"The British Army of the Napoleonic Wars" Topic

Continuing on the subject of the strength of the British Army during the period I found the following helpful. It is taken from Britain and the Defeat of Napoleon 1807-1815 by Rory Muir, 14-15:

The strength of the British army on 1 January 1804 (rank and file) was 150,000.

At the end of 1813 it had risen to 260,000 rank and file.

The British population, including the Irish was 17 million.

Foreign troops strength in the army was 17,000 in 1804 to 54,000 in 1813.

The militia had a strength of between 60,000 and 90,000 and could not serve overseas. It was in 1811 that they were allowed to serve in Ireland.

The Volunteers were part-time soldiers and the quality varied among them.

'Neither the Volunteers nor the local militia could have successfully resisted regular troops, let alone Napoleon's Grande Armee, in the open field, but in the event of invasion they would have supplemented the garrisons of important towns and fortresses, protected their home districts against detached parties of the enemy, guarded French prisoners, and acted in large bodes in the enemy's rear. Nonetheless, it may be questioned if such a force-which ultimately rose to over 300,000 men-justified its cost in the years after 1807.'

On the value of Militia and Volunteers, one should be mindful that once they were allowed to transfer, Militia "recruits" provided the field armies a ready supply of trained men and NCOs. Whilst the opposition was hardly high calibre, local forces seemed to have acquitted themselves well at Fishguard, for example.

It should also be remembered that Britain had no police force or security services at this time. Volunteers like the Yeomanry had therefore to act in an internal security and counter intelligence capacity. After all those French spies (better known as monkeys) were not going to hang themselves.

There were many more civic calls on this 'military' home establishment, from aid to magistrates to supporting revenue activities. Indeed, home defence was (and still is), seen as the responsibility of the Home Office, not the War Office or the later Ministry of Defence. Lord Lieutenants were therefore key players, and very much tied into the civil organisation of the County rather than military formations or Districts.

The concept of the integration of Regular battalion with the Militia wasn't to come until the Cardwell reforms six decades later. Anything approaching a 'one army' concept had to wait until Haldane almost a century later. One could argue that this didn't really come about until the mobilisations of the mid 1990's!

54,000 foreign troops? Does that include the KGL?

if not I don't see how they could reach a such number

for the charges spent in 1811 there were already 30 741 divided between
-the King's German Legion and Brunswick Oels for 4991 cavalrymen and 11 317 infantrymen =17 656
-the 4 Swiss Regiments for 5804 men
-Chasseurs Britanniques 1602
-York Light Infantry Volunteers 1599
-Royal Corsican Rangers 1601
-The Sicilian Regiment 1350
-The Duke of York's Greek Light Infantry Regt 1129

there were also 5551 foreigners in the British regiments
the 60th (11 officers 740 men)
the former Queen's German 97th Regiment (12 officers 213 men)
the foreign depots, or simply within pure british regiments as 34 and 33 in the 10th and 15th Light Dragoons, 23 and 22 in both 3rd and 11th Veterans Battalion and most others british regiments counted at least from one to 17 foreigners (in 23 of the 25 Cavalry Regiments, 48 of the 106 Foot and Guards Regiments, all the Veterans and Garrison Battalions…)

the foreigners returned above as serving in the Regiments of the Line are chiefly Persons employed in the Bands and many of them are Men of Colour

it existed also the Foreign Artillery 579 men, a Foreign Invalid Company, KGL Artillery 1205, the Corps of Maltese Artificers 243

'Neither the Volunteers nor the local militia could have successfully resisted regular troops, let alone Napoleon's Grande Armee

And just to say that Muir knows as much as me, you or anyone else as to how the Militia and Volunteers would have performed. Muir's quote is his opinion with no basis to it.

I posted the Fortescue information pertaining to the British army on the "Napoleon as Psychopath / Balanced study deflates" thread.

TMP link

What was the point of discussion again?

As indicated above, the real value of the Militia was less as formed units (a lot depended on the experience and commitment of the leadership cadre- which could be good or bad) but as a source of well trained and enthusiastic replacements for the regular army. Many militiamen were the sons of respectable families who acquired a taste for soldiering and arguably raised the morale and motivation level of the regular units they joined.

In an invasion scenario, it is perhaps more likely that their chief effect would be ensuring that the regular units encountered by the French would be closer to full strength with well trained rank and file.

But it's perfectly fair to point out that Muir's view of the Militia as an organisation- although he is a respected authority on the period- is absolutely just an opinion. It's also pretty much an aside comment, so I'd be surprised if he supported it being used as the stand alone basis for an argument.