"Worst Generals of WWII" Topic

Let the arguments begin! :)

link

Given that most of the Soviets on the list were more adept at not getting purged than modern military tactics, I doubt anyone will argue that they don't belong.

Let's start with the usual suspects…

Bernard Montgomery
Dwight Eisenhower
Douglas MacArthur

Mark Clark

2nd for Mark Clark ( Who iam guessing know where some offley important bodies were buried )

MY 2nd choice is

Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton

Got his bomber command in the Philippines destroyed, but was to important to be capture and was flown out on one of few remaining B-17.

Then commanded the US Middle east airforce in the horrible raid on Ploiești

Then commanded the 9th airforce in the UK to provide tactical air on d-day.

Finally commanded First Allied Airborne Army (still wondering about this one) in the failed Market garden operation. He also command the outstanding uses of airborne to jump the Rhine in Operation Varsity.

Hmmmm

Lots of choices there – certainly a wide range including poor old Rod Keller, who to fair to him tried to resign more than once prior to D-Day only to be denied

Here we go again

American Mark Clark
British Arthur Percival
German Hitler

Visconti Prasca certainly belongs on this list. He turned down additional troops because he realized that would mean that he (a lieutenant general) would have to be replaced by a higher ranking officer. Of course, he was pretty sure he lacked the men to do the job. . .
If you want to add Hitler to the list, you should add Benito Mussolini, also.

Grelber

Stillwell gets 1 vote.
YouTube link

Erwin Rommel

Who was the moron in charge of attacking the Hurtgen Forest? He gets my vote.

+1 for Rommel…or, at least, the most over hyped. Great up through division command, but never understood logistics, intelligence, or his strategic role in North Africa. And then failed in Normandy.

How anyone can claim Rommel is one of the worst Generals of WW2 is beyond me. You guys obviously have very high standards.

Anyway, Percival gets my vote, although I have a personal stake in that one as my grandfather died in a Japanese POW camp.

Trafford Leigh-Mallory.

For Australia – Thomas Blamey. Managed to get himself into the C-in-C position (he was Quarter Master General, no operational experience) then relieved every office he didn't get along with before the War, and every mid level officer who figured out how to fight in the jungle. Also vigorously opposed the issue of green uniforms as he was of the opinion that light khaki was good enough for India and therefor was good enough for Australian troops.

Then there is Gordon Bennett, who scarpered from Singapore with a few of his mates saying he was 'urgently' needed in Australia, leaving his troops in the lurch as he was in such a hurry he forgot to tell anyone he left behind where he was going.

Put in my vote for Mark Clark, there are some Soviet generals I could of.

Bradley inept
Patton arrogrant and too busy beating the British.
All the italian generals.

Why is it alway Monty with Americans thinking he was the worst, his predicitons were right. He never lost a battle so why do yanks always say he was the worst?
Talking through their backsides & brainwashed by memoires of people he sacked or rated above their capabilities, in my opinion.

Ping pong over to the good olde US of A.

My biggest problem with the list is scope. They have division commanders lumped in with theater commanders. Would have been better it limited to say at least Corps commanders and above. Certainly there was no shortage of inept division commanders on all sides :) As it is the listing is a bit arbitrary.

Lloyd Fredendall

Here we go again

+1 Fox

The question in this thread reminds me of the old joke about essay questions in college – "Describe the Universe in 25 words of less … be specific."

Good one, Legion 4. How about "life's a bitch, and then you die."

GdeP

I had not tried that as the answer to an essay question though … maybe I should have …

Monty's Operation Goodwood was a defeat, in fact chewed up several really good British divisions. His orders to run 3 armored divisions up a narrow road outside Caan was idiotic. Then his orders that caused the Falise pocket not to be closed. Then he repeated the advance up a narrow road in Market Garden. Monty deserves his share of criticism.

Gamelin.

