't think you're ever going to find that anyone made an assessment placing more tanks in the Reichswald than any assessment in that period of overall German tank strength in the west. I think what you're calling "allied intelligence" is a piece of RUMINT. In 1944, they'd have called it "latrine gossip." |
Legion 4 | 10 Oct 2020 3:31 p.m. PST |
Well as we know it wouldn't be the first time intel was wrong. |
dBerczerk | 10 Oct 2020 3:49 p.m. PST |
Operations end in only one of two ways: Operational Success or Intelligence Failure. |
TacticalPainter01 | 10 Oct 2020 4:00 p.m. PST |
Dutch historian R G Poulussen has an excellently researched book investigating Gavin's actions and decisions. He is very critical. link Cornelius Ryan engaged in more correspondence with Gavin than with any other MG commander. He never interviewed Browning, Dempsey or Horrocks. It would be fair to say Gavin had undue influence on Ryan and did much to ensure it was his version of events that Ryan recorded. Beevor can be problematic. He had a slightly irrational dislike for Montgomery and like Hastings sees the British army's performance during the war in a very poor light. Much of their thinking has been refuted by more recent scholarship. Last but not least A BridgeToo Far is a Hollywood dramatisation of events taking Ryan's work and then adding a few character assassinations based on the prejudices of the writer and director. Nijmegen was a key bridge and the question why it was not made Gavin's first and foremost priority and why he himself did not push with greater urgency is worthy of much more critical scrutiny. Surely holding the ridge was secondary in importance to taking the bridge? After all, the whole objective of MG was quick capture of the bridges so that XXX Corps could get to Arnhem. In the end Gavin's failure delayed XXX Corp who had to fight themselves to capture a bridge that was supposed to be secured BEFORE their arrival. |
robert piepenbrink | 10 Oct 2020 4:54 p.m. PST |
Too true, dBerczerk! Did we once work together? Tactical, note that I cited Ryan, not a movie. Also I'm not sure at what point disliking Montgomery becomes irrational. Some people admired him, but no one seems to have liked him. But Korvessa's question was not "was Gavin responsible for Monty's leather harness plan snapping?" but "how could General Gavin have believed there were 1,000 tanks in the Reichswald?" So far, I see no evidence that he did believe that--or that he was ever told such a thing, let alone told it by an intelligence officer responsible for an assessment. |
Blutarski | 10 Oct 2020 6:34 p.m. PST |
The official Field Order for the 82nd Airborne gives estimates of German tank strength in the general overall area of operations (i.e., including German 15th Army)as approximately 250 with an upper limit of perhaps 600 if armored reinforcements were provided. An interesting side-note is that the Field Order specifically stipulated that, in the event of any German armored vehicle being knocked out, full details re type and model were to be immediately forwarded to HQ ….. which suggests (to me at least) that the status of the German armor was a matter of some concern). One thing is for certain, however: German infantry was numerous in the operational area, including the Reichswald, and the 82nd's Groesbeek position was under heavy pressure over the entire period of the battle. B |
Wackmole9 | 10 Oct 2020 7:39 p.m. PST |
Wasn't General Browning's HQ for the Airborne Army with 82nd airborne at the Heights. |
TacticalPainter01 | 10 Oct 2020 7:42 p.m. PST |
Also I'm not sure at what point disliking Montgomery becomes irrational. Some people admired him, but no one seems to have liked him. I could have phrased it better. I don't believe that Beevor is capable of making an objective assessment of Montgomery and his contribution to this or any other campaign. That's a major failing for a trained historian. He allows a number of prejudicial views to cloud his judgement and prevent rational evaluation. The big question that needs answering is, what was more prejudicial to the failure of Market Garden, the loss of the Groesbeek position or the failure to take the bridge at Nijmegen quickly? The loss of Groesbeek may possibly have led to the failure of MG. The failure to take the bridge at Nijmegen most definitely did. Poulussen argues that Gavin must carry some of the blame for this, his access and relationship with Ryan allowed him to shape much of the narrative and absolve him from blame, but the documentary evidence would suggest this is not quite the full picture. Ryan, a journalist, failed to be more objective in gathering his story. For one thing, had he interviewed Browning he could