"Battle of the Berezina" Topic

"As the French army retreated from Russia, they were faced with the troubling prospect of crossing the Berezina River. Usually frozen by that time of the year, an unseasonable thaw kept the 100 yard wide river flowing strong, forcing the French to find a bridge. Directly in the path of the French army and determined to keep the French from crossing the river was Admiral Chichagov with 34,000 soldiers. Further north, General Wittgenstein with 30,000 soldiers was moving to join with Chichagov to hold the French back, while Field Marshal Kutusov with the main Russian army pursued the French army from the east, but was falling behind and needed time to catch up. All the Russians had to do was block a crossing for a few days until Kutusov's force arrived and they could annihilate the weakened French from three sides.

The French weren't going to give up without a fight though. Polish General Dombrowski successfully seized a bridge for the French over the river at Borisov, but Chichagov's forces quickly moved in and their superior numbers forced Dombrowski to withdraw. As the French II Corps arrived in force to retake the bridge, the Russians pulled back to the west bank and destroyed the bridge. Realizing the stark reality of the situation, Napoleon ordered his papers burned and many of the standards destroyed to prevent them from falling into Russian hands. Luckily for the French, General Corbineau discovered a ford across the river at Studyanka north of Borisov and General Eblé had a few days earlier disobeyed direct orders and not destroyed all of his bridging equipment…"

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Amicalement
Armand

'There never was a better opportunity to force the surrender of an army in the open field. Napoleon had to rely for the most part upon the reputation of his arms; and he made use here of an asset he had been accumulating for a long time…Because the enemy was afraid of him and his Guard, no one dared face him. Napoleon capitalized on this psychological effect, and with its assistance worked his way out of one of the worst situations in which a general was ever caught. Of course this psychological force was not all he had. He was still supported by his own brilliant strength of character and the peerless military virtues of his army, not yet destroyed by the greatest of trials. Once out of the trap, Napoleon said to his staff: 'You see how one can slip away under the very nose of the enemy.' Napoleon in this action not only preserved his military honor, he enhanced it.'-Carl von Clausewitz.

'It has been said that the bridges presented a hideous spectacle due to the crowding and confusion…In reality, the crossing of the Berezina in the face of the enemy was a very large military undertaking that reflects further glory on the army and its chief.'-General Berthezene.

General Eble, the commander of the pontonier units of the Grande Armee in the Russian campaign was described as having 'the appearance of an ancient Roman' and, by Bernadotte, as a 'man out of Plutarch.'

Eble was '…tall, brusque, energetic, and perservering, he could make artillery units and bridges alike out of the most unpromising materials. Superior as a man, a commander, and a technician. Few friends, but those he ha were devoted. Universally admired. Called his soldiers 'my comrades,' but kept strict discipline-with his fists if necessary.'-John Elting.

From the panorama "The Berezina" by Wojciech Kossak and Julian Falat (assisted by Polish artists – Michal Wywiórski, Antoni Piotrkowski, Kazimierz Pu³aski (cousin of Kossak), et Jan Stanis³awski).

The work started on December 1, 1894 and in April 1896 the finished Berezina panorama went on display in Berlin. In September 1898 it was displayed in Warsaw, in April 1900 in Kiev, and in June 1901 Moscow. After that it was kept at Kossak's home at Krakow. The panoramic painting was 15 meters high and 120 meters long and without a proper gallery to display it and having been rolled and slowly decaying at Kossak's house it wasn't destined to survive in its entirety for long. There was also conflict between the two leading painters, and so this great work of art was completely cut into multiple panels and then these smaller paintings were sold off to interested buyers. It started in 1907 when Kossak started to cut it into smaller pieces, selling those pieces he painted himself.
The above are photos of some of the larger scenes surviving.

Thanks very much for posting these-very well done.

Remind me again – how many French troops were left on the "wrong" side of the Berezina and how many died enabling the crossing?

Partoundaux's French division of Victor's IX Corps was cut off and captured on 27-28 November. They were the army's rear guard. After the army withdrew over the bridges after defeating both Tshitshagov and Wittgenstein there were still stragglers and camp followers on the east bank. Eble tried to get them to cross after the formed units, but they refused. Their number was possible as high as 10,000.

Casualties on both sides during the fighting has never been, as far as I have discovered, been accurately figured out.

The bottom line is that the remnants of the Grande Armee defeated two Russian armies during the operations of 26-28 November and successfully crossed the Berezina and continued their retreat. Kutusov failed to support his colleagues being content to be 'in pursuit.' Quite possibly he was afraid of being defeated by Napoleon again.

