"The Causes of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Loss at Waterloo 1815" Topic

I agree that it was an allied and not solely a British victory. Further, it was a fluke that the allies won at all. Napoleon should've really won that battle and I think that is what makes the campaign/battle all the more curious and wonderful to study and ponder.

It's also true that without Bluecher, Wellington would have unlikely given battle. But there are so very many intangibles such as If both D'Erlon and Grouchy hadn't endlessly wandered around the campaign, Napoleon wins hands down.

1) If Blucher hadn't shown
- "Desolé, mein herr. Something came up. Did I miss anything?"

2) Or had been stopped.
- By…

3) If……………..

@Minipigs

Spot on with your comments on an Allied victory.

I think though that Napoleon was more than just unfortunate.

You might well be right, an on form Napoleon with his army from the Camp of Bolougne or similar could well have been unstoppable.

It's controvertial, but I wouldn't reject out of hand that the Napoleon of 1815 wasn't the same general. All generals seek to know what's going on "on the other side of the hill" and in former campaigns his powers of perception seemed almost supernatural. Despite daring first moves, his ability to anticipate his enemy subsequently appeared lacklustre.

The Armee du Nord was not the sparkling instrument that some believe it to have been. Yes, there was a high proportion of veterans, but most recently they had experience of invasion, defeat or imprisonment. High profile defections had weakened trust in it's officers and thus eroded both formation and unit cohesiveness. Napoleon had abdicated and abandoned them once, so it would not have been unreasonable to entertain that he might do so again. High morale was in evidence, but as the collapse and rout demonstrated, much more fragile than Napoleon or his officers knew, or later commentators suppose. That makes the "Voila Grouchy!" ruse much more dangerous to perform, and I personally believe it had a much greater effect than has generally been commented on.

an on form Napoleon with his army from the Camp of Bolougne or similar could well have been unstoppable.

Unless he met an on-form Wellington with his army from the Peninsula, of course. He'd then have been lucky to lose only as badly as he did.

One thing I always find bemusing about these discussions is that they are always about what if Napoleon had sent this guy here or that guy there or invaded this other country instead. Meanwhile, the constraints under which Wellington worked are entirely unacknowledged.

Good point 4C. The usual response to this is that Wellington won. The land of What If is inhabited with scenarios in which the loser was stronger or smarter or luckier, or where the winner was weaker or not as smart or not as lucky. Wellington being in overall command of all Allied forces in 1815 isn't a likely scenario. Wellington having greater control over the staffing of his own army or having some control over the Prussians though might be something worth pursuing.

Wellington having control over the composition of the British infantry contingent after March 1815 would not be a likely factor, I doubt. Even less so over that of the new Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Wasn't the mud a fairly significant factor?

Yes, there was more mud at Waterloo than British troops, which proves Wellington lost.

Unless he met an on-form Wellington with his army from the Peninsula, of course…

That is highly unlikely. The Grande Armee of 1805-1807 was the best army of the period in personnel, morale, training, and leadership.

Which year would Wellington's peninsular army be 'on-form'? It changed in organization and units from year to year and it seldom had enough artillery, even with the addition of the excellent Portuguese artillery arm that eventually added to its combat power.

And it's just another 'what if' that really cannot be substantiated in any meaningful context.

Which year would Wellington's peninsular army be 'on-form'? It changed in organization and units from year to year

Presumably, despite the notorious debâcle after Vittoria, up until the moment the Peninsula army was dispersed after Toulouse. The variation in composition would appear to have been of relative importance. As worn out battalions were withdrawn, others arrived. They all bore 'Peninsula' on their colours.

Certainly, as far as Wellington himself was concerned,
"I could have done anything with that army it was in such perfect order."

And it never faced the Grande Armee of 1805-1807 nor even the excellent Army of Germany of 1809 with its large contingents of Confederation of the Rhine.

And what is being overlooked is after 1811 units and individuals were being withdrawn from Spain by Napoleon in preparation for the invasion of Russia.

