"US Inexperience = More Casualties" Topic

You were asked – TMP link

According to historian Geoffrey Wawro, in the final campaign of WWI, the British and French were able to kill four to five Germans for every one of their own casualties. The Americans, on the other hand, had a ratio closer of 1 to 1. What accounted for the Americans' higher cost of warfare?

The top five results:

23% of the votes: "less experienced troops"
20%: "inexperienced leadership"
18%: "excess aggressiveness"
12%: "use of outdated tactics"
8%: "American hubris"

Well, there's a surprise.

all of the above?

yeah, about those numbers…

Well if Americans had no tanks then it might be possible.

might try reading this

link

They were in different battles. Different situations.

Americans did fine alongside Australians at Hamel on the 4th of July 1918, 7000 Aussies and Yanks attacking 5600 dug in Germans.

Forces:

Rawlinson suggested to Monash in late June 1918 that American involvement in a set-piece attack alongside the Australians would give the American troops experience and strengthen the Australian battalions, which had been weakened by heavy casualties and falling recruitment, by an additional company each.[25] On 29 June, Major General George Bell, commanding the American 33rd Division, selected two companies, each of 250 men,[26] from the 131st and 132nd Infantry Regiments of the 65th Brigade.[27][6] Nevertheless, Monash had been promised 10 American companies, and on 30 June the remaining companies of the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 131st Infantry Regiment were sent. Each American platoon was attached to an Australian company. For the 41st Battalion, they had 'A' Company wiped out by a gas attack recently at Villers-Bretonneux, so Americans were embedded as 'X' Company into the battalion.[28] A difficulty in integrating the 60-man American platoons into the 100-strong Australian companies was overcome by reducing the size of each American platoon by one-fifth and sending the removed troops, which numbered 50 officers and men, back to battalion reinforcement camps.[29] The commitment of these companies represented the first time in history that US Army troops would fight under a foreign commander.[7][30]

Casualties
Allied losses amounted to around 1,400 killed or wounded.[1] There were 1,062 Australian casualties (including 800 dead) and 176 American casualties (including between 13 and 26 killed) during the main attack and a further 142 casualties amongst the 15th Brigade during their diversionary assault around Ville.[50] Around 2,000 Germans were killed and 1,600 captured, along with the loss of much of their equipment.[78] Despite the concerns of the Australian infantry, all but three of the British tanks, although delayed reached their objectives.[68] At least five of the Allied tanks were damaged during the attack but these were later repaired.[44] Casualties among the British tank crews amounted to 13 killed or wounded.[68] The Allied casualties were "light" in the context of World War I and the attack was considered "extremely successful" for the Australians.[1] A large quantity of British equipment that had been captured by the Germans when they had taken Hamel in April was also recovered.[77]

I wish our high school history teachers in the early 90s weren't from the hippy culture that hand waved world war 1 as a futile loss of life where men just walked into machinegun fire mindlessly. Aussie tactics, bravery and skill helped end that war. Wish they taught us THAT in school, might be more pride in our ancestors today.

Anyone who has read 'All Quiet on the Western Front' appreciates that training can do a lot to prepare troops for battle, but experience is the real teacher.
Casualties are always higher amongst raw troops, as they sometimes do foolish things, don't utilise cover as well as experienced troops etc etc.

Yes, training and experience combined makes capable, effective soldiers. But losses are always higher with "green" troops/units. The learning curve is steep and costly.

Would it possibly have something to do with needing to learn when to duck?

Saber6 – I followed the link to a book by John Mosier, a writer (notice I don't use the word historian) who likes to take contrarian opinions and argue them with not much research. He has written a whole series of books that start with 'The Myth of…' His book on WW2 and the myth of Blitzkrieg has a whole lot of unsupported opinions in it. I'd hardly use him as a credible reference for WW1 casualties.

LOL – Don't dismiss Mosier too soon MRC. I do not consider his follow-up books much more than an effort to cash in on his first book. But his first book was IMO noteworthy. Mosier is no kook or charlatan. He is a respected long-time academic, chairman of the English Department at Loyola. He is also a lover of history. Read the preface to "The Myth of the Great War".

Mosier is also TTBOMK the only modern tri-lingual (fluent in English, French and German) to have written on WW1 and who did his subject the courtesy of actually researching the original campaign records of both sides rather than simply accepting the representations presented in the official histories (upon many of which a giant red warning label should be affixed). The fact that he has uncovered some interesting discrepancies should not be dismissed, but investigated. Given the massive vituperation that can be stirred within any academic community when certain enshrined objects of general intellectual worship are challenged (Niall Ferguson, for example, Beldon Cooper, and arguably David Irving as well), is it possible that the huge amount of flak directed toward Professor Mosier may be a function of him "being over the target", so to speak? My B/S meter always responds when any author is so viciously attacked.

Strictly my opinion; by all means, feel free to disagree.

B

Interesting approach to the interpretation of 'flak', Blutarski. If Mosier is signficantly incorrect then how should the 'academic community' react? It is true that there can be a lot of 'flak' when some entrenched views, scientific or historical or otherwise, are challenged. Equally, it may well be that Mosier is off target.

Robert

I did read two of his books, including his 'Myth of Blitzkrieg.' That book is chock-full of factual inaccuracies and opinions with no supporting evidence. My 'vituperation' of his work is that he makes a ton of assumptions and criticizes without support. Here's one from 'The Myth of Blitzkrieg': 'The Western Front was the decisive theater of the war.' He utterly dismisses the Eastern Front throughout the book. His representation of Blitzkrieg = tank is oversimplified and his 'discovery' that the Germans were not that mechanized is known to every serious student of the war. Much 'puffery' and little substance is my assessment of Mosier's historical works. Perhaps he is better respected in English academic circles. For me, the 'flak' and 'vituperation' are well-deserved.

Mosier sounds like a guy who should never try to teach war nerds about war, maybe he could dupe normal people, but not war nerds.

I am not a fan of Mosier. When I read a book entitled "The Myth of the Great War" I am expecting to see popular myths being rebutted by unarguable facts. If the same data was put in the hands of a different author I suspect we would have had a better book.

I'd be curious to hear specific criticisms of Mosier's "Myths of the Great War". That is the book he spent twenty years researching.

As mentioned, the two follow-on books were undistinguished fluff, almost certainly published to take advantage of Mosier's new name recognition.

B

About half way through the book. I will persist and finish it, then post comments.

Robert

Just finished the book. Dreadful. Absolutely dreadful. I will pull together some specific criticisms and post here.

Robert

A couple of intro comments first of all. I am not British, so I do not share the reaction of some British critics that Mosier refers to in his Preface. I am fluent in French and German, though English is my first language. Therefore I have read many of the references that Mosier used, plus numerous French and German regimental, division, corps, anecdotal, and other accounts across the battles that Mosier deals with.

With that background in mind, I am only going to deal with some of the issues. My paperback copy is littered with so many of my side notes and comments that it won't be possible to address all of these in this thread (plus I don't want to waste much extra time in doing so).

Mosier sets out the two main questions that form the basis for the book:

1. "Why was the German army so successful?"

2. "Why did Germany ultimately lose the war?"

With reference to 1., he notes: " In terms of technology, it soon became apparent that the German army entered the war using weapons that the British and the French simply didn't possess (hand grenades, mortars, motorized super-heavy artillery) and had both a qualitative and quantitative superiority in key weapons… But the use of new weapons in combat does not automatically confer an advantage… and the technological edge in weaponry for Germany was probably at its peak in the early spring of 1915. But Allied failures and German successes continued more or less unchecked for three years after that, which suggests the basis of the German advantage was as much tactical as technical."

He goes on to state that:

"…America's role in the war was absolutely decisive. The string of German battlefield successes stopped abruptly on the entry into the line of the newly formed American divisions, the course of the war changed drastically and members of the… [German] General Staff… recommended that Germany seek terms. The Great War was won on the ground by American soldiers deployed as an American force, and operating largely against the wishes and suggestions of the senior French and British commanders…"

Before I address these major points, it should be noted that Mosier has focused most of his detailed analyses on the fighting in and around the Argonne, Woëvre, and St Mihiel sectors, which featured heavily in the American operations of 1918. He appears to have read more widely on these sectors, plus it is clear that he has walked the terrain too. There are more detailed books available on these specific campaigns, such as Jack Sheldon's book on the Champagne and Argonne battles in 1915, Christina Holstein's books on Verdun, and Lengel's book on the Meuse-Argonne 'To Conquer Hell' for example. Mosier's high-level coverage of these specific campaigns is broadly accurate; his conclusions are not. I will cover these conclusions later.

Mosier tries to cover pre-war developments and a range of other battles, mostly on the Western Front, starting with the Battle of the Frontiers, First Battle of the Marne, First Ypres, Somme, Third Ypres, and the German 1918 spring offensives for example. There are numerous errors in his coverage of these battles, as well as his analysis of the development of weapons and tactics before war.

Some basic errors include:
- 'both the French and British believed [before the war started] the key element on the battlefield was the rifle with the bayonet attached to it… German regulations brought in a new wrinkle: "In combination with the artillery, [the infantry] defeats the opponent…"';
- 'The standard British howitzer was so heavy…' referring to the 'breechloading six inch thirty cwt equipment..' but ignoring the widely used 4.5" howitzer that comprised 25% of field artillery in 1914;
- 'Belgians couldn't make up their mind [about who to align with before the war], and now that the war had begun… the country's leaders counted heads and decided to go with the probably winner… Germany seemed likely to use'. The Belgian government deployed troops to cover potential incursions into Belgian territory from Great Britain, France, and Germany (which dispersed their forces and made it difficult to focus immediately on Germany). Belgium made up its collective 'mind' once Germany crossed its border, ahead of anyone else entering Belgium. French troops were explicitly instructed not to cross into Belgium until and unless Germany did so, or the Belgians invited France.
- the Battle of Mons and Battle of Guise were the same – they were not. The two battles were separated by more than 70 kilometres and, more importantly, by 7 days;
- 'That the Liège forts slowed down the [German] advance is a myth…' – see the works by Robinson et al, specifically 'The Great War Dawning' (which includes the pre-war situation in Germany] and 'The German failure in Belgium, August 1914', both of which draw much more extensively on German sources;
- 'On 22 August 1914, the [French] colonial infantry attacked to the south of Neufchâteau, just north of the small village of Rossignol, and was basically annihilated by German artillery.' This is a wholly inaccurate summary of the causes of the catastrophic losses suffered by colonial infantry regiments, even accepting that 4,500 casualties out of 14,000 total [as quoted by Mosier] is not 'annihilation'.
- '…the German army had a built-in system of safeguards [to ensure effective command and control]…' – see Robinson et al for early war examples where such safeguards failed.
- '..on 23 August, the BEF was routed at Mons by elements of the German First Army…' The BEF was not routed at Mons and abandoned the field of battle in good order due to the loss of right flank guard protection as a result of the withdrawal of Lanrezac's Fifth Army. My translation of the German official history 'The Battle of Mons: the Official German Account' describes the build-up to and execution of the battle itself from the German perspective.
- '…the French would retrospectively roll into a masterful public relations package and call the "Battle of the Marne" was in reality five separate und uncoordinated battles fought over a two-hundred-kilometer section of the front, no one of which was particularly close to (or in fact anywhere near) the Marne River'. The administrative region is called the Marne and all of the battles were coordinated by French High Command. It was the German armies that were uncoordinated, particularly First and Second Armies under von Kluck and von Bülow respectively.
- 'Insofar as there was an engagement called the Battle of the Marne that aimed to break the German flank as a result of the plan hatched by the Allies, the Battle of the Ourcq was that battle. Simultaneously, the BEF and the other armies would try to pin the Germans to their fronts'. There was a clear attempt to outflank the right flank of von Kluck's First Army but a 30km gap opened up between First and Second Armies as a result. The role of the BEF was to advance into this gap, threatening the rear of First Army and the exposed left flank of von Bülow's Second Army.