have pressed him much harder on the planning and decision making around Groesbeek and Nijmegen, but Ryan failed to do that and so helped create a narrative that continues to this day. Worth remembering that Hasting too is a journalist. While they are trained to gather the facts, they are also looking for the scoop or the big story. Until Ryan published A Bridge Too Far, Market Garden was not a well known operation. Lost between DDay and the fall of Berlin, it was one unsuccessful operation in an otherwise very successful campaign in NW Europe. Its failure did little to prolong or change the outcome of the war. You could easily argue, as several historians have done, that it was well worth the attempt, as success could well have shortened the war. |
Dn Jackson | 10 Oct 2020 7:55 p.m. PST |
"How could they possibly believe that? A quick check of tanks.net said the Germans only had about 600 for the Battle of the Bulge." It was the bad radio crystals. Because of them Gavin didn't have internet access so he couldn't look at tank.net |
Skarper | 10 Oct 2020 8:01 p.m. PST |
It looks like Gavin knew he bore the brunt of the blame – and sought to shift it on to others. If he did say he was worried about 1000 tanks in the Reichswald it was probably to cover his grave error in not doing more to capture his primary objective on day 1. In hindsight – that is where the operation failed. At Nijmegen on day 1. Many commanders could have prevented this error, including Browning who should have done more. That said – the whole operation was planned in a week and mistakes were bound to happen. |
15mm and 28mm Fanatik | 10 Oct 2020 9:24 p.m. PST |
Nobody's perfect, even legendary commanders of daring US paratroopers could have moments of timidity and indecision. Still, one could wonder what his 101st AB colleague Maxwell Taylor would have done in his shoes. |
raylev3 | 10 Oct 2020 9:53 p.m. PST |
First of all, we're all looking at this with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight with a far more knowledge of what the Germans actually had. (Too bad he didn't have access to Tank.net!) Allied intelligence, Gavin, whoever would have relied on incomplete intelligence sources, best guesses, etc. Anything would have been an estimate. The bottom line is everyone knew the Germans had armor in the area, but did NOT know how much Anyone who's been in the military knows you have your objective and your intermediate objectives. You could NOT have controlled the bridge without controlling the high ground overlooking it. The ridge became an objective you needed to have in order to take and control the bridge. I seriously doubt he deployed his troops because he thought there were 1000 tanks in the woods. He would have had to deploy troops to defend against Germans of any kind on that flank. And, frankly, using YouTube as a source without seeing the primary source is as valid as using Wikipedia. If it's on the internet, it must be true. |
Korvessa | 10 Oct 2020 11:00 p.m. PST |
Some observations: I am not a professional historian, I don't really have a history degree (Social Science with a history concentration) , just an amateur who loves to read military history. But I am not an idiot either. I know that there is a lot of nonsense on Youtube. But you can also find quality if you look hard enough. I don't believe everything I read on the web, but I don't dismiss it just because it is on the web either. The particular one I looked at can be found here:
YouTube link and lists it sources including many of the works mentioned above: Sources: John Frost, A Drop Too Many. 2009. Max Hastings, Armageddon. London, 2004. Robert J. Kershaw, It Never Snows in September. Surry, 2007. Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 17-29 September. 2009. Robert Neillands, The Battle for the Rhine 1944. UK, 2014. Poulussen, R.G. Lost at Nijmegen. 2011. Cornelius Ryan, A Bridge Too Far. USA, 1974 Major General R E Urquhart, Arnhem. 1958. Major General S Sosabowski, Freely I Served. Great Britain, 1982. |
TacticalPainter01 | 11 Oct 2020 12:05 a.m. PST |