Davout's command in central Europe was never deployed to Spain and Wellington never faced Suchet either. So your points are irrelevant.

And it should be remembered that those British regiments sent to North America to fight the US didn't do too well and two of Wellington's commanders were killed in action-Ross at North Point, and Pakenham at New Orleans.

Let's unquestioningly accept for a moment that the Anglo-Allied army and the Prussian army of 1815 were not troops of the same calibre as Napoleon's army; that Wellington and Blucher were not such skilful generals as Bonaparte; that their subordinates were not the equals of Soult, Ney &c.; that they had been outwitted strategically, &c. &c.

Doesn't it then make their achievement in winning the campaign and battle of Waterloo all the greater? And the men and their commanders deserving of more praise?

Rather like a lower league soccer team of unheard of semi-professionals beating a Premier team such as Manchester United, full of expensive, foreign, star players, in an FA Cup match, who would be loudly applauded, not criticised. The manager of the losing team bleating 'we was robbed', 'the referee was biased', 'we deserved to win' would just be dismissed as 'sour grapes'.

@ Arthur1815

Well, quite. The alternative is to accept that the side with the better troops and leaders won, which is completely unacceptable to latter-day Buonapartist fanboiz.

The critical participant was Wellington. Napoleon had faced and defeated bigger allied armies before. In a confrontation between 130,000 French and 175,000 Prussians / Austrians / Russians, the result would have been a French victory. We know this because in 1805 to 1814 at such odds, it always was. Add into the mix a British army, which Napoleon had never encountered and which no French general had defeated, and further add in Wellington, whom nobody ever defeated, and you have a recipe for an epic upset. I have seen literally nothing in 40 years of reading about this that suggests to me that Napoleon had the slightest inkling of how much greater a threat this coalition army was. Nothing in how he proceeded suggests he understood this either. He thought he was up against another army of Eurobozos and planned accordingly.

By 1815 Napoleon was only the third-best commander in Europe. The second-best was in Paris and the best was on the other side.

Many find this difficult to accept even today, so it's not surprising Napoleon didn't get it 200 years ago.

So, basically, in relation to "The Causes of Napoleon Bonaparte's Loss at Waterloo 1815"-

- can we say it was something to do with Wellington, something to do with Blucher, and something to do with Napoleon?

And something to do with the men under their command.

Hi Handlebarbleep,

I think also the Allied armies weren't exactly the best, thus maybe the playing field in terms of quality was somewhat even. It appears that somehow Napoleon always managed to have a large contingent either in limbo or watching a flank.

In any case, the Duke did all he could to set himself up for a win and Bluecher played his role of ever driving towards a fight; a quality few of the other Allied commanders exhibited. Thus, everyone played their role to a tee.

The campaign was Napoleon's to lose and his parameters for losing were tight. After all, even if he had beaten the allies at Waterloo, he still would've had to deal with more Prussians, Russians, Austrians and lord knows what else.

It depends on what level of the concentric circle of the balance of power in Europe you want to settle on. As you keep rising, and in so doing, seeing more of the circles, you can see so many dynamics where personalities and nations go from hero to villain to loser to hero again.

What makes the 1815 campaign such an enduring classic are the contributions by all of the players and all of the intangibles, all the results and all of the "What ifs". What isnt that interesting except to a very narrow, egocentric viewpoint is the idea that beating Napoleon was akin to beating the forces of evil; it just isn't true.

It seems Napoleon was sick from cancer but also had bouts of brilliance mixed with very odd choices- Why Ney was directing the tactics instead of Soult is one of many mysteries- and this all goes into the mix. But the biggest mystery of all, and what is worth analyzing, is why Napoleon lost and NOT well, yes, the allies were always going to win… based only on the hindsight that they did win.

@42flanker,

The Allied armies in the Peninsular War consistently got the better in battle of all the Imperial French forces, including the corps from the Grande Armee of 1805-7 which were severally defeated between 1808 and 1811 (Napoleon left practically all his non-Guard troops in Spain). I don't think the Allied armies got so much better in 1813-4 as the French got distinctly worse after the 1812 and 1813 troop withdrawals, particularly the latter (which also tells anyone interested in comparisons what they need to know about the relative value of French and Allied units there).

