"Waterloo was 'irrelevant' (?!?)" Topic

Hi all,

I am seeing this opinion appear in a number of specialist studies of the period. For example:
link

link

The argument is that, even had Napoleon defeated Wellington at Waterloo, and subsequently crushed the Prussians, he'd *inevitably* have been defeated by the Austrians and Russians, who were on the march westwards.

Is this a fair assessment? Was Napoleon 'inevitably' doomed? Was Waterloo therefore 'irrelevant'?

Any account which does not place sufficient weight on something like "Legitimacy" is inadequate, at least. That is, with or without Napoleon or some other charismatic "Sword" to be First Consul, or Emperor, or Chef even, nevertheless the Absolute Monarchies of Europe, and the Oligarchy of Britain, would have fought against all the ideals of the Revolution to the last peasant they could shove into the field. Alexander saw Napoleon as "the force of the Revolution concentrated in one person", and that is a constant and inescapable "substrate" to the whole period.
In other words, Waterloo was as irrelevant as Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, Wagram, Borodino and all the rest of those "fifty pitched battles". Perhaps, among possible events, a decisive victory at the Nile might have changed the history of Europe for the better (according to one political and social position), but that's at the other end of the career.

'What if…' is a rather tough thing to prove. However, the argument that Waterloo might not have changed much is usually based on three things:

1. the strategic balance of power in Western Europe, which was very heavily against Napoleon (no key allies, for example), and growing worse by the day;

2. the presumed unlikelihood that any single member of the coalition would have bailed out or dragged its feet (think of Prussia in 1805), because the front against him had been more or less consistent since 1813; and

3. the precarious state of Napoleon's regime, with active revolts, little money, few troops, and few resources to carry on a lengthy struggle.

Victory might have prolonged things, but it is hard to imagine it leading to a French victory in the war as a whole.

Unless…

If the victory had been decisive – an Austerlitz-type stroke, this changes slightly the calculus. IF the French win decisively, let's say by destroying one or both of the main Allied field armies, and IF Napoleon then asks for a compromise peace, and IF one or more of the allies, rather than face him in the field in the fall, decides to explore this option, then two things from the above pessimistic calculus change.

First, in the short term he has changed the strategic balance against him. If the allies remain resolute, this doesn't matter. But if one or more falter, or are open to overtures?

And second, he buys time – three months at least – to raise troops, arm them, and defend properly the French, Italian, and German frontiers.

So, I think the question is not whether or not a mere French victory changes anything, but whether or not a truly DECISIVE victory does.

As the last of these was 1807 (Wagram in 1809 did not have the same impact), it is extremely unlikely in June 1815. Unlikely, but hardly impossible.

One could make that claim about any number of historic battles. And it would be just as lame.

Mind you, as a wargamer and a military history major, I appreciate Waterloo. But yeah, I can't take it seriously as a historical turning point. By 1815, he'd weakened himself too badly, annoyed too many people and wasn't quite the general of the Glory Years. I can see him parading through Brussels, but I can't imagine him ending his days Emperor of the French and leaving the throne to the King of Rome any time after the fall 1813 campaign.

Waterloo's appeal is the drama. "your mission is to go back in time and persuade Napoleon to be content with the Peace of Tilsit" is not what your publisher wants to hear. Neither is "persuade him to ignore the Russians trading with the British: it doesn't endanger the regime, but losing an army in Russia could." But somewhere in there he started making enemies and losing supporters. A lot of winning is knowing when to leave the table.

Robert, we don't get to replay it, but my guess is that he could have survived the legitimacy thing if that were all it was. Cromwell did, after all. And Bonaparte was acting more and more like one of the club, making himself a hereditary monarch and surrounding himself with a hereditary nobility less and less open to talent. I think in the end it was the lack of any sense that he would rest content at some point, coupled with the self-inflicted destruction of the army his power rested on which did him in. A monarch might put up with a parvenu "Emperor" whose children will have Habsburg blood, but not with the man who keeps deposing monarchs to find thrones for his family. A German or Spanish nationalist might not care who rules the French, but he'll take an interest when that person decides Saragosa and Hamburg are French cities.

Brechtel, over to you.

The more interesting question than what if Napoleon had won at Waterloo, is how did he lose?

Most refights of Waterloo that Ive seen have the allies sent packing.

Whether there was a peace arranged after a french Waterloo victory or whether the allies ground it out with massive casualties, their dedicated purpose to turn back the clock to ancien regime norms was doomed to failure because in order to defeat Napoleon, they had to resort to the very ideology that eventually killed monarchy…Nationalism. *La Marseillaise starts playing*

you forget that the best Prussian units were still on the way to France too, and all nations in Central Europe as well.
Boney was regarded as being a criminal then and almost all Europe was hell bent not to have to wage Boney Wars part 2.
Belle Alliance appeal is drama, yes indeed.