So far, my comments relate to not even 25% of the content. Plus there are several other issues in that content that I have not added to the list. I will continue in another post.

Robert

Picking up on the Battle of the Marne, further errors include:
- 'The Allied plan [to attack the open flank of von Kluck's First Army] went wrong from the start for two reasons: …Maunoury's Sixth Army was to weak to mount an effective flank attack [and] Maunoury had a whole mixture [of units]… none of whom had every worked together, run by a staff that had been scavenged the same way the units had been. This was hardly an effective combat force to be entrusted with such a critical mission.' In fact, Maunoury's 'too weak' army was strong enough to decisively cause von Kluck to turn about.
- 'The… second major problem: the Allies simply ignored any consideration of what their adversaries might do. This was a calamitous mistake.' The Allies had a much clearer idea of what the Germans were doing than the reverse. Von Kluck had disregarded the signs of activity outside his right flank, though he did leave von Gronau as a right flank guard. All the while, the French were shifting forces from their right wing to provide as much power as possible to the counter-attack. Far from being calamitous, the Battle of the Marne reversed the successes of the German army to that point in time.
- Mosier posits that 'von Gronau's men seized the key position [near Meaux]… and watched while [the] heavy artillery massacred the developing [French] attack.' This analysis is wrong on several counts. Von Gronau adopted a very intelligent right flank guard position but the artillery support was provided by field guns, which did not 'massacre' the French. The flank attack was stopped but von Gronau then retreated 10km to the rear.
- 'Far from outflanking the Germans, all the Allies had actually done was to alert the Germans to the fact that they intended to outflank them from the west. Von Kluck's staff saw the problem quickly enough – and they now had the time to rectify it. They shuttled men back to the west, and in two days of fighting broke the Sixth Army completely.' It is complete nonsense to suggest that Maunoury's Sixth Army was completely broken. Furthermore, and much more serious, von Kluck's staff pulled his army west, opening up a huge gap of more than 30km to von Bülow's Second Army [Mosier consistently misspells von Bülow].
- 'As von Kluck shifted to the west, von Bulow's [sic.] army slotted in behind him, engaging the French Fifth Army, and forcing it back still further to the Seine.' This is complete rubbish. Von Bülow's Second Army was attacking on its eastern flank, not towards the French Fifth Army. By the time von Bülow realised that von Kluck had completely exposed his right flank, the best he could do was refuse that flank. All the while, Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army was moving to outflank von Bülow.
- '…the Germans believed – correctly – that they could smash through the flank of the French Fifth Army and envelop them before the BEF and Maunoury were able to exploit the gap [between German First and Second Armies] and the exposed right flank.' Again, this is utter nonsense. Mosier appears confused or simply didn't know the details well enough to realise that the operations of Franchet d'Esperey [Mosier refers to him as "d'Esperay" but his full family name was Franchet d'Esperey] were decisive in panicking von Bülow and launching the request for OHL to intervene, which led to Hentsch's review and the decision to withdraw to the Aisne.
- 'the point of greatest German vulnerability was the exposed right flank… Maunoury simply lacked the force to push in the flank…' Mosier is right that the greatest vulnerability was the German right flank when the Battle of the Marne got underway. Thanks to von Kluck's response, however, the vulnerability became the gap between First and Second Armies. At that point, it did not matter that Maunoury 'lacked the force to push in the flank' – though this comment goes against the previous statement that Maunoury's army was 'completely broken'!

In case anyone is wondering how I know about the details of this battle, my son and I put on a huge replay of the whole of First Marne on the 100th Anniversary. Here is a photo of the battlefield that we created in the commemorative chapel in Dormans:

The battlefield represents 60km of terrain, with Paris being located roughly where the big pillar top left. The photo is taken from the east, with Foch's Ninth Army operating on the table at the bottom of the photo and the Battle of the Ourcq taking place on the table near the gentleman with the blue cardigan. More than 10,000 figures were used in 1/285 scale. Note that the two tables in front of the man with the dark blue cardigan, plus the gap to the top table, approximate to the gap opened up by von Kluck. The BEF was on the table at the top; Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army on the table next to it.

Mosier has misrepresented the nature of the battle and its significance. I won't bore everyone with a similar analysis of other battles that he covers. I will highlight some other significant issues though in subsequent post/s.

Robert

As noted above, Mosier predicates his book on the notion that there was a 'string of German battlefield successes'… and that these successes '…stopped abruptly on the entry into the line of the newly formed American divisions [in mid 1918]…'

I have examined Mosier's review of the First Battle of the Marne. There are numerous errors and misrepresentations in his review. The purpose of Mosier's review becomes clearer when aligned with his conclusion that there was a 'string of German battlefield successes…' that only 'stopped abruptly…' with the interventions of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). First Battle of the Marne could not be allowed to represent a stop to the German 'successes' of the first weeks of the war: the reduction of the forts; the advance through Belgium into northern France; the Battle of the Frontiers; the Battles of Mons and Le Cateau; etc.

Mosier goes on, therefore, to reinterpret First Marne in this light. He notes that Germans had sustained '…a few tactical defeats on both [Western and Eastern] fronts [but] by the end of the first week in September the Germans had already reeled off an impressive set of territorial gains and inflicted enormous casualties'. This statement is correct. Mosier notes 'there was a growing threat in the West' but he defines the threat as having 'all its manpower deep in France' and 'there was no way the Germans could protect their flank and maintain a front between the Seine and the Marne.' Mosier, however, does not link this threat to the potential for military defeat on the Marne battlefields: 'Von Kluck could match the steadily growing [French] Sixth Army step for step up to the Ourcq and higher'; and 'the Germans were temporarily masters of the battlefields over which they had been fighting…' As I noted before, Hentsch was despatched by the German General Staff to review the immediate threat to German right flank. Mosier claims that 'all Hentsch did was confer with von Bülow's staff, and the good general himself. The decision, unfortunately, was painfully obvious. The Germans… had no supplies, reinforcements were a long way off, and they could be easily outflanked [to the north of Von Kluck's First Army]'. Mosier's interpretation of Hentsch's visit is not correct. Hentsch toured the German front, consulting with far more than just von Bülow. He spent considerable time talking with von Kuhl for example, who was von Kluck's Chief of Staff. Von Kuhl states in his memoirs that he argued strongly to continue the First Army attacks against Manuoury's flank north of Paris, though it is interesting to note from von Kluck's memoirs that von Kluck was excluded deliberately from the one-on-one discussion between Hentsch and von Kuhl. By motoring from German Second to First Army Headquarters, Hentsch was acutely aware of the size of the gap that had opened up between the two armies. Von Bülow made Hentsch aware of the immediate threat from Franchet d'Esperey's Fifth Army.

In reality, the German army deep in France was outmanoeuvred and faced an extremely serious and immediate threat. Whereas von Kluck thought he was fulfilling his brief to outflank the French army, he had misunderstood where that flank was. Although First Army reacted quickly to the threat from Maunoury, the reaction simply shifted the immediate threat to the rear of First Army and to the right flank of Second Army. Had that process continued then the risk to the other German armies would have unfolded similarly, driven in by the very key operational process that the Germans prized so greatly but feared being on the receiving end of – envelopment from the flank and rear.

In his attempt to minimise the tactical reasons for the defeat during the Battle of the Marne, Mosier even goes so far as to denounce the idea that there was such a battle. 'Since the Germans had broken off the engagement and retreated back to the north [because of no supplies, no immediate reinforcements, and risk of being outflanked to the north, not on the battlefield itself], the Allies announced it as a great victory.' He then quotes Gallieni out of context '…who had a pretty good idea of what actually happened [and] was far from convinced. "Where was the Battle of the Marne?" he asked. It was a rhetorical question. Given the legend that he was the architect of the victory, the comment is significant.'

What is more significant is the essay that von Kuhl wrote with his chief of logistics in First Army, von Bergmann. It was published in English as 'Movements and Supply of the German First Army in August and September 1914' and is available here:

PDF link

Von Kluck wrote the Preface, in which he noted:

"The author is to be commended for stating emphatically that, considering the magnitude of the task which had devolved upon the First Army, the service of supply as regards subsistence and ammunition, during the successful Battle of the Ourcq, functioned in a satisfactory manner."

Robert

In an effort, seemingly, to preserve the basic premises of the book, Mosier has carried over the process of minimising Allied successes prior to the AEF to other major battles as well.

First Ypres, for example, is largely ignored. Summarising First Marne, Mosier notes:
"One week after [the] great defeat [of the German army – Mosier is being sarcastic because this comment comes immediately after mention of 'Gallieni's cynicism' that the Marne actually qualified as a battle], the Germans went back on the offensive and scored some of the greatest victories of the war.'

Mosier then introduces General von Falkenhayn, who succeeded von Moltke after the Marne. Mosier introduces von Falkenhayn as a commander whose '…actions are those of a man who had realized that the dominant aim of all the combatants before the war, the idea of a great battle of annihilation that would destroy your enemy's armies in the field, was now impossible". Von Falkenhayn's own admissions refute this conclusion, at least in late 1914 when he took over. In his memoirs, translated into English as 'General Headquarters 1914-1916', von Falkenhayn wrote:

"It only remained, therefore, to carry out with the greatest speed movements behind the German front corresponding to the enemy's movements [in the Race to the Sea], with the object of not only meeting the enemy's efforts at envelopment, but of countering them also, so far as the circumstances permitted, by means of an envelopment by the Germans. [Note that 'envelopment' was the classic term that characterised the attempt to annihilate the enemy in battle]

Every attempt to deal with the East before the Western Front was thoroughly consolidated must necessarily lead to an intolerable situation in the West, whilst a smashing success was not to be hoped for in the East…

But to a German leader it was quite beyond doubt that the securing of the Western Front had to be attempted by means of an offensive, so long as such a thing seemed at all possible.

…the determination to force the decision in the west first was maintained…'

Von Falkenhayn launched the huge series of attacks agains the Belgian, British, and French lines in what became know as the First Battle of Ypres. In his words:

'…the enemy's attempts at envelopment were repulsed at the end of September and the beginning of October, but the German enveloping movement [in late October and early November] was not realized."