Well, I'm not sure I would count the retreat to Coruña, notwithstanding the successful holding action outside the city, nor Wellington's check at Burgos and subsequent retreat, as 'getting the better of the Imperial French forces.'

Be that as it may, I wasn't commenting on an incremental improvement of Wellington's army nor indeed a comparable decline in the quality of French troops- (they seem to have put up a tough enough resistance in the Pyrenees).

My observation was simply that it was Wellington's belief that, in the course of the Peninsula campaigns, he had shaped an army that in its marching and fighting was a perfect expression of his decisions as a commander. By implication "I could have done anything with that army" was also an expression of the trust his troops put in him. The periodic collapse of discipline was maddening and shameful but what Wellington appreciated ultimately was what 'fine fellows we made of them.'

This is all irrelevant, however

That is all fair enough.

Well, I'm not sure I would count the retreat to Coruña, notwithstanding the successful holding action outside the city, nor Wellington's check at Burgos and subsequent retreat, as 'getting the better of the Imperial French forces.

I don't think Allied armies in general got the better of Imperial French forces, but that they specifically did in battle .

If only Bonaparte had a couple of Apache gunships, he would definitely have won.

Whirlwind, bien entendu

Now I always thought that a couple of Bren Guns (I am not even asking for MG42s), with Picton's lads, facing d'Erlon's Corps, would have made a huge difference.

But that requires everyone, not in the immediate vicinity to be dismayed by the effect.

I guess something in the sky, spewing death, would lead to a morale factor that no dice throw could overcome. Two Apache gunships over DoW's lines, against infantry in column or even line. How many could the two kill before they ran out of ammo? Accepting that 90% of rounds kills the grass; Ignoring the shock to soldiers who are at least here in defence (or defense, across the pond)

I love "Guns of the South", where the Rebs acquire AK47s from the future, but think the suggested timeline is insane. Would a couple of future weapons, with limited ammo (and no replacement parts), have changed the day?

(Napoleon left practically all his non-Guard troops in Spain)

No, that is not correct.

For the second invasion of Spain when Napoleon went in himself, Davout was left in command in central Europe with 90,000 troops which included his own III Corps, St Hilaire's veteran division from Soult's IV Corps, and the heavy cavalry.

That was the nucleus of the Army of Germany in 1809.

@minipigs

You are quite right, Wellington's army was not without it's challenges, Bluecher already had lost troops due to mutiny and with many of his troops coming from 'new' or re-acquired territories not quite as homogeneus as some people portray. I think the difference is that they acknowledged and addressed them, whereas the fragility and sudden collapse of French morale came as a rude shock to Napoleon and most of his generals.

Ultimately, it's not the perfect plan or person who wins, it's the ones that can adapt their imperfect plans and manage their problems in a timely fashion that do.

That's something I learned on my very first day of officer selecton. The rope is never long enough, the plank never reaches and the ammo box you are supposed to get to the other end is always too heavy. Most of the tests have a solution, but it was not necessary to find it to get a pass. Only later, when I got involved in the assessment process, did I discover that at least one of the tests was meant to be phyisically impossible. In other words, we wanted to find out how they handled failure, could they continue to work the problem, could they continue to motivate the team and maintain morale.

I think Viscount Slim of Buma summed it up nicely "I'm a hell of a general when I am winning and everybody is walloping along and the enemy is running away. We can all be jolly good at that. When it is I who am getting the hammering and the enemy is after me, that is a very different matter."

Hi Handlebarbleep

The question isn't whether Napoleon had lapses in judgment, suspect motives and made self serving decisions, he did and, additionally, most do or can be interpreted to do so.