That's at least two comments based on the notion that the Allies' purpose was to reinstate the 1789 regime. Hard to disprove--especially for those who claim it was a silent understanding. But you know, they really didn't push very hard for that back in the First Coalition, and I seem to recall at least two offers which would have left him on the throne in 1813. Only when he rejected those did they move to trying to reinstate the Bourbons.

For me, they didn't mind "turning back the clock" but the objective was to confine France to no more than their often-claimed "natural frontiers" and ideally back to the Louis XIV borders while having a French government they could work with. Mind you, the other could be true. But I don't think it's so obviously so that you just start from there.

*Play "Wacht am Rhein."*

The spreadsheet analysis is weak. Napoleon/France were not doomed due to numbers alone.

However, I would argue that by dawn of June 18, Napoleon was at a huge, possibly terminal, disadvantage. His one mobile army had already been stung, even in victory, and to be decisive on June 18 would be costly.

The French staff had proven ineffective in this campaign. Could that evolve/improve? Certainly. But this had demonstrated to be Napoleon's greatest weakness going forward. Napoleon could deal with numbers – but his advantage was only realizable if what was in his mind could be put into action. In 1815, Napoleon didn't even know where his left wing was on June 15/16…

The battle of June 18 gets far too much attention. The what-if that is more in tune with Napoleon's thinking is what if the campaign commencement had not been bungled, it began on June 14 as planned, and the Nivelles-Namur road was seized. No meeting of Wellington and Blücher prior to battles that didn't occur, no coordination below Brussels, the King is chased from Ghent, and Napoleon has a rapid strategic victory.

In that scenario, France's situation would have been stronger than 1814 except with Davout and a growing army in Paris.

Napoleon was as certain to lose to the Austrians and the Russians later in 1815 like he was certain to lose to them in 1805, 1807, 1809, 1813, etc etc. In fact he thrashed them singly and jointly in every one of those campaigns and only lost after the 1813 armistice because Austria joined in and he had 250,000 men tied up in France getting pulverised by Wellington.

It's a bit like saying Midway wasn't decisive because if the Japanese hadn't been thrashed in 1942, it would have been in 1943 or 1944 or 1945.

Which is all very well, but somebody does has to inflict the requisite decisive thrashing at some point. Nothing in the recent military history of Austria, Prussia and Russia suggests they were the boys to do it.

Prussia sent the B team who had to be rescued by Wellington after three out of four Corps had been soundly thrashed by inferior numbers, a fifth having been sent home having mutinied. In fact, Germany was ripe to fall apart to French advantage – if you did a census of how many German states in 1814 were pro- versus anti-Bonaparte I reckon you'd find there more of the former.

The gorilla in the room in 1813-14 was that away in Spain 250,000 French and pretty well every marshal sent there were getting repeatedly owned in battle by allies who eventually invaded France over the Pyrenees. Take away that example in 1815, presuming the unbeaten Wellington to have lost at Waterloo, and I suspect the resolve of the central European powers, always jelly-like, would have wavered very badly indeed.

I agree with Fred Mills,

There are several IF's, so the probability that Napoleon would come out of a prolonged campaign still on his feet and in power was quite small, but still it was there. Which is why my opinion is that the allied victory at Waterloo was relevant.

A similar case could be made of the German attack through the Ardennes in 1944. The chances of achieving the goal of isolating the forces North of the thrust were quite small, and the chance to turn the campaign even slimmer. However, Eisenhower was of the opinion that it was still possible to lose the war at that stage.

I doubt the 'Monster' could have won, even after defeating Wellington. I think we may have had a different prime minister in 1828, perhaps no Catholic Emancipation Act…a real can of worms!

@robert piepenbrink, For someone who does not agree entirely and absolutely with my every opinion, your analyses were remarkably well argued, and even courteous. I know not how to respond.
(More seriously, Napoleon's having become more and more like "one of the Club" was to some extent a deliberate manoeuvre to "reconcile France with Old Europe", as his institution of the Legion d'Honneur was intended in part to reconcile pre-Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary France. However, although I appreciate that I did not develop the thought about "legitimacy" very much, there's the related matter of what might be termed "example", and what was certainly seen as precedent, not alone in France. The precedent of the American War of Independence showed that a people could successfully defy, and remove, a monarch; to have the example of another country without hereditary rule and with the nominal promise of "la carriere ouverte aux talents" so close to home was – in my view – a threat which the rulers of Europe, and those whose positions in Society depended upon the perpetuation of the existing structure, could not ignore.
1789, 1830, 1848 and 1870 are significant dates in recent French history, approximately a generation apart; the pattern is even more striking when 1815 is seen as the ultimate Counter-Revolution it was.

