"Influence of Napoleon on Civil War Tactics and Strategy" Topic

" At the onset of the American Civil war both North and South scrambled to establish powerful armies to support their causes. The military leaders on both sides, however, all shared the same basic military training as well as the basic concept of how an army should be built and how a war should be fought. The military training as well as tactics of the civil war was geared towards emulating the grand armies created by Napoleon.

The campaigns of Napoleon formed the bases of formal military education through out the western world. At the start of the civil war European observers were anxious to see to what extent the American campaigns would conform to the accepted doctrines of Napoleonic warfare.(1) All of the military thinking of the day was influenced by Napoleon. These lessons learned from the "Great Corsican" were relayed through the writings of Antoine Henri Jominie. Through his writings an emphasis was put on the Napoleonic strategy. Keenly aware of the dominance of French military arms many civil war leaders looked back to the Napoleonic method of wagging war for enlightenment. Through 23 years of war the French army became the world's model of a fighting machine. Through the study of the tactics, training, and even mistakes of Napoleon it was hoped that a copy of the "Grande Armee" could be recreated in America.(2) In West point the writings of Jomini were used as a textbook through Henry W. Halleck's "Elements of Military Art and Science", which was essentially a translation of Jomini. As the curriculum at West Point leaned in the direction of engineering, mathematics, fortifications and administration most cadets absorbed this text, as it was the only resource on military strategy. Today many of these tactics seem to be common sense, their application was so universal. These tactics were such concepts as, concentrate a mass of your own fore against a fraction of our enemy, menace the enemy's communications while protecting your own, attack the enemy's weak point with your own strength. These rules seem to echo the strategy and execution of Sherman's great march for "Salt water."…"
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Amicalement
Armand

It is often, and accurately, said that the generals always fight the last war. That's because they don't have any other point of reference. History is linear. The rifled musket, and the Minnie ball, were brand new. First Manassas was fought with smooth bore muskets, for the most part.

Trouble is, when the effective range of a musket changed from 60 yards to 250 yards, nobody adapted their tactics. Infantry should have routinely fought in skirmish order. But instead they maintained shoulder to shoulder 2-deep linear formations, resulting in astounding casualties.

How they kept that up for four years is beyond me.

You routinely hear about Generals using Napoleonic tactics. However, if you look at an ACW battlefield it would have baffled Napoleon. The use of cavalry and artillery was completely different from his day. And very rarely did anyone fight in column.

As for fighting shoulder to shoulder, that was more a function of the slow rate of fire rather than stupidity.

I will say, my hat is off to the bravery of a ACW soldier.

Haven't heard N referred to quite so consistently as "the Great Corsican". Overall, the article would have benefitted from some accurate proof-reading, and there's a misunderstanding of "skirmishers" ( as distinct from a "screen" of cavalry patrols). And, with regard to Generals always being prepared for the PREVIOUS war, I think it was Terry Pratchett who made a suggestion, effectively, that when the Greeks and Trojans went to war again each side lined up with a dozen wooden horses….

Artillery.
* 12lber minimum size
* Breach-loaders
* Shrapnel shells
* Plentiful ammunition (delivered ex-railhead)

* Massive armies (delivered ex-railhead)
* Massive armies (supplied ex-railhead)

General Bonaparte would have loved it.

Sorry, but the article is riddled with inaccuracies. Napoleon invented the idea of the flanking attack? Uh, no, I think it was developed a bit before him :)

And it also contains the tired old saw about the vast improvement in accuracy of the rifle-musket making linear tactics obsolete. Sorry, that just isn't true. It wasn't accuracy that was critical, it was rate of fire. Most ACW weapons were still single-shot muzzle-loaders with a rate of fire the same as the smoothbores. Linear tactics in the Civil War worked just fine. It wasn't until the the universal adoption of breechloading rifles that the old tactics failed.

From what I gather, the rifle musket's impact on Civil War combat was not nearly as great as I had initially thought. With well-trained soldiers, the rifle muskets does make a significant improvement in accuracy, but the soldiers of the Civil War were relatively poorly-trained. With armies composed almost entirely of poorly-trained soldiers, there was little difference with the new weapon.

Many of the generals on both sides had studied Napoleon at West Point. I think they soon learned that tactics had to change with technology. I'd guess that the battles at the end of the war looked different than the battles at the beginning of the war.

