"Montgomery's Memoirs" Topic

Well worth looking for and reading.

My opinion of him has gone up and other down, I wont say who you decide for yourself :)

Memoirs are usually rather self-serving.

Nigel Hamilton's Monty Trilogy is the best biography of M of A

I read the condensed one-volume by Nigel Hamilton. Made me think better of Montgomery than previously, but I had read little of him prior. I have come to believe that the more you learn about a famous person, the more human they are found to be. Not better or worse, necessarily.

Scott you pessimist he had no political motive sunlike shall we say American General, readf th ebook then make your mind up !

No one rises to a high position in any hierarchy
with a small or medium sized ego.

Eisenhower had a temper, but knew when to rein it
in. Patton did not.

Ike came from a relatively poor family, Patton did
not.

I have no idea about Montgomery's life, other than
the (always suspect, in my eyes) 'capsule' bio's one
finds. However, from what I have read (minimal) he
had a single-minded approach to things and went about
his duties in that way, probably to the great benefit
of the war effort.

Both Ike and Monty were from straitened childhoods,
albeit in different senses. Patton's childhood was
more privileged, and he was fed tales of Confederate
glory by family friends, particularly one John
Singleton Moseby.

Perhaps that is why Ike and Monty got on reasonably
well, while Monty and Patton did not.

Somewhere, I read that Monty was a non-smoker and
a teetotaler, but not by choice, but as the result of
WWI combat wound(s). Anyone know if that is the case ?

Ed Mohrmann I like your style.
one thing that has become clear through two new Arnhem books is that in reality Pattone messed up Market garden by refusing to halt and thus drawing stores fuel etc that could have been used to aid the drive to cut rotterdam off and stop the V2 rockets clobbering London.

I, for one, would be interested to learn exactly how Patton "messed up" Market Garden.

Can you elaborate?

B

Montgomery was one of those types who make great bosses and lousy subordinates.

I believe his many, many abilities and accomplishments were sometimes overshadowed by his immense ego (not necessarily a handicap to high command) and his single minded self confidence which rubbed some of his peers and superiors the wrong way.

Blutarksi I think its clear in my last over.

WARGAMESBUFF wrote – "Blutarksi I think its clear in my last over."

With all due respect, you did not give any relevant details regarding what Patton is alleged to have done and how 21AG suffered as a consequence. If you are not in a position to provide same, I'd certainly be interested to at least know what books you are referring to. Was 21AG suffering from a supply shortage in Sep 44? According to "Notes on the operations of 21 Army Group, 6 June 1944-5 May 1945", apart from supplies being hauled 350 miles overland, apart from the supplies provided for Market-Garden which involved the advance of 20,000 vehicles attempting to link up with the airborne drops, 21AG also received nearly 10,000 additional tons of supplies by airlift.

Go here for a peek into US 3rd Army's logistics situation – link

Just sayin'

B

Here is another look into Third Army's situation -

The Lorraine Campaign
Hugh M Cole

"The Lull in Operations Comes to an End
The priority on gasoline which had been assigned the First Army, in consequence of General Eisenhower's decision to make the main Allied effort in the north, left the Third Army virtually immobilized from 1 to 5 September. During the period 26 August – 2 September the gasoline received by the Third Army averaged 202,382 gallons per day. Since Patton's tanks and trucks had habitually consumed between 350,000 and 400,000 gallons a day during the last phases of the pursuit, and since some 450,000 gallons per day would be needed east of the Moselle, there could be no real question of mounting a full-scale attack against the Moselle line until the supply situation improved. On 2 September the gasoline receipt at Third Army reached the lowest figure of the entire arid period – 25,390 gallons. But finally on 4 September the gasoline drought started to break, only a day later than General Bradley had predicted to General Patton. On this date the Third Army was issued 240,465 gallons; during the next three days 1,396,710 gallons arrived, and by 10 September the period of critical shortage was ended. In the meantime, however, General Patton had been given permission to resume the Third Army advance."

Patton was no rogue element. It was Eisenhower who was dictating events and making decision about supply allocation.

