"The Causes of Napoleon Bonaparte’s Loss at Waterloo 1815" Topic

Of possible interest?

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Amicalement
Armand

The author's references are somewhat dubious overall with a few enlightened exceptions, such as John Ropes excellent study on the campaign and battle. And there are no French references used at all or any Prussian references.

There are just too many on the list that are not authoritative or well done or researched:

-Jonathon P. Riley, Napoleon as a General.

-Owen Connelly, Blundering to Glory: Napoleon's Military Campaigns.

-David Chandler, Waterloo, The Hundred Days.

-Jac Weller, Wellington at Waterloo.

-Mark Adkin, The Waterloo Companion.

-Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare.

Hang on, I'm writing these down as quick as possible.

Chain of Command -

Napoleon left his best army/corps commander in Paris (Davout), he made his second best army/corps commander his Chief of Staff (Soult), he elevated his best field Commander (Ney) into a wing/army commander, and he put his best Cavalry general (Grouchey) in charge of an army……..

The campaign may have had a different outcome had Soult and Davout been the two wing commanders, Ney in charge of I,II or the Guard Corps and Grouchey in command of the cavalry reserve????

with these decisions the campaign was over before it began.

The idea that the 'campaign was over before it began' is nothing but wrong-headed opinion.

Davout was made Minister of War in order that Napoleon would have a senior subordinate in Paris that he could implicitly trust. And it was Davout that got the Armee du Nord ready to take the field.

Ney was far from Napoleon's 'best field commander.' Grouchy was one of the best senior cavalry commanders in the Grande Armee. But Kellermann and Pajol were just as skilled as Grouchy. Assigning Grouchy the mission of pursuing the Prussians deprived the Cavalry Reserve of its commander and no one was named to replace him.

The position of major general and chief of staff was critical. Soult was able, but lazy and the staff he put together for the campaign bore little resemblance to Berthier's general staff. Napoleon believed that if Berthier had been present in his old job, he would not have lost.

Napoleon in point of fact was the commander of the Guard-it was his ultimate reserve.

Some of the best commanders in the Grande Armee were assigned independent missions, such as Suchet and Rapp.

@Brechtel198

To be fair to the author, this is an argument essay, and he is using some of the sources you reject to crticise their hypotheses or contrast their biases.

Likewise, he tends to use recent publications, presumably because they are more accessible to his audience, some 7 years ago. No credible author would be arrogant enough to assert his or her work is without error, and when you appreciate the size and breadth of the Waterloo Companion I'd be shocked if it was. I'd be careful in criticising his ability to choose too much, particularly bearing in mind footnote 405

He uses Chandler for:

"In Great Britain, many a history book vastly exaggerates the British role in the campaign and battle; Belgians, Dutch and Hanoverians –who accounted for almost two-thirds of the Allied manpower – often go unmentioned, and the Prussian intervention is played down in importance. Germans, on the other hand, sometimes represent the whole campaign as having been borne on the backs of the Prussian army, Wellington being accused of failing to come to Blücher's aid at Ligny on the 16th …."

For a work nearly four decades old, I'd suggest that this passage is remarkably prescient. Whatever your beef with the late Head of War Studies at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and a D. Litt from Oxford, Fellow of both the Royal Historical and the Royal Geographical societies and former President of the British Commission for Military History and a Vice- President of the Commission International d'Histoire Militaire might be.

+1 Handlebarbleep re Chandler.

"The idea that the 'campaign was over before it began' is nothing but wrong-headed opinion."

Opinion, certainly, but at least it has some partial evidence to support it. It WAS over. Loss of a battle, probably amongst the worst rout in French military history, collapse of a regime, abdication, imprisonment and death. A cursory glance at the numbers massing against him, the resolve of the Allies at Vienna and the war weariness of France can make a reasonable argument therefore. I wouldn't neccessarily subscribe to it without caveats, but I wouldn't call it "wrong-headed".

Now, romantic nonsense about pulling off a peace settlement, a regency for Napoleon II or retiring as an English country squire. You are more likely to persuade me that Peter Ney was really a Marshal of France than anyone other than the wrong-headed buying that one, and that includes Napoleon.

Brechtel, little bit of colour around your statements on the sources you listed would be helpful.

While I agree that Soult didn't perform well in his new role as chief of staff, blame for his failings falls on Napoleon who just assumed a marshal who hadn't served directly under him for the last 7 years would simply pick up where Berthier left off. Better oversight and mentoring was called for.

