"Tiger Tanks! - Ammo consumption versus long range fire" Topic

Regarding the small unit after action reports, I am wondering if there is some degree of survivor bias in the stories that end up being documented in the first place. That is, in order for a crew to be able to report how many rounds they fired to score a hit they need to survive the battle – and it certainly does not hurt if their tank is still intact, so they can double-check how many rounds they used. Meanwhile a crew that panics and fumbles might have their tank brewed up before they can even score that first hit.

Of course there may be engagements where one or both sides manages to break off without losing vehicles, in which case both sides get a possibility to make a report.

mkenny wrote – "I believe he just re-used the Jentz tables which is range firing. The same tables have a warning that this accuracy 'does not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under battlefield conditions'
That last bit is always ignored."

Read Jentz's original text more carefully -

"The first column shows the accuracy obtained during controlled test firing of the gun to determine the pattern of dispersion. The figures in the second column in parentheses includes the variation expected during practice firing due to differences between guns, ammunition, and gunners. Both columns were reported in the accuracy tables from original fire tables as shown in Table 7.1.2. These accuracy tables do not reflect the actual probability of hitting a target under battlefield conditions. Due to errors in estimated the range and many other factors, the probability of a first round hit was much lower than shown in these tables."

The sentence that follows makes an important distinction -

"However, the average, calm gunner, after sensing the tracer from the first round, could achieve the accuracy shown in the second column."

At 2,000m, second and following shots = 50pct hit probability. (~75pct likelihood of a hit in three rounds, assuming no hit by 1st round)

At 2,500m, second and following shots = 31pct hit probability. (~50pct likelihood of a hit in three rounds, assuming no hit by 1st round))

- – -

A point of possible interest, judging from the early/mid 1943 dates of all the Tiger action reports mentioned by Anderson, is that the Soviets may, in some cases, have been unaware that they were under direct fire. The Tiger tank was a recently introduced and fairly rare creature at the front and the Soviets had never before been confronted by any German tank engaging at such distances.

B

A point of possible interest, judging from the early/mid 1943 dates of all the Tiger action reports mentioned by Anderson, is that the Soviets may, in some cases, have been unaware that they were under direct fire.

I would assume this to apply particularly in the case of 27 Mar 1943 entry where a horse-drawn artillery column came under fire at the rather respectable range of 5 km. That kind of situation is pretty bad news for artillerists.

Read Jentz's original text more carefully –

It was only after I mentioned it that you now use the warning. I wonder why you chose to leave it out first time around?

At 2,000m, second and following shots = 50pct hit probability. (~75pct likelihood of a hit in three rounds, assuming no hit by 1st round)

At 2,500m, second and following shots = 31pct hit probability. (~50pct likelihood of a hit in three rounds, assuming no hit by 1st round))

Not so in the examples of real combat by real guns against real tanks. The Jentz book lists 11 rounds per claimed kill at 'normal' ranges and 20+ at 'long' range for both Russia and Libya. . The individual Units that compiled these figures are listed in the Jentz book along with the ranges, type of target and result. Easy to confirm if you wish to check/dispute.

I would assume this to apply particularly in the case of 27 Mar 1943 entry where a horse-drawn artillery column came under fire at the rather respectable range of 5 km. That kind of situation is pretty bad news for artillerists.

Indirect fire at that range is normal for all nation's artillery. It would not be something the Soviets would never expect to happen.

At 2,000m, second and following shots = 50pct hit probability. (~75pct likelihood of a hit in three rounds, assuming no hit by 1st round)

Something similar can be seen in British range test.
But, I believe the Brits are using an ranging estimation error of m.d. of 20%.

Thanks, Mobius. Interesting to see some more or less consistent/corroborative data from a different but contemporary source.

B

What does the line 'no suitable realistic trials have been carried out or can be referred to in order to substantiate these estimates' mean?

Just to clarify. The German unit expenditure figures are their claims, not Jentz's claims? In other words, did Jentz have access to the reports and compile them or did he find them in the archives and publish them as he found them?

Questions about the claims:
Claims of knocked-out tanks: Who verified the claims? Unless you've taken the battlefield you don't know for sure. Was there a problem with overclaiming and double claiming on all sides? yes. How did they gather information on claims and expenditure with units that were overrun and wiped out mid-battle? Is there any way to get info on this?

Rounds fired: How was that reported or confirmed? Were empty shell casings turned in for a new one? Did battery commanders call it in so they can get new rounds? Did they report correctly or over-report usage because they knew they'd get fewer rounds than they requested? I know I would. Any details supplied?

Were they firing numerous rounds at a target they could not penetrate? Were they firing at moving targets at long range? Were they wasting ammo? Were they firing HE for suppression or recon by fire? Were they firing at non-tank targets? Were the environmental conditions so poor they could not confirm hits or misses so kept firing? (likely in N. Africa and Russian winter). Were they firing the wrong type of ammo? Were the crews poorly trained? Did they continue to shoot until the target burned or exploded?

Any of the above situations could account for 1-5+ extra rounds per target. Many games already take these factors into account. If Jentz's claims is going to help game designers we need to know the details. I can see where it could take 6+ rounds to ensure a tank is knocked out. But I can also see how 1-2 would be the norm, especially in W. Europe with StuG's and AT guns waiting in ambush opening fire at 500m or less.

Again, the average is irrelevant to a game unless we can understand the how and why details. Does Jentz provide them?

If Jentz claims an average, under what conditions were more rounds than average used and fewer rounds than average. That would help understand the average. Regarding combat conditions, what were the numbers when defending and when attacking. It would not be the same.

In addition, a crew in a tank may not even know they are under fire. Their SA is all to the front, the gunner has a narrow field of view and the other crew only a limited view through a periscope if any. I just don't buy the whole "combat conditions" generality, it does not translate into a tactical situation for the crew and can change greatly during a battle.