USAFPilot, you might be wrong :) Clearly the increased use of entrenchments in the second half of the war changed the situation significantly. But when the armies were fighting outside of fortifications they mostly used the same tactics they did at the start of the war. I did my master's thesis on that very topic and I searched through the reports in the Official Records trying to find if the tactics did change and after examining thousands of reports, I concluded that they really did not. Sadly, the vast majority of reports don't make much mention of specific tactics (they were probably so routine that the reporting officers felt no need to make any mention of them) but in the cases where they do mention the tactics, they seem to be very much 'by-the-book' tactics you would find on the parade ground. As late as Saylor's Creek, just days before Lee surrendered there are examples of battalions advancing in columns of divisions. In one Novemeber 1864 action near Petersburg a Union regiment formed a square when threatened by Confederate cavalry.

I agree with Scott. The sieges carried out by ACW forces are pretty much the same as the sieges carried out by Napoleonic forces, only without photographs.

Same siege methods and techniques for the same reasons
Same reasons for carrying out sieges

Thanks for your educated answer. I was indeed thinking about trenches in the later part of the war when I guessed that things had changed with tactics.

The big tech changes as I see it from Napoleon to Grant were 1) mass transportation in the form of rail 2) mass communication in the form of telegraph 3) and overall mass industrialization which brings replaceable parts, bigger and better weapons etc.

Earl Hess, in Civil War Infantry Tactics (2015), talks about the increased use of skirmishers as the war went on.

Skirmishing properly requires well trained and disciplined men. It is not just a bunch of guys running around in front of the main lines. So yes, as the war went on and the troops gained experience you see more skirmishers in use. However, with single shot muzzle-loaders, a skirmish line (which had about 1/10th the density of a close order line of battle) can neither hold nor seize a position against formed troops unless there is some sort of terrain advantage like dense forest (or entrenchments).

Scott:

While true about the needed training of skirmishers, designated companies were designated for skirmishers fairly early in the war.

The Vermont Brigade regiments threw out skirmishers at the Battle of Lee's Mill April of 1862. Rosecrans in December of 1862, according to Stevenson in his book Stone's River, dedicated an entire brigade to skirmishing on the right at the beginning of the battle--a prelude to his planned attack. Skirmishers were deployed by the CSA during the Second Day and Pickett's Charge.

In fact, I have a difficult time thinking of a ACW battle that didn't find skirmishers deployed with the possible exception of 1st Bull Run and other 1861 battles.

That doesn't mean they were effective or well-trained, but they were sent out, in numbers at time.

This is what Sherman had to say about ACW combat:

Very few of the battles in which I have participated were fought as described in European text-books, viz., in great masses, in perfect order, manoeuvring by corps, divisions, and brigades.

We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines, taking advantage of the shape of ground, and o every cover. We were generally the assailants, and in wooded and broken countries the "defensive" had a positive advantage over us, for they were always ready, had cover, and always knew the ground to their immediate front; whereas, we, their assailants, had to grope our way over unknown ground, and generally found a cleared field or prepared entanglements that held us for a time under a close and withering fire.

Rarely did the opposing lines in compact order come into actual contact, but when, as a Peach-Tree Creek and Atlanta, the lines did become commingled, the men fought individually in every possible style, more frequently with the musket clubbed than with the bayonet, and in some instances the men clinched like wrestlers, and went to the ground together. Europeans frequently criticized our war, because we did not always take full advantage of victory; the true reason was, that habitually the woods served as a screen, and we often did not realize the fact that our enemy had retreated till he was already miles away and was again intrenched, having left a mere skirmish-line to cover the movement, in turn to fall back to the new position.

It is an important point lost to many contemporary authors, that when you in 1861 talked about Napoleonic tactics, you were referring to Napoleon III. His army who had just won at Solferino was the model people was emulating – just look at all the Zouaves. The french tactical concept at that time was the bayonet rush as opposed to the prolonged firefighting. It worked against the austrians – with Rifle muskets – at Solferino, but when the austrians copied it in 1866 against the prussian fire dotrine enhanced by breechloading rifles.

From about 1745 and forth unprepared shock attacks against an enemy with good morale fails or results in unacceptable casualties. This was the experience of Frederick at Prague and Kolin and holds true in the Napoleonic wars, the ACW and the francoprussian war, regardless of whether the defender has muskets, rifle muskets or breechloading rifles.

