"Did ancient or medieval warriors “substitute” in and out" Topic

… of combat?

Interesting thread here…

"Some claim that in archery, horse archery, or hand-to-hand combat, a warrior could function effectively for at most 2-3 minutes. Therefore, frontline troops, archers, or horse archers would substitute out of combat after 2-3 minutes of intense action, a la the line change in ice hockey.

Is there any historical proof for this? More specifically, how long could a longbowman sustain fire in combat if ammunition was freely available? Would this be different for a horse archer?

The Romans apparently had a system in place for this, but I interested in knowing whether this was widespread…"
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Amicalement
Armand

If soldiers are fighting shoulder to shoulder, how does this happen without disrupting formations? Maybe for light troops in a looser grouping. All in all, I doubt it.

It is clear that lance armed nobles, who brought retainers with them, would enter combat and if the lance were broken or lost they would retire to get another and reenter the fight…this was true into the late Renaissance period. I doubt formations of foot could do the same for the already stated impact on the formation.

The Byzantine tactical manuals mention a drill where part of a mounted formation would ride up, shoot at the target and then retire. This was repeated with other parts of the mounted formation taking turns doing the same. T

he Parthians at Carrhae brought extra arrows on pack animals. When the horse archers ran out of arrows they retired to the pack animals and replenished their supply of arrows.

I just read the chapter on the battle of Delium in J.E.Lendon's Song of Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins. He's trying to explain how a hoplite battle works, something I've certainly wondered about. He suggests there is evidence that lines, or even small sections of lines, would fall back a meter or so, where they could still threaten each other with their spears and yet take a breather.

I suspect any sort of shieldwall formation (like a phalanx) would serve to decrease the exertion on the part of the individual warrior, whose comrades defended him from some attacks.
Here on TMP, it has been pointed out by re-enactors that you can use thrusting weapons in shieldwall, but not slashing weapons. When a Viking wants to attack with his two handed ax, he has to push forward through his own shieldwall before he can start swinging, giving the guys behind him a brief rest.

Not exactly formalized, doctrinal answers, more an explanation of how physically intense combat might go on for a prolonged period.

Grelber

The descriptions I've read it's assumed that after 5-10 minutes both sides would fall back, this would give the opportunity to change any soldiers who were tired. But you weren't necessarily safe, during the times were throwing spears were used this would be a time when those that weren't thrown at the start would start to fly again. Viking formations usually had archers in the back line, if the lines pulled back to far, I assume the archers would fire again.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

I believe there are Roman reports of gaulish warriors attacking in 2 waves so that as the 2nd wave hit the first could fall back enough to bend their inferior swords back to straight.

Robert

Oldnorthstate….I nave never read/heard of such a thing as a medieval practice. Also, the guys who brought retainers….the retainers were either men-at-arms who served beside the boss or they were infantry who got folded into the rest of the infantry.

Crossbowmen did that in some cases, due to long loading times, from what I've read.

Other times, they would just turn their backs to their opponents, while wearing a pavise on their back in some cases. Still other times, the pavise could be staked into the ground, instead.

There are many accounts of Crusaders riding back and having the arrows of the enemy cut off their chainmail as they resembled porcupines and the arrows hindered their movement.

There was obviously necessity AND trust in allowing troops to retire when needed on their own volition.

I believe the Byzantines (much later Romans?) used such practices during medieval times (prior to mid 900's) by keeping their heavy foot in the center. My understanding is the center formation (above foot) would hold back while the armies mounted wings maneuvered and attacked; if they faltered they could retire and recoup behind the center foot.

I'm going to throw in a basic "it depends".
On training – if you haven't been taught it is going to be hard
On situation – if one side starts breaking the other side quickly then there may be no opportunity, or only for a few units not as heavily engaged and:
On terrain – fighting on something very restrictive like a bridge or fortification may mean that only one side has a place to "retire to" out of combat.