Another way Jentz's claim breaks down is that in an engagement once you've hit a target you are ranged in with the right elevation. Engaging another target +/-100m is going to use the same elevation setting and most likely hit again with no problem if within 1-2 seconds time of flight. Mobius's images confirm that. It's not going to take 6+ rounds unless you are not penetrating and should not be shooting.

If you want to convince people that Jentz's claims are nothing more than an interesting conclusion that is meaningless to game designers you'll need to break it down to how, why and under what conditions. A generalized "under combat conditions" does not cut it.

I'm not questioning his claim, I'm attempting to understand it so I might be able to use it to tweak my gunnery model. So far the information is useless to me in that respect.

It's up to the crew to estimate the range to put in the right elevation and gunner to aim correctly for wind conditions, shell type, etc. The TC needs to sense the tracer for the result to make corrections. The reloader needs to perform his function. The crew is suspectable to fear, suppression, being fired at, making mistakes, etc when under fire. When not under fire, even in the middle of a battle, there is less fear and they perform better. So the claim of "battlefield conditions" needs to be broken down to understand how it affects the crew. Again, generalizations do not help.

I mentioned the error budget earlier. There are fixed and variable forces that affect accuracy. A gun and a shell are inanimate objects and do not care about combat conditions or who is firing it. If it has a 1 mil accuracy it will be 1 mil at any range. If a vertical object gets in its way along its trajectory path it will impact it. Those factors of the error budget are not changed.

Check out tank gunnery Error Budget:
link

The variable biases and random errors are the ones that combat conditions will effect. We need to quantify these to determine the accuracy. That will help determine how many rounds to knock out a tank. Penetration and visible damage is another factor in expending more rounds and is variable.

Look at images Sherman tanks destroyed in W. Europe. In many of the photos, you'll see 2-4 rounds that fully penetrated all within 1 foot of each other. That's the typical performance of a German 75L48 from a StuG or Pak 40 from 400m-500m. I doubt if any rounds missed. Most penetrations of a Sherman will be a kill or crew bailing out.

It appears that in many cases in WWII if you hit the target you followed up immediately with another round unless the target brewed up right away which could happen about half of the time. So now we have an average of about 2 rounds expended per claim. How do we get to 6? I seem to recall someone stating that US Shermans in W. Europe averaged 1.6 hits per knocked out tank.

Not so in the examples of real combat by real guns against real tanks. The Jentz book lists 11 rounds per claimed kill at 'normal' ranges and 20+ at 'long' range for both Russia and Libya. The individual Units that compiled these figures are listed in the Jentz book along with the ranges, type of target and result. Easy to confirm if you wish to check/dispute.

It's interesting but meaningless unless it breaks down the reasons for the expenditures. Does he claim hitting and knocking out a tank on the first shot is rare? If so there is a conspiracy of WWII crewman and gunners that are lying to cover up their ineptness.

Wolfhag

"What does the line 'no suitable realistic trials have been carried out or can be referred to in order to substantiate these estimates' mean?"

Exactly what it says it means. Do you need help with your English comprehension?

Do you really believe that any of this could ever reach any degree of perfect exactitude? If so, you are no historian.

B

. Do you need help with your English comprehension?

No I just wanted someone to confirm that its all theory and not fact . You knew that which is why you chose not to answer the question and deflect with insult.

A tip. To quote someone use this format:

The red box at the front and rear of anything you want to quote will place it in a white box inside your post.

Wolfhag,
I have a copy of Jentz's "Dread Threat" as well. Here is another AAR from 2.Batterie/Flak-Rgt 'Hermann Goering' dated 22 April 1943 relevant to an action in Tunisia -

Too lazy tonight to transcribe the entire report, so just the highlights -

About 0940 hours, on the coast six tanks rolled out of the depression toward 8.8 cm Flak "C". Fire was opened at a range of about 500 meters. Five shots set two tanks on fire, and one was immobilized.

<snip>

Twenty minutes later, strong enemy forces again were advancing to the right over the hills. A group that closed within 1100 meters was then fired at by 8.8 cm Flak "A'. With seven shots, two tanks were set on fire and two immobilized.

<snip>

Results: Seven tanks knocked out.*

(*) I count a total expenditure of twelve shots in these two engagement – five shots from Gun "C" plus seven shots from Gun "A" … on 1.7 shots per claimed tank kill.

- – -

As a side-note, one important factor was omitted from the 29 May 1942 AAR report cited by mkenny. Quoting from the report directly -

"At 0830 hours, the first enemy tanks could be seen by the battery advancing from north to south.
At a range of about2000 yards, the enemy suddenly opened fire, supported by vigorous artillery fire. AS the enemy forces came no nearer to the battery, fire was opened at this range. Five of the attacking tanks (Mark II) were destroyed,
<snip>
After an engagement of about an hour, the enemy made no further attack."

Context is important.
Ammunition expenditure will absolutely differ between shooting in undisturbed conditions and shooting while under enemy fire. And VISIBILITY also will play a role. All this is covered or referred to by Jentz, but somehow falls out of the discussion from time to time …..

B

"No I just wanted someone to confirm that its all theory and not fact . You knew that which is why you chose not to answer the question and deflect with insult."

Keep fishing.

B

What does the line 'no suitable realistic trials have been carried out or can be referred to in order to substantiate these estimates' mean?

The estimates are a mechanical evaluation. An actual evaluation would include the 'hero' adjustment in my linked PDF. There a hero crew is on average 3 x the effectiveness of an ordinary crew. If you want to include a hero factor in a game it must be decided to allow a crew to be designated a hero before the action or to allow probability to decide if a unit was 3 x as effective by the results of die rolls in the game and such.

