Tango01 | 14 Sep 2019 3:51 p.m. PST |
…in April 1941?. "One of the enduring images of the desert war is that of the rapidly advancing Afrikakorps sweeping all before it. This is certainly what happened in April 1941, and it led to considerable gains of terrain for the Axis, and substantial losses in men and equipment for the Empire forces, and the siege of Tobruk. This advance was against clear orders given to Rommel, namely to await the arrival of 15. Panzerdivision in May 1941 before commencing any major operations. Raids however (the Wehrmacht used the same term) were allowed. These were presumably considered useful in that they would keep the Empire forces off balance, and would deny them peace and quiet during which to prepare for their planned advance on Tripoli. Rommel commenced his raid on Agedabia, and when testing the Empire defense found it weak, and unleashed his forces for a deep penetration and with the aim to completely defeat the enemy in the western desert. This was of course of major propaganda value, and it has shaped the image we have of Rommel today, with a victorious German force (the Italians are normally overlooked) advancing rapidly, encircling and defeating all before them…" Main page link Amicalement Armand |
robert piepenbrink | 14 Sep 2019 5:00 p.m. PST |
Hmph. Maybe. But he's making the call with knowledge quite literally no one had at the time. Rommel might have held parts of North Africa for--well, pretty much as long as he did historically--with a strict defensive. An offensive was always going to be under-resourced and a logistical stretch. Adding "with troops and commanders unused to long desert movements" to the picture doesn't immediately sound like a clear win. I think it was always a long shot. He had to catch the British off-balance or win a set-piece battle, take Tobruk on the bounce and get through to Alexandria before the British could regroup to get a strategic win. If he'd followed orders, waited until 15th Panzer arrived, fought a bitter battle with prepared veteran British, won, but failed to take Tobruk afterward--all entirely possible--some historian 70+ years later could make a good case that he should have ignored orders and moved early while the British were still disorganized and not expecting an offensive. War involves a lot of luck, and something can be either an opportunity or a snare depending on things completely beyond the commander's control. |
Frederick | 14 Sep 2019 6:50 p.m. PST |
The retrospectoscope is always 20/20 Agree that Rommel was always going to have to take the long shot given OKW's preoccuption with the East; there was something to be said about keeping the British guessing and I don't see Rommel being able to foresee the pace or amount of reinforcements on either side |
Marcus Brutus | 15 Sep 2019 5:35 a.m. PST |
Plus Rommel had some reason to be confident that the supplies promised him in 1941/42 would arrive. Lack of fuel and spare parts would constantly haunt his plans. |
Major Mike | 15 Sep 2019 6:36 a.m. PST |
The problem was always the movement of logistics. We studied the logistic aspects at my officer basic course at Ft. Knox. The difficulties of the total amount of supplies that could be handled thru secure ports, the availability of transport to move those supplies to the front and the amount of supplies consumed just to get the supplies to the front illustrated that just to get to Egypt was remarkable. Then you add in any possible interruption to any portion of the logistic train and you see how it all went wrong. |
Legion 4 | 15 Sep 2019 8:06 a.m. PST |
Good points Mike … Without a steady and secure supply lines/LOC the commander, e.g. Rommel in NA, was extremely handicapped in many cases. As any other commander would be … From Kelly's Heroes :
Staff Officer – "We haven't got the supplies. It's a matter of logistics." …Gen Colt – "Logistics?" … Staff Officer – "Yes, sir." … Gen Colt – "We've got logistics coming out of our ears! What we need is fighting spirit! The will to win!"…
[I was a Mech Bn S4 and Mech Bde Asst. 4. As well as a Mech Bn & Mech Hvy Bde BMO.] |
Blutarski | 15 Sep 2019 10:49 a.m. PST |
Rommel's biggest logistics problem was a function of: (a) the British ability to read the mail of the Axis command; (b) the commencement of major US military equipment to the NAfrican theater. (c) the German withdrawal of their air assets from the Mediterranean theater, thereby ending the neutralization of Malta. B |
AndreasB | 15 Sep 2019 1:27 p.m. PST |
As the author of the piece, I'm really not clear what is retrospective about pointing out that Rommel violated instructions that were given to him before he set out. The supply losses weren't extensive until late August. The supply issues were not caused by ships being sunk but by him having advanced to the frontier, and failed to capture a decent port. This isn't a new point. What is new AFAICT is that this is the first time someone looks at the force built up on both sides if he hadn't done this. All the best Andreas |
