"Austrian use of Corps" Topic
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Carnot93 | 29 Aug 2005 5:55 a.m. PST |
Some interesting assertions were made by Kevin in a long thread below and rather than replying there, where the discussion is likely to get buried in tangential topics I figured I would spin it off as a new thread. A few questions. Kevin wrote: "The bottom line is that the Austrians went to the French system in 1809, and their staff couldn't handle it. They were also hamstrung by the fact that there were no staffs at division level. 1. Evidence that "the staff couldn't handle it"? 2. If there were no staffs on the divisional level, then how much is this a "copy" of the French system and how much is this a variation of the prior Austrian practice of establishing permanent corps without permanent divisions? True, they numbered their corps in 1809, and I agree they might have copied the French in that. But based on your incorrect statement regarding the complete absence of permanent corps-sized formations in 1805, I have to wonder if you are aware of the similarities between the 1805 and 1809 structures that point towards a natural structural development without specific external influences. Kevin wrote: "Before 1809 there were no permanent corps-level organizations in the Austrian army. As alte as 1805 there was nothing permanent above the regiment. Austrian divisions were ad hoc formations that were organized as the campaign opened." 1. define "permanent" in relation to a "permanent corps system". 2. Agreed that Austrian divisions were ad hoc (much as French brigades were at this point), but what evidence do you offer for the complete absence of corps in 1805? You obviously have not studied the Austrian higher level structure in 1805 at all. It is based on permanent corps-sized formations (permanent in my definition being for the duration of the campaign). What is lacking is a multi-tier hierarchical structure composed of both permanent divisional and corps sized units. The difficulty with studying higher-level formations in the Austrian army in 1805 is the nature of the campaign. The Army of Germany was destroyed within weeks after its mobilization and finding any information on the Army of Italy after Caldiero is virtually impossible. But the limited information available works against the theory that the Austrians were completely ad hoc above the regiment – Roland Kessingers work on 1799 contradicts this view as well. I think much of the confusion stems from the erroneous belief in Napoleon's propaganda depicting the Austrian advance into Bavaria as an "invasion" rather than part of Austrian mobilization in what they perceived to be friendly territory. The columns of advance, sent forward as the regiments arrived, are then mistaken as army organization. In fact, the formal organization occurs as the various columns of march assemble. The French corps had been mobilized in 1803 and so obviously did not have any need to go through any mobilization process where regiments marched to designated assembly points in 1805, and this needs to be considered in any direct comparison. |
3e Regiment Etrangers | 29 Aug 2005 6:48 a.m. PST |
Carnot93 Everything I have read on the battle of Austerlitz the Austrian and Russian forces are describe as being organized in Columns of Attack. These "Columns" I beleive were about Divisonal + size consiting of Infantry, Artillery and Cavalry. So they appear to be what we would call a corps system but that term was not use and I don't think that this Column system was permanet. O'Faoloin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 29 Aug 2005 8:32 a.m. PST |
There is a lot of mythology surrounding the "creation" of Korps in 1809. The list itself, reproduced by Bowden, was sketched out by Chief of Staff Mayer as part of his war planning. The 1809 armies were huge compared with the 1805 and earlier campaigns, so he just listed out some formations ina way that reflected the old practice of a corps being something bigger than a division and numbered them for reference. A quick comparison with the final line-up shows there was nothing fixed about them at all. The same structures contineud throughout the campaign and it was all abandoned at the end of he campaign, so if Austria had no "permanent" Korps before the campaign, nither did it have afterwards. Indeed as Rothenberg notes, in 1813, they were called Armee Abteilungen, but were organised in the same way. It is all about this "post-1807" reaction to show how the Allies won using French methods, but is not actually based on anything more than wishful thinking and a desire to read into a single document a meaning, which is not actually there. The French system was only "permanent" from 1803, because the GA was permanently at war. Its staff were in fact rotated from the line and aside from a few who had held independent command pre-N and Davout, none of the senior commanders could function on their own. All this permanence also goes back to trying to get round the existing system. Austria would have armies and corps/columns in the normal way,. which ahd commanders with the required staff. This of course has to be differentiated, so the "French" authors claim that the French developed permanent divs with permanent staffs in the 1780s – yes they do, but this was a peacetime arrangement similar to Russian Inspections and Austrian Generalkommandos in the provinces. If you look at De Cugnac, you will often see the 18e Division taking about the various field divs passing through and the only "corps" are odd side units – which shows what a lot of nonsense this claim about N's 1800 new corps was (sorry, I was taken in by it too in the Marengo campaign!). N's corps could equally be columns as they are simply a necessary army size – you could easily note that the 13 armies of Carnot are about the same size. They are necessary at that size since that is the maximum you can run down each road. However, they all took precise instructions from the central brain – they w re never given indepoendent misisons or anything else that has been built up subsequently to get round the Moltke problem. On the 1809 Austrian staffs, it was not a case of not being up to it – that is just a claim. It was a bad CoS (Prochaska), who lost control of the army and too few trained staff officers to go round (II korps' CoS was a Hauptmann – captain). Indeed, IV korps with soem help from III did well in the face of overwhelming odds at Eckmuhl, while the left escaped through Landshut to defeat Bessieres at Neumarkt, while the rest of the army escaped through Bohemia to fight again. The only commanders N would leave on their own were Davout and Massena, plus Lannes with a small advance-guard, but all had shown they could function without N's direction. |
Carnot93 | 29 Aug 2005 8:41 a.m. PST |
O'Faolin - Most of the allied columns fighting at Austerlitz were comparable to a French 2-division corps (1st column somewhat larger). "Columns of Attack" is not a phrase used in any of the original documents detailing the Olmutz organization or the orders given to the commanders. This term has specific tactical connotations. Column is synonymous to corps in this usage, the body of troops being a semi-autonomous subdivision of an army. The Russians consistently used the term "column" and the Austrians used the term "corps" in the documents I have seen. Both describe an established army subdivision and both the column and corps might be subdivided into divisions and brigades. The advance guards were more division-sized as might be expected of a French advance guard as well. The original Russian docs relevant to the Olmutz reorganization and the orders for Austerlitz can be found in Beskrovnyi's published collection of Kutuzov docs. The allied columns were forces of all arms (analagous to the French corps) and had a parallel function to the French corps. These were often described as being "ad hoc" and Langeron is cited in proof – Langeron complained about the daily shuffling of his command during the advance to Olmutz. This is due to Langeron's agenda as the columns as they left Olmutz were identical to the columns that fought at Austerlitz with the exception of some redistribution of jager (Bagration had requested extra jager after Wischau). Again, we need to look at analagous situations. The three armies assembling at Olmutz – Kutuzov's Army of Podolia, the Austrian remnants under Liechtenstein, mostly from Vienna but also Nostitz who had been deteched to Kutuzov since Braunau, and Buxhowden's Army of Volhynia. These merged armies were reorganized at Olmutz, one army being formed from multiple parts, but reorganization of forces due to operational necessity is perfectly normal and acceptable procedure even to the French. For example, Lannes commanded the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli at Austerlitz. Suchet began the campaign with IV Corps and Caffarelli was still formally part of III Corps, so what of "permanence"? Obviously in any army permanence is entirely independent of practical military necessity. And the French army had suffered a slight fraction of the disruption of th allied armies, so I don't see the Olmutz reorganization as fundamentally violating the "permanence" rule. In effect, this was an entirely new campaign being conducted by an entirely new allied army. For another example of the permanence of the Austrian structure, there is Kienmayer's corps. This was formed in late September from the 4 corps of the Army of Germany asembled between Ulm and Gunzburg when it became known that Bavaria has allied with France instead of with Austria. This corps (later under Merveldt) made several detachments for mission-specific purposes – but the main body of the corps that advanced to Goding in support of the allied offensive (Austerlitz) was identical in composition to the main body of Kienmayer's corps in Bavaria. This is analagous to the French VI corps detaching Dupont's division for the formation of VIII Corps (mission-specific detachment) but otherwise remaining intact for the duration of the campaign. Similarly, the three corps of John's Army of Tyrol remained intact until its union with Charles' army, at which point it may or may not have remained intact – I haven't found any details on these armies after their union. The Austrian Army of Germany had a brief existence, but during that time the corps remained intact. The internal organization of the corps is a different story, though. At issue is not whether or not the Austrians had a full-fledged corps d'armee system entirely analagous to the French – they did not and were really one developmental step behind. At issue is Kevin's assertion that they had no permanent formations above the regiment when there is ample evidence to suggest that they did (using my definition of permanence). Roland Kessinger also demonstrated this with the 1799 Austrians in an FE article several years ago. Disregarding the terminology used (which hinges on language and usage, a corps not always being a corps), all armies were employing higher-level organization in this period and it is factually inaccurate to state that the Austrians (or Russians for that matter) had no permanent higher level formations above the regiment. Beyond this, the structures in use in other armies were functionally equivalent to the corps, not the division as is sometimes asserted. What is lacking (and in fact what Kevin alluded to) is a functionally equivalent permanent formation equivalent to the French division – in other words, no permanent two-tier hierarchical structure, which affects efficiency within the corps/columns, the dissemination of orders and the ability to rapidly reorganize, but not the larger-scale organization. As for the idea of permanence, once any army stood down to a peacetime footing, the army structure changed, as it did with the French between 1800 and 1805. The reason French structure appears to be more "permanent" is that the army never assumed a peacetime footing during the entire period 1803-1814, although cataclismic events did require some substantial reorganization – as was the case with the Austrians at several points. You can see a similar organizational integrity maintained in the Russian army from January 1806 through 1815, with a single significant reorganization occurring in 1811 when they shifted to a two-tier structure consciously based on the French model. This corresponds with the period during which the Russians maintained a standing army and did not revert to peacetime demobilization and so is analagous to the French. Claims that the French would have retained their organization even on a peacetime footing are just conjecture, we can't know because this never occurred. Complicating things is the fact that the French, Russians and Austrians used the same terms in slightly different ways. So a column and a column of attack have different meanings, a division might be a division (an army or corps subdivision) or a division (a pair of squadrons or companies in an Austrian regiment) depending on context. The terms used have to be regarded very loosely and the underlying function understood. But I'm now rambling. To sum up, the allies did have administrative/operational army subdivisions above the level of the regiment, established permanently for the duration of the campaign or conflict (hard to tell which when the campaign ends the conflict). Bob |
SauveQuiPeut | 29 Aug 2005 10:34 a.m. PST |
Rothenberg mentions a vetoed proposal raised in early 1798 by Bellegarde to divide the Austrian Army into 15 permanent all-arms 'Legions'. Unfortunately he didn't go into any more detail in NGA. Any ideas how these were to be organised? Given the relatively large number of Legions these would presumably have been divisional rather than corps scale formations, but interesting nonetheless. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 29 Aug 2005 11:11 a.m. PST |
His memo was called "About the appropriate arrangement of the army into independent korps, capable of all war operations, formed from the three arms". However, it was only an outline proposal and needed plenty of fleshing out – however, Charles rejected it as unworkable given the time available before war began again. While it shows small formations, it also demonstrates that everyone is thinking in the same way and this memo comes during a lengthy overhaul of the Austrian army which began as the Nostitz-Rieneck commission and was later chaired by Unterberger. The key advantage the French have is that their army units are spending long periods together – and this is what Bellegarde is aiming for. That means people get to know each other and procedures can be standardised. However, it does not make your system the right one as a poorsystem – here central direction of mass formations – can be made to overcome a better one, whose operators are not practised enough in it. Since Moltke permanent staffs and their senior commanders have practised "war games". However, the staff is a separate formation and has a career structure to it – the French merely rotated people from the line hence its rapid deterioration as the task became bigger and they too lacked experienced staff. There is no magical French divisional staff – except that these divisions were running pernmanently. However, it wa sreally at that level where the French functuoned, since divisions could be pushed around between corps – or if you like, among various commanders. Austria tried too hard to get the allocations right before a dn during a campaign, so that cohesion was lost.They did this less and less from 1809, since the corps formations were large enough to contain enough troops for the job in hand, much as had been the case when various armies like those in Germany in 96 and Carnot's armies. |
anleiher | 29 Aug 2005 1:04 p.m. PST |
Dave, Carnot, I will admit to having a bias in favor of the Austrians. I personally believe most rulesets underestimate their potential. Having said that, they generally underperformed. Yes we can cite certain instances of dogged determination and indeed bravery but the question remains; why did they perform so far below their portential? Was it chiefly this "ad hoc" nature of the corps resulting in a lack of of unit cohesion at the upper levels? My admittedly cursory knowledge of the workings of the Hofkriegsrat and Austrian politics of the time shows no lack of willingness or sense of a "forlorn hope". Indeed in 1809, they were (excepting Charles) eager for another go at the French. They certainly did not view them unbeatable. Just where would either/both of you lay the principal blame? |
anleiher | 29 Aug 2005 1:06 p.m. PST |
Make that "potential". I need to better proof these posts. |
Carnot93 | 29 Aug 2005 2:09 p.m. PST |
Anleiher, I think the problem comes in when people form their opinions of the Austrians starting with 1805. Then they see awful 1805, the 1809 rebound and solid (if unspectacular) performance for 1813-4. They then conclude that the Austrian army is hopelessly outclassed, "reacts" by copying the French and then by virtue of copying the French they improve. The flaw in this reasoning is that the post-1805 Austrian reaction theorists extend the performance of 1805 back onto the good performances of 1792-1800. Austrian performance in 1799-1800 is every bit as solid as 1809 (arguably better) and 1792-1797 really wasn't bad if you discount the repeated underestimation of that guy Bonaparte. Charles' 1796 campaign was excellent, his 1799 campaign perfectly respectable and Melas fought the French to a standstill in 1800. On the other hand not all generals are great, so while Arcola (1796) and Hohenlinden (1800) don't make the Austrians look good, Wurzburg (1796), Stockach (1799), and Novi (1799) don't make the French look that great either. So the only place where I see a fundamentally bad Austrian performance is 1805, and that failure assumes a disproportionately large influence in peoples' opinions, IMO. The exception is transformed into the rule. As far as reasons for the Austrian failure in 1805, there are so many that trying to isolate corps structure or tactical doctrine is virtually impossible. These factors provided an apparent advantage for the French, but based on 1796-1800 and 1809-1814 this advantage was far from overwhelming. There were much more fundamental problems in 1805 that had a much greater impact on performance that these factors – over-hasty mobilization, miscalculation regarding Bavaria, a fundamentally flawed grand strategy based on erroneous assumptions about the French, deep divisions in high command, supply, training, specific command blunders, etc. etc. From the allied perspective, after mid-October, the entire campaign was in shambles and the Austrian army with it, making the rest mostly a Russian show. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 29 Aug 2005 3:28 p.m. PST |
That is all very true, but there is another key factor – namley what the army there to do? All armies change according to the political philosophy behind them. Guibert had set up a French army locked into the offensive, whereas the Austrian army was simply there to maintain the Imperial dominions – authors have mocked the "defensive philosophy" of the army, but that was what their political masters required. Nap was also his own master and did not have to work to someone else's objectives. Austria was about survival – hence no plans to go further than the Rhine after 1795 – and they succeeded in that aim – France was smaller when N fell than when he found it. There is a lot to be said for dictatorships in difficult times when central direction is required, but Austria was half the size of France and even less able to mobilise her resources because of the compromises with hte parts of the empire. |
3e Regiment Etrangers | 29 Aug 2005 4:26 p.m. PST |
Carnot93, Ref my quote "Columns of Attack", that was my usage and perhaps a wrong choice of words. I realize that the Russian and Austrian forces moved forward in columns and thats why I used that term "AttacK" as in the columns at Austerlitz advancing. Question ref below? "What is lacking (and in fact what Kevin alluded to) is a functionally equivalent permanent formation equivalent to the French division in other words, no permanent two-tier hierarchical structure," Are you saying that in 1809 the Austrian corps, columns, etc did not include a divisional formation. Speaking of the term Division, the Prussian corps in the Hundred Days used the term brigades (but they were actually the size of divisions), with the Regiment (2 bn's or more) being the lower tier structure. O'Faoloin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 30 Aug 2005 12:41 a.m. PST |
Austria used brigades and divs like everyone else, but the allocation of staff was done on the level of independence of a formation – ie: if there was a brigade on its own, it would have a staff, but if a d iv was part of a corps, it would not. The French army was built around divisions – that is field divs formed up when the army set out, not to be confused with the permanent divs used for peacetime admin. However, what that demonstrates is a degree of rigidity normally attributed to Austria. These wartime div staffs became permanent by virtue of being permnnently at war. However, it is important to bear in mind that there were no French professional staff officers, just men rotated from the line, and if you look at what they did, it was simply to carry the admin burden. |
anleiher | 30 Aug 2005 5:52 a.m. PST |
Dave, If I understand your statements; an Austrian corps would have a staff (were these officers permanently assigned to the role?) but an Austrian division would not if it was attached to a corps. If this is so who performed the normal administrative duties associated with the division's functions? You point out that these functions were handled in the French formations by rotating line officers, so surely the need existed. Am I missing something? Gerald |