As a side-note, one important factor was omitted from the 29 May 1942 AAR report cited by mkenny. Quoting from the report directly -

"At 0830 hours, the first enemy tanks could be seen by the battery advancing from north to south.
At a range of about2000 yards, the enemy suddenly opened fire, supported by vigorous artillery fire. AS the enemy forces came no nearer to the battery, fire was opened at this range. Five of the attacking tanks (Mark II) were destroyed,
<snip>
After an engagement of about an hour, the enemy made no further attack."

I never quoted a ' 29 May 1942 AAR report and the book uses several engagements over a number of days. Why this one is important enough for you to selectively quote it is a puzzle but here it is complete.

I have a copy of Jentz's "Dread Threat" as well. Here is another AAR from 2.Batterie/Flak-Rgt 'Hermann Goering' dated 22 April 1943 relevant to an action in Tunisia -

Too lazy tonight to transcribe the entire report, so just the highlights –

Here it is complete and readers can judge for themselves why you left so much out.

I count a total expenditure of twelve shots in these two engagement – five shots from Gun "C" plus seven shots from Gun "A" … on 1.7 shots per claimed tank kill.

Yes that is your calculation and nothing to do with Jentz.
Why you prefer this example to all the others were the official count of rounds expended is used is a mystery.

More

Notice "because of the long-range and poor visibility, couldn't be clearly determined".

That's a battlefield combat condition I had mentioned that was common in N. Africa, especially with mechanized units moving around at high speed, that would involve a large expenditure of ammo. I'm in agreement. Just look at some of the pictures on the battles. Then throw in the ever-present mirage and you get huge gunner aiming errors (error budget), poor observation (inability to make bracketing adjustments) and difficulty in observing hits meaning shooting off more rounds to confirm destruction even if the target may already be knocked out. the gunner can't be sure.

Since the desert terrain is flat with no real identifiable features and batteries had to relocate no one could make a range card to engage targets with no range estimation error. Another great handicap. Now we know why and can design that into the game. Thank you for the clarification.

But emckenny, it has nothing to do with the inherent accuracy of the 88 guns! It's the difficult conditions that bring about poor fire control and challenge for the crew! You can't make a blanket statement on the 88 accuracy, or lack of it, based on the N. Africa engagements. No way!

The conditions that Blutarski related were completely different than N. Africa and the 88 battery enjoyed every advantage of being in a defensive position and not under fire, good observation, something they did not have in N. Africa in the actions you related. Better conditions equal better efficiency and fewer rounds expended just like poor conditions will use a greater expenditure. Is that something you can agree to? You and Blutarski seem to be right.

Blutarski,
Thanks, I would not have found those engagements. Those accounts seem more typical of the ones I've read in the conditions that it occurred in.

In addition to the high % of hits, a good crew would have noted down the elevation settings for each tank knocked out and added it to their range card. Any target coming near a knocked out tank will be fired at without a range estimation error with a great chance for a first-round hit.

Notice the "closed to within 1100m". That means they saw them further out and tracked them to open fire at 1100m. Why 1100m? Well, maybe they had that spot already ranged in so they'd fire with no range estimation error to almost guarantee a first-round hit.

The 1.7 shots per tank kill match up to the 1.6 against the Americans in W. Europe. It's no wonder that in N. Africa it was 10+ rounds.

However, to show I'm agnostic regarding Blutarski's info, do we know how many HE rounds the 88's expended? I'd think that they would immediately target the bailing out crews with HE-Q and could fire a round every 4-5 seconds since they are ranged in and do not need to make bracketing adjustments. Again, this is why I question many of these accounts as you can't be sure of all of the activities that actually took place unless you were there. They could have fired as many HE as they did AP. Does it matter? Not really.

This is from Jentz's book, "Dreaded Threat – The 8.8cm FLAK in the anti-tank role:

I think he got this from the German publication from field testing. The number in ( ) is the expected accuracy in "combat conditions". Does this match up with the 6-10+ rounds statement? Again, "combat conditions" is just a math estimate degrading the accuracy to give an idea that range performance cannot ALWAYS be expected in combat.

In Blutarski's recent example he shows how effective when not under fire and in good conditions. emckenny, you shouldn't have a problem with that. I doubt if Blutarski has a problem with the N. Africa engagements unless you want to use it as a blanket statement for the entire war. Same area, different conditions, nothing unusual there.

An 88 does not need many penetrations to knock out a tank. Here is a first-person account of what happens to a Sherman:

Just how accurate can a gun be? Let me relate a story from my Grandfather in WWI (the one on the American side, his cousins were on the German side) at the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. He was the Captain of an Army 79th Div Machine Gun Company with 12x M-1917 water-cooled Brownings. He mainly employed them in area and indirect fire over the German trenches up to 2000 yards away. He was located about 500 yards behind the American trenches. One morning he stepped up to the parapet and peeked over to take a look at the German lines with his binoculars. A short time later he saw a flash on the German side. He immediately dropped back down into the trench and a second later a German shell (probably a 77mm) exploded on the parapet where he had his binoculars. Those trenches had been there since the Battle of Verdun and the Germans had every location plotted on their range cards for any gun emplacement they had.

I can't emphasize enough how accurate a gun is when you know the range and under good conditions. He didn't indicate the range but the German 77mm gun has a muzzle velocity of just over 500m/second so a 2 second time of flight is about 1000m. Conditions and observation were most likely ideal and the German gun crew was not under fire. I think that qualifies as non-combat conditions in a combat area, something long-range high-velocity guns enjoyed very often.

Wolfhag

I was shocked to find this but i hope we find this somewhat relevant. civil war artillery accuracy by excellent crews at 1000 yards. YouTube link

But emckenny, it has nothing to do with the inherent accuracy of the 88 guns

It is about real shooting at real targets in a real war and nothing to do with range firing.
It is the same as the designers of the Panther tank wondering why their test results showing 90% of all frontal hits don't penetrate and yet 75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated.