Remind me again – who appointed Ney, Soult and Grouchy? Perhaps he was saving his best players for the 2nd Leg?

Thanks Kevin!.

Amicalement
Armand

Couple of points. Davout never failed in a task assigned to him. Napoleon needed someone steady to hold Paris as he needed steady commanders to hold Hamburg (Davout) and Dresden (St. Cyr) in 1813. Wargamers would look at their record and commit them to the field. Napoleon thought on a strategic level. Davout was available in 1815 did a good job as Minister of War. Whether Lazare Carnot, who was Minister of the Interior during the 100 Days, would have made a better Minister of War is open to debate. He probably wouldn't have been steady enough to hold Paris considering his last real field command was in 1793.

Napoleon could have done better in 1815 by creating François Gédéon Bailly de Monthion a Marshal and appointing him chief of Staff. He was a staff officer who had served with Berthier for many years and was used to working Napoleon. He also fulfilled von Moltke the Elder's criteria for a staff officer; he was both Intelligent and Energetic. By the same token Soult was Intelligent but Lazy, which under the principles of der große Schweiger, meant he was ideally suited to be a general (if he had a good Chief of Staff prodding him.)

General De Gaulle – probably as Anglophobic a Frenchman as you could find – thought Dr Chandler surpassed any other writer with his works on Napoleon's military career. But then De Gaulle hadn't been "trained in history" so would he know?

I am reminded of when my brother climbed into my parents car aged 5 or 6, managed to release the handbrake and was found at the foot of a short slope where the car, after veering of the driveway, had come to rest against a sturdy oak.

'I was going all right until that tree got in my way" he protested.

(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

@Handlebarbleep
@IronDuke596

Re: Chandler.
I had passed over that original observation by Chandler. Nothing is quite as new as it appears.

I don't consider the writer achieves what he set out to do. Too much summary and not enough substance.

I'd be careful in criticising his ability to choose too much, particularly bearing in mind footnote 405

And what exactly do you mean by that-or are you pursuing your usual course, on multiple forums, of baiting those you disagree with? And I usually don't discuss my own work on the forms. Please feel free to criticize if you like.

But it should be noted that some of his statements on artillery in the paper (page 174), such as describing artillery round shot as being made of lead instead of cast iron, and of canister being composed of musket balls (which were cast-iron shot), as a poor use of the noted source. He had the material and didn't use it properly.

Regarding sourcing, the author supports, as already noted, his opinions with some suspect references, such as Adkins coffee table book. Adkins book is poorly sourced and what is noteworthy is the material not discussed about Waterloo that I believe should have been.

And I agree with Allan that there is 'too much summary and not enough substance.' The paper should not be used as a source.

Regarding Chandler, I would not use him as a source for Waterloo or any other subject on the period, though there is some useful material in his Campaigns of Napoleon, though that is not the best on the subject, the Esposito/Elting Atlas is superior to it.

Opinion, certainly, but at least it has some partial evidence to support it. It WAS over.

20/20 hindsight. Perhaps you could actually support that idea with evidence?

Using Houssaye, Ropes, and William Siborne's history of the campaign would be a good start, given the agenda-driven obsession with Waterloo.

In battle, thousands of "causes" combine to produce the final result. Looking for "the one most significant cause" is at best a fools errand.

…'who appointed Ney, Soult and Grouchy?'

Yes, Napoleon 'knew' they would fail in there tasks, that's why he appointed them. As with Football managers who put on strikers who fail to score. Definitely the 'managers' fault. LOL

Oh the skill of hindsight, how would 'some' people fare without it or even have any opinions, eh?

Brechtel198

I was only making the point that if your point is that an author has a poor choice of sources, and they include your own work, you are effectively saying "except when it's me" You might see how that might come across as a bit, well, immodest shall we say? Perhaps it's a question of style, being an Englishman I'm much more used to a more self-effacing approach? We tend to refer to our life's work that we spent decades on as "a little something I knocked up". PG Woodhouse's Jeeves is an excellent style reference.

