"Sickles at Gettysburg: The Controversial Civil War..." Topic

…. General Who Committed Murder, Abandoned Little Round Top, and Declared Himself the Hero of Gettysburg.

"No individual who fought at Gettysburg was more controversial, both personally and professionally, than Major General Daniel E. Sickles. By 1863, Sickles was notorious as a disgraced former Congressman who murdered his wife's lover on the streets of Washington and used America's first temporary insanity defense to escape justice. With his political career in ruins, Sickles used his connections with President Lincoln to obtain a prominent command in the Army of the Potomac's Third Corps—despite having no military experience. At Gettysburg, he openly disobeyed orders in one of the most controversial decisions in military history.

No single action dictated the battlefield strategies of George Meade and Robert E. Lee more than Sickles' unauthorized advance to the Peach Orchard, and the mythic defense of Little Round Top might have occurred quite differently were it not for General Sickles. Fighting heroically, Sickles lost his leg on the field and thereafter worked to remove General Meade from command of the army. Sickles spent the remainder of his checkered life declaring himself the true hero of Gettysburg.

Although he nearly lost the battle, Sickles was one of the earliest guardians of the battlefield when he returned to Congress, created Gettysburg National Military Park, and helped preserve the field for future generations. But Dan Sickles was never far from scandal. He was eventually removed from the New York Monument Commission and nearly went to jail for misappropriation of funds…."
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Amicalement
Armand

I recommend the book "American Scoundrel" by Thomas Keneally. Read the book and you will discover that Sickles was way worse than you thought he was before getting the whole story.

I recall that after he killed his wife's lover, he took her back into the marriage. Shortly thereafter, she committed suicide.

GdeP

Best thing I heard was a Union officer who said of Sickles wounding at Gettysburg that "it's bad news for Sickles, but good news for the Union".

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Sickles is very under rated and much blamed, If he had stayed in the dip he would have been shot to pieces by artillery.
He did talk about moving the night before with Meade, who told him if you do that let me know i'll support you with V Corps. This action is what I have based my armies on.
Having walked the ground three times and measured the distances.
A lot what ifs have been over looked.
I think it was the best move of the battle, if looked at it in unbiased eyes.
P.S. I play Johnny Rebs being from the midlands of the UK, we totally dislke London and Parliament!!
Long live the KING :)

Sickles was the only non-West Point corps commander at Gettysburg. Considering that he lost his Corps and it took @40,000 Union troops to stop 20,000 Confederates, I am not sure saying his corps would have been shot to pieces if he'd stayed.

Considering Lee's plan, Longstreet wouldn't have had anyone to attack if Sickle hadn't moved so he did have something to outflank and crush.

He did talk about moving the night before with Meade, who told him if you do that let me know i'll support you with V Corps.

If that is true, Sickles didn't move until @ 2pm the next day, after sending several messages asking to make that move, which supposedly he 'already' had permission to carry out.

There is a reason that, even after losing his leg, he hightailed it to Washington to tell 'his story'. He had moved without orders and lost his entire corps.

Sickles was the only non-West Point corps commander at Gettysburg.

It was less that Sickles was not West Point educated and more that Sickles was Sickles. Plus Sickles probably had a high opinion of his judgment in the aftermath of Chancellorsville.

Bill N:

Well, true. Sickles always had a high opinion of his own judgement. I only mention that all the rest of the corps commanders and Meade were West Point graduates because he wasn't part of the club--didn't speak their language, and in comparison, didn't have the military background and education.

His advance disrupted the confederate plan and diverted their attack toward the meat of the union army, rather than around their flank, which would have been fatal. Go walk the ground, he would have been shot to pieces if he had stayed back and the union flank would have crumbled. He basically did a "spoiling attack" by being advanced and in the way of the confedrate's deployment. ….. Besides, he is a real cad and I admire him for it.

His advance disrupted the confederate plan and diverted their attack toward the meat of the union army,

1968billsfan:

I have walked the ground. Sickles was shot to pieces anyway--he lost his corps. Sickles would have 'disrupted' Lee's plan of attack far more if he'd stayed in place. The Confederates would have formed up to attack empty ground. He ablidgingly moved to the very spot they were planning to attack all along.

Sickles didn't plan a 'spoiling attack', nor would it have been necessary if he'd remained in place where the Union reserves, both artillery and infantry corps were in close proximity--and in position to support his original deployment. He knew that. As it was, it required 40,000 Union troops in uncoorordinated scrambling to stop 20,000 Confederates. The Union Army was nearly 'outflanked' as it was, because of Sickle's deployment. Sickles certainly was.

The Confederate plan and deployment met the circumstances Sickles provided…even though Lee had such poor intelligence that he developed a plan to attack parallel to Emittsburg road where--until Sickle moved, there were NO Union troops. In response to Sickles' move, the Union Army was forced to scramble to save the situation, if not Sickle's III corps. Meade said as much when he saw Sickles advance.