First of all, we're all looking at this with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight with a far more knowledge of what the Germans actually had. (Too bad he didn't have access to Tank.net!) Allied intelligence, Gavin, whoever would have relied on incomplete intelligence sources, best guesses, etc. Anything would have been an estimate.The bottom line is everyone knew the Germans had armor in the area, but did NOT know how much I have to disagree. We are talking about early September 1944 in the West. The German front had nearly disintegrated and the Germans were frantically transferring units, trying to rebuild others and plugging gaps. The Allies knew much of this and had a good idea of enemy strength and location, plus they had Ultra. It's one reason a plan like MG looked viable, the Germans were barely able to hold a cohesive line, let alone concentrate and mount a major counterattack. Surely once XXX Corp reaches Nijmegen and crosses the river the threat of a successful counter attack preventing Arnhem being reached recedes. Assuming the Germans can muster enough for a serious counterattack (and that's a big assumption) it must be carried out against total Allied air superiority and not against lightly armed airborne units but against the supporting British corp on the flank of XXX Corp. Between crushing allied air power and artillery it's hard to see how a counterattack is likely to succeed. While the decision to hold the heights and guard the flank makes sense, it only makes sense if the Nijmegen bridge is taken quickly and XXX Corp arrive and cross as planned. While there was much fighting around the heights, none of it represented such a threat to the core plan that it warranted delaying taking the bridge. If we want to use any hindsight it's to understand how critical the Nijmegen bridge was to MG's success and how the decision made before the landings and immediately after were pivotal to operational success. This begs the question why wasn't taking the bridge the overriding priority for the units assigned to take and hold that area? And if they were, why didn't Gavin act more aggressively? |
robert piepenbrink | 11 Oct 2020 4:06 a.m. PST |
Korvessa, I never meant to call you an idiot. If you took it that way, I'm sorry. But you made a very specific statement--that Gavin went into the Arnhem campaign having been told that there were 1,000 German tanks in the Reichswald, that Gavin believed it to be true, and that this belief affected--as it naturally would--operations to seize the Nijmegen Bridge. But you're not telling us anything which tracks this back to any source. You aren't giving us a statement by Gavin in an interview or memoir which mentions 1,000 tanks. And you're certainly not showing us an intelligence briefing which used such a number. In fact, you're not even giving us the organization which allegedly used such a number. THAT is the big advantage of a properly footnoted book: when the author says something you haven't heard before or don't believe, you can see where he got his evidence, and in extreme cases double-check to confirm that his source did in fact say that. Which is why, while I'm perfectly willing to use Wikipedia for a ready reference, or to check Youtube for the latest movie gossip, when someone says something I have trouble believing, I want to see it in writing, and footnoted. We really don't have a better system for verifying facts. In fact, we don't have anything else as good. |
Brownand | 11 Oct 2020 4:26 a.m. PST |
Raylev3, your conclusion on objectives is wrong, without having the bridge, holding the ridge makes no sense. Gavin interpreted the situation totally wrong. The first objective should have been the bridge, and it could have been taken on the first day. |
Blutarski | 11 Oct 2020 9:03 a.m. PST |
I would offer an alternative interpretation: The Groesbeek Heights dominated both the bridge itself and the road leading to it. Without firm control of the heights, the road bridge alone was useless. It did not make sense to spend assets in an early attack upon the well defended bridge before the adjacent heights were seized and brought under firm control. The Field Order issued to 82nd Airborne listed capture of the Groesbeek Heights as the first order of business. Seizure of the road bridge was indeed assigned to one of the 82nd's regiments, but the actual timing of the attack was left to the discretion of Gavin as the division commander. It must be asked why that condition was included in the Field Order; one plausible explanation is that it was deemed desirable to allow some degree of command flexibility to Gavin. Browning (who had himself chosen to drop with the 82nd) was actually the senior in command at Nijmegen and had told Gavin that he (Gavin) was to take no action regarding an attack upon the road bridge without first consulting with him. Once again, why the hesitation and concern? Perhaps because the Groesbeek situation was at that time viewed as a good deal more sensitive than the histories suggest. We all focus on the road bridge at Nijmegen as if it were the pivotal aspect of the fight at Nijmegen; there has been precious little discussion of the hard and continuous back-and-forth fighting around the Groesbeek Heights. The approaches to the road bridge were heavily defended by the Germans and the 82nd, having been dropped behind German lines, did not have the luxurious sort of artillery support otherwise available to infantry attacks. Is it possible that Browning and Gavin were waiting for the appearance of XXX Corps to support the effort against the bridge? After all, the bridge was of no use until XXX Corps reached Nijmegen ….. and they were running behind schedule. This was an operation with (once again) a lot of moving parts. B |