Tango01 | 15 Sep 2019 3:27 p.m. PST |
Air Supply…? Amicalement Armand |
WARGAMESBUFF | 15 Sep 2019 10:58 p.m. PST |
AndreasB over 50% of Rommel supplies ended up at the bottom of the sea. A division needs 500-600 tonnes per day to carry attacking. Air supply over half the aircraft carrying stores were destroyed on the ground BY the LRDG & SAS, other shot down by fighters. so Supplies are key to any victory. |
Fred Cartwright | 16 Sep 2019 4:12 a.m. PST |
Good points Mike … Without a steady and secure supply lines/LOC the commander, e.g. Rommel in NA, was extremely handicapped in many cases. As any other commander would be … Which is precisely why Monty didn't go haring off into the desert after Rommel following the retreat from El Alamein. His logistics dictated the rate of advance. Rommel of course was getting closer to his supplies, which is why he raced back as fast as he could. I have wondered if Rommel's best strategy would have been to go for the backhand offence as Manstein did after Stalingrad. Conduct a fighting withdrawal wearing down 8th Army and drawing them further away from their supply bases, then when sufficiently reduced turn and attack, hopefully catching them wrong footed, recapture the lost ground, rinse and repeat as necessary. |
Legion 4 | 16 Sep 2019 7:35 a.m. PST |
Supplies are key to any victory. No ammo, no fuel, no food & water, no repair parts, no medical, etc. you are back to sticks & stones … His logistics dictated the rate of advance. Rommel of course was getting closer to his supplies, which is why he raced back as fast as he could. Of course short supple lines/LOC are hard to interdict for the attacker and easier for the defender, generally. |
Marcus Brutus | 16 Sep 2019 8:36 a.m. PST |
Which is precisely why Monty didn't go haring off into the desert after Rommel following the retreat from El Alamein. His logistics dictated the rate of advance. That is the polite way of putting it Fred! |
mkenny | 16 Sep 2019 9:42 a.m. PST |
Rommel's biggest logistics problem was a function of: (a) the British ability to read the mail of the Axis command; For most of his successes Rommel was helped by his reading 8th Army Mail.
link |
AndreasB | 16 Sep 2019 1:20 p.m. PST |
@Wargamesbuff I'm sorry, but no. In the first half of 1941, January to June inclusive, 13% of fuel, and 4% of other tonnage (includes supplies and of course unit equipment) were sunk. Total loss in terms of tonnage 5%. Not 50%. 5%. Not a typo. Yes the loss of fuel would have been an issue. As was the sinking of a lot of AR33 on the Lampo convoy. But still. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 16 Sep 2019 1:21 p.m. PST |
@mkenny – hi. Not correct for this period of course. The code was only broken in September. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 16 Sep 2019 1:23 p.m. PST |
@Tango01 Air supply was stretched already and couldn't deliver the tonnage needed. Later in the year they needed about 2,000 tons a day. That's what? North of 500 Ju 52? Impossible to maintain. link All the best Andreas |
Blutarski | 16 Sep 2019 1:40 p.m. PST |
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AndreasB | 16 Sep 2019 2:24 p.m. PST |
Thanks! Minor correction, due to spreadsheet copy and paste error, fuel loss was 14%. Total loss remains 5% All the best Andreas |
mkenny | 16 Sep 2019 3:19 p.m. PST |
Not correct for this period of course. The code was only broken in September. I know the German Army Codes (ENIGMA Intercepts) were not broken until September 1941 so that means that 8th Army was not reading Rommel's mail at this time. |
Legion 4 | 17 Sep 2019 7:35 a.m. PST |
All things considered Rommel generally did pretty well with what he had based on all the constraints he had to deal with … |
mkenny | 17 Sep 2019 9:48 a.m. PST |
All things considered Rommel generally did pretty well with what he had based on all the constraints he had to deal with That is because the bar is set relatively low for a German 'success'. If any German Unit is not encircled and wiped out to the last man/last Panzer then that is an Allied 'failure. Rommel was a disaster in NA. He disobeyed his explicit orders and the resulting defeat was of his own making. |
Tango01 | 17 Sep 2019 10:43 a.m. PST |
ok … thanks!. Amicalement Armand
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Legion 4 | 17 Sep 2019 3:32 p.m. PST |
That is because the bar is set relatively low for a German 'success'. If any German Unit is not encircled and wiped out to the last man/last Panzer then that is an Allied 'failure. Rommel was a disaster in NA. He disobeyed his explicit orders and the resulting defeat was of his own making. And yet he did eventually push the UK Forces deep into Egypt. After almost 2 years of fighting back and forth across Libya. Regardless he very often did proved to be a very able foe in the NA Campaign. If of course the historical record is at all accurate. And based on everything I read/studied it generally is … Of course I was not there … so …