Thus Mosier's representation of von Falkenhayn's approach is only correct AFTER the failure of First Ypres. Mosier completely plays down First Ypres, claiming that '…the prize… was easy to comprehend: a main railroad line that looped through Lille through Cambrai and St Quentin… a perfect network for a modern army…' The importance of the network is true, as is Mosier's mention of the uncontested capture of Lille. What is not true is that the network and Lille were major strategic drivers; it was envelopment of the Anglo-French armies.

Mosier then summarises First Ypres, which was commissioned by von Falkenhayn, with the following:

'…German attacks drove the Allies out of most of the little that was still left of independent Belgium. The remnants of the Belgium army was penned up… The BEF managed, finally, to hang on to a piece of land around Ypres, losing both the city (which was levelled) and what was left of the BEF all at once. Most of the credit must go to the engineers who flooded the countryside and thus made the German advance impossible.'

This is a complete misrepresentation. The majority of the multi-corps German envelopment attacks were not affected by the inundations; they were brought to a halt by the Belgian, British and French forces on ground that was occupied in advance, not that these forces had been 'driven' back from a much more extensive occupation of Belgium. Ypres itself was not 'lost'. Many men from the original BEF force that landed in France and had not been wounded in previous battles were either lost or wounded in First Ypres. This is not the same as 'what was left of the BEF'.

Von Falkenhayn's approach in late 1914 set the scene for his eventual dismissal in 1916. Von Hindenbug wrote in his memoirs:

'In spite of our earnest representations Main Headquarters could not see their way to release further units [from the Western Front]. At this moment they were still hoping for a favourable issue to the Battle of Ypres.'

The hoped for 'issue' was an attempt to achieve a major 'German battlefield success' but it was '…stopped abruptly'.

Mosier tries to play down other major battles too. Mosier concedes that the Anglo-French attacks on the Somme '…took a roughly rectangular section of territory of possible four hundred square kilometres…' but tries to minimise with '…a very small piece in proportion to what the Germans had achieved at Verdun.' Mosier then introduces another measure of 'battlefield success', which is that:

'…the important thing in measuring territory is not acreage but its actual military value.' He then defines 'the left bank at Verdun [setting the scene for his subsequent coverage of the AEF], for example, was valuable territory…' but, in Mosier's view '…there was never any practical value to what was taken in case the offensive didn't score a major success. So on the Somme, the importance of the ground seized was, alas, nil.'

Mosier's conclusion is, alas, very much mistaken. The Somme had a profound effect, as evidenced in Jack Sheldon's book 'Fighting on the Somme' for example and in Benjamin Ziemann's book 'War Experiences'. The latter catalogues the perceptions of Bavarian soldiers throughout the war. The Somme features heavily in the changing perceptions as the impact of Materialschlacht (industrial warfare) came to the fore. The decision to create and withdraw to the Hindenburg Line was driven by the effects of the Somme, as catalogued by Sheldon in his book mentioned above and in his book on 'The German Army at Cambrai'. The territory, if such be a measure, was significantly more than the 'roughly rectangular section'.

There are several other examples but the worst relates to the Battle of Amiens in August 1918. According to Mosier:

'[The Battle of Amiens] was successful because the Germans had already begun to withdraw.'

This is complete nonsense. 8th August was described by Ludendorff as the 'Black Day' of the German army. It was the first time, in his perception, that the gradual erosion of morale, which Ziemann noted as appearing first in soldier's letters during Verdun and the Somme, was exposed through mass surrenders on the battlefield. Far from withdrawing, German forces were sent to the area to stabilise the new defensive line, only for the Allies to attack further north almost immediately. The Last 100 Days had begun.

Robert

The next issue to address is the 'tactical' basis of 'German advantage'. Mosier is correct that the fundamental underpinning of successful tactics was artillery. The pre-war investment in heavy and super-heavy guns paved the war for early German successes. Mosier correctly notes that this advantage was being eroded by late 1915, not just in terms of number and types of artillery but also the capacity to produce unlimited supplies of ammunition. It took more than two years for the Allies to achieve this level of parity. Once substantial number of artillery pieces and unlimited ammunition was available (Battle of the Somme for the British) then it took time to standardise how to use artillery most effectively.

Mosier recognised that the German artillery advantage was eroded during the war. He then invokes the development of stormtrooper tactics as the basis for leap-frogging the Allies. There is an excellent review of Sturmbataillon Rohr and the role that it played in the development of assault tactics (Sturmtaktiken) here:

link

In much of the popular literature, the Sturmtruppen are associated with the capacity to 'infiltrate' enemy defences, as if imbued with special powers. The specialist units demanded total fire superiority before an attack went. Artillery was particularly important to achieving success; junior commanders in specialist assault units, such as Flammenwerfer companies, had the power to cancel an operation if there was insufficient artillery support.

The specialist Sturmtruppen had very little direct tactical effect on the outcome of the war. Their numbers were too small. They were used to disseminate assault tactics through training. The unexpected consequence of this process was the concentration of the more fit and able infantry into semi-specialist units, even down to company level where, for example, a specialist Stosstrupp might be formed. Within the normal infantry units, however, there was not the same attention given to artillery support for example compared to the specialists. The specialist assault tactics skewed the skill mix; the ultimate expression was the distinction between divisions that could be involved in offensive operations and those that were fit for just holding the line defensively.

The highly specialised stormtroopers were involved in the major assaults of the German 1918 spring offensives. 'Infiltration' was featured in Operation Michael but in Operations Mars (which followed Operation Michael) and Friedenstürm (which attempted to pinch out the Reims sector and was the last major German offensive action of the war), even the specialist units failed completely. Both offensives failed; neither involved the use of AEF forces, indeed Operation Mars preceded the entry into the line of AEF troops.

The Allies did not create specialist assault units in the same way. It is important to note, however, that British infantry were referred to by the Germans in regimental and other histories as 'Sturmtruppen' during Third Ypres for example.

There was another fundamental difference with German defensive tactics. Mosier hints at it when talking about the German response to the British success on day one of the Somme in the Montauban sector:

'When it became obvious that the BEF would attack using the same kamikaze methods as the French had used in the Champagne a year earlier, von Falkenhayn promptly sacked the Second Army's chief of staff, replacing him with Colonel Lossberg, an expert on defensive operations. He brought with him the mandate to ensure that the defenders used the standard procedures that had been used by all German troops to the Reims since early 1915. Henceforth, the defenders would trade territory for lives.' [p. 236-7]

Von Loßberg became the defensive guru of the German army, referred to as the "the fireman of the Western Front". This epithet is very telling; German defensive tactics in major battles were dependent on a single individual that had to coordinate such tactics. His memoirs have been published in English now:

Lossberg, Fritz von (2017). Lossberg's War: The World War I Memoirs of a German chief of staff. Foreign Military Studies. Translated by Zabecki, D. T.; Biedekarten, D. J. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky. ISBN 978-0-8131-6980-4.

Von Loßberg's reputation as a defensive expert (as opposed to his pre-existing reputation in other respects) was built first in the Champagne battles of 1915. He was brought in especially because the Germans were loosing ground to the French attacks. Far from trading ground for lives, von Loßberg refined the defence of the reverse slope. When he arrived on the Somme to help stabilise the serious situation facing the German Second Army, von Loßberg was focused on holding ground. It wasn't until later that the concept of trading territory for lives was introduced – until then units were forbidden from giving up ground. Von Loßberg was then transferred into the Battle of Arras after Vimy Ridge was lost (because the principle of mounting a rapid counter-attack was not implemented); subsequently he was brought into Third Ypres in late 1917. These moves illustrated a fundamental weakness in German defensive tactics; German armies could not be relied on to execute the tactics effectively without the direct intervention of a super-specialist. I will come back to this point in a moment.

When Mosier starts writing about the British preparations for the German spring offensives in 1918, he notes that '…the British failed to grasp the key basis of German defensive success, the holding back of most of the infantry so that the attackers would be sucked into a trap, blasted by artillery, exhausted by their trek, and then wiped out by the developing counterattack.' This is totally incorrect. The British understood these principles as early as the Battle of the Somme, based on interrogations of prisoners, captured documents, etc. By Third Ypres, the intelligence function within the British army had become so sophisticated that intelligence officers accompanied assault troops in order to interrogate captives immediately and to process documents as soon as they were discovered in dugouts. By this means, the British and Dominion forces were able to understand in real-time how the German counter-attacks would develop and along which routes. This enabled rapid interdiction, based on the intervention of artillery told off especially for this role.

The British tactics were so successful that Ludendorff countermanded von Loßberg at one point and ordered the front line to be held in strength again. This corresponded to a major Allied attack, which decimated the German forces as might be expected. Von Loßberg barely touches on Third Ypres in his memoirs, which is highly significant IMHO. He suffered a near mental breakdown from the terrible stress. Rudolf Binding wrote about a meeting with von Loßberg late in 1917. Binding described him as looking "ill and tired". The British came very close to forcing a major withdrawal from the nearby Belgian coast. Von Rupprecht provides evidence of this in his memoirs:

'Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria: Diary Entries
11 October 1917
"Our forces along the main battle front in Flanders are still thoroughly mixed up and confusion reigns in the various formations. It is really worrying that the fighting ability of our troops is reducing all the time and that all the means we have employed to attempt to counter the oppressive superiority of the enemy artillery have failed to have any effect. Because we are involved in a battle for time, there remains nothing for it, but repeatedly to give ground in order to force our opponents to waste time as they move artillery forward"' Source: Sheldon. The German Army at Passchendaele. pp228-9.

Von Rupprecht then noted in a subsequent diary entry that it was only the late rains that prevented him from abandoning much of the Belgian coast due to the British attacks.

Third Ypres was extremely important in driving the German High Command's decisions about 1918. The British had come very close to breaking one of the most defensible parts of the Western Front. More important, Third Ypres took away any capacity for the Germans to exercise the initiative. The German railway network, for example, was completely given over to transporting the troops and ammunition needed to contain the British. Two limits were exposed: the limit of one man as a defensive expert against the growing offensive power and tactical sophistication of the Allies; and the limits of the railways. The latter would become important during the German spring offensives, which had to launched as a sequence of operations with gaps to allow artillery assets to be moved from the previous operation and set up for the next one. The limits of the railways subsequently became important during the Last 100 Days, for reasons that I will touch on next.

Robert

Mosier has completely failed to understand how the Allied offensives worked in 1918. The German spring offensives had illustrated one of the limitations of the German railway network. Gaps were needed between the German operations, not least to move the heavy and super-heavy artillery between the operational sectors. The German offensives were halted by the French defence of Reims against Operation Friedenstürm in July 1918.

Mosier mentions the important role of the AEF in defending the Marne crossings during the earlier Operation Blücher in May/June. Unfortunately, Mosier fails to give credit to the French army units that defended the majority of the re-entrant created by the German advance. The excellent defence at Château Thièrry and the subsequent attacks at Belleau Wood would have been impossible if the French had not held the Germans on either side. The French situation was not just passive support either. The Battle of Matz, in response to the second-to-last offensive of Operation Gneisenau, was a major French combined arms operation involving massed French medium and heavy tanks (the Renaults were not operational at the time of Matz). The Battle of Matz brought the German offensive in the river valley to a complete halt.