You may want to investigate "battles at barriers" for the middle ages. In the middle of a siege you have barriers place outside gates, so a quick force can't get in, an fights take place over/through the barrier. Not implying this was decisive battle in any way but definitely in the "I'm bored and want to hit someone" and do so until tired/ agreed time or such. Then let the rest of the boys play.

I've got some thoughts on the group dynamics involved here from my experience with medieval re-enactment fighting in the SCA.

My main observation is that while the anaerobic effort involved for those at the sharp end absolutely does limit the tempo of prolonged fighting, situational awareness and unit cohesion do so to a similar degree, and so a rotation of combatants within a group occurs fairly naturally over the cycle of hand-to-hand combat.

The nearer the enemy and the more chaotic the situation, the more threats there are to keep track of, to the point where the ability for each individual to process them all is overwhelmed. The presence of comrades beside you helps block off some of those threat angles, lessening the individual burden, while also putting more pressure back on your opponents in return. This is where cohesion is key, as a line in which every person takes one step forward both applies and resists much more collective pressure than one in which every other person takes two steps forward!

The more heavily two groups are engaged, the fiercer the fighting, but more intense fighting quickly burns out because of the disorientation and disruption it causes the individuals and groups involved. Even putting casualties aside, people will be knocked back or down, will shift in one direction or another, breaking up the formations. Those fighters initially engaged will have to reorient and regroup with their comrades, otherwise they will be defeated by a group of opponents who have done so more quickly. Even the victors of a given clash can use up much of their momentum and awareness in the process and become very vulnerable to a counter-charge by previously unengaged fighters who weren't disrupted by the initial clash.

This means the fighting will tend towards an equilibrium, as isolated individuals who are threatened by a group will either be defeated or withdraw to the relative safety of their own group. Swirling melees can happen if both groups get really disrupted, but they last about as long as it takes someone to be unengaged long enough to reorient and find a buddy.

Although the above is based on competitive re-enactment, I'd expect "live" (i.e. deadly) hand-to-hand combat to consist of comparatively even more of this back-and-forth than what I do because of the real danger. There are plenty of historical units that balked at charges or withdrew from positions without a fight. When I "die" I'll have to sit out for a couple minutes and go drink some water, and maybe I'll wince at the bruises later around the campfire when we're recounting the day's exploits.

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As for the specific physical act of substituting one fighter for another, it is fairly straightforward to step into or out of the front line while keeping your guard up. A formation too compact for you to do this in will also generally be too compact for individuals to change their facing or motion easily, so isn't desirable except right at the moment of contact when momentum is key. Your replacement won't always directly take over your place, it's usually easier for your comrades on either side to shift over slightly to close the gap between them while someone else steps in farther down. This happens all the time without being planned as the frontage of the line changes based on the terrain and situation, so fighters will be shuffled back and forth in the formation.

The only time a substitution isn't really feasible is when one group or the other is pressing forward in unison. The most powerful thing on the field is a whole unit that steps forward together, because it ramps up the pressure across the whole front. If your side is going forward, it isn't hard to drop back out of the fight, but doing so removes your pressure from the advance. If you are already going backward but are still being engaged, you're in a very dangerous situation because you can't effectively disengage until you stop the opponent from following up, and are likely about to be pinned against the ranks behind you.

Training, motivation, and communication at low levels are going to be the big factors in this happening smoothly. It's much easier to fight with folks I know, because we have the same foundation of skills and can identify each other by armor and heraldry. Also, we all want to be there, so someone is going to be happy to step up to take my place and get to swing. In a historical army with less cohesion and initiative, that process is going to be much more sporadic, and you can see it some of the mass armies where officers have to exhort units to engage, while elite forces can defeat more numerous foes because not only are they individually more capable, they're also achieving local parity or superiority.

I havent read on troop rotation in medieval battles, with one exception. My guess is that the lack of drill opportunities meant that most units werent accustomed to it.

The exception is the battle of Sant'Egidio (1416). Michael Mallett describes it in "Mercenaries and Their Masters". According to him, Braccio da Montone had his cavalry attack in smalls squadrons which would rotate to be able to rest. This was one of the factors that contributed to his victory in the battlefield.