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mkenny | 17 Sep 2019 3:38 p.m. PST |
And yet he did eventually push the UK Forces deep into Egypt. After almost 2 years of fighting back and forth across Libya. Regardless he very often did proved to be a very able foe in the NA Campaign. If of course the historical record is at all accurate. And based on everything I read/studied it generally is … He lost because he was hopeless at obeying orders and knowing his limitations. Its no good saying he 'did well' because at the end of the day he did very badly indeed. Its like a football game where your team lost by 5 goals but forever reliving the fact your team were 1 goal up at half-time. |
Lee494 | 17 Sep 2019 4:13 p.m. PST |
We need to put the entire war in perspective here. The Fall of 1942 saw not only El Alamein but Torch and Stalingrad. Given the European strategic situation in late 1942 even IF Rommel could have taken Egypt there is no way Germany could have exploited that success or ultimately even held Egypt for any length of time. Therefore Rommel was foolish to attempt it. Check closely and you'll find that Rommel gained most of his fame early in the Desert War beating up on understrength, poorly equipped and battle worn British units and worn out commanders. His record was much less legendary fighting competent commanders and comparably equipped forces. Save for Kaserine, where was the "genius" in his performance post Alamein? In Italy (why wasn't he given command there?). In Normandy? IMO Rommel was a good division commander, an adequate corps commander and totally out of his depth as an army commander. Much like Patton. Thanks to historians love affair with him after the war based on his questionable participation in the July 20 Plot he was elevated to legend status. Perhaps the most overrated general of the war. :-) |
Fred Cartwright | 18 Sep 2019 4:11 a.m. PST |
I think you are being somewhat disingenuous to Rommel. For a start he wasn't beating up on outnumbered 8th Army formations. For Battleaxe the numbers were about even. For Crusader 8th Army had a significant advantage in tanks. As for disobeying orders well he certainly went against what Commando Supreme were ordering him to do, going over their heads to Hitler if necessary, but I don't think they were military geniuses either. Certainly his initial orders to hold would have surrendered the initiative to the British and his initial offensive caught the British flat footed. With respect to the attack into Egypt there is an argument that you should reinforce success. The alternative view that he should have stopped to allow the focus on the capture of Malta I find less convincing. I don't think the Germans had the stomach for it and the Italians couldn't have done it alone and by mid ‘42 it would have proved a much tougher proposition. Malta should have been taken in 1941. Moving onto Normandy I think it is fair to say that without Rommel the Atlantic Wall would have been a lot easier to crack. It was his drive that strengthened the defences in the months prior to D-day. He was spot on in his assessment that the invasion would be won or lost on the beaches. As for the conduct of the subsequent battle difficult to see what any German general could have done to influence that. When your enemy is strong enough to dictate the pace of battle and has significant advantages in terms of naval gunfire and complete air superiority there is not much you can do about it. As for his flaws, well he had a massive ego, not unique among generals, contemptuous of other opinions, also not unique. He made some odd decisions too. The whole dash to the wire during Crusader for example. Overall I would have said a competent commander, not the greatest, but not the worst by a long way. Perhaps the most overrated general of the war. :-) No that would be Patton! :-) The Fall of 1942 saw not only El Alamein but Torch and Stalingrad. Given the European strategic situation in late 1942 even IF Rommel could have taken Egypt there is no way Germany could have exploited that success or ultimately even held Egypt for any length of time. Therefore Rommel was foolish to attempt it. You are getting confused here. When Rommel moved into Egypt the Battle of Stalingrad hadn't even started. He would have needed a crystal ball to predict the strategic situation in November ‘42. In June ‘42 German forces were pushing rapidly into the Caucuses, there was no reason to believe they would not be successful. In that context a push into Egypt makes perfect sense, a double pronged assault threatening the oil fields from 2 directions. |
Marcus Brutus | 18 Sep 2019 5:32 a.m. PST |