B

Market Garden did not fail due to a supply failure….at least not for ground support. You can complain about planning (e.g. dropping too far from the Bridges) limited air resources (well hardly limited compared with Axis, but needing repeated lifts to drop in three Airborne Divisions) intelligence failures, bad weather, bad luck…..

But above all underestimating your enemy. The incredible ability of the German Army (and SS) to improvise, react, counterattack. OK the 9th and 10th SS sitting there was bad luck, but most of the counterattack came from units rushed into the battle.

But the one that always gets me. Let's allow XXX Corps to get to Arnhem by the third fourth day. They are at the end of a very narrow bridgehead. Hell's Highway is now even longer and harder to defend. Begging for a flank attack and potential disaster. Monty was strange. He went from being a very cautious general who wanted everything guaranteed to a risk taker, with that race for Berlin rather than a broad front. So long as it was his race for Berlin.

with that race for Berlin rather than a broad front. So long as it was his race for Berlin.
Not so. Certainly he would have liked it to be 'his' race but he stated he would serve under any commander who was chosen to lead any 'race to Berlin'.

Hi deadhead,
One important factor that must be kept in mind when deciphering Montgomery's conduct during the war was the profound manpower shortage faced by Great Britain. Many of Montgomery's decisions make a good deal of sense when viewed from the perspective of reducing British casualties. Market Garden was indeed a large gamble, but the perceived pay-offs were on the other hand most attractive in terms of an accelerated termination of the war.

Strictly my opinion, of course.

B

If Montgomery had a supply problem, he was part of it. He should have taken Antwerp when he had the chance, but he waited until it was too late. He was more interested to pushing for the Rhine, which is fine, but you can't blame Patton for Monty's failure based on lack of supplies.

At the same time, any comparison of Ike, Monty, or Patton is a comparison between apples and oranges. Patton relied on maneuver, Monty was the champion of the set-piece battle, and Ike was the General who had to manage all those huge egos. Neither Patton nor Monty could have done Ike's job.

Arnhem was a crap shoot…it was an all or nothing attempt. Either it would have succeeded, or failed. Capturing all that territory up to the Rhine accomplished nothing, he would have had to get across to accomplish anything.

If Montgomery had a supply problem, he was part of it. He should have taken Antwerp when he had the chance, but he waited until it was too late. He was more interested to pushing for the Rhine,

By this time he was a subordinate and thus could be ordered to do whatever his superior wanted. He was never ordered to prioritise Antwerp over Arnhem. That 'failure' was above his pay-grade.
Also the supply problem was hitting the US Forces far more than 21st AG. This was a direct result of Bradley deciding to push East in July rather than (as planned) turning west and take the French Atlantic ports and/or construct CHASTITY. All the Allied supply shortages stem directly from that decision and it completely destroyed the carefully worked out US 'direct-from-US-Ports-to-France' supply schedules (the infamous 'Phase Lines' wrongly used to castigate Monty over CAEN) so the blame does not rest just on Monty's shoulders. In fact Quiberon Bay (where CHASTITY was to be built) was not even captured until after Antwerp. When he decision to forgo CHASTITY was made in the first week of September then, and only then, did ANTWERP (or more correctly the approaches to Antwerp) become crucial.

Guys you really need to read his book and also read Arnhem 1944;
Arnhem 1944 by Christer Bergstrom
Vol 1
ISBN # 9789188331485

Blutarski I totally agree with you here.
Monty really cared for his troops both US, Candaian and UK.
'One important factor that must be kept in mind when deciphering Montgomery's conduct during the war was the profound manpower shortage faced by Great Britain. Many of Montgomery's decisions make a good deal of sense when viewed from the perspective of reducing British casualties. Market Garden was indeed a large gamble, but the perceived pay-offs were on the other hand most attractive in terms of an accelerated termination of the war'.

"By this time he was a subordinate and thus could be ordered to do whatever his superior wanted. He was never ordered to prioritise Antwerp over Arnhem. That 'failure' was above his pay-grade.
Also the supply problem was hitting the US Forces far more than 21st AG. This was a direct result of Bradley deciding to push East in July rather than (as planned) turning west and take the French Atlantic ports and/or construct CHASTITY. All the Allied supply shortages stem directly from that decision and it completely destroyed the carefully worked out US 'direct-from-US-Ports-to-France' supply schedules (the infamous 'Phase Lines' wrongly used to castigate Monty over CAEN) so the blame does not rest just on Monty's shoulders. In fact Quiberon Bay (where CHASTITY was to be built) was not even captured until after Antwerp. When he decision to forgo CHASTITY was made in the first week of September then, and only then, did ANTWERP (or more correctly the approaches to Antwerp) become crucial."

