"Was the Russian Military a Streamroller ?" Topic

FROM WORLD WAR II TO TODAY

"Joseph Stalin supposedly claimed that "quantity has a quality all its own," justifying a cannon-fodder mentality and immense casualties. The problem is, Stalin never actually said that, but it fits our stereotype about the Russian military so neatly that everyone believes he did.

When it comes to war, Russia is commonly perceived as favoring quantity over quality and winning mainly by overwhelming its opponents with hordes of poorly trained soldiers. You can hardly find any account of Russia's wars that does not use terms like "hordes," "masses," and even "Neolithic swarms." Quantity, it is believed, made quality almost irrelevant.

German generals propagated the myth of a Red Army comprised of faceless masses of troops, motivated only by NKVD rifles at their backs and winning only through sheer force of numbers. Many Western histories accept this view, and it is standard fare in Hollywood, notably in the 2001 Enemy at the Gates. The story was also standard fare during the Cold War, when the intelligence community frequently overestimated the quantitative side of Soviet capabilities while belittling its quality…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Russian (Soviet) generals were at the forefront of military innovation in the 1930s. They developed theories of large-scale operational maneuver and mechanized warfare that are still influential today. Then came the Stalin purge. He eliminated anyone he considered bright or talented enough to be a serious rival for power. One victim was Marshall Tuckhachevsky--the brain behind operational maneuver. Another one was the Polish-born general Rokossovsky, who survived the gulag and terrible tortures including the loss of his teeth to lead Soviet Army groups in the Great Patriotic War. I work with a former Soviet officer who now works with me for the US Army and he assured me that his father, an artillery soldier during the Battle of Stalingrad and his buddies, went into battle with the name of Stalin and Mother Russian in their lips. Westerners are still beholden to self-aggrandizing semi-racist myths created by Manstein, Von Mellenthin and other German generals after WWII to ingratiate themselves with the US and the West. The Soviets, my friend is Azerbaijani, fought for their very lives, their homes, and their families since they were considered "untermenschen" by official Nazi propaganda.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Good intel there Legionarius …

Humans love stories. WW2 has many stories that history does not support. The story fed to salivating postwar US officers eager for a strategy to defeat the 'Soviet Horde' still has legs, despite being highly suspect.

When we play games that play off this story it becomes ingrained. Games are the most effective teaching method, far outstripping video or text based methods. This is because they immerse the learner, and reward learning and punish misunderstandings.

Many if not all the premises we based our WW2 games on in the early years of wargames have been debunked.

The Soviets never enjoyed massive numerical superiority at any time in WW2. What they were able to do was concentrate a large local superiority, 3:1, 5:1 or 10:1. This was much easier to do in the East where the Germans were stretched thin than it ever was in the West.

I characterise Soviet WW2 strengths as follows:

Soviets were ruthless – willing to absorb losses to achieve results.
Soviets were smart – using their strengths well.
Soviet material was of adequate quality and available in quantity. [Though never the vast quantities alleged by the postwar Germans].
Soviet strategy in the later years was sound. They didn't mess around with tactical goals and went for the big strategic moves.

In 1944-45, Soviet forces achieved amazing results. Admittedly, the Germans had been ground down by attrition, stupid policies regarding replacements and some strategic decisions that moved large forces West to meet the impending invasion. Operation Bagration would have been a tougher prospect if all those divisions sent West had been in the East but it would likely still have been a success.

Skarper, good contribution!+1 By the way Operation Bagration showed that Soviet marshals and senior officers had become masters of large-scale operational maneuver--they went for the big objectives not tactical finesse. Sometimes they had "won ugly," but in the end, that is what counts. On a different note, the Soviet Army, did commit horrendous war crimes in this last phase of the war in revenge for years of Nazi atrocities and their scorched earth policies. The war between two totalitarian ideological powers was extremely ugly.

All very true … Along the way to Berlin and once the USSR troops got there. Payback was SOP. E.g. over 90,000 German women were raped if those stats are correct. And based on my study, it seems being an accurate number … sadly …

And both Nazi German and IJFs' war crimes are very well known, very numerous, heinous and horrible.

Not a lot of clean hands …

I've often wondered how the western front would have gone with Russian generals in charge.

Rommel's whole force would have been pocketed and bagged in Normandy, I suspect.

The Western front was a different ball game. The same kind of operations could not have worked in the West as they did in the East.

I think the Soviets became very good at subterfuge; making it seem like the attack is coming from point A while attacking point B. In this case the Germans were expecting the attack south of the Pripyat Marshes I believe. It's probably easier to amass a better troop ratio when your opponent doesn't see it coming.

I can imagine Soviet Generals doing Market Garden and/or other airborne landings like the US/UK Generals did. With allied airpower in the west I don't think it would have mattered much which generals were in charge.

My two cents.

Is it possible to answer that question 'yes' without it being construed as a negative? I am guessing my thinking is in line with Skarper's. The Soviets have sufficient numbers and sufficient parity in quality that the Soviets can mass forces to obtain clear local superiority on one part of their line without fataly weakening it elsewhere. If taking a key objective means throwing in a second or third wave of troops and equipment, the Soviets are willing to do it.

Also Agree with Skarper.

Amicalement
Armand

It is pretty well known the USSR in WWII was more than willing to take heavy losses. If they really wanted to take an OBJ/complete a mission, etc.