The difference is that whereas most others haven't any offsetting virtues, Napoleon possessed a plethora of talents. This business of Napoleon wasn't perfect and appointed some of his relatives to high office, so everyone else are the good guys gets tiring. All of these monarchies were self serving, if they weren't, they could've made a lasting peace with Napoleon just as much as Napoleon should've realized they'd never allow him to stay in power.

Now, I find the period fascinating but I don't get worried about who was more righteous. I am just as happy to see things through a British, Prussian or Austrian lens as much as a French one. I don't have any personal preferences and I find it disappointing and astonishing on a site which purports to discuss intellectual subjects that some need to make this all personal and accuse people that they are pro-Napoleon just because they aren't completely anti-Napoleon.

However, I have come to realize that this site protects all points of view, even those that are based on an almost complete lack of knowledge or analysis. With regard to rabidly anti-Napoleon crowd on here, I suppose my one solace is that it is such a limited, rarefied viewpoint that it cant exist outside of a laboratory environment.

Having said that I do find you to be one of the more even keeled voices on the topic of Napoleon and his Napoleonic wars.

Ever two or three months the same question crops up and we go over the same ground again and again. "Why did Napoleon lose at Waterloo?" The same arguments are brought out because the "Lost Cause" of Boney is too much for some people.

Go to the ACW Boards and you get the similar "Why did Bobby Lee lose at Gettysburg and how can we let him win?" threads. Those bring our another set of people supporting the "Lost Cause."

Both sets want to know how their "God of War" was beaten by those the perceive as lesser men. Yankees and Allies have overwhelming numbers and they're mere flunkies of the Ancien Régime or greedy industrialist who somehow cheated.

Now after the War of the Rebellion George Pickett (he of the charge) was asked why the Confederates lost at Gettysburg he said "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."

"The Causes of Napoleon Bonaparte's Loss at Waterloo 1815" let's answer the original question shall we.

"I always thought the Allies had something to do with it."

Why do Welly lovers and Nap haters keep ignoring the obvious and insult people who dare to disagree with their biased viewpoint?

The facts are, successful as he was in Spain, Wellington's plan in 1815 was to simply rely on the arrival of the Prussians. They arrived and saved his bacon. Lucky him. Had they not arrived and been the main cause of the 'allied' victory, one wonders what history would have said of Wellington?

Napoleon's plan was for Grouchy to prevent the Prussians arriving. For whatever reason Grouchy failed to do so. Had Grouchy succeeded in his task, one wonders what history would have said of Napoleon?

Sometimes a plan goes to plan and (Austerlitz, Jena etc) and sometimes it doesn't.

And those who consider the allied commanders, better commanders, perhaps they can explain how such 'better' commanders managed to allow Napoleon to get between them? Or was that part of their 'better' plan? LOL

MiniPigs

It would be ideal if everyone respected each others viewpoints, after all, everyone has a right to their own viewpoint and opinion and incredibly boring if they didn't.

I like to look at all aspects of the period (if not other historical periods) from both sides of the fence. That's why I love reading French, British, Russian and any other memoir, along with as many non-fictional accounts of the same actions and campaigns as I can get my hands on.

But, despite the viewpoints of some people, nothing is really black and white in history and war, and nothing is simple or a case of he was better than him all the time. Sometimes so and so was better and sometimes not. That is why battles are won or lost. I love reading about the Peninsular War, even though the French never beat the British in battle. But the British always seemed to end up retreating after their battles or even evacuating their forces from the country, and the French usually, although not always, beat the Spanish. It all makes for great reading.

Anyway, you get used to those who can't cope with anything negative being revealed about the British or the allies. But if you dare to argue for Napoleon or the French, you must hero worship Napoleon and you must certainly hate your country! LOL

History is history. You can't change it. But anyone who does not accept Waterloo was an allied victory is in denial of reality and historical fact, for whatever reasons.

@Minipigs @Gazzola

For the record, I'm not a Wellington lover or a Napoleon hater. I find both those groups are really just dealing in the aura, the historical afterglow if you like. Both of these figures are just men, with all the frailties that come with being human. I leave defining "greatness" to sports pundits and Top Trumps players. I'm interested in their humanity, what drove their decision making, what made them tick if you will. To do that though you have to blow away the froth of labels like "Great" and "Genius".