There is nothing wrong with that footnoted source, but I'm just as likely to use Lipscombe or Franklin, or alternatively nip up to the Royal Armouries and use their library, for any specifics. As you rightly point out, he seems to have been confused on the specifics, but then again he did say that this work was not a military treatise, and I believe he was using the source only to add a little colour. Of course, it should have no effect on those from a more well informed audience. I think it does emphasise a pre-dominance of US authors in his sources, which would be fair comment as where he does use European works he cites their US editions.

As to baiting, well I don't go around describing people as incorrect, wrong-headed or uniformed. I might express that my opinions or conclusions may differ, and why, but I don't immediately arbitrarily attack their scholarship as an opening gambit. I regard that as intellectual bullying. I leave that to others, as I happen to believe that our fellow enthusiasts deserve more respect. Knowledge tends to be advanced when diversity of opinion is welcomed. I believe therefore that humility is much more productive than hubris.

I have found the mark of a true expert is that they are patient in dealing with the enquiries of novices, kind when dealing with their peers yet robust in their debate of ideas and argument of facts. In my humble opinion these attributes are what raises the good to the great.

But what do I know? Actually absolutely very little, although I summise much and opinionate frequently. Hopefully I can continue to remind myself of the fact. What was the phrase Roman generals allegedly had whispered to them as they paraded in triumph?

One day, you and I will be dust, and our forum posts will be so much digital detritus. History will have moved on and all the petty squabbles will be amongst forumites who haven't even attended kindergarten yet. No one will be putting up statues to the one with the best sources, or had the highest opinion of themselves. However, we might be remembered as someone who encouraged another who went on to be great. We are not going to achieve that by labelling them as wrong-headed.

I don't normally indulge in venting my opinions, but you did invite me to criticise, so I thought it rude not to oblige. I can only apologise and crave the indulgence of our moderator and fellow forumites.

I was only making the point that if your point is that an author has a poor choice of sources, and they include your own work, you are effectively saying "except when it's me" You might see how that might come across as a bit, well, immodest shall we say? Perhaps it's a question of style, being an Englishman I'm much more used to a more self-effacing approach? We tend to refer to our life's work that we spent decades on as "a little something I knocked up". PG Woodhouse's Jeeves is an excellent style reference.

Except that I didn't say that, nor was it intended. I listed the sources that I believe to be inferior in the article. I guess you missed it.

And I disagree that you do not engage in baiting, and you lace it with a good deal of condescension. And generally speaking, you add little to the corporate knowledge on the forum. And, yes, I have read you 'venting your opinions' quite liberally here and on the other forum that you are a member of.

Lipscombe is an excellent reference both with his Peninsular War Atlas as well as his work on Wellington's artillery. Franklin's three Waterloo Ospreys not so much.

There is more information out there if you do not speak English.
Type in Battaille La Belle Alliance, maps and versions you have never seen, English version compound original errors and blow hards over the last 200 years.
A few points;
1. The attacks were supposed to be from left echelon, NEY changed it to the right.
2. Jean-Baptiste Bessières was not interrupting Napoleons orders as he had done in the past.
3. The French artillery was effective as affirmed by many eye witness accounts.
4. French, Dutch and German maps vary greatly with the British versions.
just something to ponder on guys.

Marshal Bessieres was not at Waterloo; he was killed in action in Germany in 1813.

That would explain his silence.

yes dying two years earlier put a damper on his planning :)

One is reminded of John Belushi in "The Blues Brothers" when he is confronted by jilted ex-girlfriend Carrie Fisher in a storm drain….?

We've all been there

…'who appointed Ney, Soult and Grouchy?'

Yes, Napoleon 'knew' they would fail in there tasks, that's why he appointed them

If you look at their service records Soult had been a corps or army commander under Napoleon while Grouchy had mostly commanded cavalry divisions and corps. There wasn't anything in either of their records for the past 10 years which would have suggested that Soult was a proper person to serve as Chief of Staff, or Grouchy as Wing Commander. Ney was the only one of the three who was exercising a role similar to what he had done in the recent past.

There is always the temptation to ask what if Napoleon had used with the Army du Nord commanders he gave other tasks to, but there is another option. How about simply shifting around some of the talent he already had with the Army du Nord. For example d'Erlon had a fair amount of staff experience, as recent as 1809 under Lefebvre. Make d'Erlon chief of staff. He wouldn't have been another Berthier, but who would have been. Then give Ney the I Corps and make Soult second in command of the army. Vandamme could have been given command of the forces following the Prussians and Napoleon could have kept Grouchy with him to command the cavalry. It might not make any difference to the outcome, but on paper it would have been easier to justify.

