"Counter-Battery Fire" Topic

"It is a commonplace in Horse and Musket rules to treat deployed (i.e. unlimbered) artillery batteries as 'dispersed targets' or similar. Like light infantry, deployed batteries are assumed to be well spread out and therefore, in general terms, harder to hit. This fits in well with what you read in most books about Horse and Musket tactics – firing at enemy artillery batteries with your own artillery is supposed to be a waste of ammunition.

So far so good. The reading I have been doing recently around Napoleonic warfare (and I've been doing a lot), commonly supports this idea. Napoleon himself spoke against artillery carrying out counter-battery fire. Unfortunately for this theory, when one turns to reading battle accounts, it is quite common to find the artillery from one side being instructed to engage enemy artillery when the enemy fire is becoming a serious problem – or indeed for artillery units themselves to engage enemy batteries on their own initiative. It is also common to find that such fire succeeded, depending of course on various factors such as the competence of the opposing batteries, their relative numbers, and any advantages of position one or the other artillery grouping might have.

So, in my opinion, the concept and practice of gaining 'artillery superiority' during an engagement was definitely current in Napoleonic warfare, and other Horse and Musket periods. I wanted to reflect this in my rules – having a nice little ding-dong between opposing batteries would, it seemed to me, add a bit of spice to a game. So in Shadow of the Eagles there is no negative modifier for artillery (or anyone else) firing at deployed artillery…"
Main page
link

Amicalement
Armand

Might the number of comments decrying counter-battery mean it was pretty common, or the commanders wouldn't be mentioning it so often?

A bit of human engineering…. Those enemy cannon can hurt ME, whereas I can limber up and get away from infantry.

(smile)

Amicalement
Armand

The made points on artillery superiority is correct. Most rules do not reflect that artillery often retreated when under long range artillery fie, which never happended to infantry. This was propably because the artillery commander was more independent than the batallion commander. All tactical accounts are filled with batteries silencing the opponent. The comment on artillery usage depends on whether you are attacker or defender. If you defend you want to shoot up the attacking infantry. If you attack you want to silende the enmy artillery then danage his infantry,

also when you are shot at – you want to give back the compliments.

Yermelov seemed to be personally offended by it.
But then, he seems to have been a bit of a tw_a_t as well.
Can't say the translation of his memoires inspires me much…
d

also when you are shot at – you want to give back the compliments.

Really? Is that your experience or merely your opinion?

Perhaps you should give Duteil a good read…it is an excellent resource for French artillery doctrine of the period.

I would rather go for the Paddy Griffiths approach of tactical snippeting from accounts than theroretical works on how doctrine was percieved pre or post-hoc – historical litterature is full of misleading descriptions based on the theoretical approach as opposed to what actually happened.

Excellent comments, Sparta.

However, Duteil's manual is not theoretical, but practical, and if you actually follow the French artillery employment through the years, the basis for it was Duteil as well as the artillery instruction in the French artillery schools that stressed infantry/artillery cooperation.

The excellent education the French artillery officers received directly resulted in their continued success on the battlefields, especially under the Empire.

@Kevin
Is Duteil available in english? Or how do you cover it in your book on the subject?
May I ask you about your forthcoming book? What is new compared to the 2005 title? I was looking at acquiring a book about artillery tactics as I would like to understand the employment and use of this arm better. Which book would be the better of these two about tactics and doctrine?
Regards

George Nafziger has Duteil in English.

The next book is an artillery dictionary on the period 1792-1815 and I have attempted to put all relevant material into the book, including organization, command and control, and tactics.

link

I don't usually recommend my own books but Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars-Field Artillery which was my first book might help you.

link

Kevin, I would be interested in your comments on the original points quoted by Armand.

A fairly minor point about wargaming I'll admit, but having the attention of an expert is a rare occurrence.

Thank you for the gracious comment, but I have not found any experts in any period of history but there are excellent historians who do the research and publish credible and reliable material that is well-worth reading and using for further research.

The French practice for counterbattery fire was not to engage enemy artillery unless they were hurting your own infantry worse than you were hurting theirs. The primary artillery target was to be the enemy infantry.

If counterbattery fire was to be engaged in, it was better to use the smaller calibers available as they had a higher rate of fire. Enemy batteries were engaged by the friendly battery one piece at a time, and when that was disabled or put out of action, the next piece was then engaged. Effective counterbattery fire consumed a lot of ammunition.

If there were not infantry targets 'available' then targets of opportunity, including enemy artillery, could be engaged.

The Russians did not adopt this practice until after 1807 and being badly defeated by the French. The British artillery arm had the same practice.

I do hope this helps a little.

Jean-Pierre du Teil died in 1794 by firing squad. He fought in the SYW and in Corsica. Are you saying that his work was applied without change or variation through out the period 1795 to 1815?