Carnot93 | 30 Aug 2005 6:54 a.m. PST |
O'Faoloin, Thanks for clarifying what you meant by columns of attack, we're definitely on the same page then. "Are you saying that in 1809 the Austrian corps, columns, etc did not include a divisional formation." I'll defer to Dave on 1809 as I haven't studied the campaign in enough detail to say. With regard to 1799-180 and 1805, the Austrian corps did not include a *permanent* divisional formation, and I suspect the same holds for 1809. What this means is that divisions and brigades were assembled for a specific battle or march. Division and brigade assignments might even be customary due to officer preferences or traditional brigading of regiments together (for example the two Szekler Grenz regiments were typically brigaded together) and obviously once detached the subdivisions would remain intact until they rejoined the parent unit. But the division had no identity of its own the way the French divisions did and were formed in much the way that French brigades were formed – a GdB was assigned to perform X mission and given one or more battalions. The French division was actually far more "permanent" than the French corps and reassignments were made by detaching a division, reassigning to another corps, etc. The allies lacked this "building block" for corps subdivisions. Staffs are an interesting area to consider and seem to show a distinction between French and Austrian practices (with the associated opinions as to which was better), but I haven't studied staff structures enough to say much on this – a good dissertation topic for someone. With the Austrians and Russians (through 1805 at least) any reassignment occurred at the regimental level, which is likely where the misconception occurs that there was no permanent higher formation above the regiment. The difference through 1805 is in a permanent multi-tier hierarchical organization (French) and a permanent single-tier organization (allied) with the multi-tier hierarchy conferring advantages in terms of efficiency and continuity. "Speaking of the term Division, the Prussian corps in the Hundred Days used the term brigades (but they were actually the size of divisions), with the Regiment (2 bn's or more) being the lower tier structure." Organization takes on a national character, and looking exclusively at the nomenclature can be misleading. For example, the French light cavalry brigade would typically run 2-3 regiments or 9 squadrons in strength (1805-7 period). An Austrian cavalry regiment was 8 squadrons, a Russian light cavalry regiment 10 squadrons and Russian heavy cavalry operated in brigades of two regiments with 10 squadrons. So the basic units are all about the same strength, but the French have multiple regiments while the Russians or Austrians often have only one. The French subdivide into 3-squadron regiments, the Austrians subdivide into 2-squadron divisions, the Russians subdivide into 5-squadron battalions (light cav) and into 3/2 bodies (I've seen 2.5 squadrons mentioned in places as an operational unit). So all the armies are doing the same thing, but because of organizational differences the terminology is different, which causes misunderstandings. A brigade might be analagous to a regiment, a division analagous to a brigade, or a corps analagous to a division. In the case of the Prussians in 1815 (another campaign I haven't studied in much depth) the brigades were equivalent to divisions. Presumably if there was a need to subdivide they would use ad hoc subgroupings of regiments. I'm not sure what these would be called, but they would then be analagous to the ad hoc French brigades. Overall, the key conceptual difference I see is that the allied practice through 1805 was to assign the regiments to a commander to create a higher level formation while the French practice developed by 1794-6 was to assign the commander to an established unit. The results are much the same, but the conceptualization of a distinct unit identity independent of the commander is one of those minor rational adjustments emerging from the revolutionary period that triggers the subsequent development of a permanent multi-tier structure. Bob |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 30 Aug 2005 3:58 p.m. PST |
This demonstrates the usefulness of boards such as this in that any one interested can show up a dark corner – in this case, I have not explained the Austrian system clearly. When I have talked about the General Staff and its functions, I have essentially been talking about the General Staff, which is this bunch of about 30 expanded out in wartime with additional aspirant staff junior officers. They do the bulk of the jobs discussed in the staff definitions. However, there is another group – the Adjutant staff – the difference in insignia being that the GS wore the Feldbinde off the right shoulder and the AS wore it off the left shoulder. These men were selected by the Generals and the 1767 regs set out how many each could have and of what rank. On the Army staff, the head man was the General Adjutant, some of the more well-known being Radetzky in 1800, Grunne in 1809 after the previous GA, Wimpffen had become CoS. This was not a permanent formation, but tended to be young nobles, who were matey with the senior commanders. Their job was administrative, a mix of some elements of G1 and G5, and under the 1811 system, they were combined with the logistics function of the GS to form the Dienst Department. There is a bit of an overlap as it was a way on to the GS and the correspondence functions within the staff were often conducted by adjutants. Although they were gophers, the head man was very influential – with disastrous consequences in Italy in 1800 when Radetzky and CoS Zach were at daggers drawn competing for Melas' ear. So, there is an admin staff attached to each senior General – GMs ran brigades and FMLs ran divisions with senior Generals running the armies. This staff is no different from the French div staffs – they collected returns, got orders issued and dealt with some of the logistics (although much of that was run through civilian contractors, rather differently from the French). It is not a difficult task – hence you could just bring intelligent men in to do it for a campaign. As Bob says, the Austrians would allocate a commander to each significant formation with his adjutant staff for the admin tasks. The Grosse Generalstab – which was the wartime expanded version of the peacetime Kleine General Stab – was allocated to each army's CoS, who would then distribute them as required among he key formations to maintain the cohesion in the direction of the army. The function of a junior CoS was help the formation commander understand the plans and objectives set out by the CoS – which is the key difference from the French, where everything was directed from the centre by the Great Brain. The system at these lower levels is thus no different for Austria, except that the formations were not permanent as the army could not be maintained on that basis. Beyond that, an admin staff for a French div was allocated to the div, whereas an Asutrian comamnder would take his staff off to whatever formation he was given and was augmented by GS officers if engaged in indepenet operations. It gives an illusion of change in 1809, since every Korps was given a GS and AS under its designated commander, while the korps were still part of a bigger army. While that seems a new and different practice, it is based in the need to manage much much larger formations – and Charles' intention that he only ahd to issue hios general intentions and could then leave it to hte corps comamnders to sort out the detail. This is of course the modern system and what is claimed (although not what happened) in the French army. In Charles' particular case, itw as also a difference in philiosophy sicne his physical weakness made him a natural delegator of functions in his peacetime overhauls of the army. This is another useful consideration, when you look at the level of civilian detail that N would deal with – leopards do not change their spots. |
Carnot93 | 31 Aug 2005 6:26 a.m. PST |
Dave - One point I'm still having trouble with: "which is the key difference from the French, where everything was directed from the centre by the Great Brain." Surely this can only be considered to be the case with French armies that Napoleon commanded? There were many more French armies over the course of the wars, and in the discussion of staff systems (as in most everything else in the period) Napoleon monopolizes all of the attention. I would suspect (but have no real evidence) that in, for example, Massena's Army of Italy 1805 or Army of Naples 1806 or Eugene's Italy 1809 were much less dominated by "the Great Brain." Napoleon sent correspondence issuing advice and instructions, but most generals in most countries received similar "phoned in" orders from the head of state or army central command. I have no idea what differences there were with these other armies, but the Napoleon-Berthier relationship shaped the system used, playing on their individual strengths and N's head-of-state status, and I cannot see how this would translate to the Massena-Charpentier or Eugene-Charpentier relationships. Who has studied the Massena-Charpentier relationship? How many people even know that Charpentier was Massena's chief-of-staff (and later Eugene's)? How many have even heard of Charpentier before? No one addresses anything other than Napoleon-Berthier in addressing "the French" staff structure and I really don't think anything else has ever been studied in any depth. It just goes from staff manual to the implementation in the GQG with Napoleon and Berthier and extrapolates from there across all French armies without ever testing the validity of the extrapolation. At any rate, agreed, the corps system was developed as a logical solution to the practical problem of managing larger armies. All armies were working on variations of multi-layer organizations in this period, coming up with variations on a theme based on their specific priorities, strengths and experiences. But anything that is not exactly like the variation implemented by Napoleon (including corps systems used by other French generals in the 1790s) tends to be dismissed as being non-existent or inferior or not a "real" corps system when really each system had strengths and weaknesses. A good case can be made for Napoleon's corps system being the most effective, but as with all systems the system itself is only as good as the people using it, making it hard to separate the advantages stemming from the system itself from the talents of the generals using it. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 31 Aug 2005 7:25 a.m. PST |
It is different in Italy and Spain, but the Generals are still under tighter control from N than Austrian field armies 9except that Vienna picked the CoS). They would need a political correspondence department, but Massena would have run his cakmpaign how he had in the 1790s, which was not according to Berthier's system anyway. The French had been moving to a more devolved system and Desolles certaionly looks important under Moreau in 1800, but the fact that most of these people cannot be named – Bonnamy under Championnet in 1799 drifts back to a div staff head in 1800 suggests that much of the driving force was still the CinC and I have not seen anything about war councils among any of the French commanders. The real nature of N's system is apprent from Vachee in 1806 with the micro-direction of what are actually centrally controlled columns – Davout's "independent" actions were simply down to an HQ foul-up. |
Carnot93 | 31 Aug 2005 8:47 a.m. PST |
Except perhaps 1809, the Austrian field armies I'm aware of were maybe half the size of the GA and in many cases there were multiple separate army commands with loose coordination where the French had one centralized command. I think though that what you are seeing as a flaw is in fact a strength up to the point at which army size and geographical distance kills its effectiveness (1812, 1813). Disjointed or loose central command can be fingered for many of the allied failures early on as well as some of the French failures (Moreau/Jourdan miscues in 1796, for example). The occasional cock-up has to be offset against the much more frequent allied cockups that resulted from a lack of close (and often competent) centralized command. And again there is the tricky bit about trying to distinguish between the system and the abilities of the people running it. How much is doen to the system and how much down to N's tendency towards micro-direction? As for specifics, I'm not convinced that N exercised tighter control over armies in Italy and Spain than Vienna exercised over field armies. It was orders from Vienna that caused Merveldt's premature withdrawal from Steyr in Nov 1805, for example, and Kutuzov was entirely unaware of this until after the fact. Rothenberg also mentions directives issued from Vienna that arrived too late for the context. Micro-direction existed in all armies to some degree, it seems to me. For your other argument, not many French CoS are familiar, but how many of the Austrian CoS are familiar? And reversion to division-level isn't a big deal, 1799 there were two armies in Italy and three in the north, in 1800 there was one in Italy and one in the north = surplus army CoS. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 31 Aug 2005 11:33 a.m. PST |
I was really talking about army management of large armies and over large areas – Napoleon's Wagram army was about 180K on internal lines and it was no different at Leipzig in 1813. That was the zenith of centralised single micromanaged command – contrast with the change in size between Charles' army at Wagram and the Allied armies coordinated into Leipzig. Certainly, there is much to be said for centralsied command – N did his best campaigns (96 and 14) with small, closely directed armies. In Germany in 96, Paris was trying to direct two armies, but Jourdan waslargely kept to the north by Wartensleben and the position of the road through central Germany. Charles had the advantage of a central command (which shows how limited HKR power really was), but he emenaged it through Schmitt and Mayer, who directed the four components to create local superiority. In contrast the GA of 1805 was really restricted by the poorer north-south road network and all the columns were directed by N. Certainly this was a time of transition, but it was not N's system, which was used by later armies. It is almost like economics – all copmpanies start off as centrally controlled but only develop as power is delegated and more senior players are involved. On the CoSs, many will know of Radetzky, Mack, Zach and Weyrother. Most people could only name Berthier and Jomini from a much larger French army. You are wrong on your numbers, 1799 was Schmitt in Germany, someone working for Johann in the Tyrol and Chasteler/Zach in Italy with Weyrother going off with Suvarov into Switzerland, after Chasteler was wounded badly. Schmitt was retired not long after Rastatt, while Weyrother worked for Johann and Zach was CoS in Italy. Where a few do get moved, it is after a small army CoS to a senior main army staff post. Rothenberg repeats a lot of received wisdom – including some from Krieg – but the HKR exercised its political control as political leaders do today, which is always an annoyance to military commanders. However, it was getting theoir men in the senior staff positions that enabled them to exercise control or whispering in the Emperor's ear. |
Carnot93 | 31 Aug 2005 12:23 p.m. PST |
Dave - I don't think we're far off and I would agree that 180k or 200k tops on internal lines hits a practical limit for centralized command in this period. I think Charles in '96 had the first army of 150k or so and I know little about this one. I think he had about the same number in '99, but Jourdan had over 100k too as I recall. The union of Helvetie and Rhine later in '99 gave Massena what was probably the largest French army to date, but he had the Rhine component operating largely independently, no tightly centralized command. But no interior line either. Then Moreau in 1800 and the GA of '05. But even in the GA in 1805, once detached a corps had considerable autonomy and was not micromanaged except to coordinate on general terms. Ney didn't get micromanaged in the Tyrol nor was Marmont at Graz (although Marmont was told to be ready to hustle north in case the big battle in Moravia went badly). By the way, my numbers were the number of French armies, not Austrian armies and in fact the trend on the French side after 1799 was to consolidate command of the many armies into fewer big ones, hence the earlier impetus to develop a higher-level command tier to manage it. And the result that there were spare army COs and CoS floating around. I'm not sure that employment at a lower command level is a disgrace, just a reflection of a surfeit of experienced high-level people – so Suchet gets a division in 1805 as an example – only so many armies and corps to go around. As for Rothenberg's generalizations, I can't say. But in the one campaign where I have studied the Austrians in detail I have one instance of Vienna doing precisely what Rothenberg claims they did and I think Duffy provides some examples in his Suvorov book. The point about the HKR and its political role is that Napoleon was supreme political and military authority rolled into one and thus the cumulation of high-level political and military direction/interference in the operations of local commanders all emanates from a single source. That has to be factored into the equation, N's role after becoming head of state (particularly after becoming emperor) was fundamentally different from Charles' role in 1796, 1799 or 1809. It all makes direct comparison tricky. Ultimately someone (individual or committee) is coordinating the various armies – or you end up with Prussia 1806 and command by committee. It's convenient to have it all done in one place but that's risky and when the load gets too overwhelming it breaks down. For the CoS names, Berthier of course was a marshal and gets lots of attention. Jomini is only known because of his later work as a theorist, else he would be just another guy. Radetzky is also known for what he would later become and Weyrother and Mack are known for screw-ups. I don't think Zach is known any more than Mayer or Schmitt and Chasteller is known for stirring up the Tyrolese, not his staff work. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau come to mind, but the pair of WWII German battleships might have as much to do with that as their actual CoS accomplishments. They were all behind-the-scenes guys, their fame comes from doing other things later in life. Or in Berthier's case from a marshal's baton and proximity to the era's superstar. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 01 Sep 2005 3:33 a.m. PST |
These people are however known – many people think Mack was CinC in Germany. Schmitt was undoubtedly the best and had he been younger/not killed at Durnstein, 1809 would have rather different. Zach is better knwon than either him or Mayer. radetzku certainly is famous for 1848/9,but as co-author of the Trachenberg plan and recognised by Horsetzky, he is far more obvious than any French CoS, aside from N's chief clerk. These people are known – the French ones just are not. Any separated korps will be relatively autonomous. In 1805, the Army of Germany had been decapitated and merveldt was essentially on his own – Vienna's prime concern was protecting Vienna, which merely illustrates the problems of coalition partners having different priorities. The point I was alluding to was the micro-managing of Davout and Bernadotte in 1806, although N tried to keep a very tight rein on Eugene in 1809 (see Epstein). The more independent operation of a corps ata distance was a necessary result of fighting these wars over larger areas and everyone was fairly similar in the 1790s. The claim is that N allowed autonomy to the corps in the army under his command – and hence Kevin's claim in your opening post that Asutria adopted this in 1809. That is what was happening within the Austrian army already – Charles was giving missions to his three separated copmmandes in 1796, when Napoleon would have tried to micromanage Wartensleben up the north-south road connections. Napoleonw a sreally trying to think for his commanders, whereas Charles said that in 1809, he wanted to be in a situation, where his comamnders would know what he wanted just from the look on his face. The distortion of the N appraoch has led to the idea that what charles was doing in 1809 was copying N, when he was merely trying to repeat 1796. His problem was that there were not enough trained staff to go round. |
Kevin F Kiley | 03 Sep 2005 9:55 a.m. PST |
Bob, Sorry I didn't answer sooner, but we're back in school and I've been a little busy. I'm also finishing up the generals book and it has been a little hectic. Kevin wrote: "The bottom line is that the Austrians went to the French system in 1809, and their staff couldn't handle it. They were also hamstrung by the fact that there were no staffs at division level.' 1. Evidence that "the staff couldn't handle it"?' See Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary, page 165-166; also see the comment from Mr. Hollins in the posting dated 1 September o5 at 0333 PST in this thread, the last sentence. 2. If there were no staffs on the divisional level, then how much is this a "copy" of the French system and how much is this a variation of the prior Austrian practice of establishing permanent corps without permanent divisions?' It would seem to me to be an attempt to copy the French methods of organization but it still wasn't as complete as it could have been.'