1805 isn't a good analogy. In 1805 France had the best troops and best generals.
The enemies he faced then had no idea what they were dealing with.

In 1815. The armies marching towards him, had been fighting for almost 4 years in the napoleonic style. They knew who they were dealing with. And Napoleon's army in 1815 was not that of 1805 or even 1812 particularly in the officer corps.
Also the Russians had close to 1 million men in uniform at this point. They didn't need to beat him in a battle, they could just swarm France locusts.

I totally disagree, if Napoleon had beaten the British and chased the bloodied Prussians back to Prussia, he would have found allies in the Belgians, several states such as Wurtemberg and Bavaria had been badly treated by Prussia in particular. Also within a few weeks, the depots in France would have turned out thousands of recruits, the call to arms of the veteran troops to the colours, and the conscriptions ahead of time would have yielded the best part of a million men, these figures are from a french book detailing napoleons preparations and reports of the depots. Years ago we used the book to fight an after waterloo french victory campaign. You also have to realise a defeat would have probably brought the British government down, and the situation in Europe was like refighting WW2 again a month after it ended, the world the people were exhausted and the economies where tottering the will do fight a victorious Napoleon I think wasn't there. With the allies best general and the British government fallen the money dried up, there is no alliance. The reason Napoleon loses Waterloo is the lack of good generals at all levels. With them swearing an oath of allegiance to the bourbons some of his best generals stood back, maybe after fat Louis had fled to Britain after a British defeat was enough to make that act a breach of there oaths and they came to fight for napoleon who knows. Just a little note using the recruitment stats, and the allied armies in the field along with estimated reinforcements the campaign we fought ended in a french Victory but it was close

Counterfactual questions are interesting starting points for arguments, but, because they are counterfactual, nothing can be proven.

the Belgians – at least those I know, dislike Boney plundering Belgium badly and occupying it – the Bavarians were quite well off (the crown prince hated the guts of Boney), the Württemberger would have been mad to join Boney.

Boney lost Belle Alliance because he was out generaled by Wellington and Blücher – France was in a sorrow state thanks to endless wars.

Within few weeks – no need to call up conscripts, the overwhelming forces of Europe would have crushed Boney.

1 236 000 men gathered for the anti-french Coalition occupied France at the summer 1815,
the biggest part of course coming from the Austrian and Russian Armies, and the Prusso-German Armies…and they had also large military reserves behind them,
Wurtemberg, Bavaria…well the former German allies were among the worst brutal allied contingents in France where the prefets faced difficulties to call the National Guard Battalions in their Departments after 23 years of war having exhausted the french peasantry, many units on paper were simply not raised but were formed Royal Volunteers units supporting the Bourbons throughout the country…
very precarious situation for a victorious post-Waterloo Napoleonic France
Napo' had lost most of his "mojo" in 1815…

Point taken, Robert. And I agree that anyone enjoying a hereditary position would have viewed revolutionary France as setting a dangerous precedent. In fact I'm sure many of the nobility would have said something similar about both the United Kingdom and the United Provinces, with their national flags, elections and representative assemblies with the power of the purse.

I'm just saying the forces of reaction hadn't made an all-out effort even against the Republic, and the French Empire was less of a threat to the old social order, while being much more of a geopolitical menace on the model of Louis XIV. I agree that Bonaparte stood little or no chance in 1815: he had too many enemies, too determined, and those enemies had learned something since Austerlitz. But for me he wasn't doomed since 1800 as the embodiment of the Revolution, but since 1808 or 1812 as a man who just couldn't quit while he was ahead. One way, he's a martyr. I see him more as a bad example and warning.

Apart from 1812 all the wars he fought were instigated by others primarily Great Britain, in 1812 he was fighting on two fronts stretching resources for the empire, he should have let Russia be with the continental system until he had dealt with Spain, 1815 was plagued by officers promoted above there ability due to lack of officers, bad staff work, if only one of those had been right he would have beaten the allies. I'm the end 1815 Napoleons campaign was littered with mistakes from Vandamme not getting his orders to advance the morning of the 15th, to the aide send to find Pajol going the long way and delaying Grouchys scouting, As for napoleon being a bad example his regime was better than the bourdons and more liberal in its laws ( still the core of laws in the EU countries today), to religious freedoms to education, property rights etc etc. I say that Napoleon was a genius a man you made modern Europe

Napoleon was defeated by the fact that he could never make peace unless it was strictly on his own terms.