- – -

[ 1 ] The task of capturing and clearing the Channel ports from LeHavre to Antwerp rested with 21AG from the moment of breakout. Antwerp was, of course, the major prize due to its great size and proximity to the German homeland. Antwerp port itself (though largely demolished) fell rather easily into British hands early on. But the 60 mile channel connecting Antwerp to the sea remained firmly under German control and prevented any access to the port. It took several additional months to drive the Germans from Walcheren Island and re-open access to the sea. Some authorities argue that inadequate forces were committed to that effort.

[ 2 ] The headlong pursuit after the Normandy breakout dramatically outstripped all planning expectations, reaching 350 miles from the Normandy beaches in a very short a time. The principal problem at that point became not landing sufficient tonnages of supplies over the beaches, but getting it to the front. The French rail system had been destroyed and all supplies had to be moved over the road by trucks (which were themselves consuming 300,000 gallons of fuel per day doing so – nearly the daily consumption of an army command). Quiberon Bay, where the CHASTITY logistical complex was to be constructed was more than 150 miles further from the front and would actually only have worsened the supply problem. What was needed was a large port closer to the front – Antwerp, in short.

[ 3 ] Re the Brittany Peninsula, the US VIII Corps of Patton's 3rd Army was assigned to deal with it. The three ports on the peninsula (Brest, Lorient, St Nazaire) were all first class fortresses. Brest fell on 28 Aug 1944, but, even with the assistance of massive bombing raids, it still cost VIII Corps 10,000 casualties and the port itself had been comprehensively demolished by the Germans before their surrender. By this time, the magnitude of the Allied pursuit had become apparent to all and the decision was taken to simply mask the remaining two German held ports. Lorient and St Nazaire did not surrender until after their receipt of news of Germany's formal surrender in May 1945. IMO, Bradley's decision to advance to the east was, at the end of the day, well founded.

B

The French rail system had been destroyed and all supplies had to be moved over the road by trucks (which were themselves consuming 300,000 gallons of fuel per day doing so – nearly the daily consumption of an army command). Quiberon Bay, where the CHASTITY logistical complex was to be constructed was more than 150 miles further from the front and would actually only have worsened the supply problem. What was needed was a large port closer to the front – Antwerp, in short.,

The French rail network south of Normandy had not been systematically destroyed because it was intended to be used to move the CHASTITY supplies forward. If CHASTITY had gone ahead then the US supply problem (and it was overwhelmingly a US problem)would not have been that serious It was the decision to not build CHASTITY that made the delay at Antwerp into a crisis. 150 extra miles per train is not the same hurdle as 150 extra miles by 1000 trucks.

Re the Brittany Peninsula, the US VIII Corps of Patton's 3rd Army was assigned to deal with it. The three ports on the peninsula (Brest, Lorient, St Nazaire) were all first class fortresses. Brest fell on 28 Aug 1944, but, even with the assistance of massive bombing raids, it still cost VIII Corps 10,000 casualties and the port itself had been comprehensively demolished by the Germans before their surrender. By this time, the magnitude of the Allied pursuit had become apparent to all and the decision was taken to simply mask the remaining two German held ports. Lorient and St Nazaire did not surrender until after their receipt of news of Germany's formal surrender in May 1945. IMO, Bradley's decision to advance to the east was, at the end of the day, well founded

CHASTITY was a prefabricated port so it did not have to be 'cleared' You just had to take the land around it. The decision to go east instead of west may have been the right one but if you freely change your priorities then you accept the problems that come with it. Blaming Monty for a problem created by Bradley then endorsed by Eisenhower is simple scapegoating

"The French rail network south of Normandy had not been systematically destroyed because it was intended to be used to move the CHASTITY supplies forward. If CHASTITY had gone ahead then the US supply problem (and it was overwhelmingly a US problem)would not have been that serious It was the decision to not build CHASTITY that made the delay at Antwerp into a crisis. 150 extra miles per train is not the same hurdle as 150 extra miles by 1000 trucks."