Brechtel198

I'm sorry if you read condescension. I read disrespectful rudeness and overbearing intellectual bullying. Perhaps we are both wrong, and we should put that down to the remote media and our different national cultures making us come across other than intended.

Failing that, I'll get my second to speak to yours, if you wish :)

By the way, the Franklin I meant was CF Franklin, but primarily for his illustrations.

Intellectual bullying? You've got to be kidding. Perhaps you should take this false accusation of yours to heart.

In other words, your posting failed and is incorrect in fact.

Have you ever heard the phrase 'Instead of dazzling with brilliance one is baffling with 'horse manure''? Perhaps you should take that to heart-or not.

CF Franklin's books are interesting and well-worth having.

There is always the temptation to ask what if Napoleon had used with the Army du Nord commanders he gave other tasks to, but there is another option. How about simply shifting around some of the talent he already had with the Army du Nord. For example d'Erlon had a fair amount of staff experience, as recent as 1809 under Lefebvre. Make d'Erlon chief of staff. He wouldn't have been another Berthier, but who would have been. Then give Ney the I Corps and make Soult second in command of the army. Vandamme could have been given command of the forces following the Prussians and Napoleon could have kept Grouchy with him to command the cavalry. It might not make any difference to the outcome, but on paper it would have been easier to justify.

Napoleon should have made Vandamme a marshal. That would have solved a myriad of later problems.

I agree with the idea that Monthion should have been made chief of staff and major general. To do that, though he would have had to be made a marshal and he was younger than the corps commanders. However, he had worked for Berthier and knew how the imperial staff should have been organized and how it was supposed to function. Soult did not, even though he had understudied Berthier at the beginning of the 1813 campaign until Napoleon had to send him back to Spain.

Suchet would have been an excellent choice as chief of staff and Soult could have had his job on the Italian front.

Ney should have been left at home.

@Billy N

I agree that Boney's personal management causes puzzlement.

His two wing approach, failed already miserably in 1813, why didn't he command as in his most successful days of 1st Italian campaign of 1805 – 1806 ?

Soult, give him a corps, Ney – give him a corps as well, and then along with Vandamme you would have three very well experienced corps commander, then why not employ Morand or Friant also in that position ? Instead of giving them an insignificant task in the Imperial Guard??

On case looking at Stephen Beckett's website and reading the day to day decisions – will show the very poor performance of Boney commanding.

I doubt Vandamme would ever get a marshal's baton after surrendering in 1813. His fault or not, it's a serious black mark against him.

His two wing approach, failed already miserably in 1813, why didn't he command as in his most successful days of 1st Italian campaign of 1805 – 1806 ?<q/>

He used it in Italy in 1796 and it worked very well.

Vandamme didn't have much choice in the matter, being surrounded and outnumbered, with no sign of relief on the way. Fighting to the death would not have gained anything.

I wonder why Vandamme got off so lightly, Dupont went into prison fighting under much severe circumstances – on old axe to grind with him?

Vandamme didn't betray his own people while saving himself.

And over half of Vandamme's command broke out.

Dupont even surrended troops far away to his command and when they were fighting well and with good chances to retreat….

Amicalement
Armand

Yes, he did. And the commander of that unit displayed a gross lack of moral courage by obeying Dupont. He was out of danger and not being threatened by anyone except his own commander.

This situation undoubtedly prompted Napoleon later saying:

'A general in the power of the enemy has no orders to give. Whoever obeys him is a criminal.' No doubt Napoleon was referring to Dupont and Vedel.

@Brechtel198

Oh Well, seconds it is then. I tried, I really tried to offer you an olive branch. A chance to draw a line as a misunderstanding, getting off on the wrong foot.

You really don't see how your approach of relentlessly attacking others work and scholarship for merely disagreeing with you and calling people names isn't constructive? How it drives people away from forums like this and others. I know of at least two people who stopped posting on the old Napoleon Series forum because of similar conduct. It discourages the airing of ideas or sharing of research, and we are all the poorer for it.

Being attacked by you has become a badge of honour on this and some other forums, and you a figure of fun for it. I happen to think you are better than that, and I would have hoped you would too. But you seem determined to continue plowing the same furrow; as a result I'm not antagonised by you, only quite saddened and disappointed.