'Kutusov avoided the enemy and, remaining in one place, he was constantly far behind the enemy. This, however, did not prevent him from informing Tshitshagov that the main army was closely pursuing the enemy. These letters were backdated and delivered late to the Admiral. Tshitshagov often reprimanded couriers for being late but they explained that they were sent much later than the dates indicated on letters.'-Denis Davidov.

'Kutusov most likely had neither a definitive plan of action mpr desire to interfere in events, preferring to let everything resolve itself. But at the same time he took every precaution to protect himself from any criticism, which required finding a convenient target for attacks.-I. Vasilev, 2001.

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

this is a very sad story were thousands perished due to a megalomaniac, strange nobody is telling the story of the mother who did strangled their own child to death before getting trampled to death.

This was sheer human misery to a gigantic scale and Boney was responsible for that.

There are a lot of wild stories from this event. Most of them are fantasies. Bonaparte certainly made one of his greatest mistakes in launching the campaign to begin with, but you could just as easily blame it on the French Aristocracy for the grinding poverty of the working people and launching the French Revolution.

you could just as easily blame it on the French Aristocracy for the grinding poverty of the working people and launching the French Revolution.

I blame it on Clovis, for starting the French kingdom, without which there would have been no French Aristocracy!

Some people blame it on the Iberian tectonic plate, for creating the island of Corsica, but I consider that to be revisionism.

There is a bigger game of politics and power that was being played out and ignored in many criticism of the Russians at Bereiza. The Russians did NOT want to capture Napoleon and destroy all of the French army in Russia. If they did that, then France would have been carved up by England, Prussia and Austria and Russia would be left out as a minor power. A repeated pattern in the 7YW, Napoleonic wars and others was that the center of power, equipment and supplies for the Russians was in Russia and NOT Beolruss and Poland. It would take a half year to move a well supported army to eastern German to take part in the final battle- and that is what happened. (The Russians also had to make good their army which was also damaged by being in the field during a bad Russian winter). The Russians played their hand right, in the 1814 battles they had a fresh well supplied veteran large army to play a dominate role in the defeat of Napoleon and take their fair share of the spoils.

The Russians did NOT want to capture Napoleon and destroy all of the French army in Russia.

Then why did they try so hard to do so? Why did two Russian armies try, and fail, to trap the remnants of the Grande Armee at the Berezina?

I don't give any credibility to that idea at all. And I've never read anything credible that supports that idea.

And what were the Russians' 'fair share of the spoils' in western Europe? They lusted over Poland, which is one of the main reasons for the invasion of Russia in the first place.

I guess withdrawing troops from in front of the ford was an accident? The Russians did not want to ruin their army to destroy Napoleon and his army for the benefit of the English.

Tshitshagov took and destroyed the Borisov bridge on 22 November. Napoleon had planned to use it to get across the river.

Oudinot had learned of two fords across the Berezina, one at Studenka and one closer to Borisov. He chose to use the Studenka crossing and began to perform deception operations at every possible crossing point from Veselovo (north of Studenka) to Borisov (south of Studenka).

Tshitshagov initially held most of his army across from Borisov with a division under Tschaplitz across from Studenka.

Tshitshagov was fooled by the French deception operations as well as by a message from Kutusov, which caused him to initially withdraw Tschaplitz leaving only Cossack patrols in the Studenka area which were driven off by Polish lancers supported by voltigeurs.

Bridge construction began early on 26 November, the needed trestles for the bridges being constructed under cover on the eastern bank of the river.

Tshitshagove figured out that he had been fooled on the 26th and that Tschaplitz had been defeated on the west bank by Oudinot.

On the 27th Tshitshagov sent Langeron toward Brili and advanced himself the next day, finding that both Langeron and Tschaplitz were being badly handled by Ney. He immediately counterattacked was finally defeated by Ney.

So the bottom line to your question, is that Tshitshagov was fooled by the French deception operations and then badly defeated by Ney who commanded both the II and III Corps after Oudinot was wounded.

Seems to me that Tshitshagov's army was badly defeated with heavy losses in a deliberate battle to try and keep the French from crossing. At the same time Victor was defeating Wittgenstein on the east bank of the river.

Where did you come up with your incorrect 'conclusions'?

And where is the evidence for your 'opinions'?