"CHASTITY was a prefabricated port so it did not have to be 'cleared' You just had to take the land around it. The decision to go east instead of west may have been the right one but if you freely change your priorities then you accept the problems that come with it. Blaming Monty for a problem created by Bradley then endorsed by Eisenhower is simple scapegoating."
- – -

False arguments.

Construction of CHASTITY could not even have been commenced until Lorient and the defenses on the Quiberon peninsula and Belle Isle, which interdicted sea access to intended CHASTITY port site had been captured. After that, the port facility plus a ten mile rail link to the French rail system had to be constructed. The main benefit was that deep draft ocean-going ships could dock and unload there. When completed, the CHASTITY port facility was anticipated to have an inbound cargo handling capacity of about 10,000 tons per day, with the supplies discharged from the ships, then loaded aboard trains for a 150 mile haul to Normandy where they would be re-handled – i.e., unloaded from the trains and re-loaded to trucks for road transport to the front. This might have made some sort of sense if the Allied advance had conformed to original projections – seizure of the Brittany peninsula by D+50 and the Seine reached by D+90. The distance from Normandy to the Seine could have been easily managed by the available road transport companies.

Instead, the Allied advance was far more rapid than anticipated, with 21AG having hurdled the Seine and raced more than 200 miles north in four days to seize the huge and largely intact port of Antwerp by coup de main on 4 Sep (D+90). Unfortunately German command of the channel connecting Antwerp to the sea was apparently considered a low priority by 21AG and the Germans were not cleared out of the Scheldt until late November – two and a half months after the capture of Antwerp port.

Go here – link – for a well done summary of events connected to Operation CHASTITY.

Planning projections for logistics were as follows –
"The development of beach and port operations was planned to provide for a capacity somewhat in excess of that actually required for the support of the forces moved to the Continent.9 Discharge capabilities were expected to expand from approximately 14,700 long tons per day on D plus 10 to about 45,950 long tons by D plus 90.10 The OMAHA, UTAH, and Quin�ville beaches were to begin discharge on D Day. The artificial port at OMAHA would be opened on D plus 12, and the small nearby ports of Isigny, St. Laurent-sur-Mer, and St. Vaast-la-Hougue between D plus 12 and D plus 21. These installations would be operated by the Engineer special brigades, with the assistance of Transportation Corps troops, including a major port headquarters, port, amphibian truck, harbor craft, and truck units, and a large supply of floating and materials handling equipment.11

Meanwhile, Cherbourg would be opened on D plus 11, and was to be operated by the 4th Port, with attached troops and equipment. Rehabilitation activities of the Engineers were to increase the port's discharge capacity to 5,000 long tons per day by D plus 20, and 8,000 long tons per day by D plus 90. The 4th Port was also scheduled to operate Barfleur and Granville, ports capable of handling coasters only, which would be opened on D plus 20 and 25, respectively. At each of these installations, port troops would be phased in to keep pace with the discharge capacity of rehabilitated facilities.12
In the Brittany area, St. Malo and the nearby beaches were scheduled to begin operation under the 12th Port on D plus 25. With anticipated capacity of 2,000 tons per day by D plus 40 and 3,000 tons daily by D plus 90, this area was to sustain the US Third Army and possibly to handle the debarkation of Third Army troops. The other Brittany ports were expected to come into the logistic picture between D plus 53 and 57, with the opening of Brest and the Rade de Brest, Lorient, and Quiberon Bay.13 The planners estimated that these ports would provide a daily discharge capacity of 8,040 long tons by D plus 60, and 14,550 long tons by D plus 90."

( source – link )

So ….. the entire planned logistical contribution of all the Brittany ports, including CHASTITY, was only projected to reach < 15,000 tons per day by D+90, compared to 45,000+ tons per day over the beaches.

Further reading in the afore-mentioned document will provide detail regardin Allied motor transport challenges and efforts to re-build the French rail net. Worth reading if you are interested in the logistical planning and challenges connected with Operation Overlord.