Either side that buys in to the "greatest" theory will tend to become (or pretend to become) mortaly offended when anyone tries to peer behind the mask. That actually says more about them, and the propensity for us to look for heroes, than it says about either Napoleon or Wellington. It's tribalism, plain and simple and you see it everywhere from politics to sports. In a forum based around miniature gamers though, I suppose it's relatively benign.

I respect everyone's opinions, views and loyalties. We should welcome that diversity and if we want to want our hobby to grow (or at least not die) we should be particularly tolerant of those who may be starting out on their journey of historical enquiry.

What I will not tolerate though is attacking people's scholarship or rubbishing their efforts based on their own views. All sources, including eyewitnesses, can be in error. We should judge each point on it's merit. The debate on provenance and myths can be a good one and perfectly valid. However blanketing a source or an auther as 'bad' just because it disagrees with our personal opinion isn't. We certainly should not use our own prejudice in sources to criticise others. I see that as a form of intellectual bullying, basically saying I'm better than you, I know more than you and I have the following carefully selected dead friends that agree with me. It is not good modern historical enquiry, which takes a more empirical approach. It's not good scholarship, which emphasises respect and good debate. It is especially not good in encouraging anyone into our hobby.

So, I will call out such destructive and negative behaviour for what it is, whenever I see it and as long as moderators permit me to. I wouldn't want to silence such people, just ask them to play nice.

On Napoleon, I'm not convinced by "The Great" paradigm any more than I am by "The Corsican Ogre" one either. Did he do 'bad' things. Yes. Did he have 'mitigating' factors? Certainly. But then again, I'm sure you can find things that Nicolai Chauchescu's regime did that was not all bad too, if you search hard enough. To me though, it is moot, as it is Napoleon the general we should be interested in, and Napoleon the man that fascinates.

To compare Wellington with him on anything but pure generalship is invalid. Wellington was a public servant, not head of state. He went into politics in later life. He has great attributes and military qualities. He also had his faults, many of which he shared with others of his class and I'm not convinced that if I met him I'd necessarily like him. Although he had his devotees, I'm not sure I would like to work for him either. His reputation of being judgemental and a hard taskmaster are some of the few things that you could say he shared with Napoleon.

As generals though, they only met once. Even then, it was a two on one. The strategy of the central position gave Napoleon a temporary advantage, which he only had because the political situation gave him the initiative, and the Allies rules of engagement effectively blinded them. It was never a fair contest either way, but then warfare rarely is. That's what keeps us coming back to the 100 days.

Regarding Waterloo I often ponder the question how history would have developed if Wellington would have agreed to name this battle after "La Belle Alliance" rather then his own headquarter "Waterloo". Given the prominence of this battle in British culture, I am quite sure that the relationship between Germany and Great Britain would have been different, especially after Germanys unification.

@Puster

Wellington's normal practice to name battles after his headquarters. Makes sense, as dispaches would be headed by the location they were sent from. The dispatch was from Waterloo, so the battle it's writing about must be Waterloo. If he hadn't, it was more likely to be called Mont St Jean. That would probably have been anglicised to the Battle of St John's Hill!

I doubt that the name of one battle would have such a material effect on european politics though. Britain was already (and still is) ruled by the house of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha. Although Salic law prevented Queen Victoria succeeding to the Hanoverian throne it would be with some sadness the Britain saw the absortion of Hanover into a Prussian province after 1866. In fact unification with the inevitable domination by Prussia was perhaps seen as the problem.

The Kaiser was a British Field Marshal and the Colonel in Chief of the 1st Royal Dragoons in 1914. It was customary until then for the German embassy to present the regiment with a wreath of laurels each June 18th. At least one German unit marched to war in 1914 with the honour "Waterloo" on their pikelhaube.