based on your incorrect statement regarding the complete absence of permanent corps-sized formations in 1805, I have to wonder if you are aware of the similarities between the 1805 and 1809 structures that point towards a natural structural development without specific external influences.' First, my statement on organization isn't incorrect. And before this degenerates into either a he said, she said' discussion or a my dog is bigger than yours' I would suggest that a demonstration of permanence in Austrian higher-level formations be given. You haven't done that. Rothenberg is quite specific in his criticisms in this area, and I agree with him based on both study and experience in organization of armies. I was actually tasked with writing a staff study on the subject and did a lot of work in the area. You have a different perception of what permanence in organization is from mine. Mine is based on professional training in that area. There really isn't much difference from a French corps organization of the period and US one in War II, or today. A corps is basically a headquarters with corps troops (supply, artillery, military police, etc., ) assigned permanently to it along with two or more infantry divisions and enough cavalry to scout for it. Where is that evident in the ad hoc organization the Austrians used? The French trained together and knew each other. Organizing just prior to a compaign every time doesn't give you that edge or cohesion, and the knowledge of what the commander on your right or left will or might do is a great advantage. The ability to attach and detach divisions between corps was also a great advantage, as was the ability to organize very quickly provisional corps for use during a campaign. The system was institutionalized in the Grande Armee and the commanders of that army knew how to use it. Lannes commanded two provisional corps (1807 and 1809); Desaix was given one in 1800. It was flexible and permanent, in that it was the way they fought-and it gave the Grande Armee a tactical and operational flexibility that wasn't matched by the allies until the Prussians did virtually the same thing in 1813. The problem then was that the allies intermixed the different armies in their operational commands which I believe greatly hurt their operational fitness and operability. Further, corps strengths were not fixed-it depended on the skill of the commander and Napoleon's desire to confuse enemy intelligence. Second, I agree with you that the Austrian structural changes were gradual, as were those of other armies of the period. The problem with the Austrians, is they were slow to do it and didn't have the caliber commanders or staff to handle it initially, if indeed they actually had them at all during the period in the quantity and quality that was required. 'Kevin wrote: "Before 1809 there were no permanent corps-level organizations in the Austrian army. As late as 1805 there was nothing permanent above the regiment. Austrian divisions were ad hoc formations that were organized as the campaign opened."' 1. define "permanent" in relation to a "permanent corps system"' Something that is institutionalized in the system and is used repeatedly tactically and operationally. After 1805, the French corps were kept intact in Germany. The same ones went into Prussia in 1806 and kept on going into Poland in 1807. The French second invasion of Spain in 1808 was made up of some of the original corps that went east in 1805. Davout's command was intact through 1812, though it was renumbered for 1812. The Grande Armee was deactivated for Spain-the corps organizations were not. 2. Agreed that Austrian divisions were ad hoc (much as French brigades were at this point), but what evidence do you offer for the complete absence of corps in 1805?' Again, see Rothenberg and your own comments below. Ad hoc is not permanent. You obviously have not studied the Austrian higher level structure in 1805 at all. It is based on permanent corps-sized formations (permanent in my definition being for the duration of the campaign).' By the above definition, the Austrian organization was not permanent. I don't agree with either you or Kessinger. An Austrian command above the regiment in 1805 was not the equivalent of a French one. I wouldn't start to throw stones-you have no idea what I've done or studied. Comments like that should be kept our of the discussion. I could make an equivalent one about your qualifications to comment on corps organization and structure, but what purpose would that serve. I suggest we both keep to the high road. What is lacking is a multi-tier hierarchical structure composed of both permanent divisional and corps sized units.
Agree. Most of the allied columns fighting at Austerlitz were comparable to a French 2-division corps (1st column somewhat larger)
The Russians consistently used the term "column" and the Austrians used the term "corps" in the documents I have seen. Both describe an established army subdivision and both the column and corps might be subdivided into divisions and brigades.' Comparable how? In numbers? Certainly not in capability nor in the ability to operate independently. And, as proven, not in fighting ability. Cohesion was poor. The allied columns were forces of all arms (analagous to the French corps) and had a parallel function to the French corps. These were often described as being "ad hoc" and Langeron is cited in proof Langeron complained about the daily shuffling of his command during the advance to Olmutz. This is due to Langeron's agenda as the columns as they left Olmutz were identical to the columns that fought at Austerlitz with the exception of some redistribution of jager (Bagration had requested extra jager after Wischau). Again, we need to look at analagous situations
reorganization of forces due to operational necessity is perfectly normal and acceptable procedure even to the French. For example, Lannes commanded the divisions of Suchet and Caffarelli at Austerlitz. Suchet began the campaign with IV Corps and Caffarelli was still formally part of III Corps, so what of "permanence"? Obviously in any army permanence is entirely independent of practical military necessity. And the French army had suffered a slight fraction of the disruption of th allied armies, so I don't see the Olmutz reorganization as fundamentally violating the "permanence" rule. In effect, this was an entirely new campaign being conducted by an entirely new allied army.' Pay attention to Langeron. As already stated, the French organized new corps at the beginning of a campaign (Massena did so in 1809). They also were proficient at using provisional corps. The ability and efficiency were there through long practice. I would submit that a French division being cross-attached to another corps for a battle or mission would feel just as at home as it would with its parent corps. I don't see that happening with the allies. Allied efficiency would undoubtedly suffer. I don't see that as routine with the French system. At issue is not whether or not the Austrians had a full-fledged corps d'armee system entirely analagous to the French they did not and were really one developmental step behind. At issue is Kevin's assertion that they had no permanent formations above the regiment when there is ample evidence to suggest that they did (using my definition of permanence). Roland Kessinger also demonstrated this with the 1799 Austrians in an FE article several years ago.' That is exactly the issue. It appears to me that you're merely trying to justify all things being equal when they are not. There is a very good primer you might want to get hold of from the West Point Military History Series: Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art. I have found it most helpful from time to time. The series editor in Thomas E. Greiss. Beyond this, the structures in use in other armies were functionally equivalent to the corps, not the division as is sometimes asserted. What is lacking (and in fact what Kevin alluded to) is a functionally equivalent permanent formation equivalent to the French division in other words, no permanent two-tier hierarchical structure, which affects efficiency within the corps/columns, the dissemination of orders and the ability to rapidly reorganize, but not the larger-scale organization.' No there wasn't. Organizationally the allies were behind by a step and a half most of the time. Read Scharnhorst for his comments on what the Prussians needed to do to catch up.' And they were much better off than the Austrians by 1813. As for the idea of permanence, once any army stood down to a peacetime footing, the army structure changed, as it did with the French between 1800 and 1805. The reason French structure appears to be more "permanent" is that the army never assumed a peacetime footing during the entire period 1803-1814
Claims that the French would have retained their organization even on a peacetime footing are just conjecture, we can't know because this never occurred.' You are incorrect. French combat units stood down after 1809, some going on a peace footing and staffs being transferred to Spain. And, as already stated, between 1805 and 1806, the French did maintain the corps structure, as Davout did in Germany. So, again you have erred. Sincerely, Kevin |
Kevin F Kiley | 03 Sep 2005 9:59 a.m. PST |
Bob, As a footnote, Austrian performance for the first half of the Campaign of 1809 was terrible at the operational level. They had all of the advantages and lost every one of them. They were thoroughly beaten in the battles and maneuevers around Ratisbon, and the subordinate commanders dithered and moved too slow. Charles wasn't at his best either. It reminds me of 1805. However, they did redeem themselvs at Essling and Wagram. It should be noted that the corps/column commanders didn't distinguish themselves at Essling when they had hold of the crank. If the shoe was on the other foot, the Austrians would have been driven into the Danube. Sincerely, Kevin |
raducci | 03 Sep 2005 1:43 p.m. PST |
Kevin Didn't the Russians before Austerlitz need the services of Austrian staff officers? Is this a reflection of a Russian need or sign that they were good? You mention Scharnhorst. Is this the paper he wrote just before he died that says the allies didnt have the tactical skill or staff organisation of the French? What is its name and where could I get it? |
Kevin F Kiley | 03 Sep 2005 2:35 p.m. PST |
Raducci, Suvorov especially prized Austrian staff officers. Peter the Great imported foreign officers to jump start his reorganization of the Russian army. During the Napoleonic period Barclay was considered a 'foreigner' by even members of his own staff. I would recommend The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White. He has done extensive work with German archival material, even having access to Eastern Germany in the early 1980s. The book is excellent. I would also highly recommend Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret. That and his Clausewitz and the State. Sincerely, Kevin |
Kevin F Kiley | 03 Sep 2005 5:10 p.m. PST |
Mr. Hollins, There is a lot of mythology surrounding the "creation" of Korps in 1809. The list itself, reproduced by Bowden, was sketched out by Chief of Staff Mayer as part of his war planning. The 1809 armies were huge compared with the 1805 and earlier campaigns, so he just listed out some formations ina way that reflected the old practice of a corps being something bigger than a division and numbered them for reference. A quick comparison with the final line-up shows there was nothing fixed about them at all. The same structures contineud throughout the campaign and it was all abandoned at the end of he campaign, so if Austria had no "permanent" Korps before the campaign, nither did it have afterwards. Indeed as Rothenberg notes, in 1813, they were called Armee Abteilungen, but were organised in the same way.' And the point is? They still didn't have enough staff to handle them and the commanders were not skilled in their use. It is all about this "post-1807" reaction to show how the Allies won using French methods, but is not actually based on anything more than wishful thinking and a desire to read into a single document a meaning, which is not actually there.' Examples, please. The French system was only "permanent" from 1803, because the GA was permanently at war. Its staff were in fact rotated from the line and aside from a few who had held independent command pre-N and Davout, none of the senior commanders could function on their own.' The corps d'armee system was introduced in 1800 and the information is in du Cugnac as you have been shown more than once. Massena, Macdonald, St. Cyr, Marmont, Lannes, Desaix, Kleber, Savary, Eugene (who was especially adept at defeating Austrian generals), and others clearly demonstrated that they could operate independently at one time or another operationally. It should be remembered that Frederick accurately stated that offensive generals are few in any age. That adage was excellently demonstrated by both the British and Austrians during the period. All this permanence also goes back to trying to get round the existing system. Austria would have armies and corps/columns in the normal way,. which ahd commanders with the required staff. This of course has to be differentiated, so the "French" authors claim that the French developed permanent divs with permanent staffs in the 1780s yes they do, but this was a peacetime arrangement similar to Russian Inspections and Austrian Generalkommandos in the provinces. If you look at De Cugnac, you will often see the 18e Division taking about the various field divs passing through and the only "corps" are odd side units which shows what a lot of nonsense this claim about N's 1800 new corps was (sorry, I was taken in by it too in the Marengo campaign!).' The French started using divisions late in the Seven Years War-see Quimby-and they were the only nation to use them routinely and doctrinally in the wars of the Revolution. Next in line could quite possibly be the United States Army-organized as the Legion of the United States by Anthony Wayne in 1794. N's corps could equally be columns as they are simply a necessary army size you could easily note that the 13 armies of Carnot are about the same size. They are necessary at that size since that is the maximum you can run down each road. However, they all took precise instructions from the central brain they w re never given indepoendent misisons or anything else that has been built up subsequently to get round the Moltke problem.' That's an oversimplification and inaccurate. On the 1809 Austrian staffs, it was not a case of not being up to it that is just a claim. It was a bad CoS (Prochaska), who lost control of the army and too few trained staff officers to go round (II korps' CoS was a Hauptmann captain). Indeed, IV korps with soem help from III did well in the face of overwhelming odds at Eckmuhl, while the left escaped through Landshut to defeat Bessieres at Neumarkt, while the rest of the army escaped through Bohemia to fight again. The only commanders N would leave on their own were Davout and Massena, plus Lannes with a small advance-guard, but all had shown they could function without N's direction.' Again, inaccurate. See Rothenberg or offer evidence to the contrary. You haven't done that. As to what commanders Napoleon could actually employ in independent commands, see the information supplied above-or you could wait until the generals book comes out next year from Greenhill. Since Moltke permanent staffs and their senior commanders have practised "war games". However, the staff is a separate formation and has a career structure to it the French merely rotated people from the line hence its rapid deterioration as the task became bigger and they too lacked experienced staff.' Abject failure in two world wars proved the bankruptcy of that system. The US has never had a general staff corps in that all those officers do is serve as staff officers. US practice is to rotate them through the line so that they have the opportunity to command. There is a very big difference from being a staff officer and being a commander. The French also instituted a rotation system so that officers had to go back to the line to get promoted. There is no magical French divisional staff' Who said there was?