Tousard wrote:

Never fire gun against gun, unless the enemy is under shelter, and his cannon exposed; moreover, unless your troops, being more annoyed by their fire than their troops are with yours, should be rendered incapable of performing their maneuvers.

Even under those strictures, there was still several points in most battles where counter-battery fire took place.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Forget all those theories, in case you read eye witness accounts and battle reports, there is plenty evidence of counter battery firing.

Yermolov, Alexey : Memoires of the Napoleonic Wars

(Eylau) I opened fire and set this village on fire, driving out the enemy infantry that harassed my guns. Then I directed my fire against the enemy batteries and held my ground for two hours.
P. 88

Our artillery was under fire the entire day, and if our hussars had not captured some French horses to replace our killed animals, I would have lost a few guns.
p. 80 (Wolfsdorf, 1807)

Moving by forced marches, the vanguard arrived on that battlefield only to find Yurkovskii hard pressed by the enemy and falling back to a small village, the main street of which was bombarded by enemy artillery. I immediately brought my horse artillery company up and, taking advantage of my elevated position and numbers, I drove the enemy guns back and covered our cavalry's retreat.
p. 74 (around Mohrungen 1807)

Memoires of Radozshitskii
My two guns were deployed against three enemy cannon. I aimed both my guns at one enemy cannon and damaged it on the very first shot.
p:40
Noticing that the French maintained reather precise fire at my guns and had already killed another cannonier, I moved 10 paces forward.
p. 40
But alas I was astounded by the condition of our artillery at the right side of the road! Several guns were scattered around, damaged or overturned, and dead gunners and horses lay among them. Forming a central battery, our company was ravaged by enemy cannon balls from three sides.
p. 41

There were a lot of threads about this topic where you can find easily more – a dead horse beaten to death again.

also Geert van Uythoven translated this interesting article.

DEPLOYMENT OF CAVALRY COMMANDED TO COVER ARTILLERY

("Aufstellung einer zur Deckung von Geschütz kommandirten Kavallerie")

Translated by Geert van Uythoven

Source:
- 'Ein Kavallerieoffizier': "Aufstellung einer zur Deckung von Geschütz kommandirten Kavallerie", in ‘Militair-Wochenblatt' 2. Jahrgang, 61. Stück (Berlin 1817) pp.272-274


"The 52nd chapter of the Militair-Wochenblatt contains a thesis about artillery cover. Without going into these new ideas, I merely consider the case as it is right now, not how it should be, and will only treat the passage of the thesis were the author has the opinion that: "the case, in which batteries will act on its own with a proportionately cover of cavalry or infantry should be treated as a very rare case". Regarding this statement, one should make an exception of the frequent advance and rear guard combats, to which I will limit my opinions in this article –which one also can treat as a contribution to ‘little wars'- as I believe that the horse artillery, in combination with single squadrons or a cavalry regiment, will form the forward [‘vortrab'] or rear force [‘nachtrab'] of an advance or rear guard of a corps.

The latest tactics which connects both arms so closely calls for the creation of such commands frequently, and the author of this article participated often in them during the 1812, 1813, and 1814 campaigns.

The more mechanical the deployment of the cavalry as a rule takes place in such cases, the more one should be surprised, that they nevertheless should receive the attention of the commanding officer in so many respects.

If cavalry is commanded to cover artillery during the pursuit of the enemy, or during a retreat, it will usually take up position close behind, or close to the flanks of them: so do single squadrons as well as regiments. Both ways, if not using the cover of the terrain 1), can impossible be regarded as efficient, then:
1) The enemy will expect this deployment when it will take place mechanically, and planning his attacks accordingly. When this attack succeeds, artillery and cavalry altogether will be defeated;
2) it will more or less uncover the flanks of the artillery, and finally
3) both forces are deployed close to each other, forming one target at which the enemy can concentrate his fire. The damage done by this has been shown by experience, and is already enough reason to act in this case also according to the spirit of the new.

To remove these disadvantages, according to the opinion of the author, the cavalry in advance and rear guards, which would be commanded to cover the artillery during the fighting, would have to take up a forward position on the flanks of the enemy. In an oblique direction in order not to present the enemy our own flank.

Assuming that a half horse artillery battery would have to be covered by two squadrons: so should one of these deploy 100 to 200 paces to the right and forward of the battery, and with an advanced right wing; the other one at the same distance with an advanced left wing, opposing the former squadron, to the left and forward of the battery.

The enemy forward or rear force, when not outnumbering us, would in such circumstances never dare to undertake an attack. If he nevertheless would try it, even when outnumbering us, he will not be able to defeat us, when beside these dispositions he will be opposed by a calm presence of mind, and a decisive use of the right moment.

Assuming that the enemy would attack the cavalry, it would present our artillery their flank. These would have to wait until they have advanced into canister range, and then fire, giving by doing this at the cavalry the signal to [counter]attack. If the enemy would direct his attack at the artillery, he would have to pay dearly during its retreat, when the conditions of not acting to rashly, and determination will be fulfilled by both arms.