You have the very British view and those authors support you opinions. Letting Napoleon go for strategic reasons was not something to publish after the sacrifices the Russians made to get Napoleon out of their country. The British were very happy to have both Russia and France bleed each other dry for their benefit. I guess you can not see any other parallels in history for this type of power games. Sad.

I have not posted the 'British view' whatever that is. I have posted what happened during the battle and the bridging operations of the French.

You have not posted anything to support your opinions, and in that you are historically incorrect.

So, if you have anything of value to post to support your postition, please do. If not, your opinions are moot and are not supported by the record.

Once again, what sources are you using to support your viewpoint?

Brechtel198 accused of posting "..the very British view…"? I shall have to lie down in a darkened room for some days.

The very idea of a British 'view' is both ludicrous and disingenuous. I'm not aware of any British eyewitness at the Berezina. Sir Robert Wilson was with Kutusov if I'm not mistaken, and Kutusov had no intenetion of facing Napoleon again as, according to Clausewitz, he was scared of him.

Going by the latest example of VW's usual anti-Nap logic, Napoleon must have known the Russians would use their run away tactics, rather than stand and fight. He also must have known they would burn their own sacred city. And on top of that, he must have known he would be forced into a retreat and that it would take place under incredibly deadly winter conditions. And of course, he must have also known his battered army would hold off two Russia armies and still defy the odds and manage to cross the Berezina. I mean, to be 'responsible' for all that, he had to know these things would happen, didn't he? LOL

Great to see you back.

I think that the Berezina represented neither an all out attempt to trap Napoleon and the Grande Armee which ended in failure, nor a clever Russian ruse feigning a real battle for deeper political purposes.

I also don't think there was a single 'Russian' strategy at this point, for the underlying tensions within their high command were too great. I do think Kutusov was the pivotal figure for the Russians though.

I think that by this point or perhaps well before, Kutusov knew that the campaign was already won and Napoleon disastrously defeated in Russia. As events proved- within days and weeks the men of the Grande Armee who fought at the Berezina would anyway mostly either be dead from the direct effects of the prevailing environment, or killed or captured peacemeal by the Cossacks etc as their units broke up- the latter also as a result of the environment.

I don't think that Kutusov was at all averse to having Napoleon and the whole of his army captured at the Berezina, but he wouldn't have seen it as a necessity at all. Had Wittgenstein, Chigakov et al managed to pull it off, Kutusov would have still been the saviour of Russia, but if they failed the Grande Armee was still a collection of dead men walking and no one would invade the motherland again for a very long time afterwards, and he would still be the saviour of Russia. But in my view the one thing he did not want to risk was an embarrassing and unnecessary tactical defeat by Napoleon while he Kutusov was on the field, especially when the campaign to save Russia (the original objective let's not forget) was already won. Napoleon was very much capable of pulling off such a tactical victory- futile as it would have been. So Kutusov was sensible not to risk it.

We tend to think of Kutusov's earlier career for its bloodiest and most dramatic moments like the storming of Ochakov. But much more of his military life was spent in long tiresome campaigns against the Turks where things like heat, cold, thirst and hunger were more often decisive factors than pitched battles. Kutusov was far more experienced at that type of warfare than Napoleon, and so better able to predict the effects of lengthy environmental attrition. In fairness he had far more experience of that sort of warfare than virtually anyone- on account of being an elderly Russian who had been in the army since he was a boy.

I think that some epoch making victory during the retreat, such as at the Berezina, involving the capture or death of Napoleon- would have indeed been very welcome for Kutusov, and perhaps worth risking his subordinates' reputations for- but not worth risking his own at that point.

Of course Kutusov never wrote any of this down, so we can't really know one way or the other. But given Kutusov's strongly repeated pattern of behaviour to preserve his reputation (if not his physical safety) as a soldier- I think this is a very plausible explanation of how events unfolded. Oh and obviously- the miserable death of so many of Napoleon's soldiers and their women and children at the Berezina was really Napoleon's responsibility. He did lead them into Russia after all.

I'm not sure foreknowledge is an essential requirement when determining responsibility?

I think I understand that Connaught, but it's late and work has been busy today, so forgive me if I misunderstand. I agree that foreknowledge may not be an essential requirement in determining responsibility, but I think that lack of foresight is.

'Lack of foresight'? What is that supposed to mean? Army commanders do not have wizards as in Lord of the Rings to advise them.

Lack of foresight can mean shortcomings in preparations for operations, but that wasn't the case with the French in 1812.