In the Napoleonic wars the attrition phase of the combat, which in the SYW was mainly linear firefights, was to a large degree replaced by skimrishing and artillery. A lot of the early ACW tactics degraded into linear firefights a la the seven years war, but with lower casualties than that war, and only towards the end did "Napoleonic I" skirmishing as the attritional part of an attack come into effect – such as the Atlanta campaign.

The ACW is in my opinion one of the most misrepresented periods in the historical litterature, due to the majority of the (american) authors lack of knowledge of all the other major wars on european soil before and after…..

In the Napoleonic wars the attrition phase of the combat, which in the SYW was mainly linear firefights, was to a large degree replaced by skimrishing and artillery. A lot of the early ACW tactics degraded into linear firefights a la the seven years war, but with lower casualties than that war, and only towards the end did "Napoleonic I" skirmishing as the attritional part of an attack come into effect – such as the Atlanta campaign.

Sparta:

There is some misrepresentation with the ACW as a transitional war, but I don't think 'Napoleonic I' skirmishing only appeared at the end of the war… that 'attritional' aspect appeared earlier, depending on how you characterize it…but for intent, it was there.

Little things are overlooked concerning Napoleon III influences. For instance, little is made of the main infantry 'manual' for the war, Hardee's [and then Casey's copy] "Light Infantry Manual."

When I mean attritional I did not mean in the long term effect, more in the way that Clauzewitz divided combat into the destructive and the decisive phase. Napoleonic I style combat, with effective softening of the enemy by skirmishers and artillery was present in the ACW, but the linear approach taken by most commanders precluded the full development of a decisive phase. We see some use of the "force frappe" concept in cases such as Uptons column, but otherwise most attacks were completely linear even preceeding Fredericks oblique system in their antiquated approach.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Infantry should have routinely fought in skirmish order. But instead they maintained shoulder to shoulder 2-deep linear formations, resulting in astounding casualties.

I would think that one of the main reasons -- perhaps THE main reason -- for shoulder-to-shoulder formations was (wait for it): command and control. How do you control and maneuver even a few hundred men (let alone thousands) on a noisy battlefield (and, yes, often in heavily wooded terrain) in an era that never heard of radios?

Infantry should have routinely fought in skirmish order. But instead they maintained shoulder to shoulder 2-deep linear formations, resulting in astounding casualties.

General W.T. Sherman: "We were generally in a wooded country, and, though our lines were deployed according to tactics, the men generally fought in strong skirmish-lines,…"

or shoulder-to-shoulder formations was (wait for it): command and control. How do you control and maneuver even a few hundred men (let alone thousands) on a noisy battlefield (and, yes, often in heavily wooded terrain) in an era that never heard of radios?

Don:

The basic method for commanding and controlling an infantry formation of any size was carefully explained in just about every infantry manual of the time in detail. It isn't like this was some unknown or unsolved issue for ACW officers. The same method for moving skirmish lines what used for moving brigades and even divisions: The guiding or directing file, battalion or brigade.

Command and control was indeed one of the key factors which required close-order formations. This is something I have studied in depth both through readings and from practical experience maneuvering large bodies of reenactors.

At the time of the ACW the basic tactical unit was the battalion (regiment). Army commanders decided how to deploy their corps, corps commanders decided how to deploy their divisions, divisions commanders decided how to deploy their brigades, brigade commanders decided how to deploy their battalions, and battalion commanders decided what formations to use for their battalion, but that's where the chain of decision-making stopped. Company commanders were not making any decisions. The role of their companies within the battalion were strictly defined by the tactics regulations. When a colonel gave an order to the battalion, the company commanders were there to make sure their company did what the colonel wanted. Line officers (captains and lieutenants) were not trained to make tactical decisions. They were not trained to act independently. Even when deployed as skirmishers, their role was strictly defined on how to operate--usually in direct support of the battalion.

There were always exceptions, but the bottom line was that the only way for the commanders to maintain control was to keep their men within earshot. This called for close-order formations. And yes, when moving through thick woods, formations would tend to open up, but upon halting the men would quickly reform.

After the Franco-Prussian War where it became evident that in the face of breech loading rifles the formations HAD to spread out, the armies of the world spent the next 40 years in intense debate on how to do this and still maintain control. They reluctantly concluded that the chain of decision-making had to descend one more step--to the company. It took the horror of the First World War to bring it down to the platoon and eventually the squad.

But during the Civil War it was still the battalion, and the tactics reflected that. And for the most part the tactics worked very well. They did not result in 'mass slaughter on the battlefield'.