@Glengarry5

I think there you have it. The boy had cried wolf too many times, everyone at the Vienna conference knew any peace overtures Napoleon made were disingenuous. He had only ever regarded peace as preparation time for conquest, and there was no reason to suspect he had changed.

Wellington only accepted battle on the 18th because he was confident of Prussian intervention. If he hadn't we would have seen him tiptoeing behind the Scheldt for a while. The only question was one of timing.

Too soon, as Professor Charles Esdaile theorises in "The Eagle Rejected" would likely have been more problematic for the Allies with an intact French army withdrawing in good order, still capable of mounting strategic operations.

Too late (and they very nearly were!) and although Napoleon may have had his victory, it would not be a crushing one, his exhausted forces facing a minimum of a holding action against Blucher.

It was not the battle that was decisive, but the panic and rout that followed. It set the war weary French on the path to a second restoration, put his subordinates in a similar position to the previous year and himself on the slippery road to abdication. It was ultimately morale and loyalty (or the lack of enough of it) that did for him, not a speadsheet of numbers.

The endeavor was just too fragile

Too soon

I am with Glengary5.

For Napoleon to survive against Allied opposition in 1815 he had to be as good a general as he ever was, but he also had to pursue a much different foreign policy than he had in the past.

@Handlebarbleep

I think there you have it. The boy had cried wolf too many times, everyone at the Vienna conference knew any peace overtures Napoleon made were disingenuous. He had only ever regarded peace as preparation time for conquest, and there was no reason to suspect he had changed.

You're talking about Napoleon like he is some sort outrageous interloper; which is of course the opinion of the larger monarchies of Europe. Only one problem, modern people living in democracies really shouldn't be propping up monarchies like they are legitimate because there not.

Not when they could be working on their spelling and punctuation.

If you preassume an outcome, then it's not hard to convince yourself that everything leading up to it is either irrelevant or inevitable.

The basic problem was Napoleon was fighting an external as well as an internal enemy. High ranking French officers were refusing to serve and in some cases serving but going over to the other side or worse going over but still serving. There is a good book I read that units of the French army were being given "bad" orders and Napoleon was getting incorrect situation reports.

I think that 20+ years of war is what eventually defeated Napoleon.

@gamershs
On the evening of June 15, Napoleon did not know the dispositions of his left. He also did not know that the Prussians had an army gathering at Sombreffe.

In previous debates about 1815, some had said that the decisive victory was no longer possible for Napoleon – the allies had learned too much.

Yet here, the Prussians had concentrated within range of the Armée du Nord – and did so without informing Wellington (they would only send word with confirmation of the French advance.) All the Prussian complaints after the war about the lack of support at Ligny was clearly a CYA over their own failure. Yes, some Allied powers were still capable of being Napoleon's fodder.

Napoleon is surprised, but opportunity! A chance to envelop the Prussians. A decisive victory is possible. He formulates a plan – its mid-afternoon on June 16, but plenty of time!

But the ignorance of his left becomes fatal. Ney doesn't have 40,000 men. d'Erlon was closer to Napoleon than Ney. A victory, but not decisive.

All the spreadsheet analysis about the size of armies is trumped by the absence of Berthier or a competent major-général.

And remember, Soult was in Avesnes on June 12. The critical orders on the concentration of the army, Gérard's progress report from Metz, all were sent to Laon, where Soult was expected. Devastating. If Napoleon was doomed, if Waterloo was irrelevant, this is why.

And in that vein of what ifs, had the major-général been competent, Napoleon dines in Brussels on June 16 and the King is fleeing the continent.

@ Minipigs

"You're talking about Napoleon like he is some sort outrageous interloper; which is of course the opinion of the larger monarchies of Europe. Only one problem, modern people living in democracies really shouldn't be propping up monarchies like they are legitimate because there not."

Democracy and Napoleon? Really? He came to power by force. Twice. He makes Mummar Gadaffi look like a parliamentarian.

Constitutional monarchy is a perfectly legitimate system, that has the advantage of seperating the role of Head of State from that of political leadership. In a parliamentary system where the government can be brought to it's knees by a single vote. As one Prime Minister put it "The people? They can only vote me out every few years, my backbenchers can get rid of me by 10 0'clock tonight!" A constitutional monarch can lend a sense of continuity rather than making affairs of state subject to the whims and dictats of a popularist buffoon that elections may throw up from time to time. In times of national crisis we don't have to hold our noses and accept the reassurances of a political enemy. In the UK we get the benefit of the wisdom of a monarch whose first Prime Minister was Winston Churchill. She can unite us, not in a bipartizan way, but as being above politics altogether.

It is a much more nuanced and sophisticated system than you appear to believe. In the end, since the renunciation of rule by divine right, it has produced much less tyranny than the ballot box. More than one country has selected it, inviting a monarch as Great Britain did in 1714 and Norway in 1905 for example.