When one looks at Rommel's total career (WWI and WWII) he was a superb tactician and consummate leader of men. He was a gambler for sure and it worked time after time for him. Certainly his command of 7th Panzer Division in the 1940 campaign was first rate. The whole African adventure by the Germans was another example of strategic dissipation but considering the situation in the summer of 1941 perhaps understandable. I think Rommel rates highly. As Fred suggests Rommel was instrumental in making the Atlantic Wall a significant barrier to Allied landings. His strategic sense allowed him to argue for the panzer divisions being kept in forward positions for immediate counter-attack. I certainly rank him as an outstanding leader and commander. |
Legion 4 | 18 Sep 2019 7:49 a.m. PST |
Its no good saying he 'did well' because at the end of the day he did very badly indeed. I have to disagree as many other pointed out. E.g. Lee, Fred and Marcus pointed out. As a young 2LT in the 101 in '80. Our Bde Cdr, a Vet of a number of tours in Vietnam. Had a meeting with all the LTs in the Bde. He highly recommended we all read Rommel's book, "Infantry Attacks". Many of us already had … So to dismiss Rommel out of hand I think is unwarranted, IMO. E.g. Napoleon lost in the end yet we still study his battles, etc. As many still believe, justifiably so, he was very important figure in the study of military history, etc. |
4th Cuirassier | 18 Sep 2019 7:56 a.m. PST |
Much of Rommel's desert success does seem to have been down to reading the enemy's mail – not just courtesy of Colonel Fellers but also his sigint unit that, until fortuitously destroyed, listened in on very sloppy and insecure Allied radio traffic. His initial attack was unexpected because Britain was aware of his orders and that these were not to attack. It was incorrectly assumed he'd obey those orders. He gained more from intelligence than his opponents; what he knew about them was reliable, but knowledge of either his orders or his stated intentions was relatively unhelpful because he was quite capable of doing something else entirely. He was also lucky in his desert opponents. The only skilful one was Auchinleck, but unfortunately the Auk didn't pick good subordinates and fought 1st Alamein with that which was left after his previous picks had got routed. Montgomery simply fought Auchinleck's intended battle with much greater resources and still nearly lost. Rommel did appreciate the Normandy situation correctly. Given his 1941 decisions, though, it's surprising in a way that he didn't pre-empt D-Day and invade southern England himself. |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 1:25 p.m. PST |
@mkenny – German army Enigma wasn't read reliably until much later. They read a bit quite close to sending times in December/January 41/42 I think because D.A.K. HQ was captured. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 1:27 p.m. PST |
@Fred Cartwright "Certainly his initial orders to hold would have surrendered the initiative to the British […]. " My Blog entry just shows that this view is entirely, 100% incorrect. Yes I know it's the accepted reading by many. It is also completely wrong. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 1:30 p.m. PST |
@4thcuirassier Correct on the intel gained from local radio traffic interception. This was quite powerful. I have the whole of the intel assessments at Panzergruppe during CRUSADER available here: link These were based on a mix of POW interrogation, aerial recce, and mostly it appears on radio intel. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 1:32 p.m. PST |
@Legion4 I have read it, and I can absolutely see how Infantry Attacks is highly recommended for lieutenants and anyone up to maybe battalion command. Unfortunately I doubt Rommel's talent extended much beyond that. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 1:34 p.m. PST |
As for the Atlantikwall and how awesome it was, maybe we are not talking about the same Atlantikwall, but the one I am aware of was breached and overcome in the morning of 6 June 1944. All the best Andreas |
Marcus Brutus | 18 Sep 2019 7:48 p.m. PST |
I have read it, and I can absolutely see how Infantry Attacks is highly recommended for lieutenants and anyone up to maybe battalion command. Unfortunately I doubt Rommel's talent extended much beyond that." I don't see how your statement can stand up to Rommel's leadership and activity in the 1940 campaign. His command of 7th Panzer Division was superb on several levels. It was certainly the launching pad for his assignment to Afrika Korps. |
AndreasB | 18 Sep 2019 11:08 p.m. PST |
In my view the launching pad for his assignment was his job commanding Hitler's guard. His performance at Arras was deeply unimpressive, and his cries of being attacked by five divisions that day ludicrous. All the best Andreas |
Blutarski | 19 Sep 2019 4:37 a.m. PST |
"As for the Atlantikwall and how awesome it was, maybe we are not talking about the same Atlantikwall, but the one I am aware of was breached and overcome in the morning of 6 June 1944." ….. Really? The Atlantic Wall breached by the morning of 6 June 1944? How interesting. Perhaps you could expand on what the Allied invasion forces, after so easily breaching said wall, were doing during the months of June, July and August 1944.