When the Allies went over to the offensive with the Second Battle of Soissons, Battle of Amiens, etc, etc, they delivered a continuous rolling series of major operations along the line. The intensity of the battles was so great that German units were unable to rotate out of the line or be shifted to reinforce other threats. The Von Loßberg approach to managing a protracted defensive battle was overwhelmed, as there wasn't a single protracted defensive battle. The nature of the operations in the Last 100 Days was the most important contribution of Foch in his role of Supreme Commander.

I will pick up this theme in the next post, which will examine the two major operations carried out by the AEF: St Mihiel; and the Meuse-Argonne.

Robert

Mosier correctly notes that "…Pershing wanted entire divisions which would train together and then go into action as a separate force under American command." As it happens, American forces were committed to battle under other commands to begin with, such as the Big Red One and its operation at Cantigny, and the Second Division on the Marne. The major US operations were carried out by separate armies under US command.

Both St Mihiel and the Meuse-Argonne offensives were significant contributions to the Last 100 Days. St Mihiel was the less impressive of the two (which is not to denigrate the battle) because the Germans were already in the course of abandoning the salient. The opposition was significantly less as a result, though the American force would still have eliminated the salient if it had been defended stoutly – the process would have been longer and more costly but the outcome would have been the same. I think the fact the Germans abandoned the salient without a significant fight is why Mosier tries to denigrate the British successes in the Last 100 Days by saying that the Germans were just withdrawing from insignificant territory in the British sector of the front.

Meuse-Argonne was a wholly different operation. It was a very tough grind throughout. The Germans were not prepared to abandon these prepared defenses and they fought a determined battle during the whole time. It was enormously helpful though that the Germans lacked the operational initiative to focus on the area. The huge and continuous offensives elsewhere, plus the enormous strain on the railway network, meant the AEF faced a less daunting task that it would have otherwise been. The interlinkage and inter-dependencies across the Allied offensive efforts are just as important to understand as the determination and ultimate success in the Meuse-Argonne. Kudos to the AEF in respect of the outcome. Mosier's analysis fails to pay due respect to the Allies in return.

This is as much as I want to cover off. Mosier's book will now be consigned to the recycling. It is a shame. The book would have been better if he had focused on the background to the fighting in the Meuse-Argonne, with his analyses of Champagne, etc. Instead he wandered into territory that was wholly outside his research domain and made a complete hash of analysing the rest of the war.

Robert

Hi Robert,
"Ask and you shall receive." Thank you for the deep and extensive critique of Mosier's work. Not having delved deeply into the proceedings of the several battles you reference, I am in no position to dispute your presentation. My interest has overall been directed toward a lower level – weapons, tactics and battle doctrine. As such, it is on that level that I would like to discuss the above two comments.

> My reading of Gudmundsson ("On Artillery") and Bailey ("Field Artillery and Firepower") and several very useful doctoral research papers on British artillery in WW1 (available through the British Library Ethos archive – May God bless the parties responsible for making this freely available to the general public) suggest that Mosier was not, in the above-referenced two cases, as guilty as is implied. The BEF that landed in France in 1914 was, doctrinally speaking, very much a product of the British army's experience in the Boer Wars, with a focus upon mobile warfare, flexible open order tactics, infantry marksmanship and improved fieldcraft. The artillery arm was clearly subordinated to the infantry and intended to support the infantry via direct fire. Indirect fire techniques were not part of doctrine until necessity forced the issue on the Western Front.

While the 4.5-inch howitzer was indeed as very fine weapon, and may have constituted 25pct of the overall artillery park of the British army in 1914, such appears not to have been the case in the early artillery holdings of British 1st Army (BEF) on the Western Front. According to the data I have seen, after receipt of additional weapons over the winter of 1914/1915, the British artillery park was as follows – please correct me if these figures are inaccurate:

Divisional Guns
324 – - – - – 18-lbr QF Gun
60 – - – - – - 13-lbr Gun
54 – - – - – - 4.5-inch QF Howitzer
12 – - – - – - 2.75-inch Pack Gun (note 1)
Artillery Reserve (created upon receipt of the a/m reinforcement)
12 – - – - – - 60-lbr Gun (re-assigned from the divisional artillery)
32 – - – - – - 4.7-inch Gun (note 2)
28 – - – - – - 6-inch Howitzer (note 3)
4 – - – - – - – 6-inch Gun (note 4)
3 – - – - – - – 9.2-inch Howitzer (note 5)
1 – - – - – - – 15-inch Howitzer (note 6)

Note 1 – obsolete gun, soon withdrawn from frontline service.
Note 2 – obsolescent gun, lacking modern recoil system.
Note 3 – fortress gun on extemporized carriage, lacking modern recoil system.
Note 4 – fortress gun on extemporized carriage, lacking modern recoil system.
Note 5 – Modern weapon
Note 6 – Modern weapon, but not known to have actually participated in any battles.

Of a total 530 artillery weapons of all types at the front in early 1915, only 10 pct were 4.5-inch howitzers and only 16pct were howitzers of any sort.

- – -

Ammunition Outfits – Divisional Guns
18-lbr QF Gun – - – - – - – - 95% Shrapnel / 5% HE
13-lbr Gun – - – - – - – - – - – 100% Shrapnel
4.5-inch QF Howitzer – - – 90% HE / 10% Shrapnel
2.75-inch Pack Gun – - – - 100% Shrapnel

Ammunition Outfits – Heavy Artillery Reserve
60-lbr Gun – - – - – - – - – - 55% Shrapnel / 45% HE
4.7-inch Gun – - – - – - – - – 75% Shrapnel / 25% HE
6-inch Howitzer – - – - – - – 75% HE / 25% Shrapnel
6-inch Gun – - – - – - – - – - 70% Shrapnel / 30% HE
9.2-inch Howitzer – - – - – - 100% HE
15-inch Howitzer – - – - – - 100% HE

Of the total 530 artillery weapons, therefore –
384 (72 pct) had an ammunition outfit consisting of 95-100% shrapnel.
36 (7 pct) had an ammunition outfit consisting of 70-75% shrapnel
12 (2 pct) had an ammunition outfit consisting of 55% shrapnel
58 (11 pct) had an ammunition outfit consisting of 90-100% HE
28 (5 pct) had an ammunition outfit consisting of 75% HE

The predominance of shrapnel ammunition strongly points to an expectation of fighting in the open field. Shrapnel was highly effective against unprotected troops in the open, but very much less so against an opponent in cover, and ineffective as a destroyer of field defenses.

FWIW.

B

Thanks, B.

With respect to British howitzers in 1914, Mosier stated:

'The standard British howitzer was so heavy that "the breechloading six inch thirty cwt equipment had to be unshipped from its main travelling carriage and mounted on a ground platform for firing, a slow and laborious process at best"… Given that the barrel assembly weighed three metric tons, the fact that it was moved in sections and set up on site is hardly surprising.'

Mosier reinforces this in a subsequent paragraph:

'Howitzers were weapons that, like the British example above, took time and effort to emplace.'

Mosier is incorrect. The standard British howitzer in 1914 was the QF 4.5" howitzer, which saw service into WW2 as well. It was highly mobile and easily brought into action.

You have rightly raised issues around numbers and percentages of howitzers. These issues reflect the pre-war investment (or lack thereof, typically a political decision eg. in the case of the heavy guns for the French army that Joffre pushed for pre-war but the government would not fund) and the relative lack of industrial capacity to increase output (of both guns and munitions) from pre-war levels. This is wholly different (but still an important consideration) from the point I was picking up on, if that makes sense.

A minor point but British artillery was mostly used in indirect fire mode from the beginning of the war. There were some (minority) notable exceptions, such as some of the artillery in the Battles of Elouges and Le Cateau. These exceptions simply reinforced the importance of what the rest of the artillery were already doing – taking up positions in defilade and using forward observers linked by signals or telephony. At Elouges, the batteries operating on the forward slope managed to get limbered up and away. Le Cateau saw those batteries operating in direct fire mode take much heavier casualties and lose more guns. Most batteries at Le Cateau were in defilade cover though.

Robert

Hi Robert,
Mosier clearly misapprehended the distinction between classes of howitzers. Both Great Britain and France at the opening of the war were badly deficient in heavy howitzers (not to mention heavy artillery ordnance in general) compared to Germany.

Re artillery doctrine, the BEF did indeed rapidly abandon its pre-war assumptions in the face of practical experience and quickly embraced the need to both master indirect fire techniques and to establish a more centralized artillery command and control structure above division level.

Overall, I think it is fair to say that the first 24 months of the war for the Entente involved a period of furious "on the job training" in order to close the gap in artillery tactics and doctrine and to redress the artillery materiel gap.

B

B, I respectfully disagree that the first 24 months was one of 'on the job learning' about artillery tactics and doctrine. British and French artillery were both trained in indirect fire methods pre-war. British 60 pounders attempted to engage German artillery with counter-battery fire at Le Cateau; the British guns were in defilade cover. Hurricane preparatory bombardments were known as a preliminary prerequisite for fire superiority in supporting infantry assaults. In March 1915, the British executed the excellent fire plan for Neuve Chapelle. The plan was based on aerial photographs and target plotting. Heavy and super-heavy artillery were included. Direct fire was also employed, with light artillery being wheeled forward at night into the front line to engage in wire-clearing and parapet destruction. The 30 minute bombardment was highly effective, except in the area of the Quadrilateral. British troops occupied Neuve Chapelle almost unopposed and only stopped because the first objective line was reached. Command inertia failed to capitalise on the gains but the success of the artillery was immediately obvious. The plans were circulated throughout the French army as an exemplar, by order of Joffre.

The problem was not how to use the guns; the problem was far too few of them and, even worse, the almost complete lack of munitions. If you had supplied the British and French with the necessary mix of field, heavy and super-heavy guns plus unlimited ammunition in 1914 then they would have known what to do with them.

All sides had to learn how to use the mix of artillery to best effect for the hitherto unknown scale of the major offensives. The Germans had more guns in the heavy and super-heavy range to begin with, no question. Pre-war investment had gone into this (though not as much as the Great General Staff had wanted). All sides had to learn how to integrate aerial observation to a greater degree, how to detect and neutralise the growing threat from enemy guns, etc, etc.

Robert

Hi Robert,
I think we will have to agree to disagree on this point. As I see it, the success of Haig's very short but very intense neutralization bombardment at Neuve Chapelle was a happy accident borne from an artillery ammunition shortage that had simply precluded any other option. When a much improved availability of ammunition (and an increased number of artillery tubes) became available for the Somme, Haig abandoned the Neuve Chapelle approach, opting instead for a lengthy 6-8 day period of destructive fire. As I see it, British artillery doctrine and tactics were in a continued process of empirical evolution, not truly reaching a fully mature state until 2nd Arras and Messines.