typhoon2 | 11 Oct 2020 10:50 a.m. PST |
William F. Buckingham's stance in his book 'Arnhem 1944' gives the benefit of the doubt to Gavin. He cites Browning as having specifically ordered the 82nd to focus on the Groesbeek Heights, leaving the bridge for after the Heights were secured. Quoting Gavin's book 'On to Berlin' Buckingham claims that Gavin agreed with Browning but shortly after take-off ordered the 508th PIR to send a battalion to the bridge as soon as the situation allowed. It should be noted that Gavin also instructed his division to carry over 700 anti-tank mines plus extra ammunition loadouts, based on his experiences in Normandy. While this is again information gleaned from Gavin's own book it does make sense, although if he really believed that there were a thousand panzers in those woods 700 mines were definitely not enough! It should be noted that elements of the Nijmegan force had to be recalled to protect the landing zones for the second wave. It wasn't tanks that caused Gavin worries but infantry and SP flak. Only after the artillery had landed and the Germans been beaten back did Browning finally twig what was really the priority and ordered Gavin to push for the bridge (some three and a half hours before Guards Armoured Division's pre-battle timetable had the tanks crossing it!). However, he quickly scrapped that idea and fixated again on holding the Heights as a priority, only releasing forces once more when GAD actually arrived. Buckingham believes that subsequent badgering of Gavin to press the Nijmegan bridge was due to a growing realisation that Browning's plan was unravelling and the latter needed a scapegoat. As a proud Briton I'd love to able to say that it was US, not British (and Polish) failure at Market-Garden, but I firmly believe that Gavin did the best he could while under direct orders – literally direct since Browning was looking over his shoulder half the time. |
Brownand | 11 Oct 2020 11:27 a.m. PST |
The bridge wasn't heavely defended on the first day, that happened only later as Germand reinformcements arrived. The whole idea was to have a corridor to Arnhem, all the bridges were necessary. In not attacking,taking and holding the bridge was a grave mistake (be it from Gavin or his superiors for not pusing Gavin enough). |
Mark 1 | 11 Oct 2020 1:57 p.m. PST |
…without having the bridge, holding the ridge makes no sense. Gavin interpreted the situation totally wrong. The first objective should have been the bridge, and it could have been taken on the first day. This statement demonstrates a common logical failing -- it conflates priority with sequence. Just because taking and holding the bridge was the top priority, does NOT mean it should have been the first task undertaken in sequence. Anyone who does planning as part of their profession should recognize this. - My first priority is to grow revenue. That does not mean I push sales BEFORE I have developed and produced new products. - My first priority is to defeat the Nazi regime based in Berlin. That does not mean I attack Berlin BEFORE I have landed in Normandy. Just because you have a priority does not mean you have the sequence. That's why you have plans with "a lot of moving parts". The bridge wasn't heavely defended on the first day, that happened only later as Germand reinformcements arrived. And France was not heavily defended until 1944. That does not mean D-Day should have been attempted in 1942. There are often pre-conditions that must be met before one attempts the main effort. If the 82nd had seized the bridge on day one, and been encircled and cut off by a flank counter-attack coming from the direction from which it had been EXPECTED to come, we would instead be decrying how Gavin had not followed his orders, had ignored the intelligence appreciations, and had violated basic principles of warfare that have been known since time immemorial. (And we would have been just a bit less wrong there as here.) A commander deals with imperfect information, and tries to balance priorities, using economy of force where he can so he can focus the majority of his forces in space and time on a limited number of objectives. To do this he must sequence the issues he will focus on. And generally, the sequence is to focus first on the greatest near-term threat, before focusing on the greatest long-term gain. Or so I have read. Never actually served as a commander of a combat force, nor have I played one on TV. -Mark (aka: Mk 1) |