I doubt if Blutarski has a problem with the N. Africa engagements unless you want to use it as a blanket statement for the entire war.

It was not just NA. The Russian Front example I posted showed 117 rounds expended for 12 claimed kills.

An 88 does not need many penetrations to knock out a tank

And a 75mm does not need to penetrate a TII frontaly to knock it.

.Some quotes from Duel in the Mist 3 by Haasler, Vosters, and Weber; a small engagement on 22 December 1944 involving a tank of Task Force Lovelady and a tank of Kampfgruppe Peiper in the Belgian town of Parfondruy

US veteran Charles R. Corbin recalls:
Quote:
…I went upstairs in a house on a hill behind us to observe better. There under our nose was a large German tank in some trees. After telling Plummer and Edmark we got artillery on it and flushed it out where one of Company D's tanks had a clear shot at it, and shoot it he did, but three balls of fire bounced off of it and it backed away never moving its turret. It had to be a Mark VI Tiger. It made us all wonder and I know the tank gunner was shaking his head, feeling helpless, as it backed up the railroad on our left flank. I had seen our 75s bounce off Mark V tanks before, the last time near Roetgen where they wiped out several of our tanks…
The tank was indeed a Tiger Ausf.B, number 133 of 1./s.SS-Pz.Abt.501. TC SS-Oberscharführer Werner Wendt relates his side of the engagement:
Quote:
…I started again in the direction of Stavelot trying to give my best. About fifty meters in front of the edge of the town my driver suddenly swung around our tank. The interphone isn't working, I don't know what happened. The driver drove back at full speed, passing the command post in the direction of Petit Spai. About 100 meters in front of the bridge we drive into the ditch. Only now can I see the reason for the sudden turn-around of the driver. We have received a hit into the turret ring. The shell had bounced downwards into the hull, torn off the hatch of the radio-operator, and killed the radio-operator…Fragments had destroyed the steering gear and the gearbox, oil was leaking. As the driving mechanism and gear shift was conducted by oil pressure the failing oil pressure caused the tank to run out of control. The Tiger was totally immobilized.

The Tiger could not be recovered and thus was a total write off/kill.

…an average of 10 rounds per tank. This is a much higher expenditure than would be predicted by a simple assessment of the inherent accuracy and penetration ability of the 8.8 cm Flak L/56 against these targets.

Not if you really understood the penetrating ability of the old 8.8 cm Pzgr Patr. AP shell. It was realized these were not very good against sloped armor. They were replaced by the Pzgr. 39 AP shell in the summer of 1942.

Notice the test vs. the T-34. It was reliable against the turret up to 1000m. The hull only to 100m.

@Wolfhag, the Flak 88 used the ZF-20E sight when firing at ground targets. 4 x 17.5° FoV. (Crude milliradian system.) Against a tank sized target it would have a 49% first round hit on a static tank at 1000m with Pzgr 39. Using Pzgr Patr 50% chance. This assuming a 19% s.d. range error.

Wolfhag,
Your comment regarding the influence of combat conditions is very important. Combat conditions will run the gamut from totally benign to completely overpowering in terms of affecting the efficiency of any weapon system. It might be interesting at some point to discuss what might qualify as "typical" combat conditions and the frequency thereof, but I'm not sure that any meaningful agreement on either point could ever be established.

The modern battlefield is a very complicated environment that no single "factor of merit" (whether it is 1.7, 11, or 100 rounds per kill) can adequately represent.

Context

B

BTW, how does one count ricochets? Early accounts from the Russian Front (see "Dreaded Threat" for example) indicate numerous 88m hits (assume early pre-war AP projectile) that failed to penetrate/kill heavy Russian tanks (KV's & T34s) at 1,000+ yard ranges.

This becomes a problem when simply comparing cumulative numbers of rounds expended versus tanks "killed" to judge weapon system accuracy.

The devil is always in the details.

B

emkenny,
Yes, I'm familiar with the early 88 AP shell. Yes, I really understand the penetrating ability or lack of it, that's why it was replaced. The larger the HE cavity means less mass of the shell which can account for about 10% less penetration. I think the steel of the shell was inferior too. It's in Bird & Livingston's book, I use that penetration data in my game. I totally agree with you. Are you familiar with his WWII Ballistics and Armor publication?

Yes, I'm familiar with the 88 gun sight, I have pictures of it too. It was not optimized for ground use. The Tigers had a better one but the 88 had a better rangefinder too. The 88 sight could generate a greater aiming error (error budget again) but not affect the inherent accuracy of the gun (that won't change). It would still shoot the same size groups and dispersion no matter what sight you put on it. It just won't be pointed directly on the target with less chance of a hit.

The aiming errors will put the MPI of the group would be off the center mass of the target resulting in fewer hits but the dispersion would remain the same. The gun itself is very accurate. There are a variety of circumstances that can account for any lack of performance in the Error Budget which you have not addressed.

Increased ammo expenditure is a manifestation of the variable biases and random errors from the crew and combat conditions that fail to point the gun on target and miss. It is not the gun's fault. Read the account again from my Grandfather for ideal condition performance from a WWI howitzer not know for accuracy.

Because of the brittle armor in the T-34, a round did not need to fully penetrate. Partial penetration spalling was common and frequently killed crewman. The highly angled turret sides could easily deflect 88 round as could the mantlet. The 88 was not a guaranteed one-shot-one kill in WWII but it did happen but not all of the time. I doubt if anyone in this discussion would make the one-shot-one -kill wonder weapon claim.

I just want to backtrack for a second to maybe clarify some things. The video was about "one-shot-one--kill wonder weapons". Anyone claiming the 100% one-shot-one-kill for any gun is making a generalized and uninformed statement. No gun or tank was a wonder weapon in WWII. They all had their limitations and weaknesses. I think everyone here would agree. I don't think anyone is making that claiming. Certainly not me. Forgive me if I made that impression.