The last war for all the generals in the ACW was the Mexican American war, not the Napoleonic wars. Many if not most of them fought in it as junior officers.

That is absolutely correct. Well done.

There were always exceptions, but the bottom line was that the only way for the commanders to maintain control was to keep their men within earshot.

My point in a nutshell! Excellent explanation, Scott.

I agree with USAF in regards to the studies of the Generals. They did study Napoleonic tactics since the war was only a few decades before they were in college.
They cut their war teeth during the Mexican-American war where the tactics used was still Napoleonic American War of 1812 were used.
The Crimean War exposed the Colonels as they were, with limited information on ‘modern' sieges.
Tactics do change as a war rages over time. It did in the Civil war and it did during World War Two. The American training in the 1930s changed after a few actual battles. The Louisiana Exercises were massive and showed a style of combat that would not be effective.
The same in the Civil War, for example the Confederates used more effective cavalry tactics and weapons but Union tactics improved later.

There were always exceptions, but the bottom line was that the only way for the commanders to maintain control was to keep their men within earshot.

It depends on what that actually means. When a commanding officer, whether of a skirmish line, battalion, a brigade, or a division gave an order, the order given to the directing file or unit by voice and then that order would be repeated down the line by all officers:

Here is the 1861 Infantry Tactics, vol. 3 by General Scott.

1716: In this instruction, a line of eight battalions, making a corps d'armee of two divisions or four brigades, will be supposed; but the rules herein prescribed are equally applicable to the brigade, a division, or any number of battalions.

1729: When the general shall wish to cause a movement to be executed, he will give the general commands relative thereto. Each colonel will always successively repeat, with the greatest rapidity, on their reaching him, those general commands, unless the general has given or sent to him, an order to the contrary.
1730: The colonels having repeated the general commands, as just prescribed, will immediately command, and cause to be executed, without waiting for each other, the preparatory movements which, in their battalions, out to precede the execution of the general movement.
1731: The brigadier and major generals will look to the prompt execution of the preparatory movements in their brigades and divisions, and rectify any error that may be committed by the colonels.
1732: The final command, or that which determines the execution of the general movement, will always be given by the general.
1733 The lieutentant colonels and majors will repeat the general commands, whether of caution or of execution, as often as the wind or the noise of arms may prevent those commands from being easily heard from one battalion to another.
1734 When, from any cause, a colonel shall not have heard the general command, he will, on seeing the battalion next to his own executing a movement, immediately cause his battalion to execute the same movement.**

This is the primary method of command from the SYW through to the 1880s and beyond. There is a preparatory command, then the command to execute, both being repeated down the line.

It was by voice, but not just the commander's voice and the same system was used for skirmish lines. Every manual including the 1793 French regulations, British regulations etc. through Hardee and Casey to Upton's Tactics contain the very same instructions for command control.

**This was understood to mean the battalion commander looks in the direction of the regulating battalion, left or right to be guided on the actions of the battalion next to him which is nearest to the directing battalion. So when French General Foy says that a 600 man battalion is about the size limit where all men can still hear the commands of the colonel, keep in mind it is within this larger command relay structure.

The ACW rifled musket was different from the smoothbore Napoleonic weapon is several significant ways. First, it used a percussion cap rather than a flintlock pan. Fewer misfires and a soldier could shoot better because he did not have the delayed pan flash in his face. Second, the minie ball had a flange at its base that caught the rifling. Besides the accuracy factor, it made the weapon more self-cleaning and more rounds could be fired before the weapon became fouled. Third, the rifled musket was more accurate within 100 yards and had sights on the barrel. …. The rifled musket did have a lower muzzle velocity compared to the round ball but this did not hurt 0 -100 yard accuracy because the RM bullet drop was not significant. Fourth, the rifled musket projectile had a much better weight to diameter ratio so it could travel 100-200 yards with aimed fire that would hit, by using ranged sights. A roundball is horrible for ballistic co-efficient, minimum mass for diameter, so it slowed down quickly and the acceleration of gravity made it fall to the ground quickly. Rememeber if you do trap or skeet shooting with smaller round shot, that you can safely shoot 150 yards away from people- the shot can not go that far…. …. The big changes in tactics was to go from a dense double line to a strong skirmish line. There would be a lot of empty space for enemy bullets to land and the soldiers would take advantage of any terrain/swales for cover…. Another was to pack multiple ranks in entrenchments where the rear 2-4 ranks could pass up loaded muskets to give continuous dense defensive fire. ….. More flexible formations than napoleonic line tactics.