Strictly my opinion, of course, although I suspect that we could bounce this ball back and forth for a very long time.

p.s. – I do not argue that the British were incapable of indirect fire, only that no cogent and settled overall artillery doctrine existed within the pre-war British army. Some writers I have come across have gone so far as to assert that the British army had entered the war with no real artillery doctrine at all beyond mobile operations in support of the infantry at divisional, brigade and regimental level.

p.p.s. – I totally agree that IF the pre-war British army had possessed a heavy artillery branch akin to the German "Fuss Artillerie" branch, a doctrine for its use would have been in place. But they did not have such an arm (neither really did the French army). With no such tool in hand, why study and experiment in its practical use?

Lovely discussion.

B

B, again I would respectfully disagree with the notion of a seemingly one-off plan for Neuve Chapelle and an abandonment of this approach for the Somme bombardment. Rawlinson established the plan for the attack on the Somme, as presented to Haig in "Plan for Offensive by the Fourth Army. GX3/1" on 3rd April, 1916. In this document, Rawlinson suggested there were two options for the infantry attack. One was to "rush the whole of the enemy's defenses in one rush as was attempted at Loos." The second option was to "include the enemy's front line and certain important tactical points [including] the ridge running north from Fricourt to Pozières, past Fricourt Farm and Round Wood." This option was the prelude to a further attack "to be undertaken as soon as preparations can be made."

Rawlinson suggested two options for the artillery bombardment: one was the short, sharp 5-6 hours duration option; the other was "longer, more methodical, but less intense [lasting] 48-72 hours duration." He posted several arguments for and against both options, concluding "on the whole I consider that alternative b will fit in best with the general plan selected."

Haig's responses came in the form of OADs 710 and 710/1. Haig was for the short bombardment option. He requested "your further consideration to this question [of going with a 5-6 hour bombardment] is therefore desirable". Rawlinson considered the option but reverted back to the longer bombardment. It was Rawlinson that drove the planning for the longer bombardment subsequently.

The evolution of British [French and German] artillery doctrine continued throughout the war. Cambrai and then Amiens were two examples of a fundamentally different approach from Second Arras and Messines for example.

The crucial point about the seeming 'learning curve' of late 1914 through mid 1916 is that it was driven primarily by lack of resources, not lack of understanding. Germany had invested more heavily in the heavy and super-heavy artillery before the war. The French army wanted to compete and knew exactly how to do so, with Joffre pressing hard for equivalent weapons almost from the moment he took office. The investment was not forthcoming. To catch Germany once the war started was a very very difficult task, particularly in an economy that was not as geared towards war (though French military spend was not trivial). It wasn't just a case of rapidly designing and producing the desperately needed heavy and super-heavy guns. Just equipping the new units being formed, replacing worn existing guns, and producing the quantum levels of munitions needed all took time and precedence to a degree. This was the gap that existed, as it was for the British. Not a gap in intellect or tactical understanding.

I will carry the issue of pre-war artillery doctrines over to another post.

Robert

A minor extra point that I was reminded of today when beginning the translation of Generalleutnant von Tappen's account of the events in 1914. He was on the German General Staff and became the Chief of Operations. Von Tappen's account is "Bis zur Marne 1914' and, like all other German accounts, refers to the battle on the German right wing as 'Die Marne=Schlacht'. This translates as 'The Battle of the Marne'.

Robert

Hi Robert,
There is no question that a lack of suitable artillery materiel (particularly heavy artillery and artillery ammunition in general) hindered British efforts to update artillery tactics and doctrine over the first ~two~ years. But no less important was the faulty pre-war doctrine which had served as a starting point. The artillery arm had little influential representation or mentorship within the pre-war British military; its status was as a servant to the infantry's mobile offensive doctrine at or below division level. Travers ("The Killing Ground") is worth reading (or re-reading) on this point, as are Samuels, Bailey and Gudmunsson

See also -
"'The Infantry cannot do with a gun less': the place of the artillery in the BEF, 1914-1918"
William Sanders Marble
(British Library Ethos site)

"The Monstrous Anger of the Guns – The Development of British Artillery Tactics 1914-1918"
Jackson Hughes
(British Library Ethos site)

"The Birth of Modern Counterfire – The British and American Experience in World War 1"
William Campsey
(CARL Digital Library)

"The Evolution of Artillery Tactics, Techniques, and Organization on the Western Front during the World War"
George W Griner
(CARL Digital Library)

To sum up, IMO, the lack of ammunition and a suitable orchestra or artillery at the start of the war was but one component of the problem; the other equally important factor was the development of an effective artillery command organization that could manage, direct, distribute and concentrate the orchestra's instruments across corps and army levels – in the same manner as was exhibited by the management of British artillery in WW2. By the end of the war, almost one-half of the personnel of British 1st Army were serving in the artillery. No such high-level organization existed or had even been contemplated within the British army prior to WW1.

FWIW. Once again, a lovely discussion.

B

Hi B. The 1909 Field Service Regulations (FSR) were published pre-war. These formed the basis for 'the principles… evolved by experience as generally applicable to the leading of troops. [These principles] are to be regarded by all ranks as authoritative, for their violation, in the past, has often been followed by mishap, if not by disaster.'

FSR provided the equivalent of doctrine, with the note that 'the fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abstruse, but the application of them is difficult and cannot be made subject to rules.' This approach was adopted by the Germans and French too. Military doctrine could not be proscriptive.

FSR noted that, at the level of the army, 'the fighting troops… are composed of cavalry, artillery, engineers, infantry, mounted infantry, and cyclists. These arms are in certain proportions, which have been fixed as the result of experience. Each has its own characteristics and functions, and is dependent on the assistance of others. The full power of the army can be exerted only when all its parts act in close combination…' (emphasis in the original).

With respect to artillery:

'1. The function of the artillery is to assist the other arms in breaking down hostile opposition. The invisibility, which smokeless powder confers, has, however, modified the extent to which artillery can assist the other arms by preparatory action. Till the enemy either discloses his dispositions by his own movements or is compelled to do so by the other arms, artillery must usually limit its action to preparing to support the latter as soon as occasion demands it.

2. Quick-firing guns confer on a commander the power to develop a destructive fire with great rapidity, but fire of this character cannot be continuous for more than brief periods without risk of exhausting the available ammunition and must be effectively controlled. Improved means of communication permit artillery commanders to exercise control over the fire of dispersed artillery, so that concentration of guns is no longer necessary to ensure control of fire.

3. The effective combination of the fire of all the various kinds of artillery available is necessary if that arm is to develop its full power. With this object, each nature of ordnance should be allotted its special role, which will differ according to its mobility, range, and shell power.

4. Horse artillery is the most mobile form of artillery. It is primarily intended for employment with the mounted troops, particularly to assist the cavalry attack by directing its fire against the opposing cavalry, but it can also be employed effectively to support the combined action of the other arms in battle.

5. Field artillery is less mobile than horse artillery, but has greater shell power. It includes guns and howitzers, and forms the bulk of the artillery force. Its duty is to assist the infantry in every way in establishing a superiority of fire over the enemy.

6. Howitzers, by reason of the steep angle of descent of their powerful projectiles, are specially adapted for the attack of shield guns, or of an enemy behind cover, or in entrenchments. They are particularly adapted to supporting infantry in the later stages of an attack as, provided the circumstances are favourable, they can continue firing until the infantry has almost reached its objective. They are provided with high explosive shells which are intended chiefly for use against such targets as buildings, head cover, parapets and walls.

7. Mountain artillery is the weakest in shell power…

8. Heavy artillery is the least mobile of all artillery used in the field; it can fire accurately at long ranges [defined as 5-6000 yards] and has great shell power. Its principal duty is to engage shielded artillery with oblique fire [counter-battery fire], to enfilade targets which the lighter guns can only reach with frontal fire, to search distant localities in which supports or reserves are concealed [interdiction], to destroy buildings or other protections occupied by the enemy, and in the final stage to support the assault by fire converging on the most important points.

9. Seige artillery brigades may be allotted to the field army for special duties in connection with fortress operations.

10. Garrison artillery companies are allotted to coast defences. Their armament is divided in the guns of fixed armament and of the movable armament.'

It should be noted that British army personnel could read about the German Fußartillerie regulations in English through the translation published as 'Drill regulations for the foot artillery of the German army' in 1909.

Robert

Hi Robert,
Thank you for posting the FSRs. However, I do not consider that they really relate to what I am addressing. If you have the time, please consider reading the two essays below,

PLAYING FOR TIME: THE EFFECTS OF THE VICTORIAN COLONIAL WARS ON THE BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCE OF 1914.
link

ARTILLERY IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
(OFFICIAL BRITISH NOTES OF FEBRUARY, 1917, ON ARTILLERY IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS.)
link

- – -

Taken together, I think they do a very serviceable job of describing the great expansion of tactical control of the artillery arm all the way up to army level, the rapid and dynamic evolution of tactical doctrine that took place within the artillery arm of the British army as the war progressed, the gigantic growth of the artillery arm in both materiel and personnel within the army, and the inexorable and ultimately absolute inversion of the tactical relationship between the artillery and the infantry arms.

B

Let me suggest a context for the next round of discussions. Firstly, these next discussions are not about any attempt to rehabilitate Mosier's book 'The Myth of the Great War'. Second, this thread started with the question about the perceived higher casualty rate of the AEF, based on Geoffrey Wawro's analysis. Mosier was introduced into the discussion as providing an alternative view on the relative casualty rate of the AEF, contrary to Wawro. I don't want to get into a discussion about the relative figures with regards to casualty rates, etc. What is important, IMHO, is the concept of a 'learning curve', which underpins one aspect of this thread. As applied to the AEF, the 'learning curve' could be a reason for the AEF taking higher than Anglo-French rates of casualties (if such were the case).

Third, the pre-war and subsequent development of British artillery can be considered as another example of the 'learning curve'. This discussion can be used, therefore, to provide further context to consideration of the AEF in late 1918.

Robert

Agreed, Robert.

> Re Mosier – Flawed book indeed, but with (IMO) some valuable insights regarding the tight control and censorship by the militaries of news from the battlefronts and the degree to which that control made possible the widespread dissemination of propaganda to "manage" public opinion on the home front.

> Re AEF casualties in the Meuse-Argonne – I will refer to a favorite tongue-in-cheek aphorism: "To every complicated question there is a simple answer, and it is usually wrong." There is no question that a dire lack of training (and seasoning) played a large role in the heavy casualties taken by the AEF. But equally influential IMO were: (a) the difficult nature of the terrain fought over, and (b) the great strength of the German defenses in that vital sector of the German front. IIRC, Foch's staff had estimated that several months would be required to breach the German Meuse-Argonne position; Pershing got the job done in weeks by inundating the German defenses with American blood.

> Re "Learning Curves" – It was not my intention to suggest that the British army was at all unique in this respect.
Every army that fought in WW1 confronted its own learning curve. Shapes, slopes and lengths of those curves may have differed from nation to nation, but each military was faced by one.

B

Thanks, B.

Thank you also for the various references relating to British artillery doctrine, which I will return to later. Meanwhile, it will be helpful to look at additional primary source material. This will make it easier to assess the various references.