As to Herr Rommel's involvement in the preparation of the Atlantic Wall defense system in the Normandy zone … [ 1 ] Construction of an Atlantic Wall defensive zone was authorized by Hitler in March 1942. [ 2 ] The Atlantic Wall defense system extended hundreds of miles along the western European coastline from (approx) Rotterdam to the River Loire. [ 3 ] Rommel was formally placed in executive command of the Atlantic Wall defensive program only in mid-January 1944. [ 4 ] In that short period of a bit less than five months, Rommel reinvigorated the construction program and, to the extent that time and materiel and labor shortages permitted, was responsible for important improvements in the defenses. [ 5 ] OKW ignored Rommel's arguments about the necessity of meeting and defeating the on the beachheads as the best chance of defeating a landing attempt, with Hitler's equivocation on the issue resulting in a fractured command system beset by overlapping areas of responsibility. B |
Blutarski | 19 Sep 2019 4:42 a.m. PST |
"In my view the launching pad for his assignment was his job commanding Hitler's guard. His performance at Arras was deeply unimpressive, and his cries of being attacked by five divisions that day ludicrous." Rommel's appointment also just might possibly have had something to do with his outstanding WW1 record and the Pour le Merite he had earned for his decisive achievement at Caporetto. Arras? I suggest you read the full and complete account of 7th Panzer Division's operations in the Battle of France. B
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Andy ONeill | 19 Sep 2019 7:57 a.m. PST |
Rommel (also) literally "wrote the book" on infantry tactics based on his ww1 experience. |
Legion 4 | 19 Sep 2019 8:07 a.m. PST |
I have read it, and I can absolutely see how Infantry Attacks is highly recommended for lieutenants and anyone up to maybe battalion command. Unfortunately I doubt Rommel's talent extended much beyond that. A few years later I briefed that book as US ARMY Combined Arms Services Staff School. Got an A ! Rommel (also) literally "wrote the book" on infantry tactics based on his ww1 experience. Yes that was where he and many others in WWII got their combat experience, during the Great War. The lessons learned paid off in many cases. I don't see how your statement can stand up to Rommel's leadership and activity in the 1940 campaign. His command of 7th Panzer Division was superb on several levels. It was certainly the launching pad for his assignment to Afrika Korps. That is the way I understood it. And yes like many German combat leaders at that time. They not only understood combined arms maneuver warfare. But knew how to execute it effectively. |
Marcus Brutus | 19 Sep 2019 11:55 a.m. PST |
In my view the launching pad for his assignment was his job commanding Hitler's guard. Certainly Rommel's close association with Hitler in 1939 contributed, in part, to Rommel being given command of the 7th Panzer Division in 1940. It was Rommel's performance in France, however, that was decisive in him being given command of the Afrika Korps in 1941. |
mkenny | 19 Sep 2019 12:37 p.m. PST |
Really? The Atlantic Wall breached by the morning of 6 June 1944? How interesting. Perhaps you could expand on what the Allied invasion forces, after so easily breaching said wall, were doing during the months of June, July and August 1944. The 'Atlantic Wall' bit was breached on Day 1 and it did not prevent any of the landings and the Allies were, in June to August, crushing the German Army. |
AndreasB | 19 Sep 2019 2:17 p.m. PST |
@Blutarski. What mkenny said on the Atlantikwall. I will one day get around to reading up on France 1940. Meanwhile you may want to address the point on Arras, or not. Regardless of what you do, it invalidates the idea that his performance was outstanding on many levels, unless that includes the level of 'Drama General'. All the best Andreas |
AndreasB | 19 Sep 2019 2:20 p.m. PST |
@Marcus Brutus – I have no problem with a statement that his performance as GOC 7. Panzer was instrumental in giving him preference. But that appointment as GOC 7. Panzer was due to his prior job as CO of the guard, so arguably that was the launching pad. AFAICT Rommel had a close relationship with Hitler, and made sure he benefited from it. All the best Andreas |
