"Napoleon´s Nightmare: Guerrilla Warfare in Spain" Topic

…(1808-1814)- THE FRENCH ARMY'S FAILED COUNTERINSURGENCY
EFFORT

Of possible interest?

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Amicalement
Armand

In the Peninsula war, Napoleon found himself forced to deal with a new kind of enemy: the Guerrilla. He gradually realized that he was waging two wars: a conventional war against the combined Spanish and British Armies, and an unconventional one against the people themselves. The dual effort, his misunderstanding of the character and power of the revolt in the Peninsula, and his inability to develop adequate unconventional war tactics, ultimately led to France is defeat in Spain.

The French had fought unconventional wars before-in the Vendee, Italy, and the Tyrol. All of those were successful, and the French believed that the Tyrolese were worse than the Spanish guerillas.

And many of the French counterinsurgency efforts in Spain were successful, such as those by Suchet and Soult. The main thesis of this paper is short-sighted.

What led to the French defeat in Spain was Napoleon attempting to fight a two-front war, the presence of a British/Portuguese army in the field, and Napoleon withdrawing the best units and individual soldiers to be employed elsewhere. Wellington's army and the Spanish guerilla effort were mutually supporting and one could not exist without the other. Take away Wellington's army, and the guerillas lose; take away the guerillas and Wellington's army would have gone the way of Moore's.

I'm a "glass half-full" chap myself.

Like Charles Esdaile and a few other British writers who attribute the guerrillas with a bit more abilities and overall effectiveness than the historical record actually supports, this author presents his version in an unabashedly "nationalistic" fervor.

Still, I prefer the Spanish version--it is more honest.

Agree with you Kevin!…

Amicalement
Armand

I only partially agree with Brechtel198. the nature of the war in the Vendee was different in a number of ways, The Tyrol also was different in nature and far more limited in nature. The guerilla war in the Peninsular was much bigger, and diverse in nature and also featured active field armies in opposition. And don't forget the Portugese irregulars did their bit.

I agree with Brechtel198. Vendee, Tyrol and Italy/Calabria….all were guerrilla insurgencies. Suchet was one of the most , well, if not the most successful Peninsular Marshal. One further issue I would add would be Napoleon's policy of "make war pay for war". The resulting administrative reorganization of the war effort in Spain had a negative effect on the military command of the war effort which led to the divisive and separate operations of the French armies in Spain.

Calabria may be the only insurgency which is at least a bit similar to the Peninsular War, but Boney wasn't there, a clueless with, as well as for Tyrol, as well was for the Vendée – other generals had to fight this.

He had a mild taste of it in Italy – but nothing compared to Calabria or the Peninsular.

It doesn't matter if Napoleon was there or not. The insurgencies of the period produced a variety of French commanders who were more than familiar with fighting counterinsurgencies.

The actual problem that faced the French in the Peninsula was a lack of unity of command as well as the problem of Napoleon drawing off selected units, such as the Vistula Legion and the cadres of the dragoon regiments selected to be converted to light horse lancers as well as other units and individual replacements selected for the invasion of Russia. That began in 1811 before Salamanca and Vittoria.

And the British, the Spanish regulars and guerrillas and the Portuguese, still took several years to push the French out. And that's without Napoleon being there.

To be fair, the French, despite significant military superiority, took several years to fail to snuff out the British, the Spanish regulars and Guerillas and the Portuguese?

ConnaughtRanger

Good try. But the Brits, even after their victories, often still had to retreat to prevent themselves being squashed. Had the French united more than they did, and the British not retreated, who knows what may have happened. As it was, despite the French not cooperating with each other as much as they should have, the Brits, aided by their allies, still took several years to force the French out. Lucky for us, in a way, otherwise we may not have had such an interesting and 'lengthy' period of warfare to study and enjoy.

-Wellington had to retreat following his tactical victory at Talavera in 1809-strategic defeat.

-The first two sieges of Badajoz in May and June 1811 were failures.

-Wellington retreated after his failure at Burgos in 1812-tactical and strategic defeat.

-The first siege of San Sebastien was a failure.

-Suchet's string of successes in eastern Spain is too often overlooked by Anglophile authors.

-And the string of battlefield successes over the Spanish is usually ignored.