"American Military Aviation in the Interwar Years ..." Topic

…and After: Some Historical Reappraisals.

"In 1987, the historian Michael S. Sherry published a groundbreaking and controversial book titled The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon (Yale UP, 1987). Sherry in effect reinterpreted the history of American air power in a way that was more contextually based and fiercely critical. The result was not to every military historian's liking because it deviated so dramatically from what was considered the master narrative of American air power, which traditionally had focused on combat tactics and weaponry, and which had neglected the broader implications of air power and its employment. Moreover, Sherry upset the "Good War" narrative (mistakenly from Studs Terkel's ironically titled The Good War: An Oral History of WWII) that emphasizes the heroic side of war and downplays its destructiveness, death, and tragedy. Thus, The Rise of American Air Power could be seen as representative of what has been termed the "New Military History," an attempt to bring military history into line with other academic historical endeavor. In a larger context, historian Peter Paret has written in Parameters: The Journal of the Army War College, "the New Military History refers to a partial turning away from the great captains, and from weapons, tactics, and operations as the main concerns of the historical study of war. Instead we are asked to pay greater attention to the interaction of war with society, economics, politics, and culture." (Autumn 1991,10) The recent publication by military historian Mark Clodfelter of Beneficial Bombing: The Progressive Foundations of American Air Power, 1917-1945 (U of Nebraska P, 2010) is a fitting occasion to reconsider some of the ideas put forth by Sherry a quarter century ago. In his book Clodfelter argues that consciously or unconsciously the developers of American air power theory and strategy were a reaction to a Progressive (as in Progressive Era) way of thinking. Clodfelter argues that the advocates of progressive air power, looking back on the slaughter brought about in WWI, believed that air power could put an end to an enemy's ability to wage war by destroying its industrial, communication, and transportation centers. Clodfelter also points out that the airmen wanted a reformation of the U.S. defense structure and they believed that a separate autonomous air force was a necessity if the country was to carry out such precise aerial warfare. In addition, the airmen believed that an independent air force would be capable of winning future wars entirely on its own, without the assistance of armies or navies. While Clodfelter should be lauded for his attempt to place the study of American air power in a wider context, his view of it in regard to American Progressivism is somewhat narrow. Progressivism is a multifaceted and often contradictory movement typically characterized by activism for social justice, political reform, and efficiency. It may be difficult to tie American air power to a single motivation. Nevertheless, I would like to follow up on Clodfelter's (and Sherry's) ideas in light of recent historiography, and in particular to focus on what might be termed the unintended consequences of early American air power theory. (Technology's accidental aspects have been examined most notably by historian Edward Tenner in Why Things Bite Back: Technology and the Revenge of Unintended Consequences [Vintage, 1997]). Two psychological facets of un-intention are "cognitive dissonance," and "groupthink" (terms developed later by the social psychologist Leon Festinger (When Prophecy Fails, 1956) and the research psychologist Irving L. Janis (Victims of Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 1972); these describe various states of single-mindedness and collective rationalization in group behavior. Festinger had studied under Kurt Lewin at the University of Iowa and during WWII he had worked for the National Research Council Committee on the Selection and Training of Aircraft Pilots at the University of Rochester. Janis had worked on problems of military morale during WWII for the U.S. Army. In 1951 when he was a professor at Yale University he published Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of Bombing and Civilian Defense under the auspices of the RAND (Research and Development) Corporation). Both men made revolutionary contributions to the way that social scientists comprehend and explain complex patterns of human motivation and behavior, particularly as they apply to organizations. In her book Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945 (Princeton UP, 2002), Tami Davis Biddle explains how cognitive theory relates to military decision making. Biddle believes that "All decision makers use cognitive processes to make sense of their complicated and stressful environments. … rather than revisit the original choice, decision makers discount, misinterpret, or ignore new information … in addition to seeing what [they] want to expect to see, and not seeing what [they] find too stressful to absorb, [they] often see what it is in [their] interest to see. Decision makers with powerful organizational goals or self-interests may discount or minimize incoming information that conflicts with those interests, and highlight information that supports them." (4-5) In a very broad sense, the work of Festinger, Janis and others on cognitive processes in organizational thinking so aptly summarized by Biddle go a long way toward explaining what happened to air power theory during the interwar years and throughout WWII…."
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