Under ideal engagement conditions, the 88 performed as pretty much as expected. Under less than ideal or, extreme conditions performance dropped off rapidly as expected. Armor penetration is a variable and no guarantee of penetration and damage even if the round should penetrate. Is that something we can all agree on? I enjoy discussing the different variables of performance but I like addressing specifics, not generalizations. I have no problem with the T-34 illustration and agree the 88 would not penetrate even when expected. I model it in my game. Again – the 88 is not a wonder weapon!

To address your previous posts:

It is about real shooting at real targets in a real war and nothing to do with range firing. It is the same as the designers of the Panther tank wondering why their test results showing 90% of all frontal hits don't penetrate and yet 75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated.

I'll have to disagree. Range shooting is a baseline – known range, gun sighted in and bore-sighted, clean ammo, clean gun, good observation and no one shooting at you.

Combat conditions are of varying degrees, from the almost ideal range like conditions to a raging snowstorm, which will affect the expected ideal range firing by degrading it. Range performance is rare, I'm not claiming it as the norm. That should be no surprise to anyone.

Not all tanks went into combat with their guns bore-sighted. This will throw off the expected accuracy (aiming error in the Error Budget which can be quantified) but the gun will have the same round-to-round dispersion as on the range, but the gunner's aim will be off (aiming error in the Error Budget). Do you get that and see the difference? Accuracy is determined by variable biases and random errors. It's about the same as with a sniper rifle. They can still get expected accuracy in combat as long as they are not suppressed and have good observation, good range estimation and a weapon sighted in correctly.

Again, the Error Budget explains all of the factors about the accuracy, including combat conditions. Let's address them in a somewhat scientific quantifiable manner. Each factor in the Error Budget can be assigned a value to get the expected results of degraded accuracy. Mobius could provide an example. I have a spreadsheet formula that takes all of these into account to get the expected increase in dispersion from the ideal range performance based on the Error Budget factors. The formula will not give exact range performance because you cannot totally eliminate the variable biases and random errors. Ammo expenditure is not in anyone's formula that I know of.

The accumulated Error Budget factors will move the center of the gun MPI dispersion off of the ideal aim point. If moved too far it will result in a miss. Poor range estimation will make the shot go high or low. It is not the always inherent accuracy of the gun that is responsible for a miss. Misses results in greater ammo expenditure. That's about as simple as I can make it. It is not always the gun's fault.

Poor observation generates a greater range estimation error. Rather than an average visual estimation error of 20% in good conditions, it could go up to 35% in poor observation conditions, like N. Africa or winter conditions in Russia like snow glare generating an increased aiming and observation error. That means more rounds to fire that miss for bracketing to find the range. It also means an increased aiming error for the gunner which decreases accuracy (moves the group MPI off of the target center mass for a miss) and means more rounds fired to get a hit. Poor observation means more rounds fired to ensure the target is destroyed (fog of war). That's the explanation of the poor combat conditions and the poor performance and high ammo expenditure in N. Africa and similar situations. You can't use a generalized "under combat conditions" to get the reason as combat condition vary from excellent to terrible. You need to address the Error Budget factors and quantify them which so far you have not. Despite all of this the gun is still shooting 1 mil dispersion groups, it just the MPI is not on the target and the gunner misses. Sorry if I'm getting repetitive.

Now if the observation is good a visual range estimation error would be an average of 20%, maybe as low as 5% with a range finder. This gives a better chance of a first-round hit, especially under 1 second time of flight. An anti-tank gun in a prepared defense is most likely going to have a range card with expected areas of targets ranged in to eliminate the range estimation error giving an almost 100% chance to hit under 1 second time of flight for German 75 and 88 guns. The gunner has no problem getting the crosshairs on the target so most of the aiming error is eliminated. The gunner and TC can observe the results to make corrections meaning fewer rounds expended to get on target. If they are not being shot at, like in an ambush. There is nothing else to fear or distract them as being concealed and using flashless powder they most likely will not be spotted if they take a flank shot. These were normal ambush conditions in W. Europe except if raining or snowing. This was not the situation you gave for N. Africa.

Good observation, known range, sighted in, good spotting and no one shooting at you are range conditions! You have been on the range, right?

If you are going to keep talking about the lack of accuracy it would help if you addressed the Error Budget aspects of it as degraded accuracy can normally be explained. Please give us a quantifiable answer regarding the expected round-to-round dispersion performance in your N. Africa example because of the combat conditions. That would really help us understand it better than generalized "under combat conditions", ammo expenditure, etc. You can do better than that.

The poor accuracy and ammo expenditure in N. Africa is explained by the poor observation combat conditions that degraded the expected performance. It can be quantified in a formula. It was not the gun's fault! Now tell us about accuracy and ammo expenditure in good observation combat conditions, that occurred too.

Regarding the Panther, 75% of all hits on what aspect of the Panther penetrated? Front, side or rear? A Sherman firing at the side armor of a Panther from the average range in W. Europe will penetrate almost 100% of the time. So what is your point? Anyone making the German fanboy claim of "the Sherman could never penetrate the Panther" is just ignorant.

Your N. Africa example is accurate and I'm not questioning it but an extreme example as I indicated. Poor accuracy is because of poor observation, you can't hit what you can't see or effectively aim at no matter how accurate the gun is. Expending more ammo than needed is easily explained by the crew choice of continued firing until they see results which is difficult in some situations like NA. In the NA example how many tanks were fired at after they were knocked out? No one knows, it's the fog of war. That's the main variable that can explain it.

Do you have any personal military experience with weapons and long-range shooting?

And a 75mm does not need to penetrate a TII frontally to knock it.