I don't think it was a lack of sentiment that was at issue.

I believe Queen Victoria was the last reigning member of the House of Hanover. When Edward VII succeeded his mother, as son of Prince Albert he ruled as the first reigning member of House of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha.

It is also my understanding that the honours borne by former Hanoverian regiments who fought for King George III were on the cuffs of their tunics.

But that's not important right now.

And don't call me 'Shirley.'

I've never really understood the tired old canard that claims that Wellington, c19th British historians, or wider British society sought to denigrate the role of the Prussians at the battle, and portray it as a solely British victory.

This is one of the most common accusations flung about in the lower end of the Napoleonic history market, but I've never actually read an account of that era which does this. I'm always open to correction though if anyone can actually find one-…. Any takers?

One thing is for sure- there was quite a lot of commemoration in the UK of the Prussian role at the battle-

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In the c19th there were dozens, maybe over a hundred such street names but the vast majority were deemed 'unpatriotic' by local authorities when Britain went to war with Germany in 1914, and so were renamed. But the original upswell of admiration and pro-Prussian feeling in Britain was real enough.

To be fair, the compliment was returned in Germany sometimes in the c19th-

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(Although also to be fair- this place was not actually in Prussia).

@ Seneffe

I've been asking for as long as I've been on here for, say, five British accounts of Waterloo that understate the Prussian contribution. I've never been offered even one. It's a myth. There aren't any. This myth was laid to rest in the 19th century. Its zombie-like re-emergence of late is largely down to two discredited writers, Hamilton-Williams and Hofschroer, who far from presenting a new take on Waterloo simply rehashed a clapped-out inaccurate one.

What does exist is a body of opinion that insists Wellington was saved by the Prussians, but will not acknowledge that the reverse is also true. If you point it out on here, you are assured of several circular responses, to the effect of "Yeah but the Prussians saved Wellington". To mention this is to be tactless enough to voice a heresy.

@Senneffe and @4th Cuirassier

I've been pondering the source of this myth, and as you both rightly point out, there is very little. The only thing I can identify if that Siborne mostly used British material, despite the fact that there were letters in German in his possession, as published by Glover in his Letters book. I don't think it's too much of a criticism though, Pflug-Harting or de Bas and T'Serclaes de Wommersom also presented material mostly from their own languages.

The second possible source also involves Siborne, with the story that in trying to persuade the establishment to reimburse him, he removed Prussian figures from the model to diminish their apparent contribution. even if he did it thinking it would make a difference, there is no concrete evidence that he was asked to by Wellington or anyone else. We should remember, participants saw the model, he might just have revised it based on feedback.

With the centenary falling just 10 months or so into WW1, it's understandable that the publishing and re-publishing boom that usually attends such anniversaries was muted. Gushing pro-Prussian sentiment was not going to go down well, and anyway we were now close allies with the old enemy. British soldiers were dying protecting France, so bearing that in mind and later little difficulties 1939-45, it's not really that surprising.

I agree though, grinding axes has always help publicise books, but with so much of the original material available these days, it does appear a bit Quixotic.

I suspect that what the revisionists are angry about is the impression lay people get about Waterloo from non-historical sources.

There's a Waterloo Station in London, Abba sang that "At Waterloo Napoleon did surrender", and so on. Therefore Waterloo must have been a British victory.

Anyone who's read one book on Waterloo knows differently. The point that definitely is persistently under-comprehended is the extent to which Prussian ineptitude nearly blew the campaign. From unmasking the Brussels road and not telling Wellington, to concentrating three of five Corps too far forward and getting routed despite numerical superiority on their own choice of ground, to having only one corps fit for action on the 18th and that the furthest from the locus of decision, the Prussian commanders' performance was utterly, utterly lamentable.

They were left desperately needing Wellington to hold on so they wouldn't lose their entire army. You don't hear a squeak about this from the revisionists, and to his eternal credit. neither was Wellington ever rude enough to bring it up.

The awkward fact remains that in 1815, the Prussians couldn't win a single battle without Wellington's help.

