"Napoleonic Skirmishers Questions" Topic

From Napoleon's Apogee: Pascal Bressonet's Tactical Studies 1806: Saalfeld, Jena, and Auerstadt, Translated and annotated by Scott Bowden, 44-46.

Skirmishers, or tirailleurs if you prefer, were designated from a 'parent formation' which 'could be either the battalion, regiment, brigade, or division.'

The different methods for employing troops in open order were:

-'Tirailleurs de marche et de combat for the parent battalion' which could be one or more of the companies in the battalion.

-'Tirailleurs de marche et de combat for the parent regiment' which would comprise companies from the battalions that belonged to the regiment.

-'Tirailleurs de marche et de combat for the parent brigade' which would comprise companies drawn/assigned from the regiments that made up the brigade.

-'Tirailleurs de marche et de combat for the parent division' which would be made up of companies assigned to the division.

-'Tirailleurs en grande bande which was a 'corps principal' which would be a battalion or larger, in other words 'a cohesive command' which would operate in open order as a maneuver unit.

I didn't see much evidence for éclaireurs forming battalions. Prior to the voltigeurs if you needed light infantry, you used light infantry demi-brigades. The éclaireurs are there to scout and cover their parent battalion. The French had been doing this for decades already before the Revolution – and yes the screen is small. They think 70 men is probably enough to cover a battalion.
I have never heard the description 'tirailleurs de combat'. By the definition of the term it is a combat role. It means 'shooters'. If they were being used as scouts or flankers, they were called scouts of flankers.
The 10-15 pace interval is taken from a series of voltigeur instructions which were written in 1811, in 1815, and then by veterans after the wars, describing the function of light infantry.
I don't know why you would have skirmishers in front of a line in an offensive posture? Lines are only useful if you intend to fire, or if you want to lessen the impact of artillery for troops who are passive. If you are attacking the enemy and moving across ground to do this, the column is preferred.
There are lots of examples of voltigeurs being brigaded together on the day of combat. I would say it was more a question of did voltigeurs ever remain with their parent battalions in battle?

Prior to the voltiguers being officially formed (March 1804 for the light infantry regiments and September 1805 for the line infantry regiments) some regiments had already unofficially formed 'light companies.' That was probably based on the Royal Army's regimental chasseur companies. Between 1796 and 1801 these companies were usually called 'eclaireurs' and are mentioned in Coignet, Teste, and Thiebault.

I would say it was more a question of did voltigeurs ever remain with their parent battalions in battle?

Where would they be employed or assigned if not with their own battalions? Especially after the 1808 reorganization from nine to six companies per battalion, if you detach the elite companies, the remaining companies couldn't do too much without them.

In my research I found ample examples of voltigeurs réunis. I also found many examples of grenadiers réunis. In the old days, you always took the regimental grenadier and chasseur companies away from their battalions to form advanced guard units. The 1791 / 1792 regs also speak of the grenadiers being taken away from their battalion (chasseur companies were stupidly suppressed in 1791). It is interesting to read Duhesme's criticism of battalions of voltigeurs being formed and them being used as assault troops in sieges, simply because they were considered 'élite.' Nothing is more preposterous. Voltigeurs were only élite because they were short. They did not need any particular martial skills or bravery, or physical strength, nor have to be marksmen, as the old chasseurs were. In fact, before 1805 the majority of them were considered unfit for military service. And why form a battalion of voltigeurs and then have the light infantry battalions fight as line troops (as they increasingly did)? In 1811 the Morand instructions for voltigeurs are taught to the centre companies (line and light) because voltigeurs were not always able to skirmish for their battalion. So we can conclude that after 1808, battalions might well only have four centre companies present. Bardin suggests this is true when he discusses the voltigeurs position on the left of the line, and the fact they would be required to form a 'division' with a centre company. He concludes it wasn't a problem because voltigeurs were usually detached. When this occurred, the four centre companies did not form divisions, but acted on their own. I just see the quality of French infantry in sharp decline after 1809.

Hi Terry

WRT the formation of combined grenadier battalions.