Then his orders that caused the Falise pocket not to be closed
I think you will find that the order you believe came from Monty was actually from Bradley. It is the 'Hard shoulder/broken neck' claim. Bradley thought Patton could not stop the retreating Germans and that if Patton placed his Army astride the German escape route then he would simply be flattened as the Germans steamrollered over them. It was Bradley who thought Patton was not up to it not Monty. Wrong scapegoat.

I would argue to take MacArthur OFF this list. In 2.5 years in command into the Philippines, he had fewer casualties than the US Army in the Anzio Campaign – Italy – just months; and in the Normandy Campaign, again months.

The US prewar policy was to write off the Philippines as indefensible, but that changed in September, 1914, and MacArthur was put in charge – just 3 months before Pearl Harbor. 100,000 Philippinos were called to the colours, but many have not even been supplied with weapons, and many more had not fired theirs.

Our airforces could not fight above 12,000 feet, for the was no technology to refine oxygen in the Philippines.

Much more in the positive way he handled situations.

GdeP

I have no problems with anyone on this list.

As someone neither British or American,it's curious how allies love to point fingers at each other. Is it possible a good general can still lose a battle? I think so. Then there are the golden boys who even succeeding generations insist on venerating and protecting. Some really bad calls were made and some stupendous mistakes with dreadful results by reasonable generals. As my handle suggests … when I play WW2 I think it's most likely that I am the worst general. But what would I know? I'm only an armchair general.

I'll second Patton on the list just for his Task Force Baum raid failure and attempts to hid his involvement.

Dan

Ike and Rommel should NOT be on this list. Rommel wasn't in complete command in Normandy. How anyone would put Ike on that list is beyond my understanding.

MacArthur belongs on the list. He completely abandons the plan to defend the PI and his supplies. He loses his air force on the ground, all with plenty of warning. So he runs away and gets the Medal of Honor for it all.

He routinely ignored intelligence reports. He was determine to invade Kyushu in the face of reports of a massive Japanese build up on the island which evened the odds. Even Marshall questioned his judgement.

Montgomery should be on the list for all the reasons mentioned. All the French senior Generals were absolutely abysmal. Mark Clark was awful. I actually don't have a problem any of the those listed on the web page.

14th NJ Vol

Good waood a defeat LOL you need to read the German account of this action.
it was a success and scared the hell out of the Germans.

the terrain out side of caen is more open and the high grround was needed.

market Garden if fully support by the USA would have had 2nd Army and the US in the Ruhr productiona reas before Christmas.

monty said if we do not do this the Germans will counter attack and the was will drag on until the spring, sounds right hey?

so didnt spell check I was that excited to reply to 14th NJ Vol LOl :) :) :)

"market Garden if fully support by the USA would have had 2nd Army and the US in the Ruhr production areas before Christmas."

- – -

Even blind hero worship must have its limits …..
By Sep 44, 21st Army Group was receiving an average of 7500 tons per day against a nominal daily operational requirement of 10,000 tons. That rate of logistical support was in fact more than what both US Armies combined were receiving. US 1st Army (supporting 21AG and its right flank) was receiving about 5,000 tons per day; US 3rd Army was at subsistence level, averaging 2,000 tons per day.

The solution to the logistical problem was ANTWERP. The question is why the absolutely essential clearance of the Scheldt was put off for more than a month.

Go here –

link

- for a very informative analysis, from the intelligence (ULTRA) point of view, of the planning and politicking related to Market-Garden and the miscarriage of the Antwerp/Scheldt situation as regards the German 15th Army. The impression I drew is that Montgomery fell victim to "target fixation" with respect to getting across the Rhine.

On a related not – Market-Garden was a battle that Montgomery did in fact lose.

B

Patton, he had M48 Patton tanks at his disposal and still didn't just run over the German and into Berlin.

You mean M26s … they were around but too few in numbers and too late to make a big difference.

The M48 didn't come out until a number of years later, and the M46 and M47 before that.

I believe Gunfreak was making reference to the use of M48s in the movie Patton for the US with as I remember M47s for the Germans.