McLaddie, very true, but note that all that's happening in your example is that the the command of the decision-making officer is being relayed down the chain of command so that everyone hears it. No new decisions are being made at any stage.

McLaddie, very true, but note that all that's happening in your example is that the the command of the decision-making officer is being relayed down the chain of command so that everyone hears it. No new decisions are being made at any stage.

Yep, wasn't suggesting otherwise. Just that command was more than hearing one man's voice for large bodies of men, and that the issues of controlling and moving those large bodies of men in the noise of battle had been addressed.

I was referring to how you control a battalion, not large units.

the Confederates used more effective cavalry tactics and weapons but Union tactics improved later.

It wasn't tactics or weapons that made the Confederate cavalry superior in the early years, it was their superior horsemanship (and maybe better horses) – for the most part, the Union cavalry had better weapons.

I was referring to how you control a battalion, not large units.

The method was the same for battalions and companies and as I said, skirmish lines. Simplicity, simplicity. That is why Wellington could say he learned who to move armies while a company camptain. I can provide some parts of the regs from Hardee, Scott, Casey as well as Napoleonic regulations.

+1 1968 Billsfan

Balck ("Infantry Tactics") pointed out the superiority of the French Chassepot in long range fire compared to the Prussian Dreyse. The key IMO was not the ability or inability of the infantryman to hit a specific target with individually aimed fire; it was the density of the cone of fire delivered by the unit as a whole.

B

I believe that the difference in ballistics between a Napoleonic musket and the ACW rifled musket is being over-stated. While the ACW percussion system ignites the main charge faster, the number of misfires is actually higher not lower. One reason was in the earlier Springfield model 1861 (Or the Virginia model as well), the vent was not straight like the Enfield or a flintlock, but in an "L" manner. The later Springfield model corrected this flaw. Additionally, the vent gets plugged much easier with a cap ignition than with a flintlock type of ignition. Any reenactor will know that if you want consistent ignition, you carry a vent prick on your person to constantly clean out the nipple. Plus, most reenactors also use a special nipple that is drilled out to help with misfires.

Other issues with ballistics are that the minie ball when cast is not always balanced, and many targets that I've seen show the minie ball hit the target sideways, meaning the minie ball becomes unbalanced in flight and tumbles erratically. For target shooting, ALL the shooters I know use and recommend a patched round ball with an ACW rifled musket for accuracy.

If you can get special minie balls that are pressed, and can file down imperfections, the minie ball is more reliable, but that's not what any soldier would typically do, unless they were a sharpshooter.

While the ACW rifled muskets had a form of grooves for rifling, these were not anywhere as deep as a rifle from WW1 or 2, and I've yet to see a contemporary minie ball showing the grooving (maybe you have, or others). It's my belief (and I would need a detailed study to prove of course) is that the minie ball was not spinning anywhere like a modern slug, and only modestly more accurate.

The size of the minie ball is larger, and the minie ball being .57" in a .58 or .577 barrel would produce more pressure in the barrel than say a Charlesville being .69 and firing a .662 round ball. The effect on the enemy solider would be probably greater with a larger mass hitting (depending on range) at a slightly higher velocity. However, the size of the minie ball also meant that it dropped more than a smaller round ball, and the flight of the minie would not be anywhere close to flat.

With the massive amount of smoke, even if the ACW rifled musket has a modest gain in accuracy, it would be hard for any soldier to see how they were shooting in a firing line and adjust. Thus, the end effect was not decisive.

I've seen a number of books mention the vast casualties from an ACW battle, and conclude that the rifled musket was responsible. While the casualties were greater than previous American war experiences, the percentage or the absolute numbers were not in any way greater than the European war experience. For example, nearly 50% of the Russians and 33% of the Prussians fell at Zorndorf, and as Duffy noted, Torgau was like a "German" Chancellorsville with both sides losing vast numbers.

The Napoleonic and SYW musket was quite lethal, and we've seen on pages here at TMP that firing could take place well outside of 300m.

While I do agree that the advancement of the minie ball was overall slightly better than the smoothbore it replaced, it was not a revolutionary advancement.

The method was the same for battalions and companies and as I said, skirmish lines.

True enough, for all of these, control was by voice -- IF you could be heard!