The BEF went to war without dedicated corps-level artillery. The first divisions that landed in France were fitted out with the division-level complement of light artillery, comprising 18-pdr field guns and 4.5" howitzers, plus the heavy guns, comprising 60 pdr guns. Even at this level, there were restrictions imposed by budgetary constraints. The heavy batteries were limited to 12 horses per gun in peace-time, though additional horses were quickly requisitioned when mobilisation began in 1914.

The concept of corps-level HQs was understood before the war; this level of HQ was staffed during annual manoeuvres but there were no dedicated corps training grounds, as existed in Germany, due to budgetary constraints as well.

There were additional artillery units before the war, both Royal Garrison and Royal Siege Artillery batteries of medium, heavy and super-heavy guns and howitzers of various types. New infantry divisions were created after mobilisation; many had to incorporate some of these batteries to make up for the lack of standard division-level artillery. 8th Division, for example, had XXXIII and XLV Brigades of 18 pdrs but also had V Brigade RHA (13 pdrs in place of 4.5" howitzers) and Heavy Artillery Brigade, RGA (118 and 119 Batteries of 4.7" guns in place of 60 pdrs).

B, you noted the importance of "…the development of an effective artillery command organization that could manage, direct, distribute and concentrate the orchestra's instruments across corps and army levels." When war broke out, there were Commanders Royal Artillery (CRAs) in place for each division; Brigadier-General Findlay for 1st Division in August 1914, for example. Each CRA had a Brigade-Major Royal Artillery (BMRA) to help him. The CRA and BMRA posts were created in 1912 and 1913 respectively. CRAs were responsible for controlling division-level artillery assets. Becke has provided a very detailed account of this process in his book 'The Royal Regiment of Artillery at Le Cateau, 26 August, 1914.', published in 1919. Becke describes how the order to hold the line, issued by the General Officer Commanding (GOC) II Corps, was translated into orders for each artillery brigade by the respective divisional CRAs.

There were two other higher levels of command in 1914. GHQ was the highest level, followed by corps (I and II Corps). GHQ was operating as the equivalent of an army HQ. Major-General Lindsay was appointed Major-General Royal Artillery (MGRA) in GHQ on 5th August 1914. He operated in an advisory capacity.

Brigadier-General Horne (who later rose to become an Army commander) was Brigadier-General Royal Artillery (BGRA) for I Corps, commencing 5 August 1914. Brigadier-General Short was appointed BGRA for II Corps on the same date. Because BEF Corps did not have specific artillery assets at this time, the BGRA role was also an advisory one initially.

When a new layer of command was added with the formation of Army HQs, the MGRA title was also used. Major-General Mercer, for example, as appointed MGRA First Army on 16 February 1915. Major-General Headlam was appointed MGRA Second Army on 25 February 1915.

It took time to mobilise the heavy and super-heavy artillery assets in 1914. The efforts, quite rightly, were driven by the formation of multiple new infantry divisions. The Battle of Neuve Chapelle is very important, therefore, in considering the development of British command, control and coordination of artillery. Neuve Chapelle opened on 10 March 1915 and was the first set-piece battle that involved significant (for the time) numbers of supplementary non-division artillery assets.

The strategic basis for Neuve Chapelle was determined by GHQ. The Chief of the General Staff (CGS), General Robertson, sent out a long memorandum on 9 February 1915. It is clear from his note that there had been discussions with at least the Army commanders (Haig and Smith-Dorrien) before this. Haig responded on 12 February with 3 operational options, two of which were dependent on the re-capture of Neuve Chapelle (it had been taken by the Germans in October 1914).

From the war diaries, it is clear that the supplementary heavy- and super-heavy batteries were amassed at the direction of GHQ, not First Army. Two Heavy Artillery Reserve (HAR) Groups were formed on 28 February 1915. No. 1 HAR Group was under the direct command of Brigadier-General Franks; No. 2 HAR Group was under the command of Brigadier-General Uniacke. No. 2 HAR Group, for example, was formed from 10th Siege Battery (9.2" howitzers) initially but then had 3rd and 8th Heavy Brigade attached as well as 113 Heavy Battery. It is unclear from the war diaries what role MGRA Lindsay played in GHQ but it is very clear that no divisional CRAs were involved in the planning or set up of the HAR Groups.

I will post further details on the planning and execution of the artillery used in the Battle of Neuve Chapelle.

Robert

Following the GHQ memorandum on 9 February 1915 and Haig's reply on 12 February, the war diary of First Army records on 14 February:

"Sir Douglas Haig, and Brig. General J E Gough [Haig's chief of staff] visited the Field Marshall, C. in C. at St Omer, and a conference was held with the C.G.S. [Chief of General Staff, Robertson] and B.G.R.A."

The latter was referring to the artillery advisor in GHQ. On 15 February:

"G.O.C. First Army held a conference with the commanders of the 1st, 4th, and Indian Corps at Merville.

The Corps Commander held a conference with divisional commanders at 2nd Division Headquarters. Brig. Gen. R.A. 1st Corps and C.R.A.'s… of divisions attended."

Later that day:

"Sir D. Haig held a conference of Corps Commanders at Merville… to discuss certain questions in connection with offensive operations.

Information was received from GHQ regarding certain heavy guns expected to arrive shortly."

Next day (16th February):

"The C.G.S. and B.G.R.A from GHQ arrived at 1st Army HQ to discuss certain matters with General Gough ['Johnnie' Gough VC, Chief of Staff, First Army] in connection with future operations."

Later that day, the war diary records that Brigadier-General Mercer took up the post of BGRA First Army.

General Mercer had been involved in the planning process before his appointment. Haig noted in his diary entry for 10 Feb that Haig met with General Robertson CGS to discuss the proposed offensive at Neuve Chapelle and then:

"…saw General Mercer (CRA) regarding the action of the artillery against Neuve Chapelle. He proposed bombarding it by compartments, and to take 4 days over it. In my opinion such action would lose much of the effect of the heavy shells. Much better compress this fire into a terrific outburst for 3 hours… This will take advantage of the element of surprise!"

On 18 February, Haig met with Rawlinson and then:

"…I went by motor to Estaires and went to the top of the church tower from which a good view is obtained of Aubers village and the surrounding countryside. Brigadier-General Mercer [was] with me. One gets a good idea of the nature of the country. Aubers village stands out very clearly and is on a ridge which seems to rise gradually up to it."

Mercer continued to be actively involved in planning the artillery contribution to the Battle of Neuve Chapelle. Haig records on 2 March:

"General Mercer came to see me about 6 pm. He had been to see some practical Battery Commanders of recent experience. He now considered a bombardment of half an hour sufficient. I told him that in my opinion it was a question of calculation. For instance there were certain houses to be demolished. How many shells would it require in each case? How long would it take to fire these? Then there was the bombardment of trenches! The number of shells required must be worked out, time required for firing, etc. When all this is totalled up we might then give a decision. Tomorrow he is going into it with Colonels [sic] Franks and Uniacke [both now BGRAs of Nos 1 & 2 HAR Groups as noted previously] and will tell me at night the conclusion arrived at."

It was on 2nd March that 1st Corps war diary recorded:

"During the day a secret letter was received from 1st Army with regard to the reorganisation of the artillery. In the future, artillery will be grouped into three categories:

1. Divisional artillery – Field artillery brigades [of 18 pdrs and 4.5" howitzers] [and] Mountain batteries

2. Army artillery – Horse drawn heavy batteries (60 prs, 4.7", 6" howitzers)

3. GHQ artillery – Heavy artillery with mechanical traction (9.2", etc)"

On 3 March:

"General Mercer came to see me [Haig] about 6 pm. He has gone thoroughly into the artillery question with Colonels Franks and Uniacke and the CRAs concerned. The conclusion they have arrived at is that 35 minutes in all of a bombardment should suffice. I am to have a detailed statement of the roles assigned to the several guns and batteries by tomorrow morning. There is a considerable difference between the 2 1/2 hours bombardment first recommended by IV Corps and the present proposal!"

The precise roles of Generals Franks and Uniacke were set out in '1st Army Operation Order No. 6', issued on 3rd March:

"1. The following artillery units will be detached from Corps for tactical purposes from 12 noon on the 5th inst., and formed into two groups as shown below:

NORTHERN GROUP
Commander:- Brig. Gen. Uniacke

One 15" Howitzer
Two 9.2" Howitzers
3rd Heavy Brigade RGA (111th & 112th Batteries) [4.7" guns]
8th Heavy Brigade RGA (113th, 118th & 119th Btys) [4.7" guns]

SOUTHERN GROUP
Commander:- Brig. Gen. Franks

Two 9.2" Howitzers
35th Battery (60 pounders)
No. 8 Siege Battery [4.6" guns]
Nos. 109, 110, and 114th Heavy Batteries, RGA

2. a) Any movements of the above units to their new positions allotted to them to complete these groupings, will be carried out under Corps arrangements in accordance with the instructions issued by Army Headquarters.

b) Any readjustment of position for tactical purposes when the grouping is completed, will be ordered by the Group Commander, who will at the same time inform the Corps concerned.

3. The above mentioned artillery units will, for purposes of administration and ammunition supply, remain under Corps and Divisions as at present."

In summary, there notes illustrate that:
1. The artillery contribution to Neuve Chapelle was not 'a happy accident borne from an artillery ammunition shortage' but the result of a carefully considered planning process that involved GHQ (to source and ensure the supply of the extra heavy and super-heavy assets), First Army, the three infantry Corps (I, IV, and Indian), the divisional CRAs, and the HAR Group BGRAs.

2. By February 1915, there was a clear move away from division-only control of artillery to a pan-BEF process of managing the ever-increasing range of artillery assets at GHQ-, Army-, Corps- and Division levels. The specific titles of the levels of roles would change further as the war progressed, as did the levels of responsibilities and the range of artillery assets. Nonetheless, Neuve Chapelle showed that, within weeks of starting the planning process, GHQ had mobilised heavy and super-heavy artillery for use in the offensive, First Army had coordinated the planning of the artillery contribution, divisions had relinquished control of their heavy artillery, and the newly-formed HAR Groups, whose commanders reported to GHQ, were linked to Corps commanders.

Robert

On 3 March 1915, BEF 8th Division war diary recorded the following document, which is a reminder of how the German army controlled corps-level heavy artillery:

"FROM [a German] OFFICER'S PAPERS

Disposition of Heavy Artillery of [German] VII Corps.

1. New arrangement of groups:-
a. Richter's Group
– 1st Battery Foot Artillery Regiment No. 7 (15 cm)
– 2nd Battery Foot Artillery Regiment No. 7 (15 cm)
– 4th Battery Foot Artillery Regiment No. 7 (15 cm)
– Marine Battery
– 10 cm Battery

b. Rethenburg's Group
– Mortar Battery
– 3rd Battery Foot Artillery Regiment No. 7
– 15 cm ? Battery

2. Orders
– In general as on 30/12/14
– In particular:-
Richter's Group
– To take on all batteries north of the line… Neuve Chapelle – Locon
Rethenburg's Group
– To take on all batteries south of the above mentioned line…

(Signed) V. CAMPE"

Robert

British IV Corps participated in the attack on Neuve Chapelle, under the command of General Rawlinson. As mentioned previously, each new Corps HQ included a BGRA, who operated in an advisory role. General Hussey was BGRA for IV Corps, having been appointed in October 1914. In contrast to his counterpart on the other side of the wire, General der Artillerie von Campe, Hussey had no Corps-specific guns.