For the remainder, anyone understanding the spirit of such dispositions will be able to think about other possibilities of attack, and will never doubt the way how to act defensively and offensively.

Form the above one can justly derive the disposition of a cavalry brigade, as for example in the case given in the theses in chapter 52 already mentioned, with a force consisting of five regiments in two lines with a horse artillery battery. The flanks of the enemy however could in such a case be threatened easier and more advantageous by forming wing columns in sections (‘Zügen'); our artillery would even be better covered, and the 5th regiment –if two lines of two regiments are formed- be used most efficient, by deploying it at a farther distance to cover our own most threatened flank. In such a case it could act more independent, using every advantageous opportunity to harm the enemy.

It has especially to be remarked that, when the enemy would deploy artillery against us, he would have to direct it against three points or, if he targets only one of these, leave both other unharmed. In such a case it should not only be permitted to the cavalry, but be their duty, to change position when they notice that the enemy has found the range at them; in which case they should by alternate movements move to a side, backwards or forward again, so that the tactical deployment of the whole position is not disturbed.

Stubbornly staying at a fixed position in such occasions is not perseverance, but obstinate courage, or even pedantry! One who cannot make the difference between changing position with leaving its assigned post, and who is calmly and steadfast prepared to sacrifice troops with such pedantry, will be the cause that much blood will be spilled for the fatherland for nothing.

When in the year 1647 Duke Ulrich von Württemberg commanded the Allied rear guard against Turenne, and was fired at by him during the attack on a defile near Augsburg, the immortal General [Turenne] praised the Duke, saying among other things: "The enemy squadrons did nothing else then changing position time and again, without flinching."

A cavalry officer"


Footnotes:
1) For example when low ground will provide the cavalry a covered position which, as soon as it will not hamper our offensive, or deprive the battery from its protection, would have to be utilized. In all cases, every tactical rule is subordinate to the qualities of the terrain: in all cases they will dictate the commanding officer how to behave, and the sooner he is able to oversee its right utilization, the better knowledge he will have of the virtues a general needs to have.

Well, the observations speak for themselves, artillery needed to be supported by either infantry or cavalry to be protected and not to loose guns or to be overrun, Drouot's battery was saved at Hanau only by the timely counter charge of French cavalry.

I found another one

Drouots ADC notes :
The Emperor gave order to the General Drouot to gather thirty or forty cannon of the Guard, to silence the enemy artillery (nota bene – counter battery fire) (…) Never the less the General Drouot reached it and took position on edge of the forests with a marvelous speed; a quarter of an hours was enough for him to extinguish the enemy fire (nota bene – counter battery fire with effect). But then the prince Wrède made a charge on our batteries, which were supported by no infantry (nota bene – lack of support troops were noted); the general Drouot loaded his guns with canister shot and waited till the cavalry charge was nearly upon him till he fired … the enemy horsemen who followed, arrived almost on our guns it was a critical moment; he general Drouot who was on foot, had drawn his sword, gunners had armed themselves with ram rods and with trail spikes (nota bene – the effect of canister was not enough to stop the Bavarian cavalry and the French gunners readied themselves for hand to hand combat).
Fortunately the General Nansouty had cleared the wood behind us and emerged on our right; overturning everything which was in his way.(so the French cavalry had the credit to save the artillery)"
(Vie de la Planta, cited in Dawson : Les Brutal The Guard Foot Artillery 1797 to 1815, p.197 / 198

You miss the point (again).

Counterbattery fire was practiced, but it was not the preferred method of engagement, the enemy infantry was. It's a very simple and common sense practice employed by the French, British early in the wars, and by the Russians after 1807.

Jean-Pierre du Teil died in 1794 by firing squad. He fought in the SYW and in Corsica. Are you saying that his work was applied without change or variation through out the period 1795 to 1815?

Indeed, useless for artillery tactics of the Napoleonic wars, as are all those theories written by military philosophers being out of touch of real performance.

As one can see the French were again not the best or the only ones, this happens when non French sources are ignored – the end will be a mystification instead of history.

Just to add some new blood to this I quickly went through Nafzigers (well referenced) Lutzen, Baytzen and Dresden books, which are extremely packed with tactical snippets on my personal tactical preoccupation(s) of counter battery fire (and massed skirmish deployment).

The descriptions below of the tactical deployment of artillery can be refound continuously through the campaigns of 1812-14. For wargames this implies in my opinion the following.

1) Artillery was deployed in a counterbattery role – and general domination of terrain – to match and overpower enemy artillery before an assault where possible – both by attacker and defender. This seems to be part of the process of gaining the overhand in the destructive process before the decisive phase (similar to that of skirmish deployment)

2) Artillery was not expected to hold and cover terrain if not suproted by infantry or cavalry. Artillery not withdrawing before an assualt seems to have been considered an laudable not an autmatic event. Artillery was often overrun if attacked – especially by cavalry.