I do enjoy Minipigs rants about the evils of monarchies, especially as he appears to have limited practical experience of living under them.

I don't know about Napoleon's longevity as a ruler, it was pretty amazing that he managed to regain power in the first place. I still don't know how he managed to lose at Quatre Bras or Waterloo, when the odds were so greatly in his favour, although a late start on both days of battle gave his opponents time to reinforce. He comes across as arrogant and in not respecting his opponents he came a cropper. If he had won at Waterloo, he could well have been a pain in Europe's arse for quite a few years longer especially if say Wellington had been killed, which could have occurred at several points in proceedings.

Yes, these stuck record repeats of the blind faith position that monarchies are axiomatically a bad thing and somehow incompatible with democracy are quite tiresome to read, and also indicate a really pretty narrow political and historical perspective. Ask many Spanish people what the greatest guarantee of their modern democracy and the greatest constitutional defence against authoritarian rule is, and they will say the restored monarchy. To take one example.

Re Waterloo's relevance or otherwise- I'm with the posters who pointed out that whatever the overall balance of forces it did take real people in real battle to deliver victory- Wellington, Blucher and their soldiers in this case. If the overall balance of forces determined the outcome of all wars- we would now only be reading about Israel as a brief footnote of late 1940s history. So, yes- Waterloo was and is very relevant.

A stunning local victory would no doubt have been a welcome change for France after the preceding few years and may have convinced some to pause but I don't see Napoleon acquiescing to the decisions in Vienna after rejecting an offer in 1813 and I'm sure the Allies would not want twenty years of work go to waste. Not when they're able to secure the futures of most monarchies for a good period of time.

The Armee du Nord would have been much weaker regardless of a victory at Waterloo. Had Britain and Prussia not been in a position to give battle when they did though, Napoleon would have time to establish himself more securely. As it is, Waterloo swiftly destroys the morale of a powerful but fragile army and the self-belief of Napoleon in one blow.

By the way Marmont1814, I don't recall anyone holding a gun to Napoleon's head when he went West, then betrayed his alliance with Spain and usurped the monarchy, turning his Portuguese crudités into an ulcer?

I do enjoy Minipigs rants about the evils of monarchies

I didnt say they were evil. But, whatever, I am pleased you are amused. Perhaps it'll give everyone a little taste of how I feel when I interact with people who can only spit out what they've been fed and cant manage observations of their own. Present company excepted, of course.

especially as he appears to have limited practical experience of living under them.

I have to have

some

I don't know about Napoleon's longevity as a ruler, it was pretty amazing that he managed to regain power in the first place. I still don't know how he managed to lose at Quatre Bras or Waterloo, when the odds were so greatly in his favour, although a late start on both days of battle gave his opponents time to reinforce. He comes across as arrogant and in not respecting his opponents he came a cropper. If he had won at Waterloo, he could well have been a pain in Europe's arse for quite a few years longer especially if say Wellington had been killed, which could have occurred at several points in proceedings.

This has some promise. And a glimpse into the fact that he really should've won, rather than the nationalistic, chest beating that Im often subjected to along the lines of "We all know we beat him and saved the world". If anyone doesn't whole heatedly agree with this viewpoint, they are suspected or accused of having an agenda; whatever that would be. But it does illustrate that those who have an extreme fanaticism against Napoleon appear to assume anyone who isn't on board have exactly the opposite, charged opinion. Try and consider that many of us don't.

As a wargamer, I wouldve been interested to see the war go on for several more years. Think of all the scenarios generated.

MiniPigs, "the fact that he really should've won" can be interpreted in several ways:

1. That on past performance, and the strategic situation, it seemed more likely than not that he would win might be a reasonable assessment, though surely open to debate, not a 'fact' but an opinion, that – like any prediction – may prove to be incorrect.

2. That he deserved to win, but was somehow 'cheated' of victory, rather like a football team that has dominated the game but failed to score losing on a penalty shoot-out, by a controversial piece of refereeing or downright cheating like Maradona's 'hand of God' that was not spotted. The first two are opinions; the last example is a fact.

3. That it was morally preferable/more desirable that he should win are surely matters of opinion.

I have my opinions about 1 and 3; I regard 2 as irrelevant to warfare.

Which one are you claiming is a 'fact'?

Your final comment reminds me of a cartoon years ago in, IIRC, Punch showing Napoleon and his staff retreating through heavy snow, obviously from Moscow. Napoleon is saying, "True, as a campaign it's been a disaster, but it'll make a wonderful boardgame!"

@Minipigs

I've lived in a country with a monarchy all my life. They really have minimal power and have held minimal power since the 18th century. My main issue with the royal family (when I think about them at all) is that they cost too much money, don't really do anything and there are too many of them.