Well yes, I agree. All tanks have weak spots that can be exploited. No tank is totally immune except in games we play and ignorant people that make generalized statements on inaccurate or false information and there are quite a few of them out there. I'm not one of them.

Regarding the Tiger II penetration, it appears it hit a shot trap where the hull roof armor is less than 20mm which can happen to almost any tank but it's fairly rare. Maybe it was a Porsche turret? I model shot traps and weak spots in my game so it can happen to a Tiger I, Tiger II, Panther or any other tank with a weak spot, curved mantlet, turret ring (armor is actually reduced because of edge effects), hull bow gun, hatch, etc. However, it didn't penetrate the main frontal armor did it. No tank is totally immune. I agree and model that. Maybe something else we can agree on?

So far you've picked extreme situations of poor observation as the norm that any weapons would be expected to have decreased accuracy and forced to expend more ammo. You have not addressed the poor conditions regarding the Error Budget and the degree they will throw off the accuracy.

US results showed knocked out Shermans hit by an average of 1.6 rounds with the average engagement range less than 700m. Most would have been fired from ambush under almost range conditions. In no way, would 6+ rounds be needed but crews may continue to pump rounds into the target if they care to.

It's not unusual to put 2-3 rounds into a target even if the first one killed everyone and then 1 maybe 2 HE to kill the crew. That does not mean the gun is inaccurate if all of the rounds hit. Battlefield conditions of poor observation mean increased aiming error (the error budget) because of haze, smoke and wind could double the number of rounds fired so now we are up to around 10. Ammo expenditure is not necessarily an indicator of accuracy, you've picked the wrong accuracy variable. I know you are very knowledgable on WWII history and fail to see why you won't address the individual factors of decreased accuracy and seem to be obsessing about ammo expenditure and generalized "under combat conditions" without quantifying the conditions like the experts do with the Error Budget.

I'm going to make one more try on this. If you want to discuss real accuracy you need to confine it to the Error Budget factors. That's what the experts use to define accuracy. You are not an expert, neither am I. That's why I use the Error Budget and formulas to define accuracy as function of predicting round-to-round dispersion under ideal conditions as a baseline to predict accuracy under various combat conditions outlined in the variable biases and random errors. This is how professionals that get paid a lot of money and have advanced math degrees measure accuracy, not ammo expenditure under extremely adverse conditions.

When you minimize the variables and random errors (you cannot eliminate all of them) you get the ideal inherent accuracy of the gun. If it is 1 mil it will fire 1 mil groups at any range. The inaccuracy comes in with the variable biases and random errors created by less than ideal combat conditions, sight misalignment, poor crew performance, poor range estimation, etc that fail to point the gun directly at the target. If the gun is not pointed right at the target you'll likely miss. Don't blame the gun!

Ideal range accuracy can never be expected but under ideal conditions, it could and did come close. Look at all of the Error Budget factors, they can all be quantified and are responsible for the poor combat performance for an otherwise accurate gun. Please do not blame the poor gun!

Inaccuracy in combat is not the gun's fault! If a round did not penetrate it is not the fault of poor accuracy unless you were attempting to target a weak spot. If a crew wants to pump more rounds into a target the gun itself has no say in it. If a crew wants to take a snapshot with a low chance of hitting it is not the gun's fault if they miss. Don't blame the gun for inaccuracy because the crew chooses to fire more rounds AFTER the target is already hit and maybe knocked out. Don't blame the gun because the crew cannot point the gun good enough because of poor combat conditions or other Error Budget factors to put the target within the guns dispersion pattern which will not likely change. I think you already know all of this. Otherwise, I've enjoyed the discussion.

If you are still obsessing about the inaccuracy of weapons because of ammo expenditure you need to write a book to correct the millions of people and acknowledged experts out there, including the remaining WWII vets that are wrong or are lying about their experiences, that have it all wrong. If true, you'll have a best seller.

Wolfhag

So far you've picked extreme situations of poor observation as the norm that any weapons would be expected to have decreased accuracy and forced to expend more ammo.

I did not 'pick' anything. The Jentz book has a number of ammo counts across various days and at various ranges & conditions . The numbers are averaged.
The sPz Abt 502 examples give a 6 round average in one instance and 40 in another. The Stug examples in the Youtube link also give 10 rounds+. The limited info in Szamveber's 12th SS book for Pz IV firing also roughly matches. There is a pattern there for those who wish to see it.
The claim that the Russian tanks were 'harder' to knock out than the British Cruisers is a bit of a stretch. Ammo consumption per claimed kill seems to be about the same for both.
Also note it is claimed kills. There is room for error there as well.
Again can I make this clear as it seems to be causing a bit of confusion. I have no interest in range-shooting results. I am looking at battlefield results. Endless lists of theoretical kill %, shatter gap, slope etc are all 'why' questions that do not deal with 'what' happened. Some people (in the UK) like to spend 2 hours on Saturday watching football and then deal with the defeat or win and its impact on their teams league standing. Others spend the 6 days between matches endlessly analysing and replaying the actual performance to get a different result and seeking excuses(no one will complain if they win) as to why what the expected to happen did not happen. Being an uncomplicated soul I would be one of those who accepts what happened with a simple shrug of 's*it happens'
I do not need reams of 8.8cm ammunition performance out to 10,00 mtrs or a scientific dissection of the light-gathering ability of Zeiss sights to tell me if a Sherman could be frontally penetrated at 3000 mtrs because I can find multiple instances of Shermans being penetrated frontaly at 3000 mtrs. I know it happened because I have the evidence it happened. Thats 'end of story' for me.

If you are still obsessing about the inaccuracy of weapons because of ammo expenditure you need to write a book to correct the millions of people and acknowledged experts out there,

'Experts' like Jentz you mean?

Jentz who wrote this

Yes, a simple assessment would be in error. A detailed forensic assessment would take into account the penetrating ability vs sloped T-34 armor.