it is important to bear in mind that there were no French professional staff officers, just men rotated from the line, and if you look at what they did, it was simply to carry the admin burden.' Berthier was a professional staff officer, as were the thirty adjutants generals who were legislated as staff officers in 1790. Berthier also had experience with line units and was a thorough professional. I would suggest actually reading Thiebault's manual instead of commenting on it without seeing it. Do you actually know what staff work is? Much of it is administration, and without that being done at one level, it throws that work up to the next staff group in the chain, thus slowing down the process which affects operations. The staff is there to relieve the commander of all detailed work. The chief of staff runs the staff. That point the Austrians didn't do well or understand, and that is why the French general staff was more functional and professional, school or not. The Prussian development left the Austrians standing in the dust. I have not explained the Austrian system clearly.' No, you haven't, nor have you demonstrated what a staff is supposed to do. 'The system at these lower levels is thus no different for Austria, except that the formations were not permanent as the army could not be maintained on that basis. Beyond that, an admin staff for a French div was allocated to the div, whereas an Asutrian comamnder would take his staff off to whatever formation he was given and was augmented by GS officers if engaged in indepenet operations. It gives an illusion of change in 1809, since every Korps was given a GS and AS under its designated commander, while the korps were still part of a bigger army. While that seems a new and different practice, it is based in the need to manage much much larger formations and Charles' intention that he only ahd to issue hios general intentions and could then leave it to hte corps comamnders to sort out the detail. This is of course the modern system and what is claimed (although not what happened) in the French army. In Charles' particular case, itw as also a difference in philiosophy sicne his physical weakness made him a natural delegator of functions in his peacetime overhauls of the army. This is another useful consideration, when you look at the level of civilian detail that N would deal with leopards do not change their spots.' That is definitely not the modern system and is a misinterpretation on your part. Consult modern staff manuals and you will see how staffs are supposed to be organized and function. Every army has their own way of doing business, but large formations have their own staffs organized in a uniform manner, and pertinent staff manuals outline this clearly. I posted information from the current Marine Corps staff manual some time ago on the duties of a chief of staff-they are remarkably similar to what Berthier proposed and did, and are not what you have stated they were. Interesting, isn't it? The real nature of N's system is apprent from Vachee in 1806 with the micro-direction of what are actually centrally controlled columns' You are relying on a single source (which you fault others for doing) whose object as far as I can see is glorification of Napoleon at Berthier's expense. There isn't a lot of useful material in Vachee as his appreciation for the Grande Armee's staff system is lacking. Perhaps he was politically motivated? Davout's "independent" actions were simply down to an HQ foul-up.' If that is so, and it isn't, what about Echmuhl and Mogilev? It seems to me that you have repeated how badly the French performed in 1806 from the general staff on down. Yet, they managed to completely destroy the Prussian army and state in six weeks. Not too bad for a bunch of SNAFU artists. The point I was alluding to was the micro-managing of Davout and Bernadotte in 1806, although N tried to keep a very tight rein on Eugene in 1809 (see Epstein).'
And your conclusions here are incorrect. Again, did you actually read Epstein? I don't see micromanagement of the corps commanders in 1806. Napoleon tells them what he wants done, and how they get it done is their business. Eugene handled his independent command in 1809 with increasing competence. Napoleon could give all the advice and instructions he cared to-that doesn't win campaigns-talent does. His problem was that there were not enough trained staff to go round.' Why was that if their staff was so proficient as you have repeatedly stated? The war wasn't a surprise as it was being planned for some time. Looks like the Austrians really screwed the pooch with that one-and they completely muffed their offensive into Bavaria. And that was one of the major problems in 1809, along with no division staffs and a crop of senior commanders who couldn't handle the new system. Sincerely, Kevin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 04 Sep 2005 4:05 p.m. PST |
I think we can close this one off quickly: " I agree with him based on both study and experience in organization of armies." You cannot read the German material, so how on earth do you know? You have copied claims made by Rothenberg, which are merely Ruling Theory. You are merely repeating said RT. We have also heard of your involvement in staff work dissected in the Dragoons thread, the gist of which was that youw ere a junior officer in a corps with no permanent staff. All very interesting, but hardly an indepth undberstanding. " two or more infantry divisions and enough cavalry to scout for it." yes, look at Austrian formations as set up in wartime, No, they were not "permanent" because the army was not "permanently" at war. Indeed, given your claims about the 1800 French, I recommend you read Moreau's letter to N and how the French use "corps" in De C (see Simmonds Games). The French merely went permanent with standing army – operating by central dirtection – your claima bout divisions is based ona an incorrect reading of the 1780s' divisions, which are no different from the peacetime orgs in Russia and Austria. There is a inhertent contradiction in your flexibility with provisional corps – how can that be "permanent", any more than Desaix's supposed corps, which alsted 3 days or Lannes, which had three different ararngements in 6 weeks. No, you just see "coprs "and need to get round Moltke. The Austrian systemn was not permanent, but devolved power with real staff (not scribes in a adjutant staff role) in the corps was the key from which the modern system developed. Nobody was using a wholly modern system, but we are looking for the origin of it, so it was about big army management by devolution of power and sharing the load. It was the Austrian system, which triumphed in the end, because it could manage the huge armies and that is why the Prussians adopted it, leading to Moltke. Raducci is right about Austrian staff as they were trained to do the General Staff functions, which neither the French nor Russian were. Beware Raduci of these authors Kevin quotes – he is repeating their claims, not the underlying facts. One of this lot is a German Jew with ana axe to grind and the rest cannot break out of Ruling Theory. Indeed, you can also see Kevin using RT here in its second stsge – by defining something to fit his conclusion – thus his conclusion drives his definition. You are hearing what kevin tells you about other authors, who have done some research (although none examined Austria) – that is not the same as doing the research nor indeed do it show the difference between a claim/agenda and real fact. They want the French to be the modern system, because the Germans were unpopualr when they wrote – more recent events may lead to a situation, where people turn away from France in the US (certainly publishing anything about the French is a no-no at p[resent), so beware the recent influences. I am now questioning Kevin whether you can read French – I noted your amusing rendition of "le donna" as a title and the reliance on English versions of French works in your book (I am hearing interesting stuff about the original du teil). Go to the Simmons Games site and you can see how the French use "corps" – it is not the way Elting fantasises – and then read the Moreau letters in Campredon, but you haven't have you? There is no French corps system in 1800 – it was merely the allocation of divisions to senior commanders – indeed much like the Austrians (and do note where the Austrian massed their cavalry – around Turin in a corps under Hadik). Now we are on to Epstein – yes, the really rubbish bit of his book is this claim about corps – and where does it get it from? Same place as you, Rothenberg. To do research, you must at least read the primary material, not repeat third hand claims. Back to the 1807 reaction – well, red Rothenberg where you will find that the first regulations were, erm, 1806! Then see what he says about how they changed – well, they didn't. Then of course we have the claims about "skirmishing", but that has been done to death. However, it for you to demonstrate the positive – since provinga negative is difficult to impossible. Certainly, Austria did not have enough staff and did not have the benefit of the big formations working together, but Austria could not be a militarised state – that does not address operational systems or the origins of modern concepts. |
Kevin F Kiley | 05 Sep 2005 4:09 a.m. PST |
Mr. Hollins, Why are you bringing race and ethnicity of an author into the discussion. That is most unseemly and unnecessary to my mind. Who are you talking about anyway? If you are referring to Gordon Craig, he was born in Scotland in 1913 as I have already posted. Again, I don't see bringing race and ethnicity into any historical argument. What is your point in doing that? Sincerely, Kevin |
Kevin F Kiley | 05 Sep 2005 4:57 a.m. PST |
Raducci, All of the authors I have used or quoted are either respected authorities in their own right or subject area authorities who know their business. And, while everyone commits errors when they write, the authors I have referred to have all done excellent work and can be relied on as references. Sincerely, Kevin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 05 Sep 2005 5:50 a.m. PST |
You conveniuently overlook the agendas that can come from race or nationality – the biggest problem in your case is that you quote a lot of North Americans, who have a dislike for the Germanic nations and so want everything to be "French" in some way. Many of your fellow countrymen might now see things differently at the moment. The test is simply have they done the research – in many cases, they have not (just like your own artillery work) and you quote their claims as if they are fact. This "reliable" nonsense is meaningless – but whatever you are trying to infer, they should actually try reading something other than third hand received wisdom in most cases. |
Kevin F Kiley | 05 Sep 2005 9:31 a.m. PST |
Mr. Hollins, Again, who were you referring to with your 'German Jew' comment? I do think that was uncalled for and it certainly is not germane to the issue. What do you know about any 'North American' authors? You don't read widely by your own admission, and you certainly have no knowledge of anything Don Graves has written. What agendas are you talking about? As for research, where did you come up with Gribeauval copying Lichtenstein? You have never answered that one. For the AN XI 6-pounder being a copy of the Austrian 6-pounder, didn't you admit on one of the Napoleon Series that it was just your opinion? If so, you are presenting that as fact and have never documented anything on that subject. Generally speaking from reading many of your posts, you assert things and don't provide any documentation at all. You merely attack people with whom you disagree. That isn't methodology, it is merely being contrary. Further, you seldom have a primary source listed for your Ospreys. Why is that? You do keep repeating to 'read the material' yet you certainly don't document that you do that yourself-and you don't read the material you denigrate or review. You are very critical of source material, but you have admitted that you don't see or read it. Therefore, how can you be so certain that it isn't valid when you haven't seen it? Lastly, you have stated repeatedly that Gribeuaval's pieces were '10% overweight.' Overweight from what? If you're using the Lichtenstein pieces as a standard, that isn't an accepted standard for anything. If you are under the mistaken belief that it is, then provide the evidence to back it up. The Lichtenstein system was merely another step in artillery development, and much of it was a copy of the Prussian material that gave the Austrians so much trouble in the War of the Austrian Succession. And the copying is in the elevation mechanism, the gun carriages, and the calibers. What 'new' things did Lichtenstein and his associates come up with? You're forgetting that standardization was taken by Lichtenstein from Valliere and there was a French field artillery system that predated Lichtenstein and the Prussians. Perhaps you should read Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, which I highly doubt you have. Haven't you, as you have admitted doing for other books you have denigrated, such as the Esposito/Elting Atlas, merely skimmed? That isn't study, that's nonsense. Sincerely, Kevin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 05 Sep 2005 3:43 p.m. PST |
Nonsense wopuld be the appropraaite word for much of your book – indeed, were you to answer the questions on the Yr XI, you would see where I am coming from. however, you put in one assertion about its carriages falling to bits and no illustration – what are you trying to hide? The G barrel problem, is quite simple – it is too thick as the Yr XI proves. The man was a miner with no grasp of field artillery as he was never involved in it. However, I am not sure that authors who make up 1/2 pages on the central report of 1762 and never read it are hardly in a position to question those who have. So, Kevin, about the bricole? Still no answer – well, ep[rhaps you can tell us about the evidence to back your claim (made twice in your FE article) that G was put in charge of the Austrian artillery – could we have a ref for the appointment? Perhaps you can tell us about artillery round projectiles lines of flight or indeed, why you made up the piece on the 1762 report? Yes, you are as sloppy as other North American writers, who do not even get their facts right on the French. let alone anything else. I suggest you read up on de Valliere too, but if as you allege, he stanrdardised things, perhaps you would tell us why you and others claim this was a G innovation, as he came after both de V and L? |
Carnot93 | 06 Sep 2005 8:06 a.m. PST |
Kevin – No problem with the delay, just back in from out of town myself. Dave hush, this thread is about higher-level organization, start your own thread for the @[%! bricole. Everyone else apologies, this is a very long post in a very long thread but the nature of the topic requires some wordiness. 1. Evidence that "the staff couldn't handle it"? <I>[K] See Rothenberg, Napoleon's Great Adversary, page 165-166; also see the comment from Mr. Hollins in the posting dated 1 September o5 at 0333 PST in this thread, the last sentence.</I> I see now where this is coming from, and "the staff couldn't handle it" strikes me as a bit oversimplified. Rothenberg goes on to state that the chief problem was one of overcentralization, and clearly the way in which the corps system was structured did create problems that the staff was unable to overcome. My reading of Rothenberg is that this was more the fault of the structure, not the staff. What is also clear is that this is NOT a copy of the French system with distributed staff responsibilities, but rather more an extension of the "top-down" Austrian structure with an attempt to graft on an extra layer without distribution of responsibilities as in the French system. Again, the nomenclature is the same and there are superficial similarities with the French system, but I have some difficulty seeing this as a "copy" or as directly derivative of the French system. There are more similarities between the Liechtenstein artillery system and the Griebauval system than between the 1809 Austrian Corps system and the French corps system, it seems to me, and that is an area where you reject the idea of "copying." I agree with you on that, the Liechtenstein system was perhaps a dominant influence on Griebauval, but here I do not see evidence of copying of the French corps system, the deviations from it and similarities to prior Austrian practice work against the theory of "copying." 1809 is not a period I have studied in much depth, but the argument for copying strikes me as being based on superficial similarities and not on actual study of the discussions surrounding the formation of the new staff structure. 2. Copying of the French model <I>[K] It would seem to me to be an attempt to copy the French methods of organization but it still wasn't as complete as it could have been.'</I> The degree to which anything is a "copy" as opposed to logical extension of existing practices is always problematic. See the Liechtenstein/Griebauval debate for a similar issue. The responsibilities of the Austrian army-level staff are largely unchanged in 1809, which suggests an extension of Austrian practice rather than an import of French structure. The degree of French influence on the structure is obviously open to debate. Like the Russian divisional structure of 1806 this seems to me to be an extension of established practice with some very general influence from the French model, so your case is no weaker than Dave's case for Griebauval copying (though I sense post hoc ergo proctor hoc reasoning as the basis for both arguments) 3. Definition of Permanence <I>
based on your incorrect statement regarding the complete absence of permanent corps-sized formations in 1805, I have to wonder if you are aware of the similarities between the 1805 and 1809 structures that point towards a natural structural development without specific external influences.' 1. define "permanent" in relation to a "permanent corps system"' [K] Something that is institutionalized in the system and is used repeatedly tactically and operationally. After 1805, the French corps were kept intact in Germany. The same ones went into Prussia in 1806 and kept on going into Poland in 1807. The French second invasion of Spain in 1808 was made up of some of the original corps that went east in 1805. Davout's command was intact through 1812, though it was renumbered for 1812. The Grande Armee was deactivated for Spain-the corps organizations were not. [K] "And before this degenerates into either a he said, she said' discussion or a my dog is bigger than yours' I would suggest that a demonstration of permanence in Austrian higher-level formations be given." [K] "You have a different perception of what permanence in organization is from mine." </I>
Agreed, we are using different definitions of permanence. This is not a "my dog is better than your dog" discussion, rather a disagreement over basic definitions for framing the study of higher-level formations. In fact, I have not made any specific qualitative evaluations of either system except to say that I believe the French system to be superior by virtue of having a permanent multi-tier structure. You may be confusing my position with Dave's. My argument is limited to the fact that a higher-level structure existed and that this structure can be considered permanent (for the duration of the conflict). First, the definition of "permanence." You define this differently and have proceeded to tell me I am incorrect because my arguments do not match your definition. They shouldn't match, they are based on my definition. Second, let's take your definition of permanence that corps, once established, will remain intact even in times of peace. You note that the first French corps were developed in 1800 (a highly debatable assertion in itself, but useful for testing your definition). Between 1800 and 1804 there is a complete discontinuity in organization therefore by your definition, there is no permanent corps structure in this period. For 1804-1807 there is an established structure. In this period, there is a standing army maintained in Germany and no standing down to a peacetime footing. For 1807-1810 there is a redistribution of forces for a new campaign, so the corps structure is dramatically reorganized and in 1809 new corps are formed for the war with Austria. Between 1809 and 1812 there is considerable discontinuity of structure, the corps in 1812 are unrecognizable from the corps of 1807 or even 1809 (although some of the divisions are). So by your definition, not only did the Austrians not have permanent corps, neither did the French. This definition does not work. With regard to my definition, the French corps of 1800 (and those of 1796-7) can be considered permanent as they remain intact (with minor adjustments) through the entire campaign. Further, they remain intact while the army is maintained on a wartime footing. There is discontinuity between 1797 and 1799, between 1800 and 1804, between 1807 and 1809 and between 1809 and 1812. These periods of reorganization coincide with periods of peace (temporary though it was) and is precisely what could be expected. Corps are not the ultimate military organization. They are a practical solution to the problem of managing a large army and are designed to provide a hierarchical decentralized command structure. Therefore, where there is no large army, there are no corps, whether this is a small army during wartime or the army as a whole during peacetime. For peacetime administrative organization, the French had territorial divisions (termed military divisions or districts) that were established in the aftermath of the 7YW. 4. Evidence of permanence in the French Corps system <I>[K] "There really isn't much difference from a French corps organization of the period and US one in War II, or today. A corps is basically a headquarters with corps troops (supply, artillery, military police, etc., ) assigned permanently to it along with two or more infantry divisions and enough cavalry to scout for it." </I> Agreed, except that you have produced no evidence that the French system was retained in peacetime, the examples you have offered actually work against your argument. During the Napoleonic era, the French army established corps at the outset of a campaign and once the campaign concluded the corps may have been retained as part of a standing army or occupation force or may have been dispersed or redistributed as the situation required. Your assertion that 1800 marks the beginning of the French permanent corps structure is particularly damaging to your argument as the period of complete peace saw the most complete destructuring of the French higher-level organization.