I suspect it would have been an extremely awkward diplomatic conundrum to capture an enemy head of state. Unlike the British, the Russians had recognized Napoleon as a legitimate monarch. There's no body of precedent, much less law, for doing much with him other than inviting him to some nice dinners and possibly having a stern chat. They certainly couldn't have tried him under any existing body of law. Napoleon's absence would have probably plunged France – and thus most of Europe – into chaos. And it likely wouldn't have advanced Russian interests. By the time of the Berezina the Russians knew they'd won the campaign. Any possible growth in the coalition, such as adding Prussia or Austria, would have been possible only against the common enemy. The same was true of British subsidies, which the Russians desperately needed.

Lack of foresight can mean shortcomings in preparations for operations, but that wasn't the case with the French in 1812.

You'd think they might have stayed their side of the Nemen, in that case.

I do find it an odd suggestion that Britain somehow intended to – what? Permanently occupy bits of France? Likewise Prussia and Austria for that matter. Prussia would have liked to have staged some sort of Shermanesque chevauchée of punitive pillaging through France but both countries had chunks of their army in Russia as well, Austria had a princess in Napoleon's bedroom, and Britain had her army in Spain, so how this would have physically been brought about, I can't think.

Moreover, nothing of the kind happened when Napoleon actually was physically taken in 1814 and 1815, so why would it have happened in 1812?

@Garth

Napoleon's absence would have probably plunged France – and thus most of Europe – into chaos.

For me, the likelier consequence of Napoleon's capture would have been that it plunged France and thus most of Europe into peace. We know this because on two later occasions that's more or less exactly what did happen.

Specifically, on hearing the news that Napoleon was taken, someone – Talleyrand? Fouché? – would have staged a coup back in Paris, establishing a provisional government based on the Corps Legislatif or some emergency version of the later Chamber of Deputies. He / they would have negotiated immediate peace terms with everyone, based on military withdrawal home of all French and French-allied troops for immediate demobilisation.

The quid pro quo would be no allied invasion of France or reparations. The bauble kingdoms such as Westphalia and Naples would all have had to go, but the Bourbon restoration could perhaps have been evaded.

The allies would have taken that deal, I think, provided they could be assured that there would no role in it anywhere for Napoleon, either as politician or general, in the state's employ. This could have been assured easily enough by keeping Napoleon in Russia until, oh, 1821 or so. Once he has been removed from post as emperor, he's not a captured head of state any more, he's a political refugee and emigré.

In 1814 and 1815 alike, the removal of Napoleon produced a pretty much instant end to hostilities everywhere. The Bourbons were reimposed on France because there had to be some head of state, and none was going to emerge while Napoleon was on the scene. If the French had managed to evolve a Bonaparte-less structure for themselves, I can't see why it would not have stood.

You'd think they might have stayed their side of the Nemen, in that case.

Even that wouldn't have helped – already in the Duchy of Warsaw logistics collapsed, best would have been to stay at home.

Boney had no foresight whatsoever – he stumbled very naively into the Russian adventure and hundreds of thousands payed with their lives due to an imbecile megalomaniac.

'best would have been to stay at home.'

That was gist of my meaning.

'imbecile' It seems unlikely. I trust you have sources for that.

'megalomaniac' is very unlikely. Once again comments without sourcing or the ability to provide any.

the likelier consequence of Napoleon's capture would have been that it plunged France and thus most of Europe into peace. We know this because on two later occasions that's more or less exactly what did happen.

1814-15 was very different from 1812, though. In 1812 Europe was still covered with borders of Napoleonic design. Imagine what would happen in the Duchy of Warsaw, or Westphalia, or Croatia, or Holland, or Hanover, or Berg, etc, etc, if Napoleonic control suddenly vanished (but scattered garrisons of French troops didn't, because they had no orders to depart.) The regimes (deposed and/or still existing) that would want their territory back would seize the chance to claim it, probably with force.

Early 1813 in central Europe is a good example of how violent and chaotic things could get with Napoleon's regime merely wounded. There were uprisings from Holland to Pomerania, and from Hanover to Italy. If he were suddenly removed from the scene, it would have been chaos.

(And who the hell brings those quarter-million French troops out of Spain, and where do they go? Ugh, what a mess.)

Who would have benefited from Napoleon and his army being completely destroyed? Not Russia. Austria would. Prussia would. England would. They would collect all the spoils, while Russia and her army were still stuck exhausted and with Poland and Beolruss between them and even central Europe.