In many wargame rules which I have seen played and studied historical tactics are not possible because 1) Counterbattery fire is ineffective 2) Unsupported batteries will repel attackers rather easily.

From Lutzen:

The battle began at 12:00 A.M. when a Russian Position Battery #33 Mandelsloh's Prussian 6pdr Battery #11, and another 16 guns assigned to Klüx's brigade began to cannonade the French at a range of 800 yards." The Russian battery was in the interval between two Prussian brigades and the second was on the right wing of General Ziethen's brigade. The allied fire brought the French out of their torpor. Souham quickly established a battery of two companies (12 guns) to the left of the village and began to return fire." Souham deployed the 6,215 men of his second brigade, under Chemineau, and pushed a strong line of skirmishers forward from the village. As Klüx's brigade advanced his assault was proceeded by a few scattered cossacks. The Fus/,3/1st West Prussian Regiment covered the two batteries to protect them from the French skirmishers.
Prussian Battery #3 was cut to pieces by the French counter-battery fire, losing three guns dismounted, and was forced to retreat. The Prussian Guard Battery # 4 quickly took its position and resumed fire on the French. After forty minutes of bombardment, the allied batteries were obliged to withdraw, leaving the three dismounted guns." The artillery exchange became general and shot was falling as far as Hünerbein's brigade, which stood in reserve.

Bautzen:

The immediate area along the Spree, where Bertrand intended to cross, was covered by three batteries, Prussian Horse Battery #7 and two Russian, assigned to Klüx's brigade. This artillery d engaged the French artillery on the Gottesberg all morning, as well firing on the infantry the bridge at Nieder-Gürig.However, the fight became one sided once all the French guns began firing. The intensity of the French artillery fire and the expenditure of all the ammunition located to the two Russian batteries obliged all three batteries to withdraw to new positions. The fire was intense enough that Prussian Horse Battery #7 lost four guns dismounted in this change. This gave the opening that Soult needed to establish his bridgehead and move bertrand across the Spree; the artillery ceased its fire.

Aonther on cavalry (or other supports) being needed to cover artillery:

The artillery in the allied center was seconded by the Russian Guard who, standing behind it, had orders not to allow it to abandon its position. The Russian cuirassier corps and all its supporting horse batteries demonstrated against the advancing French, and the French I Cavalry Corps responded to this maneuver. In addition, the French and Württemberg artillery on the Kreckwitz heights took advantage of the opportunity to wreak havoc on the Russian cavaliers as they maneuvered before them. Behind the retreating Prussians, a small rear guard formed by Prussian Horse Battery #9 and Foot Battery #11, under the command of Major Braun, was covered by a force of Prussian cavalry. He engaged the French until he was so seriously threatened, that he began to withdraw. As he was limbering his guns, a force of about 50 Württemberg cavalry entered the battery in an effort to cut it off. They were quickly driven off by the Neumärk Dragoons and Silesian Hussars.

Gross-Beeren and Katzbach:

The Thüringian Battalion had defended the villages of Nieder- and Ober-Weinberg, while Katzeler's advanced guard formed itself in two lines on the plateau. It then withdrew by echelons 100 paces on Bellewitzhof, with its left wing forward, in a manner to support itself on the ravine. Barenkampf's 6pdr Foot Battery #24 placed itself on both wings of the infantry. The French artillery did engage Barenkampf's battery with some success, dismounting one gun and a howitzer in the action on the right.

Yorck became concerned with holding the village of Schlaupe, and sent successively, the 3/14th Silesian Landwehr and the Silesian Grenadier Battalion, joining the Fus/ Brandenburg there to hold the village. Hünerbein, believing he would encounter strong resistance on the plateau, took personal command of these three battalions. To support his infantry, 6pdr Foot Battery #3 stood by Bram's 12pdr battery. Oberstleutnant von Schmidt, Chief of artillery, strengthened this battery by bringing up 12pdr Battery #1, 6pdr Battery #15, and Horse Battery #2. The French responded by bringing up five batteries to return the allied fire.

The French were pushed back again, and the Prussians temporarily overran four batteries of French artillery before the remainder of Wathiez's 10th Light Cavalry Brigade appeared and drove them back. Wathiez's cavalry drove forward and obliged the left of the Prussian artillery to withdraw, abandoning nine guns. The 23rd and 24th Chasseurs and the 11th Hussars, who executed this charge, captured 200 prisoners.