As to nationalist chest beating, I don't know really. I don't dislike the French and have no strong feelings about the outcome of a battle over 200 years ago. I don't think a world with Napoleon in power was any worse than the alternative. But I also don't see him as the forefather of a modern Europe, he seemed to be much more interested in replacing the European ruling elite with hand picked members of his own family than in creating a new world order.

I'm not sure I'd be happy to see any war go on for longer in order to satisfy the requirements of a bunch of wargamers but I know what you mean, it was an interesting time.

There's a difference between "Monarchy" and "Heriditary Monarchy" (though I appreciate that they tend to go together). A Heriditary monarchy is the apex-stone on the vast pyramid making up a Society, and I belong to the Polloi, the many, the Mob which these types expect to rule over, and be supported financially by, for generation after generation. That's a general statement of principle, quite independent of the period 1793-1814+15.
Just because many in Spain found Juan Carlos preferable to Franco is not in itself a persuasive argument for a monarchy. It just means one fat, privileged waster was better than another fat, privileged destroyer.

One of the advantages the French had at the beginnings of the Napoleonic Wars was a strong sense of Nationalism that was lacking in many of the central European states such as Austria and Prussia. By Waterloo, this advantage had gone. German nationalism was a major force, and a French victory at Waterloo would not have destroyed this. Sooner or later, it would have ensured a another war, and one which would have been won by the greater wealth and larger manpower. Remember thanks to her navy, Britain was invulnerable on her island and would have continued to payroll her European allies.

Agreed, and I would add that in the early years of Consulate and Empire the contrast between life under the Bourbons and life under Napoleon was demonstrably better for many. I don't think anyone would dispute that, and introduce a digression (by the way, robert piepenbrink, I agree with your point re. Monarchies, 7 June 3-52; in earlier post, I deliberately distinguished the British Oligarchy from the Absolute Monarchs, a minor point tangential to the discussion re. Waterloo and after).

With regard to the matter of Nationalism, specifically of how its power in motivating the populace was recognised by at least some politicians at the time, there's a revealing speech by Sheridan, in Westminster, concerning the Peninsular War (which Spaniards will call The War of Liberation). I haven't the text, but the immediately apparent meaning is that this patriotic emotion can be exploited with advantage. I wish I had the text – maybe someone has better Internet access than I – because I remember that this meaning is couched in language so ironically evasive that Sheridan is making sure that it can't be said he actually approves of such a popular impulse in any absolute sense. German Nationalism harnessed in ensuring the destruction of the French Empire contrasts with Polish Nationalism resisting Prussia (and Russia, and Austria).
By the way, patriotic songs certainly played their part, from Marseilles to the Rhine and beyond, and it might be of interest to know that Clausewitz himself contributed at least one. I don't know whether it were as popular as Korner, or whether it destroyed the audience's will to hear.

Hansard, June 15th, 1808.
There are a number of long speeches.

@arthur1815 and Newarch

I meant that the campaign was Napoleon's to lose. Also that the reason we study the campaign is that it is intriguing that he did in fact lose and not that Wellington and Bluecher "showed" him who was boss. That is the mood I get here sometimes that a handful have adopted the passions of those times as their own. Which is fine to do but they shouldn't attempt to dragoon everyone else into that cult-like approach.

I know you two arent like this but it is more than a bit sad to see a few pretend to have an intellectual approach to this topic but only because "We all know who beat Napoleon" an ideology exposed when someone engages in counter factual speculation which triggers outrage along the lines of "Well Napoleon lost, any other thought is ridiculous". It could be that I am posting among a literalist, clerical mindset but it often seems more like I am stepping on the lion's tail; dusty and moth eaten as it has become.

Napoleon made a lot of mistakes but those arent reasons to justify disliking him. In any case, I only see the Napoleonic wars as fodder for wargaming with almost zero passion, except that it wouldve been interesting to see the wars go on…for scenario sake.

The campaign was Napoleon's to lose.

Excellent analysis, MP, especially the following comments:

That is the mood I get here sometimes that a handful have adopted the passions of those times as their own. Which is fine to do but they shouldn't attempt to dragoon everyone else into that cult-like approach.

…it is more than a bit sad to see a few pretend to have an intellectual approach to this topic but only because "We all know who beat Napoleon" an ideology exposed when someone engages in counter factual speculation which triggers outrage along the lines of "Well Napoleon lost, any other thought is ridiculous".

@MiniPigs & Brechtel198
A very intriguing scenario to play – The French begin the campaign on June 14 using the Charleroi plan. This plan was bungled by the French leading to a June 15 start and the center column overloaded as Vandamme had been moved there in accordance to the Mons plan – that was a mistake. The French army would begin several hours farther south.