Legion 4 | 11 Oct 2020 3:16 p.m. PST |
The Groesbeek Heights dominated both the bridge itself and the road leading to it. Without firm control of the heights, the road bridge alone was useless. It did not make sense to spend assets in an early attack upon the well defended bridge before the adjacent heights were seized and brought under firm control. I totally agree with this. I was only an Inf Plt Ldr then Co. Cdr, but that makes tactical sense to me. but I firmly believe that Gavin did the best he could while under direct orders Very much so, and as we know Airborne/Para units are generally fairly lightly armed. So as we see with having surprise on your side. You can rapidly capture an OBJ and[hopefully] hold it. That is their classic use/employment. Once on the ground they become Light Infantry and have to operate as such. Using terrain, darkness, stealth, etc., to accomplish their mission(s). A commander deals with imperfect information, and tries to balance priorities, using economy of force where he can so he can focus the majority of his forces in space and time on a limited number of objectives Even a Rifle Plt Ldr or Mech Co. Cdr I had to deal with that. You always seem not to have enough time or troops to do the job. E.g. a location that should have been a strong point held by a Plt. ends up only of having a Squad. As a Plt Ldr in the 101, '80-'81, the Co. was short a whole Plt ! |
raylev3 | 12 Oct 2020 9:20 p.m. PST |
Raylev3, your conclusion on objectives is wrong, without having the bridge, holding the ridge makes no sense. Gavin interpreted the situation totally wrong. The first objective should have been the bridge, and it could have been taken on the first day. You can't hold a small objective like that if you can't control the terrain over looking it. If you take the bridge and the enemy takes the ridge you'll be under fire and nothing will cross the bridge. So, those reinforcements you talked about could have take the ridge and controlled the bridge and its approaches. And 20/20 hindsight one whether or not the bridge could be taken on day one doesn't count. Legion4 and Mark1 are spot on. |
TacticalPainter01 | 12 Oct 2020 10:27 p.m. PST |
The Groesbeek heights do not overlook the bridge in a literal sense. We're talking about Holland here, one of the flattest countries in Europe, the term heights' suggests something this low lying ridge is not. They were a suitable location on which to place a defensive shield to cover the flank should the Germans attempt an attack out of the Reichswald. If anything they were too far away from Nijmegen. Why suggest capturing and holding the bridge was not a suitable task for lightly armed airborne troops, is this not what every airborne unit was tasked to do? It was the mission. Frost successfully held one end of the bridge at Arnhem with airborne units. He held out for three days against enormous odds. Gavin would not have had to hold out at Nijmegen for as long. No bridge, operation fails. Capture bridge and operation has a chance of succeeding. Gavin is not the only one at fault here, but neither is he blameless |
TacticalPainter01 | 12 Oct 2020 10:43 p.m. PST |
For a better idea of the local topography here's a short video looking at Nijmegen and Groesbeek, then and now, where you can see how flat the land is and the absence of any heights' over the bridge. Had the airborne held the bridge against a German attack it would have required the Germans to engage in a city fight against some very tough opponents. Like Arnhem it's not difficult to imagine the US airborne putting up a determined fight in an advantageous environment for a defender. youtu.be/IEGj_kAuvpM |
Brownand | 13 Oct 2020 5:44 a.m. PST |
this is another one about the "heights" regarding the landings YouTube link but to be honest there were really hills in the neigbourhood on which was fought. The groesbeek heights themselves were appr. 100 meter while nijmegen lies on a height of 35m |
Brownand | 13 Oct 2020 6:54 a.m. PST |
For those who want to see the geography of the groesbeek height, the distance to nijmegen bridge go to: link it's in dutch but explains itself I think As it is a modern map, the city of Nijmegen is bigger of course. |
Blutarski | 13 Oct 2020 8:33 a.m. PST |