Seeing the attack, GL von Bülow detached GM von Oppen with two horse batteries and four cavalry regiments to support the Wittstock garrison." GM Oppen established himself on the road from Ludwigsfelde and Löwenbrück. His two batteries relieved the guns placed in the redoubt. The 2/Elbe Regiment arrived at 1:00 P.M., to the west of Wittstock and moved to the right, where it deployed in
formation, holding two companies in reserve. Reynier had contented himself with a skirmish battle and the Weinberg hill fell in the French hands. Once held, a battery moved up and took a position in Wittstock, engaged the Prussian artillery, but soon found Wittstock burning around it, obliging it to move.

The village of Blankenfelde remained unoccupied. Tauentzien forces held a strong position. His artillery lined the northern edge of the fields, but were in the woods. The Blankenfelde lake covered his left against any turning movement from the east. The Italian skirmishers spent several hours pushing back the Prussian skirmishers. They made five efforts before they finally succeeded and pierced through the forest to de east of Blankenfelde. They were followed by three infantry columns and an artillery The Italian battery took a position in the woods and supported the attack by three columns, which was aimed against the left of the Prussian line. Major Kleist held that position with four battalions and six guns. The Italian battery moved to the edge of the woods and began to fire on the Prussians, at a range of 700-900 paces with cannister fire. The Prussian artillery was surprised by this and responded by firing cannister back at them. However, the Prussian artillery appears to have lost this exchange and withdrawal. Tauentzien brought his second line to the heights to stop the Italian attack. The Italian
infantry and battery soon withdrew. regrouping in the forest, the Italians sent forward several hundred skirmishers, supported by artillery. The Prussian artillery, under Lieutenants Papendick and Blankenburg", held its fire and at a range of 400 paces stopped them cold with cannister.

At the moment when the corps began to move forward, Oberst Holtzendorf observed to GL Bülow that the terrain was very level and that the French had already established a strong battery on the Windmühlberg. He proposed that the Prussians bring forward the greatest part of their batteries and form a battery to face them. Bülow consented and the battery was formed, right to left, from 6pdr Foot Battery #6 (Ludwig), Russian 12pdr Battery #7 (Dietrichs), 12pdr Foot Battery #4 (Meyer), 6pdr Foot Battery #16 (Sprouts and part of 6pdr Foot Battery #19 (Liebermann). Russian 12pdr Battery #21 (Schlueter and Horse Batteries #5 (right) and #6 (left) remained in the reserve behind the infantry. Between 5:00 P.M., and 6:00 P.M., the 12pdr batteries began to fire on the Saxons at a range of 1,800 paces. The Prussian infantry stood 300 paces behind the guns. fire had continued for about a half hour, the 6pdr batteries advanced to a range of 1,300 paces and began to fire on the Saxon first line. After suppressing the Saxon artillery, Itzendorf moved forward the other part of 6pdr Battery #19 (Liebermann) and the Russian 12pdr Battery #21 (Schlueter). They moved between the other two 12pdr batteries already in position. Horse Battery #5 (Niendorff), escorted by the Freiwilliger Jäger Squadron, Königin Dragoon Regiment, moved to the right where it fired on the left flank of the Saxon artillery. At the same time, Horse Battery #6 (Steinwehr) moved against the Saxon left.19 Later, Colonel von Cardel led forward a small Swedish force consisting of Captain Mühlenfels' battery and two squadrons of the Smaländ Dragoon Regiment, to join the grand battery. This battery took up a position to the right of Horse Battery #5 (Neindorff) and began firing cannister at a range of 600 paces. It drew the attention of the Saxon artillery and suffered a number of casualties as a result……
The Saxon infantry supported the artillery, which stood in front of the infantry. Coerl's Converged Grenadier Battalion, too weak to occupy the entire edge of Gross- stood in the cemetery. The 1/,2/2nd (von Sahr) Saxon Light Infantry Regiment in the small woods to the west, having on its left the battalions of the 1/ 2/ Anton and 2/König Infantry Regiments and all the rest of von Sahr's 25th Division. During the battle, the artillery of the VII Corps dismounted five guns from the Prussian Horse Battery #5 (Niendorff) and four from 6pdr Foot Battery #5 (Glasenapp). Glasenapp's 6pdr Foot Battery #5 was, as a result of this punishment, obliged to withdraw from the battle. In view of the poor reputation of the Saxon artillery, their success in this artillery duel is quite surprising. After about a half hour, the half 6pdr Foot Battery #6 (Ludwig) and 6pdr Battery #19 (Liebermann) advanced to within 900 paces of the village. The entire line followed their example. Twelve pounder Foot Battery #4 (Meyer) and 6pdr Foot Battery #16 (Spreuth), protected by Gross-Beeren, had suffered very little from the artillery duel. They advanced and took the village under fire. russian infantry marched to a range of 300 paces behind its artillery. When they did, the batteries of the VII Corps turned their fire on them, forcing them to deploy from on column to line, so as to minimize their casualties from the artillery fire.<q/>

Well, it wasn't me who started this thread, but the link presented was to a post on my blog.