The lack of rifling grooves appearing on the body of a minie bullet was due to the fact that it was the expanding cup at the rear of the projectile that engaged the rifling.

Any dispute regarding the fundamental ballistics and accuracy of a spherical smoothbore projectile versus a Minie bullet can be settled by a review of the results of the extensive tests undertaken by the Union Army in 1860. A complete reproduction of the original report can be found in "The Rifled Musket" by Claud Fuller.

Target 10ft x 10ft

Volley Fire – 5 volleys by 10 men (50 shots total)
RM Cal .58 // SB Cal.69 // SB Cal .69 (ball + 3 buckshot
100 yards – – – – – 48 hits // 37 hits // 36+79
200 yards – – – – – 32 hits // 18 hits // 18+31
300 yards – – – – – 23 hits // 7 hits
500 yards – – – – – 12 hits

Fire by File – 5 shots by 10 men (50 shots total)
RM Cal .58 // SB Cal.69 // SB Cal .69 (ball + 3 buckshot
100 yards – – – – – 50 hits // 38 hits // 35+82 hits
200 yards – – – – – 37 hits // 20 hits // 22+23 hits
300 yards – – – – – 29 hits // 9 hits
500 yards – – – – – 19 hits

Skirmisher Fire – 5 shots by 10 men (50 shots total)
RM Cal .58 // SB Cal.69 // SB Cal .69 (ball + 3 buckshot
100 yards – – – – – 50 hits // 48 hits // 31+84 hits
200 yards – – – – – 41 hits // 24 hits // 20+19 hits
300 yards – – – – – 29 hits // 7 hits
500 yards – – – – – 21 hits

Assuming that the 10x10ft targets reasonably reflect relative hit densities at the various ranges, comparison of the density patterns of the Rifled Musket versus the Smoothbore Musket firing a single ball indicates –

Volley Fire
100 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~1.3x denser.
200 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~1.8x denser.
300 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~3.3x denser.
500 yards – Rifled Musket = Smoothbore effect @ ~250 yards.

Fire by File
100 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~1.3x denser.
200 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~1.9x denser.
300 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~3.2x denser.
500 yards – Rifled Musket = Smoothbore effect @ ~200 yards.

Skirmisher Fire
100 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~Even
200 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~1.7x denser.
300 yards – Rifled Musket pattern is ~4.1x denser.
500 yards – Rifled Musket = Smoothbore effect @ ~200 yards.

Worth thinking about. Unless we are discussing snipers or trained marksmen, individual marksmanship in a typical infantry unit was, broadly speaking, irrelevant; it was the overall density pattern of the unit's fire that dictated enemy casualty rates.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

The lack of rifling grooves appearing on the body of a minie bullet was due to the fact that it was the expanding cup at the rear of the projectile that engaged the rifling.

There was no expanding cup in the Burton bullet used during the ACW (let's keep it simple and not include the Williams "Cleaner" Bullets or the British-made Pritchett Bullets that were issued in far smaller quantities). The bullet's hollow base allowed the main body of the bullet to expand into the rifling so the contact was directly between the lead and the bore so the rifling grooves would have been imprinted onto the bullet. When soft lead bullets that have been fired hit anything, including the ground, they distort considerably making it difficult to see these groove imprints, which are very shallow in the first place. A lot of bullets retrieved from battlefields have been dropped on the ground and not fired. Anything that still looks bullet-shaped has probably not been fired out of a rifle.

Additionally, most .577, .58 and 0.69 rifles used during the Civil War had progressive-depth rifling. The grooves were 15 thousandths of an inch deep at the breech, reducing to 5 thousandths of an inch at the muzzle. This was very effective indeed for accuracy, the bullet, when the rifle was fired, initially expanding into the deeper grooves at the breech and being gradually squeezed tighter as it travelled up the barrel, but it leaves a very light trace of the grooves on the bullet.

Other issues with ballistics are that the minie ball when cast is not always balanced, and many targets that I've seen show the minie ball hit the target sideways, meaning the minie ball becomes unbalanced in flight and tumbles erratically. For target shooting, ALL the shooters I know use and recommend a patched round ball with an ACW rifled musket for accuracy.

The incompetence of many modern day "target shooters" and their inability to cast reliable bullets should not detract from the accuracy of the Minie Rifle and Minie or Burton Ball. It was a superb combination, easily capable then, and now, of putting 10 consecutive shots into a 4" circle or less at 100 yards in the hands of a good marksman.