B

the entire planned logistical contribution of all the Brittany ports, including CHASTITY, was only projected to reach < 15,000 tons per day by D+90, compared to 45,000+ tons per day over the beaches.

I believe the planned tonnage over the beaches was considerably lower than the actual figures. It follows that the planned totals elsewhere could also be on the low side. One advantage of the Atlantic ports would be supplies could be landed direct from the USA instead of going to England, being unloaded and then shipped over the Channel.

I thought the misunderstanding was between what came ashore via the two (to start with anyway) Mulberries and what was landed over the open beaches. In the end the latter dominated to much contemporary surprise and the work that went into the former might be questioned.

It was due to the Rapid advance that Montgomery wanted to push ahead with the whole army group but was out ruled by the I/C who wanted a broad approach.
We thus lost the oppotunity go get into Germany in Sept Oct.
My comment about Patton was his ego took over and drove for the SAAR anyway thus dispersing transport and transport aircraft hence the para dropping over three days.
Eisenhowers letters to Montogomery are very informative.

As to the Mulberries they supplied a huge amount of stores, if the Americans had put it together correctly and put the locking pins in as designed it would have held up.

the British Mulberry was suppying the Canadians and Americans at one stage.

Monty says not going for Antwrrp and Rotterdam was an error that extended the war another 6 months. The Candians were tasked with Antwerp. Hindsight is wonderful.

It also srtikes me thatteh Americans love to blame the British for everything that went wrong and refush to accept s by American Generals. my opinion only.

Hi WARGAMESBUFF,

I might be wrong here, but Eisenhower's quick agreement to Montgomery's Market-Garden operation suggests that he supported the idea of a rapid thrust.

Antwerp was taken more or less intact by the British 11th Armoured Division on 4 Sep in a "coup de main". The Canadian 1st Army only became involved later, when it was committed a month later in the first week of Oct to clear out the German defensive positions blocking the Scheldt estuary (the 60 mile channel connecting Antwerp port with the sea).

Given that acquisition of Antwerp and putting it into operation as the essential port of supply for post breakout/pursuit operations against Germany proper was a principal objective for 21AG, why the Scheldt clearance operation was delayed a month is an interesting question. It seems that, after the capture of Antwerp port, all attention was suddenly diverted to Market-Garden.

B

Blutarski
Monty says it was an oppotunity to beat the Germans before they could reform, the same desert tactic, keep them running.
As we didint they regrouped and then the Ardennes happened.

"Monty says it was an opportunity to beat the Germans before they could reform, the same desert tactic, keep them running."

- – -

I'd agree that was likely Montgomery's reasoning with regards to Market-Garden. But the situation was not parallel to that faced by Montgomery after Alamein.

There was no fervent post-Alamein pursuit by the British – at least not in the sense that the term "pursuit" would suggest. 8th Army followed up the retreat of Panzer Armee Afrika at a very measured pace and at a respectful distance. A close examination of the movement timetables of the two forces makes this clearly evident. After the stall-out of 8th Army's initial progress between Alamein and Matruh (IMO due in approximately equal measures to miscue, mishap, miscalculation and meteorological misfortune (see Carver, "El Alamein" – the author was there on Montgomery's 8th Army staff). I can find no other occasions over the intervening 1500 mile march to Tunisia where any major effort was made to overtake, engage or cut off the German retreat. Especially noteworthy was Montgomery's decision not to attempt a thrust across the base of the "Benghazi Bulge" to cut off the German retreat around Mersa Brega/El Agheila. The next engagement of any note between 8th Army and Panzer Armee Afrika did not occur until after the Germans had reached Tunisia, rested, re-grouped, attacked and beaten the Americans at Kasserine Pass, then turned about and themselves attacked 8th Army at Medenine, where they were badly repulsed (thanks in part to timely advance warming by Ultra).

I'm not trying to be difficult here. But as they say, "the Devil is always in the details".

B

Postscript – May I recommend the book "Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign – The eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein" by Jonathan Fennell; Cambridge University Press, 2011.

link

Don't take the "one star" rating too seriously. It really is a fresh and interesting look into what the commanders of 8th Army in North Africa were dealing with. It fits in well with some of Carver's observations regarding the situation on the ground.