Therefore, my thanks to those who took the time to type out extended examples of artillery combat, which were most interesting. Overall, it seems I might have got it right.

And Kevin, I think you will have one more buyer for your artillery book.

Thank you very much. It is greatly appreciated.

@Sparta

Indeed, at Kriegsspiel an unsupported battery will be taken when attacked, an excellent rule.

Also counter battery fire might just invoke the aimed at battery and battery under fire to switch their target from infantry or cavalry, to that battery firing at them.

Thank you for the feedback Kevin, I look forward to reading your book.

@Sparta
Very interesting examples.

You're welcome and I do hope you enjoy the book.

@Sparta
The examples you show demonstrates several interesting elements;
"Fire and movement" with artillery was quite evolved, also with foot batteries; the alies were able to integrate several nationalities in this I would say was advanced tactics (even in NATO, this is a very high level of integration); also at this stage of the wars, the French seem to have had better quality artillery, at least indicated by the examples you have chosen.

@Winterfeldt

Yes the Kriegspiel rules definately has excellent mechanics and any ruleset which sets up mechanisms that deviates from those to a significant degree should argue well for it.

I have found that if counterbattery fire is made historically efficient, gamers act historically and fires at the enemy batteries, because they are the ones capable of hurting them, even without specific mechanisms – by the way I cannot recall the mechanism you write about in the version of Kriegsspiel that I have – where is it?

@Rittmester
Yes I agree. The offesnsive artillery deployments in the late Napoleonic period seemed to involve fire from long range with batteries leapfrogging into closer range once the enemy was angaged. This gradual wearing down of the enemy which allows closing upon him for better fire is very reminicent of how Prussians manual describe the infantry firefight from 1870+.

I also agree that the french seemed able to hold their own in an artillery duel with fewer pieces. It seems the effective commitment period of the allied batteries were shorter, potentially due to poorer resupply practices and the habit of taking batteries out of action once ammunition was low. This practice is repeated again and again in examples from the Prussian histpory of 1813-15 and goes for both Prussian and Russsian batteries.

In wargam terms if is extremely interesting to create plausible mechanics that describe the changes in command structure which allows the fluent and aggressive treamtent of allied artillery in the late Napoleonic wars as opposed to the often lumbering and slow deployment in the early parts.

it must be in the improved version of 1828, I must have a look

Even under those strictures, there was still several points in most battles where counter-battery fire took place.

No one has said that counterbattery fire didn't take place. But the fact remains, that the French artillery schools, and Jean Duteil wrote in his artillery treatise, that the enemy's infantry was the primary target.

'When scouting for a position for the battery, one must have as a primary target the infantry of the enemy, and not his artillery. It is not necessary to have regard for their artillery unless you cannot fulfill this main objective, or in cases where the enemy's artillery fire greatly disrupts the infantry that one protects. It follows from this principle that one should never engage in counterbattery fire, except when it is indispensable for the support and protection of the infantry. On the contrary, one must have a principal goal, as we have said, to fire on the infantry of the enemy, whenever they can be destroyed, or to reduce any obstacles which cover them. By engaging to eliminate the fire of their artillery is to consume powder uselessly and to seek, in vain, the destruction of their batteries. By supposing even that one could succeed in this, it would not really have accomplished anything, or very little, since there is still the infantry to be overcome.'-Jean Duteil.

Jean-Pierre du Teil died in 1794 by firing squad. He fought in the SYW and in Corsica. Are you saying that his work was applied without change or variation through out the period 1795 to 1815?

There were two Duteil brothers, Jean-Pierre the elder, and Jean the younger of the two. The author of the treatise was the younger brother, Jean Duteil, not Jean-Pierre, sometimes known as Joseph. Jean Duteil died in 1820.

Both Duteil brothers were instrumental in the training of Napoleon as an artillery officer, the elder brother had also been Napoleon's commanding officer.

Doctrine is the basis for tactics, and Duteils manual is just that and its principles were followed from 1792-1815. Some artillery commanders, such as Senarmont and Drouot, took the doctrine further, as did Napoleon. But the manual was still the basis of French artillery operations in the field and in sieges.

And Tousard's comment that you posted follows what Duteil wrote on counterbattery fire.

So, perhaps, you can explain your comments?

…useless for artillery tactics of the Napoleonic wars…

Perhaps you could explain this incorrect comment?

The Duteil brothers were both school-trained artillery officers and had served in different artillery billets, including as commanders. That only enhances what is written in the manual.

So, perhaps, you can explain your comments?

I thought they were self-explanatory…to the extent that you explained them.

Doctrine is the basis for tactics, and Duteils manual is just that and its principles were followed from 1792-1815. Some artillery commanders, such as Senarmont and Drouot, took the doctrine further, as did Napoleon. But the manual was still the basis of French artillery operations in the field and in sieges.