I understand why this sort of accuracy was not achieved in the Civil War by the vast majority of soldiers, but let's not blame the rifle itself.

Throw in the fact that West Point itself was founded in the mode of the French military Academies with an emphasis on artillery, fortification and engineering. Many of the professors were devotees of Both Frederick the Great and Napoleon as the ne-plus-ultras of military campaigning. It is fair to say that most of the professional officers were true disciples of Napoleon (And Frederick of Prussia).

When Lee was in charge at West Point he started a Napoleon club, to study the campaigns of Napoleon I (which were NOT being taught in the classes, evidently.)

There is the question, however, of how well did Jomini actually interpret and explain the methods used by Napoleon I?

I found this work useful in debunking the influence Jomini on Union generals:

link

Personally I wish the work was longer and could also cover the strategic thinking of the South.

Keeping in mind that the rifled musket was technically superior to the smoothbore, here are some comparisons of battle casualties between Napoleonic battles and the ACW. I tried to avoid captured in the numbers and French and Union army sizes are listed first with a total percentage lost of the total number of combatants.

ACW*************armies***********total loses

Gettysburg*********93,921/71,699****51,118/3 days******30%
Chickamauga********60,000/65,000****34,624/2 days******27%
Spotsylvania******100,ooo/52,000****34,624/3+days******22%
Chancellorsville**133,868/60,892****30,500/3+ days*****15%
The Wilderness****101,895/61,025****28,699 3+days******17%
Stone's River******41,400/35,000****24,645/2 days******32%
Shiloh*************66,812/44,699****23,746/2 days******21%
Antietam***********75,500/ 38,000***22,717*************20%
Fredericksburg****114,000/73,500****18,030**************9%
Cold Harbor*******108,000/59,000****17,332*************10%

Napoleonic Battles
________________armies_________Total losses

Novi____________51,547/37,252________19,500____________21%
Marengo_________24,000/31,000________16,400____________29%
Austerlitz______73,000/84,000________25,300____________16%
Eylau___________75,000/76,000________35,000+___________30%
Wagram_________154,000/135,760_______77,000/2days______26%
Talavera________55,634/46,138________14,900____________14%
Salamancca______49,647/51,949________18,800____________18%
Borodino_______130,000/124,000_______74,000+___________29%
Leipzig________195,000/365,000______124,000/4 days_____22%
Vitoria_________60,000/82,000________13,000_____________8%
Dresden________135,000/214,000_______48,000/2 days_____13%
Waterloo________73,000/118,000_______47,000____________24%
Ligny___________68,000/84,000________24,000+___________15%

With a few exceptions, casualties were running about 15-20% per day during both periods. I think we would be hard pressed to claim that the ACW battlefield was more deadly than the Napoleonic. Even in total war casualties, four years of Napoleonic war easily equals the 650,000 deaths from all causes during the ACW.

It seems that TMP doesn't respect spacing…

It must be kept in mind that weapon lethality is range dependent. A smoothbore musket might arguably possess the same degree of lethality as a rifled musket at 50 yards; the same may not be the case at 200 yards. A lot therefore depends upon engagement ranges.

B

It must be kept in mind that weapon lethality is range dependent.

Blutarski:

Could be. Paddy Griffith believed that the engagement range for both periods remained the same: @300 yards.

It must be kept in mind that weapon lethality is range dependent.

Its also target acquisition dependent.

There were a hell of a lot more trees on the above Civil War list than on the Napoleonic one. Which, as I recall, was one of Paddy's points.

The lack of clear lines of sight reduced the range differential between the two periods to a point where weapon improvement was effectively nullified on many occasions, clearings not withstanding, and then all they did was provide kill zones!

You may well have got more reliability, but over all, you were just gaining fitting and removing percussion caps instead of priming the pan.

Even in clear terrain most veteran officers considered fire beyond 200 yards to be a waste of ammunition.

Hi Trajanus,
It is important to take a close look at the important battles of the ACW.