The Allied armies begin in their historical dispositions.

I have done this numerous times – I have found no way the Allies prevent Napoleon's goals. As documented in many works, the notification of the French advance as well as the distribution of orders for Prussian concentration were both slower than expected – even if these are allowed to be optimal, nothing prevents the French from seizing the Nivelles-Namur road.

I receive a lot of hostility for my analysis. On June 14, I'll be revealing yet another recent new discovery which I am sure will off some even more… it is absolutely true that the Waterloo mythology is so strong that when it is threatened, even with primary source documentation, the reaction is often hostile.

Then keep your powder dry, Sir!
I look forward keenly to the verbal skirmishing, redeployments and rearguard actions which will follow these releases. It's not as if there's an "agreed-upon" narrative in this case, no account which is anything like universally accepted, so there might even be a wave of desertions.

The thought about "adopt[ing] the passions…" &c. is a good one; the passion with which one writer holds a view might be regarded as "obsession" by some, and "enthusiasm" by others (modern sense, rather than the rather less positive eighteenth-century one). But that's all part of other potential debates.

Hi Brechtel. I wondered what had happened to you.

@Robert le Diable

I agree that passion is to be encouraged. I just dont like other people's passion getting rolled up and applied across my snout as if it is some disciplinary approach to history.

Thus, I think it's great when some of the lads call Napoleon "Boney" or "The Monster". indeed, that type of play acting is to be encouraged. I just dont want to be accused of bias when I refuse to play their little reindeer games.

@Stephen Beckett

I believe the Duke wouldve said, "Publish and be damned!"

Hi MP,

I've been doing some work on the American Revolution board regarding the Continental Army and the American militia.

Stephen Beckett;
I would be interested in the Dispositions you discuss for the Charleroi plan. I have never looked at the two plans in detail, just the conceptual, and the various posts you have been putting out this year were all new info to me for some of the same reasons- I never looked in depth at the history of the beginning of the campaign. Now I am intrigued! Is there somewhere I can go to find this or is it something you have at hand? I would like set up a gaming scenario that puts the French where they would have been had Berthier not taken a nose dive (aided or not) out an upper story window, and Soult been managing one of the Army wings and Grouchy commanding the cavalry.

The boy had cried wolf too many times, everyone at the Vienna conference knew any peace overtures Napoleon made were disingenuous. He had only ever regarded peace as preparation time for conquest, and there was no reason to suspect he had changed.

Please explain why Napoleon's offer of peace to the allies was ‘disingenuous.' Is there any evidence that Napoleon wanted to go to war in 1815? I haven't seen any and I've been studying the period since 1964.

The idea that Napoleon launched wars of aggression repeatedly is not supported by the record. War was declared against him in 1815, the British were the first to break the Treaty of Amiens in 1803, Austria and Russia attacked the French and their allies in 1805, Prussia declared war in 1806 with Russia joining in which finally resulted in Tilsit. You can make a case for Portugal, Spain and Russia, but that is also debatable. Most of Napoleon's wars were defensive in nature, even though as a good commander he always strove to get in the first hit.

Wellington only accepted battle on the 18th because he was confident of Prussian intervention. If he hadn't we would have seen him tiptoeing behind the Scheldt for a while. The only question was one of timing.

If the Prussians had retired to Liege after being beaten at Ligny, Wellington would have withdrawn quickly to Brussels and beyond. That isn't ‘tiptoeing.' And there was no guarantee that Blucher would support Wellington at Mont St Jean. And it was Gneisenau that made the decision to move to Wellington's support as Blucher was still suffering from his fall from his horse and being run over.

…as Professor Charles Esdaile theorises in "The Eagle Rejected" would likely have been more problematic for the Allies with an intact French army withdrawing in good order, still capable of mounting strategic operations.

The Eagle Rejected is not a book I would recommend as a reference or resource as it is very biased

Too late (and they very nearly were!) and although Napoleon may have had his victory, it would not be a crushing one, his exhausted forces facing a minimum of a holding action against Blucher.

And Grouchy was still in the field and undefeated. The ideas that the war was over because of Waterloo and that the French could not have won in 1815 fails to take into account the preparations Napoleon undertook before he invaded Belgium. He planned for a long war which included manpower. He planned to have 800,000 men under arms by October. If Wellington and Blucher had been defeated, the Austrians and Russians may not have continued fighting.

It was not the battle that was decisive, but the panic and rout that followed. It set the war weary French on the path to a second restoration, put his subordinates in a similar position to the previous year and himself on the slippery road to abdication. It was ultimately morale and loyalty (or the lack of enough of it) that did for him, not a speadsheet of numbers.