Go here –

PDF link
- for a very informative analysis, from the intelligence (ULTRA) point of view, of the planning and politicking related to Market-Garden and the miscarriage of the Antwerp/Scheldt situation as regards the German 15th Army. The impression I drew is that Montgomery fell victim to "target fixation" with respect to getting across the Rhine.

Which can be summed up as :

'Everyone warned Monty but he would not listen. Ike was dubious about it but too scared of Monty because of political constraints. It was all Monty's fault.

Gordon Bennet if we include divisional commanders.

Sure, why not blame the Americans for XXX Corps not reaching Arnhem in time, or for that matter, why only part of one British battalion reached the road bridge there?

The first day of XXX Corps offensive explains everything in my opinion. From what I've read, some tried to warn Monty what they might face going forward, but he didn't want to hear it.

"Which can be summed up as : 'Everyone warned Monty but he would not listen. Ike was dubious about it but too scared of Monty because of political constraints. It was all Monty's fault.' "

Nothing of the sort whatsoever – a complete misconstruing of a well written, well researched and profusely referenced research document.

Short synopsis – All commanders at army level and above (that includes both Montgomery AND Eisenhower) were being kept up to date on a regular basis regarding German situation and intentions via ULTRA decrypts. During the time in which Market-Garden – which was a greatly expanded version of the recently cancelled Operation Comet airborne descent upon Arnhem – all senior commanders involved were aware of the following:

[ 1 ] The German high command had become quite alarmed by the rapid capture of Antwerp port in a largely intact condition.

[ 2 ] The German 15th Army had not been cut off by the capture of Antwerp, but rather was busy ferrying men, equipment, vehicles and supplies to the mainland, with an estimated 25,000 men having already reached safety.

[ 3 ] That, apart from Dutch underground reports, ULTRA had already definitely located the 9th and 10th Panzer Divisions reorganizing and refitting in the immediate vicinity of Arnhem and drawing replacement equipment from the Panzer depot at Cleves.

[ 4 ] ULTRA advised that, as a consequence of the fall of Antwerp, the German high command was in fact anticipating an Allied follow-up thrust toward Arnhem and the Rhine and expected it to involve the employment of airborne forces

[ 5 ] Allied military intelligence briefings leading up to that point in time had been painting a very rosy picture of the state of German losses and disorder at all levels and were predicting an imminent collapse of resistance.

[ 6 ] Montgomery pitched the Market-Garden idea to Eisenhower, who agreed to undertake the operation, which was hastily organized on very short notice.

[ 7 ] The Arnhem drop failed because of the inability of XXX Corp to reach them in time (relief on D+2 having been planned).

[ 8 ] XXX Corps failed to reach Arnhem because of severe channeling of the thrust along a single road axis passing through flat, boggy. forested terrain unfriendly to off-road vehicular movement AND the resistance put up by elements of the German 15th Army who managed to reach the area of operations.

Nowhere in the document is any blame or fault-finding directed toward anyone. It is a straightforward and dispassionate account of the event from the point of view of the intelligence aspect (i.e., who knew what and when).

B

Nothing of the sort whatsoever – a complete misconstruing of a well written, well researched and profusely referenced research document.

Indeed. In the introduction there a 3 references to this wargaming magazine article from 1997. Note the title:

Paul S. Burdett, "To Hell With Monty," Command, August 1997,

I tried a quick Google but no luck so if anyone has a copy I would like to check some of the 'facts'..

Nowhere in the document is any blame or fault-finding directed toward anyone. It is a straightforward and dispassionate account of the event from the point of view of the intelligence aspect (i.e., who knew what and when).

Wow! Thats a first. An article that had access to every single fact about the operation, is 100% accurate in every respect, contains no opinion, gap filling or or supposition and thus is the most complete and authoritative account of the battle.
I think we are witnessing 'confirmation bias' at work .

I tried a quick Google but no luck so if anyone has a copy I would like to check some of the 'facts'..

It is issue 44 of Command Magazine. The article is "To Hell With Monty" The Failure of Operation Market Garden by Paul S Burdett Jr. I have a copy. If you could let me know specifically what you need mkenny happy to look it up as long as everyone understands I am NOT rendering an opinion. In other words dont shoot the messanger!