I am not sure the term 'Doctrine' is applicable here, as it is a more modern concept, and 'principles' might be a better word for books that were never written as 'doctrine.' Duteil's 'manual' wasn't the only one written or being used during this time. I am sure you know which ones I am talking about, DeTuil wrote his Essai in 1778, but others such as Du Puget wrote his Essai in 1771 and Antoni wrote his manual in 1780. Napoleon studied under Detuil's older brother, so there was some connection there, but not the only 'manual' out there.

Detuil wrote:

From Duteil's Usage on the subject:

'When scouting for a position for the battery, one must have as a primary target the infantry of the enemy, and not his artillery. It is not necessary to have regard for their artillery unless you cannot fulfill this main objective, or in cases where the enemy's artillery fire greatly disrupts the infantry that one protects. It follows from this principle that one should never engage in counterbattery fire, except when it is indispensable for the support and protections of the infantry. On the contrary, one must have for a principal goal, as we have said, to fire on the infantry of the enemy, whenever they can be destroyed, or to reduce any obstacles which cover them. By engaging to eliminate the fire of their artillery is to consume powder uselessly and to seek, in vain, the destruction of their batteries. By supposing even that one could succeed in this, it would not really have accomplished anything, or very little, since there is still the infantry to be overcome.'

Note that he doesn't say that counterbattery fire couldn't destroy enemy artillery, only that it wouldn't accomplish 'anything' because the enemy infantry would still be present.

'The principal rules for the execution of the artillery are to allocate its fire based on the importance of the target, and to manage its ammunition and conserve it for the essential and decisive moment…'

That is a principal that I think most all nations followed during this period. Certainly, Du Puget, Antoni, Ayde etc. etc. of the other nations. Of course, Napoleon opinioned that once artillery was fired on by other artillery, the instinct was to fire back, protecting themselves. i.e. artillery could draw enemy artillery fire.

Note that he doesn't say that counterbattery fire couldn't destroy enemy artillery, only that it wouldn't accomplish 'anything' because the enemy infantry would still be present.

Who said that it wouldn't?

Are you creating a strawman argument?

I have posted more than once describing how counterbattery fire was employed. Do you need to see it again?

That is a principal that I think most all nations followed during this period. Certainly, Du Puget, Antoni, Ayde etc. etc. of the other nations. Of course, Napoleon opinioned that once artillery was fired on by other artillery, the instinct was to fire back, protecting themselves. i.e. artillery could draw enemy artillery fire.

The Russians didn't until after 1807 and experiencing disastrous defeats at the hands of the Grande Armee.

I can state conclusively that in Iraq in 2003 the US Marines often conducted counter battery fire against Iraqi artillery.

It's nice to have some clarity on this topic for once.

US Marine artillery conducted counterfire (the contemporary term) against Iraqi artillery in 1991 when we invaded Kuwait.

And it should be noted that ammunition is now much more lethal and longer range, and has radar for target acquisition, that was not available ca 1800.

It should also be noted that the primary mission was to support the infantry and armor; counterfire was secondary.

It is clear, I think, that there were principles for the priority of targets (just as today) which stated that the priority of fires should be to destroy/disrupt the infantry. However, I also think that the examples at least clearly indicates that there were many commanders who were of the opinion that it was an important priority, or maybe prerequisite, to establish artillery superiority and/or to suppress enemy artillery in order to be able to maneouvre with infantry and cavalry.
This is also a very important issue today, sometimes a prerequisite, depending on the capabilities of the enemy. There is an example from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine where Russian artillery destroyed two Ukrainian infantry battalions in 2 minutes. History also shows that during WWI and WWII, the artillery arm was strengthened substantially in relation to peacetime establishments. "The queen of the battle" is still very descriptive.

Since it has been brought up, I'll share a tale.

Back in southern Libya 1943, as part of the designated 'New Zealand Corps' flank march of the 8th Army, my fathers artillery regiment was the recipient of a number of large calibre shells.
As he told me many years ago, rather than exploding, they 'thumped' and 'whumped' into the sand.

While everyone took cover, after 10 minutes they moved out (of their foxholes- a standard precaution) and examined the unexploded shells. Remember the movie Schindlers List?

Yes, they had been the recipients of shells packed with Czech newspapers. He'd not forgotten this, otherwise I'd probably not have been around to tell anyway (not a bad thing some would say). Sadly my father died 10 years before the movie came out, and I never knew if he knew the full story behind his luck.

Not content with that, after a gap of days or week (unsure), the same occurred in next position. A German medium battery opened up to disuade the NZ'ers from further eploration.

This time a ready regiment advanced very quickly something like 4-5 miles toward the German lines with a thorough tank support (possibly our Divisions Recce Regiment- now M3 Lees). As the terrain was relatively flat and open it wasn't long before radio coordinates from flash spotting Artillery Observers aircraft had identified the offending battery location.