The Armee du Nord soon rallied and was joined by Grouchy's command. Gneisenau's famous ‘pursuit' after Waterloo was generally ineffective or overrated as he went after stragglers and formed units or those that were rallying were left alone.

Democracy and Napoleon? Really? He came to power by force. Twice. He makes Mummar Gadaffi look like a parliamentarian.

Perhaps you could point out where ‘democracy' was being practiced during the period in Europe or the Americas? The United States was not a democracy, but a constitutional republic. Great Britain was not a democracy and the parliamentary ‘system' then was corrupt with pocket boroughs and the like. Napoleon was a constitutional monarch after being crowned Emperor of the French. Judging the governmental systems of the late 18th and early 19th centuries by early 21st century ‘norms' is not only disingenuous but ahistorical. It looks to me that you are taking the Corelli Barnett approach to Napoleon, his government, and his method of governing. Comparing him to a murderous dictator is not only inaccurate in the extreme, but ludicrous.

Constitutional monarchy is a perfectly legitimate system, that has the advantage of seperating the role of Head of State from that of political leadership. In a parliamentary system where the government can be brought to it's knees by a single vote. As one Prime Minister put it "The people? They can only vote me out every few years, my backbenchers can get rid of me by 10 0'clock tonight!" A constitutional monarch can lend a sense of continuity rather than making affairs of state subject to the whims and dictats of a popularist buffoon that elections may throw up from time to time. In times of national crisis we don't have to hold our noses and accept the reassurances of a political enemy. In the UK we get the benefit of the wisdom of a monarch whose first Prime Minister was Winston Churchill. She can unite us, not in a bipartizan way, but as being above politics altogether.

Are you not describing the British political system as it is today? What was it in ca 1800? And a constitutional monarchy, by definition, is a government where the monarch rules/reigns with a constitution, written or unwritten. And that is what Napoleon was. The French had a written constitution under the Consulate and Empire.

There is a dichotomy in the argument that Napoleon was the foremost general of the age and that he should've won at Waterloo, was that he didn't.

Repeated refights by amateurs result in a counter factual Napoleonic victory, which throws up the following possible conclusions:

1. Hindsight is a really a much more powerful tool than we think

2. Generalship is really more difficult than we suppose, with a heftier portion of dumb luck rather than genius.

3. Our simulations are faulty, and perhaps all those modifiers for being elite are so much hogwash and more the reflection of our romantic biases than reality.

4. Losing generals tend to massage the truth rather than indulge in honest retrospection. Victors tend to trade on the glory so have little appetite for their own failings either.

5. Just like anthropromorphism makes people on the internet transpose their own feelings on the actions of cats, we are just as likely to project our own passions and national
prejudices onto caricatures of historical figures.

6. All of the above, and probably some others.

@Brechtel198

Yes I was indulging in describing a modern constitutional monarch, but that was only because MP made a comparison to 'modern people'.

There are, however some flaws in the argument you put forward.

1. Napoleon came to power for the first time in a military backed coup

2. He came to power for the second time at the head of an invading army

3. He was a nepotist

4. It is difficult to claim the protection of a constitutional status, if you dictated it yourself from a military powerbase.

5. He was dynastical

The parallels with M. Gadaffi have certain touch points, in that they were both popularist military figures that came to power at the point of a bayonet. They both engineered plebiscites. They both dictated their nation's constitution. They both appointed themselves for life. They both claimed to be adored by their people.

You are right there are some major differences though. One of them did not go around invading his neighbours and putting his family members on their thrones or creating one for them. One of them did not seek to dominate the economy of an entire continent. One of them did not take part in a sustained conflict so large that it was called "The Great War" for a century.

OK, Gadaffi was pretty murderous, but if we could ask the ghosts of the prisoners of Acre they would probably lay the same charge at Napoleon.

You are correct, modern notions of democracy were pretty nascent at this time so it would be unfair to judge political systems by them. But as I pointed out, I wasn't seeking to do that, MP made the point that no modern person should be a monarchist which I thought needed answering.

It is worth pointing out that Britain's monarchy at this point was not an absolute one, and their dynasty was invited to ascend the throne and did not come to power by force.

Napoleon is a complex character, but if you place what are seen by many as his numerous positive qualities into the balance, you also have to weigh in the negatives as well. I don't hate Napoleon, just try to see him for what he was, divorced from the afterglow of his own shining star.

Where does that put us in regards to this thread? That we struggle to understand the 100 days if we cannot get past this genius view of Napoleon. It is a heavy enough mantle for the modern mythical Napoleon to wear, an impossible one for the real Napoleon in that muddy field on that fateful Sunday afternoon.