The claims about the supply totals and Churchill asking for more 'publicity'for Monty.

Of the 10,000 tons of supplies needed per day, General Bernard Montgomery commander British 21st Army Group, received 7,500 tons; General Courtney Hodges,
commander U.S. First Army, received 5,000; and General George S. Patton, commander U.S. Third Army, received an unsustainable 2,000 tons. Cite 5 Paul S. Burdett, "To Hell With Monty," Command, August 1997, 44.

The British press was criticizing the attention being lavished on U.S. Generals Bradley and Patton at the expense of Montgomery. Prime Minister Churchill discussed this with President Roosevelt and requested that Montgomery's
sector be given more attention. Cite 7 Burdett, 44

M47s for the Germans.

Just like in Battle of the Bulge movie.

Typical attempt at misdirection accompanied by a generous amount of irrelevant hyperbolic hand-waving implying dark underlying motives.

Here is author's complete bibliography – free from mkenny's careful "cherrypicking" scheme.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Unpublished Documents
Combined Arms Research Library Archives, Fort Leavenworth, KS. Memorandum.
SUBJECT: Extracts from Observer's Report on Airborne Operation, ETO. TO:
Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, Army War College, Washington
25, D.C. Date 6 December 1944, p. 2. Need to see how to cite this.
Memorandum. SUBJECT: Enemy Situation on Second Army Front. TO: GSI, HQ
Airborne Troops, AC of S, G-2, XVIII Corps (Airborne), AC of S, A-2, IX Troop
Carrier Command (Fwd). Date 15 September 1944, p. 2.
British I Airborne Corps, Headquarters. Operation "MARKET" Operation Instruction No. 1. 13 September 1944.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Weekly Intelligence Summary 22. 19 August 1944.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Weekly Intelligence Summary 23. 26 August 1944.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Weekly Intelligence Summary 25. 9 September 1944.
Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force. Weekly Intelligence Summary 26. 16 September 1944.
Ultra Message XL 8908. 2 August 1944. Ultra Message XL 8072. 26 August 1944. Ultra Message XL 8270. 28 August 1944. Ultra Message XL 8280. 28 August 1944. Ultra Message XL 8384. 29 August 1944. Ultra Message XL 8543. 30 August 1944.
Ultra Message XL 8942. 2 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9188. 5 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9219. 5 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9245. 6 September 1944.
89
Ultra Message XL 9247. 6 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9248. 6 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9381. 7 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9481. 8 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9409. 9 September 1944. Ultra Message XL 9762. 11 September 1944. Ultra Message HP 9. 13 September 1944. Ultra Message HP 188. 14 September 1944. Ultra Message HP 220. 15 September 1944. Ultra Message HP 242. 15 September 1944. Ultra Message HP 294. 16 September 1944. HP 1019 dated 24 September 1944. US 82nd Airborne Division, Headquarters. Annex 1c to Field Order No. 11. 11 September 1944. US 101st Airborne Division, Headquarters. Annex 1a to Field Order No. 1. 13 September 1944. US 101st Airborne Division, Headquarters. Field Order No. 1 with Annexes, Operation MARKET. 14 September 1944. Periodicals Betts, Richard K. "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable." World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978): 35-54. Burdett, Paul S. "To Hell with Monty." Command, August 1997, 42-48. Books Bando, Mark. The 101st Airborne, From Holland to Hitler's Eagle Nest. Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International, 1995. Baynes, John. Urquhart of Arnhem. London: Brassey's, 1993.
90
Bennet, Ralph. Ultra in the West: The Normandy Campaign 1944-45. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980.
Betts, Richard K. "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable." In Power, Strategy, and Security. Edited by Klaus Knorr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983.
Blair, Clay. Ridgway's Paratroopers: The American Airborne in World War II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1985.
Blumenson, Martin. The European Theater of Operations: Breakout and Pursuit. Washington: Center of Military History, 1984.
________. Breakout and Pursuit, The European Theater of Operations in the United States Army in World War II. Washington, DC: GPO, 1961.
Bradley, Omar N. A General's Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983,
________. A Soldier's Story. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951.
Bradley, Philip G. "Market Garden: Was Intelligence Responsible for the Failure?" Research Report., Air War College, 2001.