There are other instances were great amounts of ammunition were consumed. In particular early in the war the Germans using captured French 75mm 1897 guns using Polish AP ammunition. They apparently didn't have tracers. There was complaints that the gunners were using too many rounds to knock out each enemy tank.

emckenny,
Yes, extreme combat conditions cases and early war too. You seem to ignore the later war and more ideal engagement conditions as I mentioned and some of the other ammo usage like 1.6 in W. Europe. If that's all you are interested in, fine, no problem. If you don't want to know why you don't have to.

I have no problem whatsoever with Jentz or your data other than not knowing how it was collected or if all of the reporting was truthful. I respect Jentz. Did he arrive at the conclusion by researching and compiling the source data or writing what the Germans reported? So is it his or the Germans data? If German data was he able to verify it? Was there any explanation for the unusually high ammo rates? That's what interests me because I like to generate historical outcomes and the interchange of ideas and opinions has helped. I can't refute it or examine the source data so I'll have to accept it. Thanks.

But remember, at the end of the video the commentator said that all of the data in the video should be taken with extreme considerations since the data sets are circumstantial and extremely limited. He also said the FLAK 88 was extremely accurate and that was not a myth. Your data postings prove that even accurate weapons can be much less effective than expected. Again, I totally agree and I think with my spreadsheet formula I can give a good idea of accuracy with inputs of data from the Error Budget paper and help determine ammo usage under any combat conditions. I'm interested in how and why you are not. No problem.

I agree your early war examples are valid and historically correct and believable (except maybe for verification of claims) but in no way the norm throughout the war in all theatres but it's not something we have to agree with. However, I did enjoy the dialog.

As you said, "end of story".

Wolfhag

"And a 75mm does not need to penetrate a TII frontaly to knock it".

A lucky, or unlucky, fluke hit, with probably about a 1% chance of occurring, if I recall my old Tractics rules stats correctly.

As for Shermans penetrating Panthers, I suspect most of the effective kill shots will be from the side and rear, instead of the front, since the Allies quickly learned that even the 76mm gun wasn't reliable against the front arc of the German cats (info gleaned from a US Tank Destroyer crewman). Only the US 90mm gun could reliably penetrate the Panther from the front arc.

A lucky, or unlucky, fluke hit, with probably about a 1% chance of occurring, if I recall my old Tractics rules stats correctly.

I can give you two examples from EPSOM (June 1944) of Tigers stopped by 75mm Shermans firing at them frontally.
The Tiger in Bovington was also stopped by a 'lucky' hit. It would appear these 'lucky' shots are far more common than many believe.

As for Shermans penetrating Panthers, I suspect most of the effective kill shots will be from the side and rear, instead of the front, since the Allies quickly learned that even the 76mm gun wasn't reliable against the front arc of the German cats (info gleaned from a US Tank Destroyer crewman). Only the US 90mm gun could reliably penetrate the Panther from the front arc.

There appears to have been a few 'lucky' shots that went down into the driver but if 33% of all hits go into the front of a tank that still means 66% of hits will penetrate. In fact the one study that counted this found that 75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated.

I can give you two examples from EPSOM (June 1944) of Tigers stopped by 75mm Shermans firing at them frontally.

You know of a TII knocked out by a 75mm Sherman?

You know of a TII knocked out by a 75mm Sherman?

Yes. I gave you it 11 posts up. It reads like a 75mm but could be 76mm. Its another one of those 'lucky' shots!

2 – 3 examples out of how many in the field?

I doubt those lucky hits are as common as you may think, especially if your 10 – 20 shots to stop your average tank is taken into account.

"In fact the one study that counted this found that 75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated".

The above quote doesn't provide any info on the aspect the Panthers were penetrated from. I suspect that percentage number is far lower for frontal shots, if there are any penetrations at all (perhaps some with the older model Panthers before the fixed the shot trap on the turret mantlet). That's not from me saying that, it's from the US tank destroyer crewman that said even the 76mm wasn't reliable against Panthers from the frontal arc. He said only the US 90mm was good for that. As a tank destroyer veteran of WWII, I suspect he and his fellow compatriots should know.

Panthers are/were known to have weak side and rear armor, which is where most of them that were killed were hit. However, even when attacked from the front quarter, based upon reports I've read, even their side armor was proof against 75mm and 76mm ammo.

22 December 1944: Towards noon, Tiger 334 and two Panzer IVs of the 6./SS-Panzer- Regiment 1 make contact with advancing enemy troops on the road to Borgoumont at Les Tcheus. Alter knocking out a Sherman, the Tiger is hit by a nine-centimeter antiaircraft gun, damaging the right drive sprocket. The crew bails out and escapes to La Gleize.
Total tanks: 41.
The tanks in La Gleize repel a series of enemy assaults, but they are fixed in place by superior enemy forces. Tigers 211 (Hantusch) and 213 (taken over by SS-Obersturm­führer Dollinger) are knocked out after numerous hits. (Tiger 213, whose muzzle brake was shot off, has remained at La Gleize ever since as an exhibit.
Total tanks: 39.
Tiger 133 advances toward the western edge of Stavelot in order to relieve encircled parts of SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1. During the second advance, this tank is accidentally hit in the turret ring. The driver's hatch is torn off, and the radio operator is killed. The driver, unable to communicate with the commander, turns the tank and backs up. The steering hydraulics lose pressure, and the tank is stuck in the road ditch. It is then abandoned.
If a tank is accidentally hit I assume it is a matter of fratricide.

The above quote doesn't provide any info on the aspect the Panthers were penetrated from

That is because you fixate of frontal hits. The numbers are correct and 75% of AP strikes on a Panther tank penetrated.