A number of battles did occur on terrain with dramatically (< 100-150 yards?) limited battlefield visibility -
The Seven Days
Murfreesboro
Shiloh
Vicksburg (to a degree)
Chancellorsville
Wilderness

And a lot did not …..
Cedar Mountain – yes on L flank; open fields in Center and on R flank.
Fredericksburg – Burnside advanced over flat and level ground.
Malvern Hill – Fought over cleared slopes.
Antietam – Confederate took positions in woods and on reverse slope positions, because that is where they could find shelter from the powerful Union artillery.
Gettysburg – Fought over cultivated farmland, except for the Round-Tops and Culps Hill.
Chickamauga – Not really. Visibility in the wooded tracts was described as 150-200 yards and the climax of the battle was fought over cleared fields.
Franklin – Attack over cleared defensive fields of fire.
Spotsylvania – Fought over cleared defensive fields of fire.
Cold Harbor – Fought over cleared defensive fields of fire.

The US Park Service laser survey of the battlefield, done for the 150th anniversary, concluded that the average field of fire were about 200 yards.

Keep in mind also that, for the first year or so of the war, significant numbers of troops (especially on the Confederate side) were armed with smoothbores.

Griffith's arguments IMO fail to hold together under close scrutiny; at the end of the day there is no explanation offered as to why both sides urgently manufactured and/or otherwise sought great quantities quality minie rifles to arm their infantry. I do not accept the rationale that the responsible decision makers on the procurement side were seduced by the allure of theoretical capabilities – not over five years of pitched warfare.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

Hi Scott,
200 yards as a practical maximum for typical infantry firing over iron sights was probably still the rule of thumb through the two world wars as well.

B

I posted the following before, but it seems germane to the discussion.

The following is from Mark Grimsley, "Surviving Military Revolution: The U. S. Civil War" in MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray (eds.), The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050, Cambridge University Press (2001), p. 76.

"These dynamics go far beyond the hoary, college-survey notion that the Civil War was a revolutionary conflict by virtue of its technology or tactics. Such a notion is misleading and sometimes flat wrong. The text-books tell us, for example, that the new rifle-muskets greatly extended the range and killing power of the infantry and that this innovation revolutionized the battlefield. In fact, a survey of the ranges of engagements in all major battles between First Bull Run (21 July 1861) and the Battle of the Wilderness (5-6 May 1864) reveals that the average infantry unit opened fire on its opponent at a distance of 116 yards – an improvement over the 80-100 yards characteristic of smoothbore warfare, but at best an incremental improvement."

This statement is footnoted as follows:

"This sample was created using the keyword "yards" in a computer word search of War of the Rebellion. The search yielded numerous references to ranges of engagements. The battles examined were First Bull Run (2 unequivocal range references), Second Bull Run (8), Antietam (21), Fredericksburg (10), Chancellorsville (16), Gettysburg (25), Bristoe Station and Mine Run (7 combined), If anything the ranges were somewhat shorter, since five of the longest ranges are from attackers' estimates of the distance at which they first received musketry and artillery fire. (It is uncertain they could have detected the difference between the two types of fire.) In any case, the findings corroborate those of Paddy Griffith, Battle Tactics of the Civil War (1987), pp. 144-150. From his own survey of Civil War ranges of engagement, Griffith concluded that the average range for musketry was 127 yards. One explanation for the relatively short range is that most Civil War commanders preferred the shock effect of a single close-range volley as opposed to the firepower advantage of several volleys delivered at longer range."

Hi, Does anyone know where late cold war Russian command vehicles placed their antennas? I wanted to make my command vehicles stand out a little more. Yes, I know..last thing a command vehicle would want in a shooting war but good for wargaming. I am interested in vehicles like the T-64, T-72, BMP 1 and 2, BTR-60, and BRDM.

Also keep in mind that Napoleonic military men repeatedly gave the 'effective' fire range of the smoothbore musket at
200 yards or 250 paces.

Griffith does give a breakdown of his ranges over time (Griffith, Table 6.1, p.147).

1861-1862: References – 58; Average range – 104 yards
1863: References – 10; Average range – 127 yards
1864-1865: References – 45; Average range – 141 yards
1861-1845: References – 113; Average range – 127 yards

He also points out that of the 113 references "only 17 mention ranges longer than 250 yards, and none beyond 500."

Griffith then states that "It is possible to argue that the limited but nevertheless remorseless increase in battlefield ranges during the Civil War was the result of gradually improving weaponry, but it was more probably the spread of disillusionment later in the war that was really to blame. In every era of military history long-range fire is the preferred tactic of soldiers who have lost their taste for assaults at close quarters – and the example from Talvera, already cited, was very much a case in point." Previously Griffith mentioned "a well documented army corps volley at 1000 yards at the Battle of Talevera in 1809."