<I>[K]" Where is that evident in the ad hoc organization the Austrians used?" </I> I provided one example (Kienmayer) and can provide others will go into more detail in a separate post as time permits. This post is already long enough. 5. Advantages and disadvantages <I>[K] "The French trained together and knew each other
snip
. corps strengths were not fixed-it depended on the skill of the commander and Napoleon's desire to confuse enemy intelligence." </I>
Agreed, but not relevant to discussion of Austrian structure. <I>[K] "Second, I agree with you that the Austrian structural changes were gradual, as were those of other armies of the period. The problem with the Austrians, is they were slow to do it and didn't have the caliber commanders or staff to handle it initially, if indeed they actually had them at all during the period in the quantity and quality that was required." </I> Partially agreed, the Austrian system used previously was in fact more centralized and more labor-intensive than the corps system used by the French, and this seems to have been its greatest weakness. Decentralizing the staff organization was essential once armies reached the size they did in later wars, but the deficiency in 1809 was, as Rothenberg pointed out, one of excessive centralization, making the subordinate staff layer largely irrelevant. Further, the number of staff officers capable of handling army-level CoS duties was limited. Consider for a moment the number of French staff officers capable of "driving" the GQG? There is Berthier and
. Berthier. When Berthier is gone, we get all kinds of criticism of the poor guys ineffectively trying to fill his shoes. Again it is a case of centralization and handling the volume of work at the army level. In the case of the Austrian corps system in 1809, there is a clear case that there was a failure at the staff level, which is observed fact. Reasons for it can include the individual (the staff officers couldn't handle it) but can also include Dave's explanation (individual failure rather than personal failure) or structural explanations (the system was set up poorly and retained too much central control). All three factors seem to contribute, this was a new structure and the staff officers could logically be expected to need time to work the bugs out. 6. Permanence of Austrian corps <I>2. Agreed that Austrian divisions were ad hoc (much as French brigades were at this point), but what evidence do you offer for the complete absence of corps in 1805?' [K] Again, see Rothenberg and your own comments below. Ad hoc is not permanent.</I> Rothenberg notes that the Austrians used semi-permanent brigades and divisions and had no permanent corps. This is demonstrably incorrect. Brigade assignments can be shown to be semi-permanent, divisions were entirely ad hoc (there is no way that I can see even semi-permanence as Rothenberg asserts), and corps were permanent. Details on Austrian organization in 1805 cannot be found in Rothenberg's excellent overview due to the very broad and general nature of the work. What else do you have to back up Rothenberg's generalization? <I>You obviously have not studied the Austrian higher level structure in 1805 at all. It is based on permanent corps-sized formations (permanent in my definition being for the duration of the campaign).' [K] By the above definition, the Austrian organization was not permanent. I don't agree with either you or Kessinger. An Austrian command above the regiment in 1805 was not the equivalent of a French one. I wouldn't start to throw stones-you have no idea what I've done or studied. Comments like that should be kept our of the discussion. I could make an equivalent one about your qualifications to comment on corps organization and structure, but what purpose would that serve. I suggest we both keep to the high road.</I> Agreed, I have no idea what you have studied. I had not intended to throw stones, just to state a fact. I have not studied the details of Austrian corps organization in 1809 nor have I studied artillery, and those are two of the many thin spots in my background. It is important to be up front and honest about where our expertise lies and where our limitations are. We all have areas of focus. Apologies if I offended. I should modify my statement to "from what you have written, it does not seem that you have studied the Austrian organization in 1805 at all." From your current comments, it does not seem that you have gone any deeper than Rothenberg, but please correct me if I'm wrong. There is nothing pejorative in this and I hope you will not take offense. I know the difficulties I have encountered in digging up information on Austrian organization in 1805, there is very little material in print. Rothenberg is an excellent overview and a good starting point, but his unsupported generalizations, like anyone's unsupported generalizations, need to be questioned and matched against evidence. Rothenberg is incorrect in both his characterization of Austrian divisions and his characterization of Austrian corps in 1805. It would be much more accurate if the words "corps" and "divisions" were reversed in his statements, then the issue would be between semi-permanent corps and permanent corps which is plainly debatable. Should I note that Rothenberg's conception of "permanence" seems to coincide more closely with mine? He is claiming a degree of permanence at the brigade level that has no basis beyond the duration of the conflict. <I>Most of the allied columns fighting at Austerlitz were comparable to a French 2-division corps (1st column somewhat larger)
The Russians consistently used the term "column" and the Austrians used the term "corps" in the documents I have seen. Both describe an established army subdivision and both the column and corps might be subdivided into divisions and brigades.' [K] Comparable how? In numbers? Certainly not in capability nor in the ability to operate independently. And, as proven, not in fighting ability. Cohesion was poor. </I> Comparable in size and intended function. That they did not perform at the same level as French corps is performance, not function. <I>The allied columns were forces of all arms (analagous to the French corps) and had a parallel function to the French corps. These were often described as being "ad hoc" and Langeron is cited in proof — big snip — [K] "Pay attention to Langeron." </I> I have paid very close attention to Langeron and have matched his assertions against the orders that were issued to him. But don't take my word for it, please see the original dispositions and daily orders conveniently reproduced in M. I. Kutuzov: Sbornik Dokumentov, ed. by L. G. Beskrovnyi, Vol. II. Moscow: 1951. Langeron's complaint stems from a specific incident affecting a single day which is exaggerated to "daily". The columns as established at Olmutz are identical to the columns that fought at Austerlitz with the exception of jager redistribution and cavalry assignments, and both of these adjustments have their parallels on the French side. <I>[K] "As already stated, the French organized new corps at the beginning of a campaign (Massena did so in 1809). They also were proficient at using provisional corps. The ability and efficiency were there through long practice. I would submit that a French division being cross-attached to another corps for a battle or mission would feel just as at home as it would with its parent corps. I don't see that happening with the allies. Allied efficiency would undoubtedly suffer. I don't see that as routine with the French system."</I> Here we differ only slightly. The efficient adaptation of the basic corps structure stems from the implementation of permanent divisions, the divisions being interchangeable. This sort of shuffling on the fly is one of the great advantages of the French structure. But the organization of new corps for new campaigns and the shuffling of corps on the fly works against your definition of permanence. I have no problems with considering the French corps system permanent and this is plainly the case in the definition I am using. But the characteristics of this permanence are such that it also applies to the Austrians. Unless two separate sets of standards are applied to Austrians and French. French divisions are the key building blocks, and the corps are established, rearranged and dissolved based on the needs of the current campaign or occupation mission. <I>At issue is not whether or not the Austrians had a full-fledged corps d'armee system entirely analogous to the French they did not and were really one developmental step behind. At issue is Kevin's assertion that they had no permanent formations above the regiment when there is ample evidence to suggest that they did (using my definition of permanence). Roland Kessinger also demonstrated this with the 1799 Austrians in an FE article several years ago.' [K] That is exactly the issue. It appears to me that you're merely trying to justify all things being equal when they are not. There is a very good primer you might want to get hold of from the West Point Military History Series: Definitions and Doctrine of the Military Art. I have found it most helpful from time to time. The series editor in Thomas E. Greiss.</I> If I have given the impression that I consider all things equal, then I have not succeeded in communicating my meaning. All things were not equal. I think you are mistaking "functionally equivalent" to equality in all things, which is a big stretch from what I have written. The equivalence does not extend beyond size and function. The Austrian corps system in 1805 was lacking a number of essential elements. But something is not nothing and structure that remains intact for the duration of the conflict can be said to be permanent, to say otherwise presents distinct problems as noted above. <I>"Organizationally the allies were behind by a step and a half most of the time. Read Scharnhorst for his comments on what the Prussians needed to do to catch up.' And they were much better off than the Austrians by 1813.</I> Agreed, organizationally the allies were a step behind the French. Who has claimed otherwise? Well Dave has, but this is where Dave and I were in the process of disagreeing. Where you have misunderstood is in inferring that functional equivalence implies equivalent performance. This is your inference, not my assertion. The function of a corps is to decentralize army command into manageable semi-autonomous subunits. Thus the allied columns/corps are the functional equivalents to the French corps. While they are equivalent in intended function, they do not perform at the same level for a variety of reasons lack of permanent subdivisions (divisions), ability of individual commanders, the degree to which autonomy is allowed/encouraged by the army commander and composition (in some cases). It's important not to confuse performance with intended function. It is also important not to mistake the corps d'armee structure as the only correct' higher level organization. A Toyota might perform better than a Yugo, but they are functionally equivalent. <I>As for the idea of permanence, once any army stood down to a peacetime footing, the army structure changed, as it did with the French between 1800 and 1805. The reason French structure appears to be more "permanent" is that the army never assumed a peacetime footing during the entire period 1803-1814
Claims that the French would have retained their organization even on a peacetime footing are just conjecture, we can't know because this never occurred.' [K] You are incorrect. French combat units stood down after 1809, some going on a peace footing and staffs being transferred to Spain. And, as already stated, between 1805 and 1806, the French did maintain the corps structure, as Davout did in Germany. So, again you have erred. This is not what I wrote, the error is in your reading of this. I stated that the French army did not stand down to a peacetime footing. If some French combat units did, what of it? Are you saying that there is an army-wide reversion to peacetime footing at any point aside from 1802-3 that is comparable to Austrian in 1806-9? There is not. The elements of the French army that did stand down to a peacetime footing did NOT remain in any previous corps structure they were formerly a part of. Again, the elements that retained a consistent organization are those that remained on a war footing. This is consistent with corps structure being maintained only while the army remains on a wartime footing (duration of campaign or conflict). When war ceases (1802-3) the corps structure disappears. When war resumes, the corps structure is reconstructed in an appropriate way for the new conflict, often with reassignment of divisions, new command structure etc. Overall, by no means should you take what I say as gospel, but it is unwise to take unsupported generalizations in a broad overview, even one by a respected authority in his field, as gospel either. Rothenberg has no useful details on Austrian organization and just provides a very general overview concerning all aspects of the entire army over a 25-year period. Beskrovnyi includes a large number of very interesting documents relating to Russian and later allied column organization. For Austrian corps organization in Germany and the Tyrol you will have to piece together a variety of sources the reports from spies that are reproduced in Alombert & Colin are useful but contain inaccuracies (not surprising considering how they were obtained). Schonhals and the museum booklets (Egger, et al) have good details but require cross-checking with Wrede to identify the handful of errors. The results can then be cross-checked against regimental histories to fill in the gaps that Schonhals leaves. Rustow isn't useful at this level. For Italy, Schneid is a good place to start but this will lead you to Criste. Beyond Criste I'm still looking. Specific examples will follow. |
Carnot93 | 06 Sep 2005 8:08 a.m. PST |
Darn, html coding for bold worked, but italics didn't. Apologies if that's hard to read. |
Kevin F Kiley | 07 Sep 2005 3:06 a.m. PST |
Bob, Not a problem. I'll respond later when I have a little time. School and football have started so I'm back to 12-hour days. On another subject, your book arrived yesterday. I'll let you know what I think off-line when I finish it if that's OK with you. I'm not going to review it in public as we're usually debating on line, don't usually agree on some major topics, and I don't think it appropriate if that's OK with you. For the record, I have a very good first impression of it. You've done a lot of good, hard work, and I do know what that's like and I'm finishing up my second one now so I'm more scatter-brained than usual. Sincerely, Kevin |
Carnot93 | 07 Sep 2005 5:32 a.m. PST |
Kevin - Thanks, I will appreciate any feedback. If you feel inspired to review/comment publicly, I have no problem with that. I'm not particularly thin-skinned. I will look into my crystal ball and predict that you will disagree with me on a number of broad topics, but for most of these I have the words of Napoleon himself backing me up! On the topic of errors we chatted about on the other forum, I noted one more editorial slip the other day – I had retained a number of French terms (ligne, legere, etc.) in my original MS and these were all translated in the editing process. To my chagrin, I saw just the other day that Marins had been transformed into Marines rather than the more accurate Sailors. I suspect in reviewing it over and over and over I kept reading Marins. Sigh. three mistakes and counting
As far as disagreeing, in the current case the main sticking point seems to be a definition. I think (but am not entirely certain) that you agree that (a) the Austrian army was in a period of transition, particularly for 1796-1809 and (b) that in 1805 it had corps-sized formations that (c) remained consistent for the duration of the campaign – which I would think at a minimum would be considered semi-permanent even with a more rigid definition of permanence. If that's the case, then I think we don't need to quibble over the definition and can focus instead on the more interesting topic of exploring the nature of the higher level organization the Austrians were tinkering with through this period. I will still pull together my examples of "corps consistency" for the 1805 Army of Germany (along with examples of divisional inconsistency). I will admit that "permanence" in the context of a 90-day campaign is relative. The problem is that in saying there is no permanent structure above the regiment, the impression is given that the Austrian army was a linear army that had not developed any higher-level structures and was essentially the same as the army of the 7YW which is plainly not the case, it was certainly somewhere between point A and point B. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 07 Sep 2005 5:45 a.m. PST |