That's not from me saying that, it's from the US tank destroyer crewman that said even the 76mm wasn't reliable against Panthers from the frontal arc. He said only the US 90mm was good for that. As a tank destroyer veteran of WWII, I suspect he and his fellow compatriots should know.

And those who counted real holes in real knocked out Panthers in 1944 did not 'know'?

2 – 3 examples out of how many in the field?

You get asked for an example and you give one. You even include a bonus of a second Tiger.

Suddenly its not good enough and they now need a TII example.
You give a TII example.
Now thats not good enough and they want multiple examples.
Fact is there are those who will never accept the facts and no matter what proof you supply they will always find a reason to quibble and reject the evidence.

If heavy German armor was no problem at all for Allied Sherman tanks …..

> why did Bradley beg the British for Fireflies well before the Normandy breakout?

> why did Eisenhower himself deem it necessary to send his now famous outraged telegram back to CONUS complaining about the inability of the new 76mm gun to counter heavy German tanks?

> why did Gen. Marshall himself see fit to override all stateside bureaucratic objections and peremptorily demand immediate rush delivery of the T71 90mm GMC in quantity to the ETO without delay?

> why did Bradley AGAIN beg to obtain Fireflies from the British when the Germans launched the Bulge offensive?

Questions, questions, questions ……….

B

Hang in there mkenny.

All tanks have their weaknesses. Exploiting and hitting it is something different.

Hitting the bottom of the Tiger II mantlet with the Porsche turret should not be too difficult. Check it out:
link

But they did not make very many with the Porsche turret.

Wolfhag

Tiger 133 advances toward the western edge of Stavelot in order to relieve encircled parts of SS-Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung 1. During the second advance, this tank is accidentally hit in the turret ring. The driver's hatch is torn off, and the radio operator is killed. The driver, unable to communicate with the commander, turns the tank and backs up. The steering hydraulics lose pressure, and the tank is stuck in the road ditch. It is then abandoned.
If a tank is accidentally hit I assume it is a matter of fratricide.

Though you did not reference it this is from TIC II by Schneider published in 1998 in English but must be older than that for the original German version. Schneider just says 'accidently' and at best its a possible translation error. Anyway it says nothing about 'friendly fire' . That reading is a desperate attempt to counter the story as told in the 2014 book Duel in the Mist 3 by Haasler, Vosters, and Weber.

Link to the book
link

This book is extremely well researched and is an account of the fate of as many individual German tanks in the Bulge as they can record. It is the definitive work on the subject. They include accounts from the US side and the German side. Crewmen are named from both the US tanks that fired and the TII that was hit.
If you wish to cling your skewed reading of Schneiders version of the action by transforming 'accidently' into 'friendly fire' then be my guest.
The account of a 75 or 76 mm M4 knocking out a TII is too well referenced to be dismissed that easily.

Hitting the bottom of the Tiger II mantlet with the Porsche turret should not be too difficult

The TII knocked out by the M4 had a production turret.
Note that the US crewman was complaining that the hits had no effect on the Tiger and said it simply withdrew unmarked. It was not claimed as a kill and another story was born that would not be out of place in 'our guns were crap' version of NWE 1944-45. If only they had known………..

I doubt those lucky hits are as common as you may think, especially if your 10 – 20 shots to stop your average tank is taken into account.

Given the much greater number of Allied tanks I would think the more tanks firing at you the greater the chance of a deadly 'lucky shot'

That reading is a desperate attempt to counter the story as told in the 2014 book Duel in the Mist 3 by Haasler, Vosters, and Weber.

How, does a 1998 book try to counter a story told in 2014? I don't know of any other way of describing some tank being accidently hit as hit by friendly fire. Would the German crew know they were accidently shot by an American tank?

I don't know of any other way of describing some tank being accidently hit as hit by friendly fire.

We know Schneider could. In TIC I describes the loss of two Tigers from sPz Abt 503 ON 18-7-44:

2 Tigers are knocked out.Presumably by friendly 8.8 cm Flak in position in Cagny.

So he did know the difference.

As a bonus I can tell you that the person who claimed the 8.8cm fire on 18-7-44 was 'friendly fire' was von Rosen and he says so in the JJF English History Of sPz Abt 503 published in 2000. von Rosen devotes 14 lines to explaining this in that book saying that he found out in 1966 about the 'own goal'. However in his later book 'Panzer Ace' describing exactly the same actions von Rosen completely drops that claim. Obviously he had second thoughts about it.

Hang in there mkenny.

Hitting the bottom of the Tiger II mantlet with the Porsche should not be too difficult. Check it out:
link

Wolfhag

If the translation was 'lucky hit' instead of 'accidental' it might make sense. If the 75mm shell struck the bottom of the gun mantlet it could ricochet into the hull roof at the turret race.

The hydraulics going out after a time is an interesting damage result. I wonder about incorporating it into a rule.

"In fact the one study that counted this found that 75% of all hits on a Panther penetrated".

The above quote doesn't provide any info on the aspect the Panthers were penetrated from. I suspect that percentage number is far lower for frontal shots, if there are any penetrations at all (perhaps some with the older model Panthers before the fixed the shot trap on the turret mantlet). That's not from me saying that, it's from the US tank destroyer crewman that said even the 76mm wasn't reliable against Panthers from the frontal arc. He said only the US 90mm was good for that. As a tank destroyer veteran of WWII, I suspect he and his fellow compatriots should know.

Panthers are/were known to have weak side and rear armor, which is where most of them that were killed were hit. However, even when attacked from the front quarter, based upon reports I've read, even their side armor was proof against 75mm and 76mm ammo.

It's from pdf page 332 of the following very large pdf:
PDF link

The version by Coop is much clearer. You can download the whole book or just the chapters you want.

Link for download
link

The version by Coop is much clearer. You can download the whole book or just the chapters you want.

Thank you! That is a much better version than that sometimes illegible scan! :)