Another thing that is being ignored, is the nature of the core of the Russian army. Soldiers were started young and their life and "village" was their regiment. The old times were the core of it and this goes far in explaining the toughness and cohesion of the Russian infantry. If the Russian lost this core, in dying to the last man to kill Napoleon, the army would be a rabble. Preserving this core was something that could not be risked for the future of the state. (Wargamers will fight to the last figure to try to win, Not so with reality. Did Napoleon ever gamble with the existence of his Guard?)

I find the phrase "What is that supposed to mean?" a rather brusque and unfriendly way to open your comment on my post Brechtel198. Just my opinion but I don't think that kind of response promotes a constructive exchange of views.

I believe that in the context of preparations for and conduct of the Russian campaign that Napoleon did display a lack of foresight in some key areas.

In the area of logistics, I think that the French Army had probably the best logistic set-up of any army of the period, and in 1811-12 Napoleon appears to have directed logistic preparation for Russia on a scale and with a thoroughness unparalleled previously. But nevertheless, these same logistic preparations proved to be completely inadequate for the campaign Napoleon waged. So- good as they were- they were far from good enough- as events proved. Indeed it would probably have been impossible for ANYONE to sustain a force the size of the Grande Armee invading Russia- certainly going as far as Moscow. That should have been foreseen.

As far as Russian reactions are concerned, there was also a lack of foresight. We know that the original Russian plans (if you can call them plans) called for the Grande Armee to be confronted much further west, but that after several narrow escapes from the French, it became clear that wasn't possible, and so the Russian armies retreated, consequently putting much additional strain on the Grande Armee's logistics and forcing a much deeper penetration into Russia proper than Napoleon had intended. That problem was absolutely foreseeable- "what if I don't manage to catch and destroy the Russians near the border, but they retreat and I have to chase them east- will my logistics be able to cope with that eventuality?" No- as events proved.

The resistance of the Russian army and people. "What if they aren't prepared to stake everything to defend the Holy City of Smolensk?". Later "What if I defeat them but they can still field an army and won't give up?" The likely outcomes of that are also foreseeable- either doubling down and further advances to try to achieve the elusive decisive victory, or an opposed retreat home- both of which would put still greater strain on logistics.

The results of the long stay in Moscow were forseeable, both on the cohesion and discipline of the Grande Armee and even more so the ever advancing calendar and absolutely predictable deterioration of the weather- which was getting closer every day. So the impacts of that were also foreseeable.

I don't think that Napoleon was an imbecile and I don't think that he was defeated by superior Russian generalship. Barclay deserves some credit for avoiding destruction early in the campaign, and Kutusov some credit at the end for sensibly not trying too hard to kill something that was already dying. But I believe that Napoleon was defeated by a set of circumstances which were all completely foreseeable. I don't mean that he should have had some second sight predictive abilities and to have 'known' they would happen. But he should have recognised these factors as mortal and unmanageable risks to his plan.

The risks were not all foreseeable before the Nieman was crossed of course, but all were foreseeable during the campaign in time to avoid their worst outcomes. Personally I think that Napoleon must bear the responsibility for that and the human consequences.

Yep. Russian cossack patrols completely missed several French corps across the river from them. Despite their reputation about being everywhere, they never went or looked there. And all the locals, well they were actually French sympathizers and didn't tell the Russian units about it. Oh, and the Russians NEVER KNEW that the river could be forded there, and couldn't figure out that with villages/towns on opposite banks, that they might have been a ford and crossing there. Only the French were smart enough to figure that out. AND the weather- well back then the forecasts on weather, melting and river flow were known exactly-except to the Russians. .. Oh, and the Russians left all the bridges, causeways leader west through the swampland unguarded and undestroyed because,,, well who knows. .. .. Gee, 200 men could have made that impassable…… … Do you think that the Austrians and Prussians (unwilling French allies AND part of the French invasion of Russia) would need Russian help to get rid of France/Napoleon if the Grand Army and Napoleon were destroyed? .. Things are not simple-especially when someone is blinded by a devotion to the God-like qualities of Napoleon.

" Kutuzov's pain did not subside, and so he decided to travel to Western Europe for better medical care. He arrived in Berlin in 1774, where he spent much time with King Frederick the Great of Prussia, who took great interest in Kutuzov. They spent long periods of time discussing tactics, weaponry, and uniforms. Kutuzov then travelled to Leyden, Holland and to London in England for further treatment. In London Kutuzov first learned of the American Revolutionary War. He would later study the evolution of American general George Washington's attrition campaign against the British. The American experience reinforced the lesson that Rumyantsev had already taught Kutuzov; that one does not need to win battles in order to win a war.[10].. link

"They spent long periods of time discussing tactics, weaponry and uniforms."