If Sickle's position in line on the ridge/gap between the II Corps and Little Round Top was such an artillery- vulnerable spot on the Emmittsburg Pike high ground Sickle thought critical, which was in Confederate hands on the 3rd Day, why did they attack in the middle of the line?

It would have been fascinating to see Longstreet attempt to 'save' Lee's original plan to attack empty terrain, when Longstreet refused to change the Lee's plan at all against Sickles, even with Hood begging to move to the left up Round Top.

Yes, Lee's intelligence reports on July 2nd were terribly flawed. He had no idea III Corps was even present, let alone in the position where it was originally. His attack plan called for Longstreet to deploy astride the Emittsburg Road with Hood to the east and McLaws to the west of it and both divisions aimed to move northeast against Cemetery Hill. That would have brought Hood's right flank directly across the front of III Corps. All Sickles would have had to do was say: "Forward, March!" and he could have rolled Hood's line up.

Micheal Priest, in his recent book, found evidence of the skirmish on Seminary Ridge which started FAR earlier then we have known. His latest information puts the fight at 9 AM which is huge considering the the many books published about Sickles and what he did. It sheds a better light on what Sickles did and his concerns.

His latest information puts the fight at 9 AM which is huge considering the the many books published about Sickles and what he did. It sheds a better light on what Sickles did and his concerns.

In what way?

That is interesting Scott. What is the name of the book.

What Scott said is exactly right! See "Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg -- and Why it Failed" by Tom Carhart. (or my own "Gettysburg and Lee's Escape to Virginia")

Sorry I meant to say d Effinger what was the name of the book?

The title is:

"Stand to It and Give Them Hell": Gettysburg as the Soldiers Experienced it From Cemetery Ridge to Little Round Top, July 2, 1863

It changes the whole time line for the fight on the Union Left. Now… Sickles is in the depression between Cemetery Ridge and the Emmittsburg Rd. He hasn't moved yet. The skirmish on Seminary ridge started and uncovered the arrival of Anderson's Div. THIS alerts Sickles that he isn't able to defend that depression especially without knowing completely what is out there. He learned a valuable lesson at Chancellorsville when he was ordered to give up Hazel Grove. Pulling back to lower ground was a fiasco. He saw the same thing all over again. He took the initiative to move back to the higher ground at the Peach Orchard.Lacking additional input or the situation in front of him.

Its easy to criticize him for this action but we are judging him for not knowing what we know today. His skirmishers only found out that there were Confederates moving into position in his front. No one at Army HQ knew this. There was no cav picketing in his front. Buford and his cav already left for Emmittsburg. They left well before the skirmish. The cav never knew the Rebs were around. It was quiet when they headed south.

I was lucky to speak to Priest about this. It turns the whole time line thing upside down. He assured me he had documentation to back it up. Look at his footnotes. He stands by it and I have to believe it. So…you either believe it or follow what you were told previously. It's a good read! :)

BTW… read his book on Pickett's Charge. Spoiler alert… He has new stuff in that book as well! It's a good read! :)

THIS alerts Sickles that he isn't able to defend that depression especially without knowing completely what is out there.

I certainly agree that we need to know what he and the army knew at the moment, not through 150 years of hindsight. However:

?Meaning that he [and Meade] didn't realize this 'depression' was difficult to defend until Anderson shows up?

No one at Army HQ knew this.

Noting the lack of communication between Sickle and Meade, or Hancock on his immediate right, I'd say this is
an odd absence indicating a failure Sickles' part, and probably Meade's too. Sickles and Meade did not get along. Actually, Sickle didn't get a long with a good portion of the Corps commanders.

Tactically, if you look at the map or walk the battlefield, the most defensible positions, at higher elevations, ones that keep the Union line intact, ones that would not have required the same frontage that Sickles' actual position did [overlapping Hancocks'],ones close to Sickles' orignially ordered position, the line that was finally defended and held anyway, would have been better tactically in most all ways.

Keep in mind that Sickles advanced without orders, in violation of his current orders, and did not inform Meade until after the fact.

Those are known facts. I am sure Sickles had his reasons for his advance, as well as his reasons for hightailing it back to Washington after losing his leg and entire Corps while the battle still raged, talking to every Congressman he could about his brilliant maneuver.

"I certainly agree that we need to know what he and the army knew at the moment, not through 150 years of hindsight"

----Agreed

?Meaning that he [and Meade] didn't realize this 'depression' was difficult to defend until Anderson shows up?

---Remember that the 3rd Corps arrived in the middle of the night to the battlefield. They camped where they 'stopped', not in any assigned location via higher orders.

--around dawn the 12th corps left their assigned position just NORTH of Little Round Top. In the morning, Sickles received orders to take the position where the 12 corps held the night before. He had a vague idea where it was but nothing in his orders made any specific reference to exactly where it might be. Only approximates. Sickles went to Army HQ for better instructions and Meade blew him off with further vague orders as what to the position was.