A) this thread is about higher-level organization, start your own thread for the @[%! bricole.- You miss the point many of these arguments are very complex and so, it is necessary to provide some concrete means of showing what is going on. The bricole fits this role as it demonstrates the repetition of a claim without even the most basic checking as the fact is rather inconvenient to the overall claim, which is driving it. In that case, we have Gribeauval allegedly inventing this important piece of kit (see Kevin's footnote in his book) as it is part of a claim that Gribeauval innovated many aspects of artillery kit to create his dominant system, which was radically better than anyone else's. This despite the fact that Duffy shows it in Austrian sue in 1757 and du Teil in the original French notes that Gribeauval introduced it into French use. Thus, those, who do not bother to do the basic checking are in fact merely repeating opinion as though it were fact hence Kevin's regular refs to the likes of Graves and Roithenberg. B) Evidence and Information: That said, it does not exclude anyone from the discussion since they are perfectly entitled to say "I have read in x secondary work that" or simply to ask a question like "who invented x?" However, I would fundamentally disagree with you over Kevin's comment: "you have no idea what I've done or studied. Comments like that should be kept our of the discussion". Absolutely wrong it is vital to know what anyone has read, since it is impossible to consider the evidence produced otherwise. If two people have read the same evidence, they can still reach different conclusions based on it or other information or other backgroud influences West Point has taught this Napoleonic origin claim pretty much since its foundation and the vast majority of authors have simply not examined the relevant material. In particular, the Ruling Theory takes hold and that is repeated without checking viz. the bricole. C) Definitions: This is the key part of Ruling Theory. The definition is drawn to fit the conclusion from which further extrapolations are made without actually checking the original. In the case of the Queen Anne's Revenge, the vessel is said to be the QAR, therefore definitions are put in that fit it such as construction and multiplicity of gun types. Any later vessel fitting these characteristics must thus be a pirate vessel. This conveniently overlooks the fact that multiplicity of guns is due to the use of barrels as ballast at this time. The definition will also move as aspects become inconvenient in the case of Gribeauval's gun system, Nafziger followed some received wisdom that the double trunnion position was due to G. It isn't and Kevin has rightly abandoned that one. Of cpourse, the bricole has not been abandoned and here we move to the "denial stage" in the case of the QAR, there is a barrel, which appears to be dated post-wreck, so the markings are ignored or somehow explained away. For the corps, this means the definition relies heavily on "permanence". Why? Easy really the word already exists in the 1790s to mean a force larger than a division or one on a separate mission. The staffs are allocated among these formations. It could be said that the Carnot 13 armies or the Austrian allocations of "armies" were roughly one or two corps size, but both lacked centralised control except from their political masters. However, theyw ere all-arms formations as were the army corps, since they were a mix of divisions and assorted reserves. Here is where the bigm army management comes in artillery had for example been messed in reserve in all armies, but now, it had to be distributed from that army reserve on an ad hoc basis to provde the requisite firepower over battalion guns. So, how about centralised "army" control that already exists in the 1790s meanings above and was used by for example Moreau in both 1796 and 1800. However, there is another corps definition, which has been forgotten here the ability to obtain local superiority against an otherwise larger enemy. This lesson was however learned in 1796 in Germany (convenient amnesia at this point). Moreau and Jourdan were limited by the road network, but importantly, were under separate direction from Paris. In contrast, for operational reasons, the two Austrian armies were united under one command and then broken into four parts, which could be used to obtain local superiority at Wurzburg and then move south against Moreau. What you are left with in an attempt to mirror modern armies is allegedly "permanence" in some kind of peacetime environment, where corps can be partially stood down or units even shifted about. D) Was there permanence? Bob has been over most of this. However, now we can see the RT definition moving. What does "permanence" mean if it is to take in 1800? Lannes' corps had three different arrangements, while Desaix lasted three days with half of his force on the Scrivia (Boudet) and half at Marengo (Monnier). The claim becomes that the commander was there to have units moved around below him, except that Austria did the same. Look at Annex 13 to De Cugnac Part1 and here we see the army listed out by its divisions the word "corps" is actually used to designate the infantry type and then the specific unit. Each division is made up of a designation des corps, using legere or bataille for the infantry, followed by numeros des corps, setting out the one legere and two bataille DBs involved. Beyond that is the cavalry reserve (Hadik directed the Austrian version around Turin) and the artillery.There is no attempt to even allocate the Lieutenants General an existing French title meaning a Gen de Div commanding something larger, but not a whole army until 10th May. The definition will change again 1800 is only the germ of the idea made flesh in 1803, but still "counts" as the opening stage. Why? This goes back to the letter NB wrote to Moreau in march, where he confirmed Moreau's organisation as M had set out, except that the left wing is called a corps, when only div size and originally described by M as such. Here we see the awkward definition in the past, it was the idea that this was the first use of the word, except that M was using the same org as in 1796. That has gone, although somehow N still has to be the originator in fact, he was merely saying look I am in charge, so I will "tell" you how to organise your army, although I am actually only confirming it for reasons of political weakness. Then there are provisional corps, which are just groups of units assembled for a specific purpose after the campaign has begun. However, in the French case, these are invariable advance-guards, which were kept on a looser rein by all armies. E) Over centralisation and symmetry: This brings us to the criticism of the Austrian system. The RT is that the Allies won by copying the French, but they then become confused apparently according to Rothenberg, the system failed in April and so, Charles reverted to central command for the Marchfeld battles. Aside from the obvious point that battles are always fought under central control, this is in direct confluit with Epstein, who claims that the Austrians mirrored the French at Wagram. The first claim is symmetry based solely on Mayer's draft of 1st March 1809, which he used to start the planning process for a considerably larger army that Austria had ever fielded. Curiously, if we consider Kevin's definition of corps we get two divs of mostly infantry, some cavalry for routine duties and some artillery for a punch. Go to 1800 and we find the divisions of Moreau and NB were these infantry groups of 1 legere and two bataille with the necessary cavalry and a few guns. It is in fact the French, who are more symmetrical! In Austria, the planning process was different up to 1809 the commanders were selected and the units allocated according to priorities. While Vienna retained control usually through the CoS, aside from some top level appointments, it was down to the army planners to sort out allocations of troops. Thus the divisions and corps are of varying sizes according to task requirements. As Roland Kessinger shows in 1799, there was if anything too much fluidity in the army org as individual units were shifted between commands. To some extent, the brigades were permanent, since the units tended to be allocated in a similar way due to their base locations and C3 considerations of language. The only difference was that in 1809, Mayer set out a rough draft of the formations before formulating his campaign plans. This OB is well-known and Austrian units just seem to appear and disappear in Germany in fact, following a change of CoS and campaign plan, the corps were shifted around quite a bit with new parts being broken off (eg: Vecsey). How about centralisation? Aside from Rothenberg and Epstein differing, why is this criticism made/ Again, it is an RT method of distinguishing the French from everyone else. Here, the "what have your read/what is your background" is relevant. Kevin using the RT wants it to be so, Bob comes from a Russian angle and enters the Austrian angle through the prism of Mack. Mayer had done quite a bit of the planning before Mack took over but he was Vienna's place man and determined to be the "one", who defeated N. This he had in common with Zach in 1800 and both derive from the position of the CoS, who allocated the staff duties. The temptation to try to direct everything was no different in Mack than it was in Napoleon except that N was better at it. Much depended on the CoS Schmitt was prepared to share the load with Mayer in 96. Berthier was just a clerk, so NB was carrying the load. The Austrian army in 1809 was not centralised it would not have survived being split in half in Bavaria and certainly would not have won Neumarkt. What is this centralisation? It was NB, who tried to micro-manage every campaign and battle not Austria. By Sept 1805, Charles had resolved the problem with the CoS by limiting his sphere to Ops and Int, although his placed greater burdens on the CinC. However, in terms of staffwork, the Austrian army was still using the 1767 regs, so there could not have been any copying of French practice. (Note the RT claims will then be that Austria did not reform "enough"). F) The Staff: This follows on from the centralisation claim. There is supposed to be this permanent French div staff and later the corps staffs, and above hem the army staff under CoS Berthier. What is the distribution of responsibilities, which is supposed to be at the Austrian top level, but further down the French? Army commanders and senior commanders in every army have always had heir own staffs throughout history, so the key is who did what? What did these French div staffs do that took the load from Army HQ? Nobody ever actually answers this as they performed what was essentially a mix of admin and logistics roles. Kevin is right that much staff work is administrative, but that is an Adjutant staff job with some logistics involvement, what became known overall as the Dienst (Service) dept in the Austrian 1811 organisation. The French staff at div level are doing no more than the staff of an Austrian FML at that level indeed, every Austrian GM, (normally a brigade commander's rank) would have a small staff, so you can argue that the Austrian staff was even more devolved with brigade staffs. The focus due to the effects of Ruling Theory is however on the corps. These supposed small armies operating independently under central HQ strategic guidance. But is that true? Orders did not carry the strategic concept, only what a commander needed to know. What did these corps staffs do? They only had to direct the formation in the conduct of the precise orders given to them. Contrast that with Austria, where the whole ops plan was sent to each senior commander, who had a CoS, whose primary task was to help the corps commander carry out that HQ strategic concept. Certainly, in 1809, there was a shortage of trained men, who had the knowledge and experience to conduct some of these functions (II Res Korps' CoS was a captain), but the effect of the system was such that with the experience of 1812 including the Observation Army and the Galicia Reserve, the army staff could direct the advance of the Allied armies to Leipzig. Contrast 1805 to 1809 at most there were three armies with about 7 major commands below (corps in Germany, army wings in Italy). By 1809, many of the senior men were gone and those below had done no big formation work for 9 years at least aside from a few weeks in Germany. G) So, why the apparent French advantage and the claims? The claims are easy it is to get round Moltke and the subject is seen from that later angle. There is no attempt to look at the actual army structures, just a clinging to a certain definition and rejection of everything awkward, while failing to examine alternative systems. The advantage the French had was of always "playing together" – but that will fail in the end with an outmoded system. After its staff corps was disbanded in 1790, the French simply sued an adjutant style staff made up of men rotated from the line, who needed an office manual. Once the requirements grew ever larger, the system increasingly failed as like Austria, France lacked experienced men. Austria had the staff system to triumph. It is a bit like major companies such as Ford and IBM. They were he big beats and centrally controlled, using mass production techniques in Ford's case. Their company culture and old system brought hem to top dog position, but they carried on with that system using the experienced hands, while the Japanese brought in new production techniques to dominate car making and IBM plunged to huge losses as PCs dominated the market, when they had rejected the concept. Another storty involved AP Moller, the Danish shipping company – they were in possession of some large oil product carriers in the late 80s as the market boomed. It was claime dthat this was down to MM Moller's foresight in building them in the mid-70s! In fact, theyw ere originally crude carriers, which had been building just as the oil price shocks hit – the centres were taken out of them and they were pushed into the product carrier market, which was still short of capacity at that time. However, it meant that the pumping equipment was not effective as it was only designed for crude. Some people just like mythological claims of foresight, when it is often either untrue or just a result of chance events. |
Kevin F Kiley | 07 Sep 2005 4:29 p.m. PST |
'Dave hush, this thread is about higher-level organization, start your own thread for the @[%! bricole.' Bob, Well said and well done. That question has been answered more than once and its constant repitition is getting quite old. I'll have a response to your posting as soon as things slow down-probably tomorrow. Sincerely, Kevin |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 07 Sep 2005 5:05 p.m. PST |
No, Kevin, you told us that you were working on it, so have you found out yet? You might ask Graves as he is on the NSF and you say G must have invented it pre-1757 as he said so. Or one of you could read du Teil – in French. If you make this claim 4 times in your book, you should be able to back it up. If you cannot in your supposed area of expertise, what are we to make of your assertions about a subject of which you know nothing? |
Carnot93 | 08 Sep 2005 6:50 a.m. PST |
Dave - I do understand your reasoning, but I'm trying to stay focused so the main topic doesn't get lost with digression into peripheral topics. Regarding the French corps and definitions of permanence, I agree that there is a very clear intention to make Napoleon the creator of the corps system and to dismiss prior corps development as somehow fundamentally different, despite what seems to me to be a clear continuity in higher-level structure from at least 1796 on. Sambre-et-Meuse and Rhine-et-Moselle in 1796-7 had clearly established corps – St. Cyr and Desaix were two of Moreau's three corps commanders (don't recall the third) and had very stable (I would say permanent) commands. Jourdan's corps commanders included Lefebvre, Kleber and Collaud as I recall, with a cavalry reserve under Richepanse. At this point in time the armies are smaller and Bonaparte's army in Italy was not really large enough to require a corps structure – something like 5 divisions which is manageable without the additional layer of corps. I see no fundamental difference between these corps of 1796-7 and the corps of 1803-7 except that the French army was substantially reorganized in 1798 while it was not in 1806, so there was no continuity of structure between 1797 and 1799 (same with 1800 and 1803)while there is continuity between 1805 and late 1806. Regarding Austrian corps development, I am fine with the idea that the Austrians are still in a period of experimentation in 1805-9 while the French have settled on a system that works for them. I detect a stabilization of terminology on the Austrian side between 1799 and 1805, but am not sure if this is the work of Charles or Mack. In 1799 there is inconsistent use of corps/column/division, the same terms often being used to describe the same functional entity. This is roughly analagous to the French in 1796-7. In 1805, Austrian practice is consistently corps/division/brigade for formal organization with flugel/vorhut/treffen/reserve used to define the role of the various components in a particular action – assignments to combat roles being made with "semi-permanent" brigades, the divisions apparently being an administrative layer. The Russians at the same time are using Column for their semi-independent army subdivisions, so for the combined army formed at Olmutz (mostly Russian) the organization uses the nomenclature column/division/brigade. The consistency I have seen in 1805 resembles 1809 more closely than 1799, the key difference being the situation – the Austrian army in Germany was fragmented and crushed so quickly that the continuity isn't obvious. In addition, the Armies of Italy and Tyrol along with Merveldt's corps are poorly documented except for beginning of campaign "snapshots", but I have dug up some details on Tyrol. Examples: I. Army of Germany A. Werneck's corps: original composition remains intact until surrender at Trochtelfingen, including at Haslach-Jungingen where it operated alongside Riesch's corps. B. Corps of Riesch and Scwarzenberg: remain intact from original formation until the surrender at Ulm (a fragment of Riesch's corps was cut off at Elchingen and escaped or surrendered) Exception: three grenadier battalions were effectively ridden over at Wertingen (one lost 440 men of approximately 480!) and three others suffered substantial losses. These "battalions" remain on the OOBs as late as 11 October, but the fragments were united with their regiments in Riesh's corps (for obvious reasons) and the battalions later vanish from the OOBs. One fresh fusilier brigade (6 battalions) was swapped with the 6 grenadier battalions to even things up. This is the only "shuffling" of the corps of Riesch and Werneck despite operating together. After H-J, both corps retired on Ulm and were subsequently dispatched in the identical composition. No