Quickly registering fire the coordinates were broadcast to the regiment and on command the ordered 'murder' (I think was the code) of 24x 25 pdr guns, rapid fire HE 10 rounds apiece exploded into life (reminiscent of El Alamein).

The German battery was never heard from again.
The NZ regiment quickly withdrew to camp lines (as planned) since the Afrika Korps took retaliation rather badly and sometimes rashly counterattacked (and they still had air cover available).

On the advance some time later the German battery position was found- several 150mm guns shattered and overturned amongst a lot of bodies. The 'lesson' had been learned.
regards davew

regardless of priority, artillery commanders did want to shoot back when being targeted by other artillery – the human factor – and which also can be seen was effective in two ways, it could cause casualties on gunners as well as destroy equipment and cause that the enemy artillery may switch targets.

@Shat1984 – Great story with the newspapers – thx for telling!

@Brechtel: How would you see the actual practice from the examples (a few of many) from 1812-14 against the principles as decribed by you here and in your book. What I would conclude, from all the tactical snippets available, is that counterbattery fire was standard real life practice, with the aim to establish firesuperiority – and it seemd to work quite effectvely at that – regardless of theoretical prinicples or doctrines. Is is not best to describe history from the actual practice, analyzing how it differed from regulations/principles – i think that it was makes Paddy Griffith such a great historian.

What I would conclude, from all the tactical snippets available, is that counterbattery fire was standard real life practice, with the aim to establish firesuperiority – and it seemd to work quite effectvely at that – regardless of theoretical prinicples or doctrines. Is is not best to describe history from the actual practice, analyzing how it differed from regulations/principles – i think that it was makes Paddy Griffith such a great historian.

I couldn't agree more – dogma is not helping at all, nor by military philosophers, Allix makes a good point about the difference of artillery officers, those behind the desk and those who did fight.

…regardless of priority, artillery commanders did want to shoot back when being targeted by other artillery

They certainly did in the Russian artillery arm, but both the French and the British artillery commanders usually followed accepted practice and their training.

How would you know what 'artillery commanders did want'?

Who said that it wouldn't?

Are you creating a strawman argument?

Really Brechtel? More than one TMP poster has suggested artillery can't destroy enemy artillery or asked about the ability. The suggestion has been that if commanders feel it is a waste of time to fire on enemy artillery, it must mean the fire is always ineffective. I was simply pointing out that DuTiel isn't saying that when suggesting that such fire is a waste of time. It wasn't about you.

I have posted more than once describing how counterbattery fire was employed. Do you need to see it again?

Yes, you repeatedly have said that. I certainly have seen the same statement a lot in many places over the years. I am sure you have it memorized. I was simply quoting Dutiel instead of just talking about what he said. That's all, babe. Which is why I don't need to see your statement again.

It is amazing how hard it is to actually agree with you.

How would you know what 'artillery commanders did want'?

I'm historically psychic? No, I just read what artillery commanders and experienced officers say those artillery commanders 'want and do.' For instance, Napoleon:

"When artillerymen are under attack from enemy battery, they can never be made to fire on massed infantry. It's natural cowardice, the violent instinct of self-preservation: men immediately defend themselves from
their attackers and try to destroy them, in order to avoid being destroyed themselves."

Fight or flight response?
If a unit suffers artillery fire, they will be affected morally and physically.

Ignore the latter, but fight on. However eventually moral does affect performance. If you don't 'feel' safe doing your work, you are likely to make mistakes.

In gaming terms I'd accept that a morale effect can include a withdrawl, realignment, or retaliation. That is where the player no longer gets to decide upon the action taken.
d

one just has to read what artillery did and how they felt, there are plenty around, it is one way to ignore or negate them in case they don't fit with ones own dogma or accept it.

Rogers's battery, in front of Kempt's 8th brigade at the beginning of the attack of d'Erlon

"During the formation of those Columns, and of numerous Batteries of Artillery, the latter occasionally opened their fire upon the Artillery of the Division, by which we lost some horses, but were restrained by Sir Thomas Picton from returning it."

EEL, issue 79, April 1984, p.21 –Notes on d'Erlon´s First Attack at Waterloo, by John E. Koontz.

Battery commanders were quite independent minded, so when Rogers was under artillery fire he liked to return it, so to speak out of human instinct – but there Picton was around, he was restrained by a general only, otherwise he would open fire on French artillery.

I think Sparta's examples showed that counterbattery fire, at least the French, could be quite effective. Driving away the enemy's batteries, and thus both protecting your own manoeuvre troops as well as artillery, has to be a fair measurement of success. Unless the examples are skewed, I think they demonstrate that CF could be quite effective when employing good arty.

it is effective in two ways, it causes destruction and induces the enemy to shot back at the enemy batteries and by that changing of targets lessen the fire on infantry or cavalry.

I cannot see that the French were any better than the rest of the world, indeed they seemed to have a problem with overshooting, see the Russian examples.