They can only be revisionists if someone is making the baseline assumption that British-centric point of view is the gold standard. Is that what we are assuming here?

But then you would have to define the "British centric-point of view" and that would seem to bring you round full circle to the observations made in the previous four postings.

Some interesting points being made here, although trying to identify one crucial factor is a fool's errand and unhelpful. I'm somewhat bemused though by the suggestion that Napoleon's victory at Waterloo was all but assured and that Wellington's victory was some sort of fluke. I prefer the term 'played for and won' as I don't think he would have risked battle if the odds were considered insurmountable.

I ascribe the victory to him due to his decision to stand and fight rather than head for the ports, because we do the same for Napoleon when he chose to fight, was in worse scrapes and saved by the actions of others. Also, had Wellington lost, I'm pretty sure people would be quick to call it a British defeat, regardless of his army's composition or the presence of a Prussian corps.

I would agree that Napoleon's forces were in reality more fragile than one might assume, given their experience. He didn't have a huge army, although I think the larger and more diverse his forces became, the worse his strategic perfomance. Five years of imperial success up to 1809 was followed by five years of failure.

In turn Wellington was shorn of his Peninsular veterans and reliant on a mixed bag of coalition forces, some of whom were far less fragile on the day than one might assume, given their previous experience and allegiances.

Similarly, Blucher's troops were not the best and had yet to be successful against Napoleon, unless operating with a substantial allied presence.

The Allies' only real advantage is numbers and experience had shown that was often insufficient against Napoleon. If you could, I think most would choose his situation; having one single force, the ability to select the commanders you want, close to home and fighting against two commanders who had not fought together before, dispersed over a large area, with one army at least having thousands of troops of suspect loyalty/enthusiasm.

In addition, with the benefit of hindsight it might well appear that a French victory at Waterloo is relatively easy to achieve. This has been reinforced by numerous refights in which a wargaming Napoleon is:

- 1000 feet tall
- playing with rules that often favour French troops and commanders, based on earlier performances and capabilities
- playing with rules that often make communications, manouevre and combined arms attacks and those on BUA much easier than in reality, whilst minimising the effect of fog of war and friction.
- aware that the Prussians are going to commit formed troops later in the day
- conscious that Grouchy arriving isn't an option
- unworried about preserving his forces for future campaigning rather than winning this single battle (800,000 equipped and trained troops in the field by autumn was a pipe dream)
- less precious about his Guard and willing to throw them in early, whilst less profligate with his cavalry

However, when you take the above points into consideration, along with some decisions before and during the campaign, I think the historical battle is much more in the balance.

Minipigs- that's a good challenge about the word revisionists.
However I think we all know the point that 4th Cuirassier is making- and "revisionists" (although perhaps not strictly accurate) certainly trips off the keyboard easier that "People who really really wish that British history books say something other than that which they actually do.".

The argument that this is perceived as a British victory is the revisionist position. From this straw man, which cannot be substantiated by reference to the work of any historian, they (Hamilton-Williams, Hofschroer) proceed to insist that it wasn't.

The point is we all know that. What we hear much less of – from the same very loud mouths – are the corollary observations that it wasn't a Prussian or German victory either, that without Wellington the Prussians were toast, and that the performance of the Prussian leadership was utterly dire. To understand 1806 and 1813-1814 you need only look at 1815. The Prussian troops were lions led by clowns in ginger wigs, striped trousers and long red shoes. If I were painting Prussian 1815 command figures that's how mine would look.

This is clearly very, very hard for the revisionists to understand, much less swallow.

@42flanker

I'm not sure on the cuff titles, but there are plenty of Pickelhaubes offered for sale with Waterloo and Peninsula on them, eg

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So much of this relies if not so much luck, then at least the law of unintended consequences. Gneisenau ordered Von Bulow to concentrate, but did so in a way that did not emphasise the urgency. This meant that his Corps missed Ligny, which meant that there was a fresh unengaged reserve available.