---Now lets take a moment to wind the clock back to July first, early in the morning. A courier racing to Meade brought the word that Reynolds had been killed. When Sickles stopped the courier be found out what had happened and was in a quandary. His direct orders from Meade was to guard Emmitsburg with the 3rd corps until further orders. A day or two earlier Meade had a 'moment' with Sickles about what Meade thought was a slow march with too many stragglers. He ripped into Sickles. So on July 1st Sickles was torn… obey order from HQ or march to the sound of the guns and support the 1st Corps there? Sickles chose to split the difference and leave 2 brigades at Emmittburg and head north to the brewing fight. In the history of the Army of the Potomac… How many Generals actually did that?! Certainly Slocum did nothing of the kind on July 1st.

So getting back to July 2… Meade was NOT the biggest Sickles fan. Meade should have been more clear exactly what Sickles assignment would be. To be fair Meade was more concerned about the Northern front, not down south. Sickles road back and sent out skirmishers which was a wise move considering the trouble that the 3rd corps went through to get to the battlefield. They got lost without a guide. They ran into Rebs in the dark. So we are caught up.

"Noting the lack of communication between Sickle and Meade, or Hancock on his immediate right, I'd say this is
an odd absence indicating a failure Sickles' part, and probably Meade's too. Sickles and Meade did not get along. Actually, Sickle didn't get a long with a good portion of the Corps commanders."

----Agreed

"Tactically, if you look at the map or walk the battlefield, the most defensible positions, at higher elevations, ones that keep the Union line intact, ones that would not have required the same frontage that Sickles' actual position did [overlapping Hancocks'],ones close to Sickles' orignially ordered position, the line that was finally defended and held anyway, would have been better tactically in most all ways."

----Well I don't think Sickles line would have held the low ground at the end of Cemetery Ridge. I HAVE walked it a million times since 1965. That wasn't very good ground apart from Little Round Top and even that isn't fabulous. Any break through would have been disastrous for the Army.

"Keep in mind that Sickles advanced without orders, in violation of his current orders, and did not inform Meade until after the fact."

-----Agreed but with the knowledge of Rebs in a place which even Meade was unaware, Meade's hatred for Sickles, Sickles experience at Hazel Grove 2 months ago and Meade's concern for the North and east… you could cut him slack. We know what happened later in the afternoon but he didn't know that.

"as well as his reasons for hightailing it back to Washington after losing his leg and entire Corps while the battle still raged, talking to every Congressman he could about his brilliant maneuver.

---To be fair he had his leg torn off, went into shock and his staff made the final decision to take the opportunity to hop on a ride on the train that was right at the right spot at that moment.

----we know he was a glory hound so… nuff said there. ;)

If Sickles wanted good ground to DEFEND then he would have been far better off moving back a couple of hundred yards to to Little Round Top and the ridge that ran north from it down toward the II Corps line.

But that ground in which you speak is lower than the ground that the Rebs would have had to cross. PLUS there would have been areas of tree belts in which would have shielded the Rebs from fire until they were within charge range. Certainly not the case with Little Round top but everywhere else. Hancock's 2nd corps had good LOS though.

so exactly where was sickles when he started his move forward? I always just assumed Basically following the park road from the PA Monument to somewhere near Little round top?

But that ground in which you speak is lower than the ground that the Rebs would have had to cross. PLUS there would have been areas of tree belts in which would have shielded the Rebs from fire until they were within charge range. Certainly not the case with Little Round top but everywhere else.

d effinger:

Thank you for the detailed analysis. We do agree on several points. there is the sticking point about terrain

The whole argument for Sickles' move is that the ground he chose was the best defensive ground from Emmittsburg east… not the ground he originally held, not the ground from II Corps across the the round tops.

1. That ground between the II Corps and the Round Tops is the ground where the 2nd day assault was stopped, and the line that was held on the 3rd day. In comparison, the open high ground in front of Anderson's brigades was breached.

A good portion of the Round Tops line is higher ground than the surrounding terrain, as Scott points out.

2. The same tree cover on the Round Tops was seen on Culp's Hill and the surrounding area. The Union decided to defend there and was successful, even with the poor LOS.

The woods hindered the South too. In fact it is the reason that Hood's supporting 2 brigades failed to remain aliegned with Laws and Robertson. Semmes also was found himself coming out of the woods in the wrong place. There were woods across a good portion of Birney's left flank,, so the presence of trees isn't a determiner here.

The whole argument for Sickles' move is that the ground he chose was the best defensive ground from Emmittsburg east… not the ground he originally held, not the ground around the round tops.

If his move was so tactically sound, why did he feel the need to spread HIS version so aggressively, so quickly? For someone who just lost a leg, he got around Capitol Hill spryly from July 4th to the 9th.

Having a good eye for terrain is a critical skill for an officer, but in this case I don't see a convincing argument that the gound Sickles chose was superior to other choices, which would not have required the Union to scramble to 'save the situation.'