IV Corps had two infantry divisions for the opening assault on 10 March. 7th and 8th Divisions both had CRAs; Brigadier-Generals Jackson and Holland respectively. We have seen how the heavy guns in divisions were reallocated to Army level. CRAs had direct control, therefore, of the field guns, light howitzers, horse artillery, and mountain guns in the division sector. Neuve Chapelle illustrated an interesting development. 8th Division's Operation Order No. 12, issued on 8 March two days before the attack, contained the following:

"3. For the attack on Neuve Chapelle village, the artillery of the 7th and 8th Divisions, less the 4.7" heavy batteries, will be grouped under the orders of the G.O.C. [General Officer Commanding] 8th Division; The 4.7" batteries of the 7th and 8th Divs together with certain heavy batteries will form a group under orders of 1st Army."

Here is an example where the artillery of two divisions were. brought together under one CRA for a phase of the battle. The OO goes on to say:

"When the 7th Div. is ordered by the Corps Commander to move forward to the attack, the following artillery units will come under the orders of the G.O.C. 7th Div. [detailed list provided in original but not reproduced here]"

Thus the artillery of two divisions would operate under one command in support of the infantry from one division going in to attack first then the command would split once the second division went in.

Two things are important to note in respect of these arrangements. First, the attack frontage was very much narrower than occurred in major battles later in the war. Thus the two sets of divisional artillery would have been no more than the artillery of a later war division reinforced by attached field artillery brigades. Second, the army as a whole was still small enough that networking could allow these new command and control measures to work more effectively than would have been the case later in the war. So a Corps BGRA could still have made significant inputs to the plan without necessarily having or needing direct control at this stage of the war. The frontage of the attack was so narrow that, in truth, First Army was acting as a Corps command, hence the control of heavier guns being centralised there. GHQ was really like an Army HQ in its control of the GHQ Artillery as it was initially called, changed to Reserve Heavy Artillery formed up in HAR Groups as seen above.

Another example of the networking approach occurred after Neuve Chapelle, in the lead up to one of the later 1915 battles in the same area. MGRA First Army wrote to his counterpart in Second Army to ask permission for a super-heavy howitzer to be located in Second Army's sector, in order to provide better enfilade fire. Haig wrote to his counterpart Smith-Dorrien as well. The request was duly accommodated. Later in the war, the scale of the offensives was so much greater with so many more heavy- and super-heavy guns that a networking style was not appropriate. The changes made in the lead up to Neuve Chapelle paved the way for more significant changes as the war progressed and the requirements for command and control increased.

The German army was much bigger than the BEF before the war started, so the Corps level artillery command was needed well before it was needed in the BEF.

Robert

Hi Robert,
Here is another very good PhD thesis document out of Kings College that really dissects the evolution of the British Army operations on the Western Front. Worth reading IMO, especially for the author's observations and insights on the trials and tribulations endured over the first twelve months – the dire shell shortage and the slow rate of delivery of heavy ordnance to the front. Interesting background material on Neuve Chapelle is also given, starting on page 127, and is at the root of why I used the phrase "happy accident" in connection with Rawlinson's artillery planning for that battle.

"The Evolution of the British Army's Logistical and Administrative Infrastructure and its Influence on GHQ's Operational and Strategic Decision-Making on the Western Front, 1914-1918"
By Ian Malcolm Brown

D/L available here – link

B

Hi B,
Thank you for the link to Brown's thesis. It is very important to re-read the section on Neuve Chapelle in the light of the details I have provided above from primary sources. Then note that Brown has referred multiple times to Prior and Wilson as the secondary sources for his analysis of the planning for Neuve Chapelle. Prior and Wilson's book 'Command on the Western Front' is a flawed analysis throughout.

Robert

Hi Robert,

"Prior and Wilson's book 'Command on the Western Front' is a flawed analysis throughout."

Very puzzling. Why do you suppose that Brown would have referenced such a work? At first glance, it makes no sense. Exactly how flawed are we talking here? Wilson is after all considered, by all accounts, to be a highly respected authority in the field of WW1 historical research; he has written something like thirty books, published by the likes of the Yale and Oxford presses. Judging by the stratospheric asking prices on Amazon UK, "Command on the Western Front" still seems to remain in high demand.

Can you perhaps point me to any good critiques from the academic community that illuminate the nature of these flawed analyses in more detail?

B

B, for now I ask that you hold onto this high degree of skepticism with regards to my comments about the flawed nature of Prior and Wilson's analyses in 'Command on the Western Front'. Let's continue with the first seed of doubt, based on the current focus – the planning of the Battle of Neuve Chapelle as the first major transition in BEF thinking and practice for allocating artillery resources. We can return to the wider scope of Prior and Wilson, applying the same level of detailed critiquing that was applied to Mosier's book.

As to Brown's use of Prior and Wilson's work, I cannot comment on his rationale. It should be noted, however, that Brown's thesis is focused on the evolution of the logistical and administrative infrastructure of the BEF. The details about the planning for Neuve Chapelle, at the level of our discussion, are not so relevant to the focus of the thesis. Given the need to prioritise time/effort and the content of the thesis, it is perfectly appropriate to reference secondary sources for those aspects of the thesis that are not central to the topic. In these situations, the inclusion of the references allows us to review them independently.

Returning to the relevant section of Brown's thesis, starting at p. 127 as you suggested, he begins the final paragraph on that page with the following:

"The new type of warfare placed great demands on the lines of communications."

This comment is directly linked to the focus of the thesis. Brown continues:

"Early on in the preparation for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle, Rawlinson (GOC IV Corps) recognised the vital importance of artillery, and helped to push the BEF towards an artillery intensive, and line of communications intensive, operational system."

This mention of Rawlinson's role is tied back to Prior and Wilson, specifically p. 25 of 'Command on the Western Front'. I will come back to this source later; suffice for now to review Brown's interpretation with respect to what actually happened – not as a criticism of Brown's work let me be quite clear.

On 6 February 1914, before formal receipt of the request from the Chief of General Staff to plan an offensive operation, General Haig noted in his diary:

"…I motored to Merville and saw Sir Henry Rawlinson Commanding IV Corps who returned from leave in England last night… I told him… that my plan was to operate against Neuve Chapelle… I told him to prepare a scheme and put forward proposals for the capture of Neuve Chapelle."

On 18 February, Haig noted in his diary:

"Sir Henry Rawlinson… handed me two papers marked 'Secret' – 'Notes for the attack on Neuve Chapelle', and points for consideration in the attack on Neuve Chapelle'."

Between these two dates, Haig had been liaising with GHQ and with Mercer on the details of the artillery assets and on the preparatory bombardment [as noted 6 posts back in this thread]. Furthermore, Haig had already submitted a plan to GHQ and on 19 February:

"The GGS (Robertson) came to me about 1 o'clock to tell me that full approval had been given by C-in-C [French] for the operations I had suggested so I could push on now as fast as possible."

With respect to Rawlinson's plan, Brown writes:

"Having experimented with destroying a German trench opposite I Corps, Haig (First Army) passed the findings on to Rawlinson, who concluded that an overall bombardment of 45 minutes, followed by a barrage, and including a large number of heavy howitzers (6"), would succeed. [reference p. 30 'Command on the Western Front]. Indeed, the Battle of Neuve Chapelle largely succeeded on the first day, though the follow-up effort aimed at Aubers Ridge did not, because of Rawlinson's decision 'to use artillery to crush the German defences' in line with his bombard and storm ideas which left his Corps with little in reserve to follow-up the initial success. [reference p.55]. Ironically, 'Rawlinson's dictum of "bombard and storm" would be validated by his own attempt, consequent upon early success, to disregard it [reference p.70]."

Based on the interpretation of Prior and Wilson's work, Brown links Rawlinson's plan back into the central theme of the thesis:

"The reason for the irony will become clear: while Rawlinson had hit upon the
basic methodology which would work in later years, the BEF had begun a period of the war where they quite simply lacked the materiel (ammunition, other supplies and manpower)to repeat the success of Neuve Chapelle. …Rawlinson's operational system would eventually evolve into the successful operational system of
1918."

Rawlinson contributed to but was not responsible for the 'basic methodology' or the 'operational system'. For example, the duration of the bombardment was arrived at quite separately based on Haig's questions to Mercer. Rawlinson will have been appraised of this work during the various meetings, both personal and during the First Army conferences with Corps commanders. As we have seen in earlier posts, the thinking behind the use of heavy- and super-heavy artillery for the preparatory bombardment was not Rawlinson's either. His role was to plan for IV Corps contribution to the attack, not to plan for the overall operation as this fell to, and was executed by, First Army in cooperation with both IV and Indian Corps. It should be noted that Rawlinson, like other BEF commanders, would have been very well aware in general terms of the importance of heavy artillery.

I will pick up in a separate post on what Prior and Wilson wrote in 'Command on the Western Front' with respect to the planning for Neuve Chapelle. Herein lies the fundamental issues, not with Brown's interpretation through his use of references.

Robert

Prior and Wilson's 'Command on the Western Front' is subtitled 'The military career of Sir Henry Rawlinson 1914-1918'. In the Prelude, the authors wrote:

"There are various reasons for choosing Sir Henry Rawlinson as the subject for this case study. In the course of the Great War he saw command at several key levels, principally those of corps commander and Army commander. Between 1915 and 1918 he participated in several momentous episodes of battle. For example he exercised a major command in what is generally deemed the blackest day of the British army in modern war (1 July 1916), and he presided over what is habitually described as the Black Day of the German army in the Great War (8 August 1918). And he bestowed upon posterity a formidable quantity of written material about his part in the war."

Prior and Wilson (hereafter referred to as P&W) then go on to make a quite extraordinary set of assertions, which skew the balance of the book:

"In sum, if a study of Rawlinson does not exhaust the subject of command on the Western Front, it may be thought exhaustive enough. Or to put that another way, one may doubt whether much of additional moment will emerge from expounding all aspects of the subject and not just Rawlinson's segment of it."

Doubt arises, however, almost from the beginning of book (leaving aside the assertions made in the Prelude). The planning for Neuve Chapelle is the starting point. On p. 23 P&W wrote:

"On 6 February, Haig ordered Rawlinson to develop proposals for the capture of Neuve Chapelle, adding: 'I [hope] to be ready for the operation in about 10 days.' This unrealistic timetable indicated how much the commanders still had to learn."

At the time of publication, the edited transcripts of Haig's diaries had not been published. Based on 'Douglas Haig: War diaries and letters 1914-1918' the full sentence is:

"I hoped to be ready for this operation in about 10 days' time."

P&W replaced "hoped to" with "[hope]". Square brackets are a well recognised academic tool that enable partial quotes to made more readable when taken slightly out of context. I have used this tool earlier, as you will have noted. As you will also know, square brackets alert the reader to the fact that the quote has been modified in some by the researcher. Linking the quote to a reference provides the opportunity for the reader to review the researcher's changes in the full context of the original primary source.