If they had at been at Ligny, they might have tipped the balance, meaning waterloo would not have been fought. If they hadn't then they would have been caught up in the retreat. There would not have been a Corps available to assure Wellington of support and he would have had to retire behind the Scheldt. Either way, if not this piece of 'fog of war' Waterloo would not have been fought at all!

In the context of Napoleon's survival, it was only because of all the armies arrayed against him that his loss at Waterloo holds any meaning. Otherwise, he might very well have survived that battle given that the allied armies in Belgium were essentially wrecked too.

In any case, i keep getting sucked into this blither-sphere, probably because I find it intellectually bankrupt. Maybe the posters here are unaware of how they come across but there is a pro British bent in the histories on this campaign. It doesnt mean those books arent enjoyable but anyone who remains brainwashed by the jingoistic microwaves will find themselves an object of derision by others. Although it is true that it seems that only a minute subsection of one nationality fanatically detonates itself against Napoleon, it also seems to be mostly on here, which can be tiring; almost as tiring as the delusion that a few thousand archers killed every French knight at Agincourt.

As la belle ruffian (Le beaux ruffian?) points out, most people admire the French army of the time and Napoleon and maybe give the French too many advantages in wargaming, the same way they probably give too many handicaps to Spanish troops. That goes a long way to showcasing where the outside viewpoint resides. I just find it comic how some on here get agitated over a man they never met and a cause they'd never have been allowed to be a part of.

Hbp, I stand delightedly corrected.

I confess I was extrapolating from what I read about three Hanoverian Regiments in the service of George III during the AWI- 3rd 5th & 6th, who were granted distinctions for their part in the defence of Gibraltar during the great siege OF 1779-82.These included new colours with suitable motifs and a cuff title with the word 'Gibraltar.' When the Hanoverian army was subsumed into the German Imperial Army this cuff distinction was inherited by IR 73 and 79 and still being worn in 1914.

Nobody said nothing about no pickelhaubes, so…
gib mir die Schuld

-something more for the curiosities file.

Minipigs, 'the posters here' seems to be painting wide strokes with a broad brush. I have made this point before but a mere handful of 'posters here' appear to feel a genuine animus against the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte, and I suspect some of them may be teasing.

The heart of the debate, as far as I can see, deals far more with questions of logic, intellectual candour and historical rigour as interpreted by members of this forum. In that regard the figure of Napoleon Bonaparte, sometime Emperor of the French, is merely a tennis ball in the court of history,

My French and German are a bit rusty after nearly 50 years, but is there really a "pro British bent" in French and German histories of the 1815 campaign? What a handicap to have English as one's Mother Tongue when you so loathe the country.

He wasn't as good as everyone thinks he was.

The French had a 'new method' of fighting. (Wargames rules usually distinguish these, eg 'French/Prussian', (impulse/linear' etc)
When they conquered countries they forced them to fight for the French, and taught them the new methods.
When those countries turn against Napoleon, and using his tactics, they start winning.
Apologists then come up with 'reasons' (usually blaming the British).
Good organiser, slightly above average general.

He wasn't as good as everyone thinks he was.

Really? So, then why is his military record an outstanding one, overwhelmingly winning his battles many times against stronger opponents?

Where in any French publication does the term 'impulse tactics' occur? It is actually a made up term trying to describe the French tactical system and it doesn't.

The main states of the Confederation of the Rhine (Bavaria, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt) as well as the Kingdom of Italy and the Duchy of Warsaw weren't 'conquered' states but allies.

Determining reasons for defeat and failure does not make one an 'apologist.'

Good organiser, slightly above average general.

More like the best general of all times. A few other generals may have some argument of a claim to the title like Caesar, Frederick the Great, Alexander, Turenne, Gustavus, Marlborough, Grant, Julian the Apostate, etc. but none of them ticks all the boxes of, among others, military reform and innovation, strategic and tactical vision, deployment of all arms, rapidity of movement.

As well as the master of the operational art, master of the principles of war, and an excellent combat leader.