Here are the tactical assessments of the terrain in the vicinity of NIJMEGEN, as written up by XVIII Airborne Corps and in Field Order No. 11 for 82nd Airborne Division From: HEADQUARTERS XVIII CORPS AIRBORNE OPERATION MARKET PRELIMINARY TACTICAL STUDY OF THE TERRAIN 11 September 1944 3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN d. Observation. The NIJMEGEN-GROESBEEK ridge affords excellent observation in all directions for that sector. 4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES a. The NIJMEGEN-GROESBEEK Ridge - - From: FIELD ORDER NO. 11 82nd Airborne Division 3. MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE TERRAIN a. Avenues of Approach and Lines of Communication: Dictated entirely by roads for large bodies of troops. NIJMEGEN is the hub for a radiating systems of main roads. b. Obstacles: The waterways named in Paragraph 2 a are formidable natural obstacles. The built-up area centering on NIJMEGEN and the high-tension line adjacent to and paralleling the WAAL MAAS Canal on the east are artificial barriers to A/B operations, as are the numerous drainage ditches. Barbed wire strung across the fields east of NIJMEGEN has been discovered through photographic examination. c. Concealment and cover offered by ditches, woods and buildings vary from fair to good. d. Observation: Excellent from the dominating NIJMEGEN GROESBEEK ridge; obtainable from structural observations and lone hillocks, elsewhere in the area. e. Fields of fire from good to excellent for all weapons - - 4. CRITICAL TERRAIN FEATURES: a. MAAS River & crossings. b. WAAL River & crossings. c. WAAL MAAS Canal & crossings. d. NIJMEGEN GROESBEEK Ridge. 5. TACTICAL EFFECT OF THE TERRAIN. The terrain forces an enemy desiring to hold it to heavily organize the NIJMEGEN GROESBEEK Ridge and the crossings of the three major waterways. The area is in general decidedly unsuitable for airborne landings from the point of view of good landing grounds, but the obviously key communications and ground warn the defender that it is a tempting target. It is very easy for him to cover with fire and obstacles the best obtainable LZ's and DZ's in the area, which are: a. Vicinity JONKER BOSCH BROEKKANT. b. Vicinity GROESBEEK WYLER BREEDEWIG. c. Vicinity NEERBOSCH BEUNINGEN WEURT. - - As regards expected enemy opposition, it was mentioned that numerous Flak weapons (9 x light, 30 x heavy) were positioned around NIJMEGEN, sited in dual-purpose positions that allowed both AA fire capability and tactical engagement of ground targets. FWIW.
B |
Legion 4 | 13 Oct 2020 10:12 a.m. PST |
Why suggest capturing and holding the bridge was not a suitable task for lightly armed airborne troops, is this not what every airborne unit was tasked to do? Yes, you don't have to physically occupy an OBJ, e.g. a bridge to control it. It is like targeting any likely enemy avenue of approach, etc. |
Skarper | 13 Oct 2020 10:39 a.m. PST |
They did have to get onto the bridge to remove demolition charges. The fact a Dutch resistance fighter was able to cut the wires was to say the least fortunate. Gavin should have made the bridge number 1 priority on day 1. Troops should have been moving towards it within 1 hour of landing. Frost was on the way in short order at Arnhem. If Gavin's plan lacked this sense of urgency, his superior should have insisted. But plans were rushed. Complacency was at ridiculous levels and everyone involved expected little to no resistance. Given these, Gavin can be excused making a few mistakes. There is no excuse though to deny that the operation failed because Nijmegen did not fall until it was too late. I am persuaded by the evidence presented in the youtube videos that this was the key error while other errors no doubt compounded it. |
Blutarski | 13 Oct 2020 2:05 p.m. PST |
It wasn't Gavin's plan. And Browning (senior commander on the ground and Gavin's superior at Nijmegen) insisted upon keeping final authorization for the attack on the road bridge in his hands. B |
Brownand | 14 Oct 2020 5:45 a.m. PST |
In a discussion on the same topic almost a year ago regarding the authorization Fred Cartwright wrote: Which recollections of Gavin are you talking about? The one you quoted or the recollection that Westover quotes where in answer to a direct question, Gavin states unequivocally that it was he who made the decision to prioritise the heights over the bridge? It seems that Gavin's recollections changed between Westover's question in 1945 and the time that the Siegfried Line Campaign was compiled. I think you have no proof of your statments about browning |
Just Jack | 14 Oct 2020 8:52 a.m. PST |