ad hoc corps assembly at any point of the campaign in Bavaria. C. Kienmayer's corps: remains intact from original formation until 5 december (less 4 battalions cut off by French advance that retired into Bohemia and the detachment of two battaions IR60 and the Liechtenstein Hussars to defend the Pyrhnn pass to protect the retreat of the Nordtyrol corps). The corps was augmented by 4 battalions of grenzers that arrived after the capitulation of Ulm (not part of the original army organization) and a freikorps from Vienna that joined after the French occupation. After Steyr, the corps was split into two parts, one retiring by Weyer-Gross Ramig-Leoben and the other via Neuhaus-Mariazell-Bruck. Despite broad separation, they subsequently reunited and proceeded to retire into Hungary, operating as an independent corps from Goding against the French flank from 27 Nov to 2 Dec. II. Nordtyrol and Sudtyrol corps of the Army of Tyrol: These remained entirely intact through the retreat. Nordtyrol was depleted when Jellacic's division was cut off by the French advance, also many detachments left as rearguard to cover the retreat. The remainder of Nordtyrol joined Charles' army and remained intact as a fourth corps of his army. Sudtyrol Corps retired via a different route and remained intact throughout. III. Charles' army: if anyone has an OOB for this army in late November I would be very interested in seeing it. I don't know if the corps organization remained intact after leaving Italy. Based on the retention of the original corps structure in the armies of Germany and Tyrol, I would expect that it did, less the detachment left to beef up the Venice garrison. Ad hoc formation of a new army in Bohemia and the reorganization of the Austrian remnants and two separate Russian armies into a single combined army at Olmutz strikes me as a necessary reorganization prompted by practical issues. This would be similar to the dissolution of the French VII corps and reassignment of the affected regiments after Eylau due to severe combat losses. Undoubtedly this could be viewed as impermanence, but if so the same argument can be made for French corps adjustments occurring as needed throughout the wars. Overall, the specific details of Austrian 1805 organization work against any assertion that corps-sized organization was ad hoc. All evidence points to the contrary, that the corps were established and remained intact throughout the campaign. French brigades in this period are "semi-permanent" and shift according to immediate needs, so tat this level there is also a parallel. The conclusion is that the chief difference is at the division level, the French division being established or "permanent" while the Austrian division is ad hoc and mission-specific. Regarding staffs, it would be interesting to find out whether Kienmayer took his staff with him when he transferred command of his corps to Merveldt or if the staff remained with the corps under Merveldt. In the French system, the staff was attached to the unit and I think this would be the other significant difference. Regarding continuity of higher-level structure, the most interesting parallel would be to compare French corps organization through the autumn 1813 campaign, with the associated losses and disruption which are pretty comparable to those suffered by the Austrians in 1805. The same pattern of detachment to hold fortresses/rearguards, elements being cut off or destroyed would be there and the level of adjustment to the corps structure would be comparable. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 09 Sep 2005 3:54 a.m. PST |
If you take a look at Nafziger's translation of Jomini's translation of Charles on 1796, you will see the continuity better. Here the French have the centre/wings/reserve, each under a corps commander, grouped into the two armies. The corps are simply an org title for the grouping of 2-3 divisions and below that each div is 1-4 brigades (although many are a standard two). Each army also has a cavalry reserve (said to be another 1800 change!). It was precdisely htis structure, which Moreau reported in 1799 to N as his arrangement in Germany, with his smaller left being just a division. The Austrian armies were similar – Wurmser's Lower Rhine was in the 3 parts each of about 9-17 battaliosn of infantry plus cavalry etc. Charles' Lower Rhine has division of 2-3 brigades (except the 5 brigade Saxon contingent) plus a separate Corps under Wartensleben, whichw as being broken off to form the northern force to face Jourdan. It is not in the wings/centre arrangement for ops reasons. What lay at the ehart of the Austrian victory here was the movement of the four formations to gain local superiority, so they had in effect already abandoned the 18th centiury structure, except that they would revert to it for the big pitched battles. Thus the corps/div/brigade is permanent in the campaign – and the Austrians call them corps for much of the campaign as it reflects their independent operations. However, in several battles, they make their attacks in columns – similar to Russian practice – although usually these are divisions. In terms of 1800, the French divs in Italy are not even permanent sicne if we look at the origins of the units in them, they come from various places and thus were formed up as the French army massed in Switzerland and given a commander with a staff. So, they are no more "permanent" than anything that had gone before in Austria or France. Part of the change was the sheer size of armies, necessitating this extra level, but also in the nature of the campaigns they had to fight. Armies were now in the field for much of a year at least and were fighting over huge areas, so the formalised "close in wings/centre/reserve" was not flexible enough and so, corps also came to represent chunks of an army with a no specific formal position. The way this comes out in 96 is no differenyt from Mayer's draft for 1809. Around the time of Emmendingen, when Charles marched to catch Moreau, suddenly name used is column to reflect the forces closing for battle – and hence Rothenberg's comment, which I think is in Art of Warfare, that the names change, but the functions do not. In 1805, this was the same as Mayer and then Mack had the forces across a wide sweep of southern Germany. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 09 Sep 2005 3:56 a.m. PST |
As far as Kienmayer goes, if I remember correctly, his Adj General, who had been on the take from Schulmeister in 1800, is there in the opening phase and at Austerlitz. It would be usual practice to take the Adjutant Staff as these were aides selected by the General, but not the General Staff, since they were allocated to formations by the Army HQ staff. |
Carnot93 | 09 Sep 2005 8:27 a.m. PST |
Retention of the general staff with a unit would be interesting, I had been under the impression that Austrian general staff only existed at the army level through most of this period. If this also exists at other levels, there is (in my view) another criteria met for permanence, namely that the formation has an existence independent of the commander. To summarize, what we seem to have above the regimental level is: Brigade level – these are formed largely on an ad hoc basis in both the Austrian and French armies with what we could call "customary" or "semi-permanent" associations among certain regiments. There is no permanently assigned staff to the unit, but the commander (GdB or GM) would have some personal staff. Essentially the same organization at this level. Division level – here I see the most significant differences. The French have truly permanent divisional formations with staffs attached to the unit. On the Austrian side, at least through 1805 there are no permanently established divisions (by anyone's definition). There does not seem to be a general staff attached to the division on the Austrian side which is not surprising given the impermanence at this level. This is the level where there is definite change in Austrian structure in 1809. Corps level – nomenclature aside, there is parallel structure with "permanence" (my definition) present on both sides from at least 1796 – although I think the preservation of composition should be tested a bit for the Austrians 1796-1800. there seems to be a permanently assigned general staff on the Austrian side for each corps, and a parallel corps staff on the French side, although again this could stand some more study on the Austrian side. Nomenclature is problematic, since there is organizational terminology and specific functional terminology coexisting. This terminology appears in documents on the allied side to confuse things, but also appears on the French side, although as armies get bigger and battlefields sprawl out the roles are less clearly defined and the functional terminology falls out of use. So even in the army of the Ocean Coasts, often termed the first modern corps system, the functional terminology is used – and we have Avant Garde (composed of 2 divisions), Corps de droite, Corps de gauche, Corps du centre, a reserve and two corps dιtachι. Advance Guard, right, left center, reserve and wings. At Austerlitz, functional terminology can be layered on: Left (Suchet and Caffarelli), Center (St. Hilaire and Vandamme), Right (Legrand and Friant) and Reserve (Drouet, Rivaud, Oudinot, Guard) but wasn't explicitly used. It should be noted that the functional organization at Austerlitz trumped the structural organization, which is perfectly sensible. All of this still leads me to the same basic conclusion: the divisional layer is the key to the observable greater effectiveness and efficiency of the French organizational system. The multi-tier hierarchy of permanent or established formations is a characteristic of the full corps d'armee structure and plainly this is lacking on the Austrian side until at least 1809. The degree to which this diminishes or limits Austrian performance is another matter entirely and a matter of opinion, I would say slightly in the areas of efficiency and familiarity of officers with units – officer quality/capabilities and the role played by the intangible elements of "doctrine" (for example the doctrine of speed and offensive action as espoused by either Suvorov or Bonaparte) are far more important than structure and systems, which is the lesson I take away from 1799. |
Kevin F Kiley | 10 Sep 2005 12:52 a.m. PST |
'It should be noted that the functional organization at Austerlitz trumped the structural organization, which is perfectly sensible.' Bob, That just isn't correct. French corps organization wasn't rigid-corps don't have the same strength and that was done on purpose. It was based on two things-two confuse enemy intelligence and based on the commanders' capabilities. French corps-and the system was designed this way-had the ability to command up to five divisions or division-sized units. Attaching and detaching was part of the system without a loss of efficiency. While divisions were usually permanently assigned to corps, it wasn't necessary (and that was clearly demonstrated in 1809). That is where I believe you lose sight of the purpose of the organization and how it was designed. It's still used that way. You also miss the point that in the older 'system'-wings, advance guard, and reserve, the army commander also commanded one of them-as Moreau did at Hohenlinden. I think you have really missed that in your analysis and it was a great operational advantage for the French. That's also the way it is taught professionally, by the way, and it makes sense. Your date of 1803 is also incorrect-Napoleon's corps organization of 1800-which you have been shown more than once and refuse to understand-had all of the elements that those of the Grande Armee of 1805. Hence, the permanence in the French army. You have admitted the ad hoc organization of the Austrian army and that is precisely the point, no matter how long your postings are that disagree. You are complicating a very simple system and in that process you are definitely missing the point of the exercise. I think you're doing the same thing tactically in your book, but I'll address that issue later on. Sincerely, Kevin |
Carnot93 | 10 Sep 2005 7:35 a.m. PST |
"That just isn't correct. French corps organization wasn't rigid-corps don't have the same strength and that was done on purpose. It was based on two things-two confuse enemy intelligence and based on the commanders' capabilities. French corps-and the system was designed this way-had the ability to command up to five divisions or division-sized units. Attaching and detaching was part of the system without a loss of efficiency. While divisions were usually permanently assigned to corps, it wasn't necessary (and that was clearly demonstrated in 1809). That is where I believe you lose sight of the purpose of the organization and how it was designed. It's still used that way." Kevin, this is a characteristic of the peremanent division and I agree with you. Divisions could be attached and detached to/from a corp efficiently as needed for mission-specific purposes. So Oudinot is detached from Lannes' corps to the reserve at Austerlitz while Caffarelli's division is attached to Lannes' corps. How is it incorrect to describe this as function trumping formal organization? Divisions were assigned to corps and corps organization changed as needed according to the situation. As you note, commander ability and operational necessity come into play. It was not a rigid system at all and I agree with you. I would term it a "structured" system, the divisions providing an essential infrastructure to do this more efficiently. You say that I am incorrect in saying that functional organization trumped formal organization at Austerlitz, but then you describe the characteristics of a system where practical considerations dictate variations changes in the corps organization. Sorry, but this is the same as function being more important than formal organization. I don't see that we are at all in disagreement. "You also miss the point that in the older 'system'-wings, advance guard, and reserve, the army commander also commanded one of them-as Moreau did at Hohenlinden." Not always. See the organization of the Army of the Ocean Coasts. Also, find me one example of the allied army in 1805 where the army commander commanded a corps or column directly. And don't say Austerlitz, because Kutuzov was no longer acting as army commander. Also Jourdan did not command a corps in 1796-7 nor did Moreau during those years. I agree that an army commander serving as corps commander is a distinct disadvantage. It is the norm, however, for the army commander to command a main body while a corps/column commander manages a wing or detached body of troops (could be one or more corps). "I think you have really missed that in your analysis and it was a great operational advantage for the French. That's also the way it is taught professionally, by the way, and it makes sense. Your date of 1803 is also incorrect-Napoleon's corps organization of 1800-which you have been shown more than once and refuse to understand-had all of the elements that those of the Grande Armee of 1805. Hence, the permanence in the French army." Kevin, Bonaparte's corps system of 1800 fails to meet your requirement (not mine, by the way) of permanence – preservation of the organization into peacetime. I agree with you that it is a permanent corps structure, I disagree on why it should be characterized that way and on your narrow definition that excludes similar organizations that differ only in minor points. As noted, I do not see your definition of permanence fitting the French army of this period. However, I do view the French corps structure of this period as permanent. "You have admitted the ad hoc organization of the Austrian army and that is precisely the point, no matter how long your postings are that disagree. You are complicating a very simple system and in that process you are definitely missing the point of the exercise." Kevin, there is a difference between a corps system and a corps d'armee system (hierarchical and multi-tier) as explained by Art Pendragon on another forum. If you dislike this differentiation, then define another term – "proto-corps" system or some other. To use a deliberately restricted vocabulary – anything not exactly like what Napoleon used is not a corps but rather "ad hoc" – is lumping 80% of higher-level army organizational development into nothing and claiming the remaining 20% of development as everything which horribly distorts the understanding of the process. This is not something that emerged all at once fully formed from the forehead of Zeus. It developed over time with refinements. I sense that your primary objective is to demonstrate that Napoleon created the corps system and that any similar structural developments that are not directly related to Napoleon are "ad hoc". You also seem to be assuming that because I see Austrian development as significantly more than nothing, I am claiming that the French did not have a more effective system and did not derive an advantage from that system, which is entirely untrue. I have clearly stated that I believe the permanent hierarchical corps d'armee structure (division-corps) to be substantially superior to the structures in use by the allies. What I have been trying to do is to provide a more complete assessment of the development of higher-level organization in other armies, which is plainly more than "ad hoc" though plainly less than a full corps d'armee system. Apply what label you like to it, but "ad hoc" is a poor descriptor. "I think you're doing the same thing tactically in your book, but I'll address that issue later on." Fire when ready. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 10 Sep 2005 2:11 p.m. PST |
