"This Naval Battle Could Have Changed the Course of WW2" Topic

"The battle involved 15 American aircraft carriers deploying some 900 aircraft on one side and nine Japanese flat-tops with about 450 planes on the other. When the smoke had cleared, three Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) carriers had been sunk (two by U.S. submarines, the other by carrier aircraft), with barely over 30 aircraft left on the decks on the remaining six flat-tops . In stark contrast, the U.S. Navy did not have a single flat-top sunk or damaged and suffered combat losses of 30-odd planes…"
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Amicalement
Armand

Nonsense. Spruance's first priority was protection of the landings. He acted in accordance with that priority. If Halsey had been as smart at Leyte, the Battle Off Samar would have turned out much worse for the Japanese.

Tha Japanese carriers were used as bait to draw off US forces. That was actually stated in their operational plans…

Spruance's caution was entirely reasonable. He'd already won a substantial victory and to risk the landings to go haring off after the retreating Japanese fleet would have been reckless.

Nimitz justifiably considered Spruance to be his top commander. I found it interesting that at the surrender ceremony in Tokyo Bay Nimitz ordered Spruance NOT to attend. He felt that if there was some treachery on the part of the Japanese that managed to wipe out all the Allied commanders there, Nimitz wanted Spruance left in command of the fleet.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

Spruance's caution was entirely reasonable.He'd already won a substantial victory and to risk the landings to go haring off after the retreating Japanese fleet would have been reckless.

Quite agree.

Missing from the analysis in the article is just how much the lens of hindsight affects those who criticize Spruance for not taking a more aggressive approach.

Yes, we can look at the disparity of training levels and aircraft performance between the two fleets, and see in the results of the "Turkey Shoot" just how significant the USN advantage had become.

But did Spruance have that perspective? I would suggest that it would have been "reckless", even more reckless than haring off after the retreating IJN units, for Spruance to assume his adversaries would be comprised overwhelmingly of inferior pilots in inferior planes.

The overwhelming evidence in hand in 1944 was still that the IJN should NEVER be underestimated. They still had expert pilots, and they were introducing very capable aircraft, and had excellent ships, and letting down one's guard could result in a LOT of dead US sailors. Spruance did not have access to IJN pilot training logs across the fleet, nor to counts of how many aircraft of each type he would face. That, and the resulting combat result disparity of the "Turkey Shoot", are all visible to us only in hindsight.

It's notably easier to choose your tactics when you have a God's Eye view of things. Even then some folks get it wrong (as our games often show). To suggest a big victory should be derided for not being big enough -- "Well I don't know why everyone things he did so well … I could have done better"-- is perhaps the height of hubris.

Unless, of course, Montgomery is involved.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Japan's navy might have been decimated by June 1944.

Decimation is 10% loss. Do the math.

nine Japanese flat-tops with about 450 planes… with barely over 30 aircraft left on the decks on the remaining six flat-tops .

That's a 33% loss of ships. More important a 93% loss of aircraft and most important a 90%+ loss of aircrew.

This author is so "black shoe" that he has failed to understand Adm. Spruance (et al) have just left the IJN toothless.

large proportion of the Japanese Mobile Fleet running away to fight another day – with potentially deleterious consequences four months later during the Leyte operation.

In which they "attacked" with empty aircraft carriers. (see above)

What if Spruance had been more aggressive and sent TF 58 after the Mobile Fleet

He did, It's called The Mission Beyond Darkness. Again, this black shoe has failed to understand that there was a sea change (yes, pun intended) in naval warfare back in the mid last century.

What makes you think the author is a "black shoe"?

While I don't disparage Spruance's activities at the Battle of Philippine Sea I believe the Japanese carriers were empty of planes at Leyte because of the raids on the Ryukyus and Taiwan?