"I think you have no proof of your statments about browning" And I think a lot of folks posting here don't know how the military planning process works. It begins with a Warning Order telling you to begin working up plans for an operation. In the WarnOrd your boss gives you a skeleton regarding: Situation Mission Execution Administration and Logistics Command and Signals That's where your boss tells you the what's going on, an assessment of enemy forces, capability, and intent, the forces you will have allotted for the mission, your chain of command, and his commander's intent, i.e., "by D+1 I wish to hold the bridge," or "by D+1 I wish to hold the Heights," or, God forbid, "by D+1 I wish to hold the bridge and the Heights." From that you get your staff together and work up a plan, which will be issued as an Operations Order. If you have time you'll actually work up three different plans and brief each of them to the boss for him to pick which one he likes best, but if there's not time you may just work up one course of action and then brief it to the boss, who, of course, may order you to modify it. Once the boss has approved the plan (and I'm speaking of Gavin's boss approving Gavin's plan for how Gavin intends on using Gavin's division in order to satisfy the the "commander's intent" provided to Gavin by his boss), final touches are put on it and then the OpOrd is published. From there it is briefed to all subordinate commanders, they work up their own plans to satisfy Gavin's "commanders' intent"), the plans get approved, and it flows down, with OpOrds going all the way down to platoon level. Once all plans are worked up, briefed, approved, completed, and issued, units at all levels carry out rehearsals and then carry out the order. Simple ;) So Browning would have assembled his staff (Admin, Intel, Ops, Logistics, Comms, Air Trans, etc…), brought in each of his division commanders, and given them an outline of their orders. The Division commanders go back to their staffs and draw up plans to carry out Browning's orders, brief and get approval from Browning on their plans, then go and carry them out. I disagree with the statements regarding tactical decisions made once on the ground; Browning's Corps HQ could be co-located with Gavin's Div HQ, but Browning is running the Corps and Gavin is running his division, so theoretically Browning making tactical decisions on the ground for Gavin's division, just because he happened to be there, shouldn't be happening. Though stranger things have occurred. So that's the planning aspect. Now it very well could be that Browning's intent was to own the bridge and the Heights, so Gavin made a plan for that but didn't carry it out. An example of that would be planning to take the bridge and the Heights, but then landing and finding the situation doesn't match what was expected, maybe feeling like the limited forces on the ground are unable to support each other and not wanting to hang them out, he changes the plan on the fly, focusing on one over the other. Or maybe he planned to take the bridge and the Heights, but from the get-go he was convinced they both couldn't be done. Maybe he lacked the fortitude or ability to argue up to Browning, so he drew the plan up to get both but knew that, once on the ground, he was only going to aggressively pursue one of them. Things like that have definitely occurred in military history. Then you can argue about how 1) he should have argued more strongly with Browning to narrow it down to a a primary and secondary, rather than two primary objectives (assuming that's what actually happened, I have no idea), or that 2) having taken the decision himself on which was primary and secondary, he made a tactical error. Along those lines I would agree that the Heights takes precedence over the bridge, but then I've never been an 'ignore your flanks and just keep pushing' type of guy. For what's it's worth… V/R, Jack |
Legion 4 | 14 Oct 2020 9:13 a.m. PST |
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Blutarski | 14 Oct 2020 4:50 p.m. PST |
A very useful document to peruse is "First Allied Airborne Army Operations in Holland September-November 1944". > Brereton was in command of FAAA. > Browning was the man who prepared the battle plan and submitted it to Brereton. > Brereton placed Browning in command of all FAAA ground combat operations, until his positions were "overrun" by XXX Corps. As such, he chose to drop with 82nd Airborne at Nijmegen. > The 82nd was not sitting idle at Nijmegen. Read the combat narrative re the continuous heavy fighting around the drop zones on the Groesbeek Heights and the miscarried supply drops starting on D+2. All the statistics are available. B |
Legion 4 | 15 Oct 2020 3:16 p.m. PST |
Yes, from what I have studied, read, etc., once on the ground all the Airborne units were heavily engaged. Generally that was the nature of all parachute drops/glider landings behind enemy lines throughout the war. And Korea too for that matter … |
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