Bob, You are still missing the point on staff – while the Austrian staff did start at HQ until assigned by the army CoS (and that includes 1809 and 1813 since Mayer and Radetzky were the army CoSs) – the Austrian divisional and brigade commanders had their own Adjutant staff, who fulfil the same roles as the French staff, (some logistiocs aside since the Austrians contracted this out, while French relied on hteft to a large extent). Once the General staff were assigned, they would stay with atht formation as long as it was independent – when the army concentrated, then staff could be reallocated as comamdns changed. However as longa s a commander was with a formatiuon, he would have his adjutnat staff there – albeit a change of comamnder would necessitate a change of adjutant staff. The French divs had a "permanent" staff attached to the div, but the staff would change within it and, as Kevin is so keen on 1800, let us note that Boudet's staff were deemed quite capable of doing the same job for Desaix and thus, in French terms, the div and corps were no different at this time in function. You can also see RT at work here as the definitions shift – I wonder we have? Apparently a French corps could include 1-5 divs, but the divs could be reassigned, while the corps remained the same. So, what is "permament" about it? It has a corps HQ with staff – so what is the difference between that and an Austrian commander, who has his adj staff and a number of Gen staff depending on exactly what he is doing. The French now are suddenly fluid because Lannes could form a provisional corps – ie: units allocated to him for a new role – which is no different from the allocation of units to an Austrian commander for a specific task – say, Nauendorff in 1796, Sztaray in 1799 or Ott in 1800 or Vecsey in 1809. The only difference in 1803 is that the French army is so enormous that although it is organised on an 18th century tactical formation with wings etc., within them, the commands are larger than a div or even one corps, so you have couple of corps in most parts. The only difference indeed is that the French are keeping to a static div formation and swapping them round, whereas Austria was prepared to shift round smaller units (as Roland would put it, being "too flexible"). The divs are structured in the same way and the idea that corps were of varying sizes is a simple redflection of what they were supposed to do – that is what corps in the 18th century sense were – the claim that Austria was rigid and symmetrical is based on Mayer's draft plan of March 1809 (when a little reading of Krieg 1809 would show how they changed). Finally we have this claim of the army commander not running the main body or an individual corps – but what is the real difference when Napoleon is micromanaging the corps? |
Carnot93 | 12 Sep 2005 6:29 a.m. PST |
Dave – I think what you have said is equivalent to my summing up of the key differences in the two systems – the French assign commanders (and staffs) to units, the Austrians assigned units to commanders (and staffs). The advantage to larger established multi-regiment units was basically shorthand and streamlined things. Also, preserving higher-level formations provided a key advantage of larger unit cohesion – the officers were accustomed to working together. And the French system of defining higher-level formations that have an existence independent of the commander is the modern practice. But the presentist notion that this is the only valid method of higher-level organization because it is modern and that anything else is a non-system of some sort is rooted in military science, not military history. What chemist would state that alchemy is a science? Yet for over 1000 years prior to the development of modern chemistry alchemy was considered very much a science (to the degree that term was understood at the time) and like astrology (the other major pseudo-science) they were taken very seriously. The empirical data massed by alchemists and astrologers provided the core body of knowledge used to develop modern chemistry, astronomy and physics – not to mention the fact that the main driving force behind the development of trigonometry was to measure and predict astronomical movements for the purposes of furthering astrology. So we might laugh at the quacks from our modern perspective, but they did some very serious work. As far as 1800 goes, I agree with you that Bonaparte's corps of 1800 resemble the French corps of 1796-7 much more than the French corps of the imperial period. I'm fine with considering this a transitional period, but I reject the idea that this is IT – Napoleon comes in and creates this whiz-bang system out of his own genius and this is a direct line to modern army organization. The whole period is one of considerable experimentation, even on the French side, and from the historical perspective the area for study and discussion is in looking at how the issue management of the much larger armies being fielded was handled by the various powers. To pick the one that most resembles what is used today and consider it the "right" solution is backward reasoning. The approach should be to look at the various solutions devised and then to determine what advantages existed in the system that was later adapted for use in armies up to this day. What we're seeing in this case is a rejection of the idea that any other system than the French system is a valid system at all for the reason that someone else came up with a more efficient one. As far as Kevin's case for Hohenlinden, I have very little detail on this campaign. Kevin's point is that a hierarchical system is advantageous (and I agree) and that if the army CO is having to deal with divisional formations directly there is an inefficiency. This doesn't preclude the possiblity that an army CO might CHOOSE to command divisions directly – at Austerlitz we see Napoleon opting to retain direct control over Oudinot's division in addition to just the Guard – but this is a choice not a constant requirement. Also, the issue of command vs. broader administrative issues like details of supply, march, bivoucs and the like are distributed even with some micromanagement from the top. For Moreau in 1800, the unanswered question is WHY he chose to command several divisions directly rather than using the distributed command structure he had used in 1796-7. If for the purposes of the battle he retained direct control over the several divisions of the center and detached his corps commanders to the wings, this is an operational adjustment that is dictated by practical reasons. If this organization was maintained throughout the campaign, then we are looking at something different. At any rate, the point I keep bringing up that both you and Kevin seem to keep sweeping under the rug is the stability of the French division and the absence of a similarly stable ("permanent") layer in the Austrian army. I still see this as the fundamental difference and chief advantage of the French corps d'armee system, the established/stable/permanent/structured (pick your word)multi-tier hierarchical organization. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 12 Sep 2005 8:56 a.m. PST |
I would not disagree with you organisationally that the French built their armies on stable (to avoid "permanent") divisions, which are very similar in design. That certainly gives an advantage in people working together etc., as you say. Ironically, this stands in contrast to the usual claims about Austrian rigidity! The Austrians were rather fond of mucking about with units, based on immediate operational requirements, not helped by the Army staff retaining direction of the Jaegers and reserve artillery beyond the battalion guns up to 1808. The advantage is thus in he stability – and muich of this existed across all levels of the army due to its own permanent nature, so it was an outcome of events rather than an operational design above div level. However, it does create the idea of some kind of corps staff operating down at div level (this probably has a root in Boudet's div staff being allocated to Desaix's corps on the eve of Marengo). That was simply an adjutant staff – although it would be interesting to see what happened when div commanders were changed. Beyond the div however, the corps are simply ad hoc as they can be shifted around – viz Lannes' Provisional corps in 1809 with staff found from somewhere. This is not the modern model. |
Carnot93 | 12 Sep 2005 2:08 p.m. PST |
Dave – actually I reject your use of ad hoc in this case as firmly as I reject Kevin's use of it with regard to Austrian corps in 1805. Ad hoc would imply that they were assembled only for a specific operation, the assembly dissolving after the immediate goals were met. But French corps are far more stable than that – and here we get into the "duration of campaign" definition. Also there is the consideration of structure vs. practicality, and no one is slavishly adhering to structure on either side. Structure is dynamic and evolves according to necessity. If there is a need, a regiment separates into battalions, companies are detached for one purpose or another, or a party of 50 volunteers from the regiment assembled – ad hoc – for a specific mission. Regiments are the most rigidly structured units, but some French regiments detach companies to form separate grenadier units and Austrian battalion composition goes from 6 to 4 to 6 companies without changing the overall size of the regiment. Regiments may be merged or one unit used to form a cadre for a new regiment. This doesn't make regiments ad hoc, their overall structure remains intact for the most part. If a unit at any level is structured, then it will subsequently resume its former composition. Otherwise, it can be considered ad hoc, the parts being recombined in different combinations each time there is a need. Change in composition over time does not make a unit ad hoc. Changing composition for every operation does. besides which, wouldn't it be reasonable to expect that something called a Provisional corps would be
provisional? I should look to see where Mortier's staff in 1805 came from – found from somewhere, I have no doubt. As far as Austrian "rigidity," I always thought this was in reference to the mindset of the officer corps, not army organization. The observation that the drillbooks of the various armies are pretty much equivalent is at odds with the observation that the French demonstrate greater flexibility/adaptability/versatility in the field. It seems to me that the reason for this is that someone has to issue the necessary orders before a unit will do x, y, and z. The doctrine of speed and agressive offensive action was drilled into the French officer corps by revolutionary governments that were intolerant of anything less. Those that were promoted were those who were successful with agressive offensive operations, which gave the French officer corps a corporate culture that was fundamentally different from those who were promoted for caution and cost-containment. This isn't uncommon in armies moving from peacetime to wartime, the qualities that are valued in peacetime are not always the ones needed in wartime. The French army went through this process much more quickly than the allied armies that cycled through officers in a more sane and responsible manner and didn't lop off officers' heads for failing to pursue the enemy agressively enough. Couple this with experience and training and there is a substantial performance boost. But back to corps, I consider it perfectly accurate to note that the French corps d'armee model formed the basis for the development of modern army organization. The Russian army copied it entirely in Barclay's 1810 reforms (replacing their home-grown divisional structure of 1806-1810) and it plainly had the greatest impact on armies in Europe and North America with some deviation/adaptation. It doesn't emerge all at once in exactly the form used today in spring 1800 when Bonaparte forms his army, but rather evolves over time with variations and refinements, beginning with the first need to address command control of larger armies and adapting to meet changing requirements up to the present day. |
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx | 13 Sep 2005 3:28 a.m. PST |
I was using ad hoc in the sense that you do not really know what you are getting – unlike with a French div, which is pretty much 2 ligne regts, 1 leger, some cavalry and some light guns. I have nopt checked, but I doubt whether the divs of 1800 survived in their allocations to 1803, so again this is more a function of the permanence of the army at war. The corps is simply an extra layer of management or a separate task unit, as it is used by both sides in the 1790s. In many ways, it is no different from the wings/centre/reserve arrangement of the 18th century. This is especially true in N's case, since the key Moltlke principle with corps was that they were small armies/all ams formations allocated a job – the modern concept of mission-orientated orders. Here is where the N corps fail the test again – they are not given orders of that nature, but micro-managed from the centre. That they are not wings/main body etc, any more is ismply due to practicality – the armies are now so big and fighting in such large theatres, that as Charles did in 96 and Carnot in the early 1790s, you can no longer fight in the formalised 18th century way. It is that small army idea that then allows you to mass corps to gain local superiority. The argument advanced by Chandler and many others for the N corps is Jena – but in reality, this was simply a mass army heading for Erfurt with two columns coming into the Prussian left in a classic 18th century outflanking manoeuvre. It turnmed out rather differently and so, later authors have seenm what they want to see – and think that N planned it that way all along. In reality, Davout and Bernadotte were simply all-arms columns under detailed central direction until Davout had to fight for himself. It is the same in Germany in 1805 – it is the capacity to use the road network that requires multiple formations on multiple axes. Hence my comment about ad hoc – it is simply corps of varying sizes (dependant on their taks) which are nothing more than groups of divisions, but by this time, armies are so enormous that certain servces usually kept in an army reserve, notably the heavier guns, are spread out amongst the coirps level of army management. The argument that these corps sizes depended on the corps comamnder's ability rather points to them being formed around a commander – which is no difefrent from the 18th century approach. That is also the case with these provisional corps, notably Lannes in both 1800 and 1809. Austria is accused of rigidity in having corps of very similar make-up – almost a French div at the corps level. However, this is due to the 1st March Mayer OB, which he was using as a planning aid as he was planning an advance out of Bohemia round the back of Regensburg, much like N's advance to Ulm. However, when the war started the corps are of a very different shape and you have flank units and special units, much like N had corps moving into the Tyrol in 1805 and 1809, which themselves were no different from Ott in 1809 (whose force is still called a corps in the Marengo orders). While Chandler did an admiortable job in constructing a framework from secondary works, through which hje could draw the long thread, the danger is always that it can lose context and things can be made to appear to suit later developments. This is what has happened here – the mix of practicality and big armies created thois extra layer of management, although the N army was tsill run in the same centralised way. It is not a modern army, where power is devolve dto the lowest all arms level (corps) with orders specifying only an objective. That N could not manage an army biogget than about 180K shows the failure of his system as Radetzky drew te various allied formations into Leipzig with the overwhelming local superioity to ensure victory – and which is the key attricute of a corps system. As to the Austrian offcier corps, there were problems with it, although like all reformers, Zach and Charles tend to paint a black picture of the current situation. here again, things are being read in that reflect practicality – N's small army in Italy did not have problems with road congestion and food, while you see no "elan" in the 96 French armies in Germany, simply because they were bigger. The French officers were certainly incentivised, although guillotining had stopped by 1794, so it was more of a case of making a name for yourself and then there was the propaganda. The idea that Austrian officers were all nobles is a myth, just as is the idea that they waited around for orders – if you look at the Generals, they are all men, who held independent comamnds and many made names for themselves as advance-guard leaders – no-one was promoted for caution. It prompted an essay by Schels soon after the wars asking whether the school of the advance-guard was the true school of the general. Kevin may not like Elite 101, but the stories of hes emen are what they are and stand comparison with the Marshals. However, the office culture is one thing – the strategic mission is another. The mission of the Austrian army was to maintain the empire – their response to Frederick was to rough up his lines with Grenzers, new guns and the like. The French had been top dog in Europe and humiliation at Rossbach led them to a different answer, which was to smash up Frederick's lines, hence the Gribeauval artillery having bigger charges and longer barrels for greater range. The attack column was precisely that – for attack, in some ways to get he line up close quickly, but also under Meusnil-Durand and as developments would push the French anyway, heavy formations to break the enemy line. The approach is much more offensive, but then look at where the French are on the strategic and tactical defensive – unless they can turn this into tactical offensive, they get beaten on a regular basis. A lot of this French "speed" can be explained by the road map or a political decision not to worry about looting other countries – a policy, which would cost them increasingly dearly. |
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