FWIW.

B

I can find no other occasions over the intervening 1500 mile march to Tunisia

Nice back-handed slap in that wording and I bet you will be amazed that anyone could think you meant any such thing. That inability to see the problem is at the root of the endless US harping on about Monty's 'slowness/caution'
The intention of TORCH was to attack Rommel in his rear but in the end it was Monty who came to the aid of the Army in Tunisia. The TORCH planning had assumed the most optimistic date for 8th Army to reach Tunis was mid January and the actual date was Jan 23rd. So the talk of 'slowness' is not contemporary and Monty was in Tripoli pretty much on schedule. How quickly did the TORCH armies move?

Blutarski

You have not mentioned the V2 this was a major political factor in Market garden.

I am wary of satff memoires as the General only has to over look them once or miff them off and then its hate mail.

"I am wary of staff memoires as the General only has to over look them once or miff them off and then its hate mail.
"

Hi WARGAMESBUFF,
Everything must be read carefully; that is absolutely part and parcel of the historian's craft. But don't indict Carver out of hand, without first having read what he had to say: he was in fact quite supportive of Montgomery's command of 8th Army at Alamein. Carver was BTW not just any "staff officer". He went on to command of an Armoured Brigade in NWE at age 29 and ultimately rose to the rank of Field Marshal Lord Carver, serving as Chief of the UK Defence Staff in the 70s.

Another good companion volume by him is "Dilemmas of the Desert War – A New Look at the Libyan Campaign 1940-1942".

- – -

I'm not in a position to comment on the influence of the German V weapon campaign upon Allied operational planning in NWE, as I have not dived into the subject in any meaningful depth.

B

mkenny wrote – "Nice back-handed slap in that wording and I bet you will be amazed that anyone could think you meant any such thing. That inability to see the problem is at the root of the endless US harping on about Monty's 'slowness/caution'
The intention of TORCH was to attack Rommel in his rear but in the end it was Monty who came to the aid of the Army in Tunisia. The TORCH planning had assumed the most optimistic date for 8th Army to reach Tunis was mid January and the actual date was Jan 23rd. So the talk of 'slowness' is not contemporary and Monty was in Tripoli pretty much on schedule. How quickly did the TORCH armies move?

- – -

Once again, you have missed the point by compulsively leaping to the assumption that my commentary (all totally correct based upon the historical record BTW) regarding the caution displayed by 8th Army in its post-Alamein pursuit of Panzer Armee Afrika was some sort of veiled insidious personal "attack" upon Montgomery.

Untrue.

Montgomery had manifestly good reason to exercise caution in the pursuit and it (IMO) largely revolved around lingering 8th Army doctrinal and training shortcomings which Montgomery had not yet had time to completely resolve during his limited time in command.

I'll be happy to chat and discuss my thinking on this topic in more detail, but not if you are going to set your hair on fire every time you think you see a bogeyman hiding in my posts.

B

Less caution and more to do with physics I think. Tanks are not likely to be able to overtake motor vehicles especially when the former are moving across the desert and the latter can use the road.

As it was 8th Army advanced the 700 miles to Benghazi from Alamein in 15 days.

The idea that 8th Army could execute a Beda Fomm is a fanciful one given how small the force they were supporting so far from Alamein was.

Once again, you have missed the point by compulsively leaping to the assumption that my commentary (all totally correct based upon the historical record BTW) regarding the caution displayed by 8th Army in its post-Alamein pursuit of Panzer Armee Afrika was some sort of veiled insidious personal "attack" upon Montgomery.

No. I tried to point out that behaviour is led by conditioning. You believe you are completely objective and have no intention of causing discord. However the history of the way Montgomery is portrayed in most US books means the too slow/too cautious mythos is firmly established. In your mind this sort of remark is entirely justified and not in any way controversial to the unbiased reader. You would consider yourself totally unbiased and would dismiss any counter-argument (from the likes of me) as just the witterings of a Monty-worshipper. It is called prejudice and no one who labours under a genuine prejudice is ever aware that they are prejudiced.