"The Evolution and Influence of Tactical Warfare in ..." Topic

…the American Civil War.

" At the onset of the US civil war the existing doctrine of military warfare was about to become obsolete. The old lessons of warfare had to be re-written by the American Generals serving in the US Civil war. War took a new turn during the Civil war. Old world tactics and training were inefficient due to modern weaponry. The U.S. Civil war was an event that was unparalleled in the annals of military history. It was a revolution of warfare in itself. U.S. military minds re-wrote military strategy to encompass all aspects of modern technology developed in the private sector. The conflict hosted the first ever use of rail and water ways and armored ships over a larges area of military operations and redefined previous lessons of battlefield deployment.(1) Previously learned infantry tactics quickly proved to be disastrous. American Generals were forced to adapt and even abandon the lessons of antebellum military thought. The railway made armies mobile to a degree that was previously unimaginable. Their development completely altered the entire concept and strategy of managing army's. The civil war laid down lessons to be copied and learned for the up coming "Great War" in Europe. Along with lessons and tactics came the new emphasis on newer and modern units and an increased importance assigned to battlefield preparation and geography. Through observation of the federal military development European observers witnessed the importance of a solid industrialized infra structure supporting the warfront. The North showed the world how strong industry and support can offset valor and other military qualities. (2)European leaders learned from the civil war the proper employment of mass armies, railroads, telegraphs, armored ships, railway, artillery, refilling, and trenches…"
Main page
link

Amicalement
Armand

There is some interesting stuff here, but it still has the tired old saw about the rifle-musket making all the old tactics obsolete. Just not true. The tactics worked fine. Armies could attack and win battles, just like before. Sure, when armies started routinely entrenching (an action made possible by railroads and steamboats that could keep armies supplied without the need to forage) then yes, attacking became extremely difficult. But that was true in the age of the smoothbore, too. Rate of fire was far more important than the accuracy of the fire, especially for armies who spent almost no time on marksmanship training. The rate of fire for the rifle-muskets was the same as for smoothbores. It wasn't until the widespread deployment of breechloading rifles (just a few years later) that the tactics were forced to change.

Rate of fire was far more important than the accuracy of the fire, especially for armies who spent almost no time on marksmanship training. The rate of fire for the rifle-muskets was the same as for smoothbores. It wasn't until the widespread deployment of breechloading rifles (just a few years later) that the tactics were forced to change.

Agreed …

By amazing coincidence I just returned from a trip to Gettysburg. I watched a lecture by one of the rangers who said exactly what Scott and Legion write above (almost word for word – scary).

Glad you like it my friend!.

Amicalement
Armand

The ranger didn't happen to be Tom Holbrook did it? Each year for twenty years my reenactment group put on a display of battalion drill and I would lecture the crowd four times over the weekend. Tom probably knows my spiel by heart now :)

Sure, when armies started routinely entrenching (an action made possible by railroads and steamboats that could keep armies supplied without the need to forage)

Scott:
I think this is overrated too. Napoleonic armies entrenched without railroads--all the time. When the strategic situation was the same, the armies entrenched and besieged each other, particularly around cities and strategic points and when an army faced a numerically superior army.

I think the amazement over the ACW entrenchments has to do with the first photographs…though they look the same as those around Sevastapol.

If we had seen photos of the lines at Torres Verdas, or any of the battles in Northern Spain and Southern France
1813-184, they would have looked similar.

Whether it was Talavera, Borodino, Dresden, Several of the battles in Italy 1796-7 etc. etc., there were entrenchments and fortified placements aplenty.

said exactly what Scott and Legion write above (almost word for word – scary).

Well both of us are students of history and both Vets, IIRC(?). So we should know what we are talking about, I'd hope !

I can't speak for Scott but I was not in the ACW though …

McLaddie, I don't recall Napoleonic or earlier armies entrenching to the same levels as Civil War armies unless they had a port or a city or a fortress close by which could keep them supplied. I think most generals realized that if they heavily entrenched, the enemy just wouldn't attack them, knowing that they'd soon have to leave their trenches or starve.