Sounds like TMP!

imbecile' It seems unlikely. I trust you have sources for that.

Of course – look how he acts in the Russian campaign, try Bernard Coppens – 1812 l'auveuglement de Napoléon, a true eye opener.

Well, our man Bonaparte was obviously not intellectually deficient.

Would Austria and Prussia allied with Russia if Napoleon had been killed?

They did not much later… and he was alive…

Amicalement
Armand

Very odd and biased logic going around these days. If the 1812 campaign and following disastrous retreat was all Napoleon's fault because he ordered them into Russia in the first place and obviously should have known what would happen (LOL), then that would suggest Moore and British leaders were to blame for the suffering and deaths during the retreat in Spain, although he obviously must have also 'known' (or had the foresight, LOL) that he would win a battle which would allow them to make their escape (just as the French did at Berezina). And the Russians and Austrian leaders and commanders must have been to blame for the disastrous 1805 and 1809 campaigns and certainly the Prussians commanders and leaders must have been to blame for their 1806 disaster. But I think sensible people who don't let their silly bias and hatred cloud their minds, know that the best laid plans often fail. But to throw the blame on one person is just weak minded and ignorance of the facts and reality of history, plus ignoring the positive side of the losers. eg: Moore lost the campaign but won the battle of Corunna, which enabled his army to escape. Napoleon lost the 1812 campaign but managed to enable part of his army to escape what could have been a total wipe out. I don't think anyone wants to lose battles or campaigns or the troops that they need to fight them. But some people just can't help throwing out the blame because they have the luxury of hindsight, something those who actually 'did' the fighting and dying, did not.

Gazzola, from the very emphatic mode of expression in your last it feels like some of the previous posts, perhaps including mine, have created some upset. I'd like to say that it certainly wasn't my intent to cause you any distress and I definitely regret it that is the case.

I have a number of counterpoints to the points you have made. However, I think that I won't post them at present as I don't want to inflame feelings.

I certainly respect your factual knowledge even if I don't always share your interpretations.

ReallySameSeneffeAsBefore

Upset-no! Distress-no! I think anyone who lets some of the opinions expressed here upset or distress them, should, if they can't stop reading the posts, at least try to ignore them. Life's too short and there are a few I have deliberately ignored and I will continue to do so. Arguing and disagreeing just for the sake of it is not helpful to anyone. And no one has to reply or make comment about any of the posts made.

I think, if anything, I am tired and bored with hearing the same old biased viewpoints being expressed, often by the same people, as if because they think it it must be right, or perhaps they just want to try and provoke others. And there are those who appear to base the defence of their bias on one book, the contents of which obviously matched their bias. LOL!

But I certainly do not expect everyone to share my interpretations because I believe we all interpret historical events and characters based on what we've read, researched and learnt from others. Sadly, too many people base their viewpoints on hindsight, as if that is an actual skill and font of knowledge, rather than something even a child could do. It is also a bit like football fans blaming the manager or certain players because they lost a game. They, of course, would have done this or done that, which obviously makes them better players or managers. LOL!

It also seems sometimes, judging by the viewpoints of some, that, if someone wins a battle or campaign, they are brilliant but when they lose, they are the worst commanders ever! It really is so comical sometimes.

But saying all this, I enjoy reading the posts, whether I agree or disagree with them. It is sometimes nice to hear how other people interpret historical characters and events. And sometimes they do make you think and challenge your own viewpoint, which is how it should be. All our viewpoints and opinions should be challenged and defended. But we must remember that there are not that many of us who are actually interested in the Napoleonic period, especially the military side, so we should not attempt to alienate those with the same interests, no matter which side they might favour. Just accept they don't agree with you and they should accept you don't agree with them.

Anyway, enough verbal rambling from me. I'm going to get stuck into more reading, so may not post for a while anyway. I'm reading the title about the III Saxon Army Corps in 1814, They Fought With Extraordinary Bravery by Gert Van Uythoven. But I'm really looking forward to reading Gill's Znaim and Wills Wellington At Bay when they come. It is so nice to see titles covering the lesser known actions and great to see there are enough of us out there to keep them coming.

Glad all is well. Sounds like a good reading list.

Agree!.

Amicalement
Armand

Excellent posting Gazzola-very well done.

+2