Marcus Brutus | 19 Sep 2019 4:40 p.m. PST |
The 'Atlantic Wall' bit was breached on Day 1 and it did not prevent any of the landings and the Allies were, in June to August, crushing the German Army. No one disputes that the Atlantic Wall was breached on Day 1 of the landing. What is up for discussion is Rommel's significant improvement of the Atlantic Wall during his 6 or so months in command. Remember, strengthening the Wall was only part of Rommel's strategy for dealing with the invasion. Unfortunately, Rommel was an executive officer on the Western Front and had limited command authority over the critical mobile forces including panzer and panzer grenadier divisions. Having just finished several large works on the Normandy campaign there are many reasons for the defeat of the German army in June to August, 1944. Rommel's leadership was not one them. |
Marcus Brutus | 19 Sep 2019 4:48 p.m. PST |
Rommel's appointment to 7th Panzer Division was supported by Hitler but Rommel also enjoyed the support for this appointment from other senior German officers including Guderian. So its not quite accurate to say that he was appointed commanding officer of 7th Panzer Division exclusively through Hitler's patronage. Hitler, to the best of my knowledge, did not in 1940 directly interfere with promotion and assignment of general officers in the Wehrmacht. |
mkenny | 19 Sep 2019 4:53 p.m. PST |
Unfortunately, Rommel was an executive officer on the Western Front and had limited command authority over the critical mobile forces including panzer and panzer grenadier divisions.Having just finished several large works on the Normandy campaign there are many reasons for the defeat of the German army in June to August, 1944. Rommel's leadership was not one them. The Allies did not just 'hope' that the Germans did not fight for they beaches the actively planned and put in place systems that prevented any German Divisions reaching the front at a greater rate than they could land their own divisions. It really did not matter who was in charge of the reserves because the road/rail/river links that carried the Germans would be severely degraded. Even if the Germans had played what many believe to be their ace (an easy choice given it was binary and the other solution failed) then the Allies were ready for it. It seems there is an assumption that if the Germans 'lost' then there must be a reason outside of their control for it (I.E it is all Hitlers fault/shortage of X, Y & Z etc) because in any 'fair fight' they can never be beaten. |
Blutarski | 19 Sep 2019 6:51 p.m. PST |
"@Blutarski. What mkenny said on the Atlantikwall." >>> Such an argument (i.e. – that the Allies "breached" the Atlantic Wall defenses on the morning of 6 Jun 1944) – is the sort of disingenuous over the top foolishness that only mkenny can concoct. Kindly see the dictionary definition of the term "breach". The German Normandy defense was not "breached" until Operation Cobra. End of story. Full Stop. - – - I will one day get around to reading up on France 1940. Meanwhile you may want to address the point on Arras, or not. Regardless of what you do, it invalidates the idea that his performance was outstanding on many levels, unless that includes the level of 'Drama General'. >>> I agree that you should by all means read up on the France 40 campaign. I find it both troubling and difficult to understand how you can deliver critiques without first having done so. Re Rommel and the operations of the 7th Panzer Division in the France 40 campaign, go here – PDF link - for a reasonable and objective introduction to the topic. - – - All the best. >>> Your kind sentiment herewith duly reciprocated. B |
mkenny | 19 Sep 2019 11:03 p.m. PST |
Such an argument (i.e. – that the Allies "breached" the Atlantic Wall defenses on the morning of 6 Jun 1944) – is the sort of disingenuous over the top foolishness that only mkenny can concoct. Kindly see the dictionary definition of the term "breach". The German Normandy defense was not "breached" until Operation Cobra. End of story. Full Stop. The German 'line' was breached several times by Montgomery. The German position was dire to begin with and got worse with each engagement. The reality is illustrated by Rundstead's outburst('make peace you fools') when he was denied permission to abandon Caen and form a line to the south. |