With access to an alternative transcript (bearing in mind that Sheffield and Bourne's book is still not the original diary entry), the original sentence does not need modifying IMHO; "I hoped to be ready for this operation in about 10 days' time." can be used as is and does seem substantially different from: "I [hope] to be ready for this operation in about 10 days' time."

This may seem trivial but, from an academic perspective, the change rings alarm bells. The first alarm is: 'Why did P&W make this change?" The second alarm, which is much much more serious, is: "If the change is counter to the standards of academic research then how unreliable is the rest of the work?" This question is of great significance when you reflect back on the assertions P&W make in the Prelude. More on this broader issue anon; for now let's stick to the planning of Neuve Chapelle.

I don't know the actual answer to the question: "Why did P&W make this change?" from "I hoped to…" to "I [hope]…" One answer is that Sheffield and Bourne made a mistake in the transcription process. Thus "I hoped to…" is not actually correct and it was appropriate for P&W to use "[hope]" in place of the true original. I am double-checking this possibility. It should be noted, however, that I have concerns about the change based on other examples from P&W, which I will come to later.

Assuming that the original text reads as quoted in Sheffield and Bourne, the use of "[hope]" could just be a mistake on the part of P&W. Perhaps the original text was difficult to read (which I am checking) or was transcribed by P&W in such a way that "[hope]" had to be used because the transcription was not completely clear after it was made. Both types of error would be regrettable but would not detract significantly from the academic process, given that both secondary sources quote the relevant reference to the original primary source, enabling us to check.

There is another possibility. P&W made the change deliberately for another purpose. If "I hope to" is correct then the change to "[hope]" does not, IMHO, seem to change the meaning of the original. This could mean that the change was made for dramatic effect. Support for this interpretation comes from the context in which the Haig quote is made. First, P&W state: "Haig ordered Rawlinson to develop proposals… adding [their Haig quote]". This creates the automatic impression that Haig added the statement about timeline in his conversation with Rawlinson. P&W then follow up with: "This unrealistic timetable indicated how much the commanders still had to learn." In this context, "[hope]" draws attention to the idea that Haig was unrealistic. From an academic perspective, it cannot be asserted that Haig was presenting an "unrealistic" timetable. Furthermore, it cannot be deduced that commanders still had much to learn based on the quote.

It is perfectly acceptable for an academic/s to propose an interpretation based on various deductions. In an academic publication, however, it is important that the interpretation is clearly labelled as such and that the means of deducing the interpretation are laid bare. P&W have made an assertion that is not supported by the evidence provided – Haig may have wanted simply to impose a timeline on Rawlinson's response for example.

As noted previously, this can all seem a bit trivial (or may even seem extremely pedantic in a pejorative sense). From an academic perspective, it rings very loud alarm bells about the academic rigour of the rest of the work. There is no question that P&W researched Rawlinson extensively, using a wide range of sources. The question is around how they analysed the research and presented their findings.

I will continue the focus on P&W's account of the Neuve Chapelle planning process.

To other readers of this thread (should any still exist), this deep dive is very specific for the moment but, as I hope will become clear, is part of a much bigger issue relating to the original question that was posed at the beginning of the thread.

Robert

Prior and Wilson (P&W) resume with details of the planning process for the Battle of Neuve Chapelle on p. 25:

"Rawlinson's response to his first directive [from Haig on 6 February presumably but this is not clear] to produce a plan of attack was somewhat odd. He did not attempt to come up with an outline plan himself, but passed the whole problem to his two divisional commanders. One of them, General Capper, did not (as far as can be discovered) respond. But General Davies, in charge of 8 Division, did produce a 'Memorandum on the Attack of Neuve Chapelle'. Rawlinson deemed it 'well and carefully worked out'…"

P&W reference IV Corps War Diary Jan-Feb 1915 (WO95/707) as the reference for the 'Memorandum on the Attack of Neuve Chapelle'. This primary source links the memorandum to a note from the GOC 8th Division, which commences:

"(1.) Herewith Division and Brigade Operation Orders and other papers in connection with the scheme for the attack on NEUVE CHAPELLE."

The memorandum itself is undated but the note is clearly dated 25/1/15, which is 13 days before the request from Haig. The memorandum actually relates to "[IV] ARMY CORPS OPERATION ORDERS" issued by Rawlinson on 20th January 1915. The Operation Orders was titled "THE ATTACK OF NEUVE CHAPELLE" and opened with the following order:

"1. The 8th Division will commence their arrangements for the attack of NEUVE CHAPELLE on January 25th, 1915."

P&W either did not realise that the time sequence was incorrect or they did realise. If the latter is true then P&W misrepresented the information. This could explain why there is a lack of definition around Rawlinson's 'very first directive' and the precise relationship with Haig's request of 6 February. Furthermore, this time sequence clearly undermines the statement that '[The] unrealistic timetable [seemingly provided by Haig on 6 February] indicated how much the commanders still had to learn'. There was a planning process already underway. Either way, further doubt is cast on the academic rigour applied by P&W: the research was either sloppy; or there was a deliberate attempt to misrepresent the primary sources. With regards to the former, mistakes happen. If such mistakes recur frequently, however, then doubt will increase over the veracity of the academic endeavour, though perhaps not to the same degree as if there is deliberate misrepresentation.

P&W then go on to note that, having praised the memorandum from General Davies:

"[Rawlinson's] actions belie this judgement. He rejected each of [the memorandum's] principal aspects. So where Davies proposed a series of sapping operations, Rawlinson substituted what he called 'bombard and storm', whereby the enemy trenches would be pounded by artillery after which the infantry would overwhelm them on a broad front. Rawlinson made it clear that a decisive predominance of artillery would be needed:

[Quoting Rawlinson:] 'An undertaking such as that which is under consideration depends for its success almost entirely on the correct and efficient employment of the artillery. It is primarily an artillery operation and if the artillery cannot crush and demoralise the enemy's infantry by their fire effect the enterprise will not succeed.'

This was highly prescient. Indeed in these few remarks Rawlinson indicated the principal feature of battles on the Western Front during the next four years. What remained to be seen, on this and subsequent occasions, was whether principle and practice would march hand in hand."

The description "highly prescient" suggests that Rawlinson had foresight of something that was hitherto unknown. As noted previously, the Field Service Regulations stated:

"5. Field artillery… is to assist the infantry in every way in establishing a superiority of fire over the enemy.

6. Howitzers… can continue firing until the infantry has almost reached its objective.

8. Heavy artillery is… to support the assault by fire converging on the most important points.

9. Siege artillery brigades may be allotted to the field army for special duties in connection with fortress operations."

I have left in the reference to siege artillery because the full context of the memorandum and Rawlinson's response shows that Davies presented an interpretation that Neuve Chapelle was a 'fortress' and therefore required a fortress operation in order to capture it. Rawlinson argued that Neuve Chapelle was not a fortress and, therefore, went on to describe the general approach to an operation against an entrenched opponent not in a fortress.

Six days before Rawlinson wrote his critique of Davies' memorandum, IV Corps had received 'MEMORANDUM ON ARTILLERY ORGANIZATION IN ARMY CORPS' on 19 January 1915. This was issued by GHQ and noted:

"3. If [a Corps-level] attack is contemplated it will be necessary to concentrate the fire of the heavy guns of both divisions on the portion of the enemy's line singled out to be attacked."

It is interesting to note, in light of our earlier discussion on the evolution of BEF artillery command and control that the memorandum then says:

"For this purpose a Corps Artillery Commander with a Staff Captain and sufficient means of communication are necessary."

It should be further noted that the GHQ memorandum is in the same section of IV Corps War Diary, only a few pages before the memorandum from Davies. The document was, therefore, readily accessible to P&W.

The principles of fortress operations were applied to many major attacks on the Western Front too. The Battle of Messines is one of the best known.

Robert

P&W continue:

"Apart from the method to be employed, Rawlinson did not here set forth any particular plan for the Neuve Chapelle operation. Yet from Haig's point of view it was becoming urgently necessary that one reach him. For on 8 February a new factor had entered the situation. Sir John French requested that his two Army commanders, Haig and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, provide plans for offensive operations. Haig was no doubt anxious that such operations should be conducted on his front rather than on that of Smith-Dorrien's Second Army. Yet Smith-Dorrien could propose an attack of considerable tactical importance, namely the capture of the Wytschaete-Messines Ridge. Against this, the storming of an insignificant village in order to straighten the line might well seem not worthy of consideration.

Haig's first step, therefore, was to increase the scope of Rawlinson's operation so as to include objectives whose capture, it might seem, would have far-reaching consequences."

Sir John French's request was contained in a letter from CGS Robertson, received by Haig's First Army on 9 February and stating:

"The Field-Marshal… desires me to transmit for your information and necessary action the enclosed appreciation of the situation, dated 8th instant, together with a Memorandum (Appendix A) on the possibility of undertaking offensive operations. No doubt the operations referred to in the papers have already been considered by you, and therefore it is hoped that your proposals will be rendered without much delay."

No specific date was specified. The first of the two attachments was 'Appreciation of the Situation, 8th February, 1915'. I won't quote the full contents, as it runs to several pages. It describes a number of limitations on the BEF and then notes:

"10. Thus limited, the question arises what steps we ought to take now in order to deal with a determined attack made by a force of three Corps in addition to the hostile troops now in our front.

11. It does not seem we can make any material improvement in our present general disposition."

Thus the primary focus of GHQ was in planning to defend a major German assault.

Appendix A then went on to note:

"1. Although we are for this moment acting on the defensive it is necessary that we should be prepared to undertake offensive measures; and in considering them we must realise the conditions of warfare in which we are now engaged.

2. A stage has been reached in which the principles of fortress warfare rather than those of field warfare apply."

The appendix makes the explicit assumption "…that we concentrate our energies on one portion of the enemy's front" based on "…what portion we are at best tactical advantage" and "…what advantages we should gain in this respect if the enemy is driven our of his position".

GHQ then analysed the two major options available: an attack on the Volaines plateau, which included the vicinity of Neuve Chapelle; and an attack on the Wytschaete-Messines ridge. Both were considered difficult but it is crucial to note that the scope of the objectives for an operation directed at Volaines plateau were not determined by Haig trying to outdo Smith-Dorrien. GHQ recognised that "…no material French advance can take place here unless the Volaines plateau and La Bassee are captured." Operation success would be to "…deny the enemy the use of the La Bassee-Lille road", which could be observed from Aubers ridge.

Haig replied to Robertson on 12 February and then again on 16 February. The 12 February response addressed the key issue of arrangements for any attack on the BEF. The 16 February response stated "…I am of the opinion that the best line would be from Neuve Chapelle to about La Cordonnerie Farm. The first objective would be Neuve Chapelle village and in the further advance would be towards the Bois de Biez and Aubers village." This proposal was entirely consistent with the operational objectives set out by GHQ for an attack in this sector.

The GHQ documents and Haig's response were all available to P&W.

Robert