Calvocoressi, Peter. Top Secret Ultra. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980.
Chandler, Alfred D. Jr., ed. The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower the War Years: IV. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970.
Cornelius, Bauer. The Battle of Arnhem. New York: Stein and Day, 1996.
Crosswell, D. K. R. The Chief of Staff: The Military Career of General Walter Bedell Smith. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
Eisenhower, David. Eisenhower: At War 1943-1945. New York: Random House, 1986.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. Crusade in Europe. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1948.
Gardner, W. J. R. Decoding History: The Battle of the Atlantic and Ultra. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999.
Garlinski, Jozef. The Enigma War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1980.
Gelb, Norman. Ike and Monty: Generals at War. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1994.
Hamilton, Nigel. Monty. New York: Random House, 1981.
91
Harclerode, Peter. Arnhem: A Tragedy of Errors. London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994.
Hinsley, F. H.. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. 2. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
________. British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations. Vol. 3, Part II. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Horne, Alistair, and David Montgomery. Monty: The Lonely Leader, 1944-45. New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 1994.
Horrocks, Brian. Corps Commander. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977.
Kershaw, Robert J. ‘It Never Snows in September': The German View of MARKETGARDEN and The Battle of Arnhem, September1944. Shepperton, England: Ian Publishing, Ltd., 1994
Kirkpatrick Jr., Lyman B. Captains Without Eyes. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.
Kozaczuk, Wladyslaw. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War Two. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, Inc., 1984.
Lewin, Ronald. Ultra Goes to War. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company. 1978.
MacDonald, Charles B. "The Decision to Launch Operation MARKET-GARDEN" In Command Decisions. Edited by Kent Greenfield. Washington, DC: GPO, 1969.
_________. The Siegried Line Campaign. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1963.
Manning, Michael L. Senseless Secrets: The Failures of U.S. Military Intelligence, From George Washington to the Present. New York: Carol Publishing Group, 1996.
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Middlebrook, Martin. Arnhem 1944, The Airborne Battle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994.
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of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1997.
Pouge, Forrest C. European Theater of Operations: Supreme Command. Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1954.
Ryan, Cornelius. A Bridge Too Far. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974.
Schultz, James V. "A Framework for Military Decision Making Under Risks." Maxwell
Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University,
1996.
Smith, Michael. Station X Decoding Nazi Secrets. New York: TV Books, 1999.
Stripp, Alan. "The Enigma Machine: Its Mechanism and Use." In Codebreakers. Edited by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Strong, Kenneth. Intelligence at the Top: the Recollections of an Intelligence Officer London: Cassell & Co. LTD, 1969.
Taunt, Derek. "Hut 6: 1941-1945." In Codebreakers. Edited by F. H. Hinsley and Alan Stripp. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Urquhart, Brian. A Life in Peace and War. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.
Warner, Philip. Horrocks: The General Who Led from the Front. London: Hamis Hamilton Ltd., 1984.

B

Typical attempt at misdirection accompanied by a generous amount of irrelevant hyperbolic hand-waving implying dark underlying motives.

Here is author's complete bibliography – free from mkenny's careful "cherrypicking" scheme…………………….

That is the old 'argumentum ad verecundiam'. You failed to notice I actually had a dig at that mindset in my reply but anyway what I do is check references rather than say 'gosh that list of references is really impressive. It must be 100% correct so I had better not criticise any part of it or I will look foolish.

For example noticed a error in the tonnage numbers (so much for his 'references!)so I have specific corrections in mind.

LOL, spare me the tiresome evasive rhetoric, mkenny.

B

spare me the tiresome evasive rhetoric,
I am in no way evasive. I will say it straight to your face.
You are a prisoner of your prejudice.