I agree. As the ACW progressed and weapons tech evolved. It became harder to survive without some solid cover. Between you and the incoming. So yes, many times both sides dug in as the war progressed. But still generally maneuvered in blocks of troops in the open many times as in the Napoleonics.

The ACW armies did entrench a lot in the second half of the war, but they also continued to use the drill manual tactics right up to the last day of the war.

McLaddie, I don't recall Napoleonic or earlier armies entrenching to the same levels as Civil War armies unless they had a port or a city or a fortress close by which could keep them supplied.

Scott,
You mean like Atlanta, Vicksburg, lots of Forts, Chattanooga or Petersburg/Richmond? What would you consider the 'same levels?'

Here are *Some* of the battles during the Napoleonic wars that saw field entrenchments and redoubts, not counting the dozens of sieges:

Battle of Arcole
Battle of la Barrosa
Battle of Borodino
Battle of Buçaco
Battle of Castiglione
Battle of Dennewitz
Battle of Dresden
Battle of Dürenstein
Battle of Eylau
Battle of Hohenlinden
Battle of Lodi
Battle of Mondovì
Battle of Novi
Battle of Nives
Battle of Orthez
Battle of Raszyn
Battle of Rivoli
Battle of Toulouse
Battle of Vimeiro
Battle of Vitoria
Battle of Piave River

And that isn't counting the War of 1812 battles or all the Russian/Turkish Wars. Or SYW battles.

The one thing that Europe had that the US didn't was fortified cities, so it was often just the attackers that dug trenches, but the ACW military men built lots of forts, often shaped just like European fortresses.

It was and is quite common for an outnumbered or outclassed army [like the Spanish] to entrench or construct redoubts to improve their chances in battle.
Also, in the US, there was a lot more building materials just growing available compared to Europe.

It is only into the end of 1863 that entrenchments became more common during the Atlanta Campaign and the Wilderness South to Petersburg. There were a number of entrenchments and redoubts built by the Russians in an attempt to delay the French in 1812 and certainly by the French in the British drive into France in 1814.

The British built bombproofs in besieging Badajoz etc. as did the French in besieging Mantua.

I would suggest that you see the Napoleonic soldiers entrenching using the same methods for the same strategic and tactical reasons as did the ACW soldiers or those during the Crimean War.

The relative 'same level' in comparison is the question.

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

One problem I have with the "smoothbore no better than rifled musket" thesis, is this – When exactly did the minie rifle truly come to dominate the ACW battlefield?

I would wager a lunch at a modestly priced restaurant that it was not within the first 12 months of the war.

B

There were still regiments armed with smoothbores at Gettysburg and I've never read anything indicating that those troops felt they were at a significant disadvantage.

Scott,
I cannot speak to the situation on the Confederate side of the battlefield. But, of the 246 Union infantry regiments listed by Busey and Martin ("Regimental Strengths at Gettysburg") as present at Gettysburg -
> Ten regiments (4 pct) were armed exclusively with smoothbores.
> Seventeen regiments (7 pct) partially armed with smoothbores.

- – -

By comparison, at the war's start –
> The approximately 500,000 smoothbore muskets in US arsenals represented about 80 pct of all available infantry long arms in 1859.
> The model 1861 Springfield rifle musket was only just then entering production, with less than 10,000 having been produced by the end of the year 1860 (Maximum production of 200,000 per year from Springfield Armory + an additional 100,000 per years by contract manufacturers was only achieved in the least years of the war.
> 428,292 Enfield rifle muskets were obtained by the Union over the war period.
> About 450,000 other types of foreign muskets of varying design and utility were acquired by the Union over the course of the war.

- leading to the impression that in the first 12-18 months of the war, a very considerable portion of the Union army was armed with smoothbore muskets … perhaps a majority of the troops in the field during the first year and a still very respectable fraction in the second 12 months.

Hence, my question about what the accounts from early war battles really represent.

B

One problem I have with the "smoothbore no better than rifled musket" thesis,

Considering the comments from various Union and Confederate officers, I'm not sure that was a settled question even for the combatants.

The same is true concerning rifled versus smoothbore cannon.