I didn't think the article was perfect either, but some of the ideas put forward interesting and not without merit. Where there were weaknesses I think they were of reasoning and understanding, rather than the quality of the sources (yours included). There are errors in all secondary works, it's just a matter of degree. That's why we shouldn't rely too much on any source, no matter how impeccable we believe it to be.

Are there mistakes in Mark Adkin's coffee table work? Certainly, but no more than several illustrated introduction style works and unsurprising bearing in mind the size and breadth of coverage. I haven't opened my copy in a while, but I'd be prepared to footnote it where he represents data in a particularly accessible way, but like all secondary works (including yours) I would cross reference before relying on it. That's just sound practice.

Soult, give him a corps, Ney – give him a corps as well, and then along with Vandamme you would have three very well experienced corps commander, then why not employ Morand or Friant also in that position?

One thing I always find bemusing about these discussions is that they are always about what if Napoleon had sent this guy here or that guy there or invaded this other country instead. Meanwhile, the constraints under which Wellington worked are entirely unacknowledged.

Napoleon got to choose his allies, his enemies, his subordinates, his staff, his organisation, and his army composition down to company level. He got to choose the theatre he fought in and the political, military and economic weight given to it. He got to compromise and interfere with his enemies' political allegiances by dismantling their conquered territory and handing out crowns to his mates and family and royal brides to anybody useful, including one for himself.

Wellington simply commanded the forces he was given, with the resources the state was prepared to dole out to him. He didn't get to make Picton king of Portugal, or marry his sister to the Prince of Orange, or invent decorations for the rank and file, or equip dragoon regiments with lances, or organise some Household foot and horse artillery, or declare war on anyone who failed to cough up money or troops, or appoint himself Emperor of the French, or co-opt a couple of divisions of Portuguese veterans, or even use his own.

And still Napoleon couldn't win against him.

Napoleon was used to facing shambolic coalitions who needed immense numerical superiority as a minimum requirement to prevail. All he managed to notice in Wellington was a sepoy general, and alongside him he saw only the usual, easily-defeated, Prussian rabble.

I suggest that regardless of how Napoleon had shuffled his deck in 1815, he would still have been defeated by the greatest coalition commander he never realised he was facing. Not to labour the point, but how would Napoleon have fared if he'd been forced to have the Prince of Orange as second in command, Uxbridge kinda-sorta in charge of the cavalry, and a load of divisional commanders he'd barely met in key positions?

Oh Well, seconds it is then. I tried, I really tried to offer you an olive branch. A chance to draw a line as a misunderstanding, getting off on the wrong foot.

Why don't you just stop then? You do what you are accusing me of and it is just getting old. And it isn't a misunderstanding on your part, but deliberate actions and insult. My advice to you is to stop the nonsense.

And yes it is baiting for whatever reason. So, I suggest that you just knock off the nonsense and/or find someone else to argue, ad nauseum, with.

And still Napoleon couldn't win against him.

Napoleon didn't win against Wellington and Blucher. Without Blucher, Wellington loses. Pretty simple, I think.

"Pretty simple, I think."
More accurately, pretty inane for someone who parades himself as a "trained" historian. Any more ahistorical gibberish you'd like to dazzle us with?

I don't see why it is so difficult to understand. Wellington did not defeat Napoleon. He and Blucher did-it was an allied victory, not merely a British one.

If Blucher hadn't shown or had been stopped, Wellington would have lost. And that is simple despite all of the nationalistic bluster.

Without Blucher, Wellington doesn't fight at Mont St Jean. Fairly simple.

@Brechtel198

All I do is call you out when you attack people. Across a couple of forums, conflict seems to follow you. Logic suggests there is a common denomonator.

If you stop trying to constantly correct everybody, and recognised a bit of diversity of viewpoint instead of calling people wrong-headed, uninformed etc, I wouldn't do it. My Grandmother left school at 14, but she saw two world wars and the great depression, so was not short of good advice. "It's nice to be important, but it's more important to be nice."

I'm all for developing a thick skin, but in some instances it reaches rhinocerous like proportions, so this quickly gets old for everyone else. I'm not in the business of polluting their threads unnecessarily, and I apologise to you all for doing so. For your sake I'll ration myself. That doesn't mean I've gone soft on pompous, boorish or bullying posts, just that I'm keeping my powder dry.

Not so much "Adieu!" then, but more "En garde!"