I've noted that in Napoleon's instructions on the six company organisation in 1808, he notes to the effect that when all six companies are present, the battalion manoeuvres by divisions. When the grenadiers and voltigeurs are absent the remaining fusiliers manoeuvre by platoons. Its almost as if the expectation is the voltigeurs and grenadiers are detached as a norm.

The "Règlement provisoire sur le service de l'infanterie en campagne du 5 Avril 1792", notes when brigades are formed, the companies of grenadiers of each brigade will be combined in a battalion…These battalions will be intended to serve out of the line of battle.

I have not seen anything similar to form voltigeur battalions. Certainly not on the lines of Wellington's instructions for his troops in Peninsula and Belgium.

Is there perhaps a contemporary document clarifying this, or hall we have to await your book? :-)

Regards
Scott

Nothing is more preposterous. Voltigeurs were only élite because they were short. They did not need any particular martial skills or bravery, or physical strength, nor have to be marksmen, as the old chasseurs were.

It takes more than size to make either a grenadier or a voltigeur.

Napoleon was reluctant to designate any unit 'elite' including a battalion's elite companies, until they had proven themselves to be so.

‘The fire of skirmishers is best of all…'-Correspondence, XV, No. 12416, pages 102-110.

‘There will be in every battalion of light infantry regiments a company called the ‘mounted company' or ‘mobile company' or ‘partisan company,' or any other name of this sort.'

‘This company will always be the third in the battalion, counting the grenadier company as the first.'

‘It will be composed of well-built and vigorous men, of the smallest height. No noncommissioned officer or soldier should be more than four feet eleven inches tall and the officers should not exceed five feet.'

‘It will be armed with a lighter fusil than the dragoon's fusil and will be drilled in firing. Officers and noncommissioned officers will be armed with rifled carbines.'

'The men of these companies will be practiced in following the cavalry at the trot, holding sometimes the boot of the rider and sometimes the man of the horse, and in mounting briskly and jumping behind the rider, so that he thus can be transported by the cavalry.'

‘These companies will always be complete and maintained on a war footing…They will be taken from among those men exempted from the conscription because they are too short.'-Napoleon to Berthier, 22 December 1803.

From Swords Around A Throne by John Elting, pages 209-210:

‘The French Army was full of good soldiers who were too short to gain elite status as grenadiers, however much they might deserve it…[Napoleon's] specifications fore voltigeurs called for strong, active men, able to march at the trot and to vault up behind a cavalryman. No enlisted men was to be taller that 4 feet, 11 inches (French); officers could have an inch more. They were to be especially trained to shoot rapidly and very accurately, and their companies were to be kept constantly at war strength…and they would rank next after the grenadiers.'
‘But the ‘kleine manner' were efficient-swarming skirmishers in the attack; sharpshooting rearguards in a retreat; useful people for any detail involving hurry, dodging, scrambling, and danger, sch as the first wave in the assault crossing of the Beresina River, where they were ‘ferried' across by Polish lancers. Voltigeur companies might be grouped temporarily into special battalions to support the advance guard cavalry in close country…'

It should be noted that when the follow-on troops to support the Polish lancers and the voltigeurs crossed the Beresina River, every dead Cossack they came across had been shot in the head.'-see Paul Britten Austin's The Great Retreat, page 261.

'Grenadiers, carabineers, voltigeurs, and sapeurs alike fully earned their extra pay and privileges. Napoleon was insistent that only qualified men be assigned to them. Newly formed battalions and regiments could do without elite companies until they had been in enough combat to be certain which of their men were the bravest and most reliable. Appearances could be deceiving: It too more than above average height to make a real grenadier.'-John Elting, Swords, 211.

From Coignet, 95:

'…we started off at once to go to the house of General Davout, colonel-general of the foot grenadiers. He received us pleasantly…he has a musket of honor. But he is very small.'

'He made me stand beside him, and said, 'Your are not tall enough for a grenadier…We must cheat the measure.' When he passes under the measure make him put some packs of cards in his stockings. 'You see…he's too short by an inch or more…you will see that with two packs of cards under each foot, he will pass all right.

Doing as Davout instructed, Coignet passed the measure and entered the Grenadiers a Pied of the Consular Guard. So much for height…

@Terry

About the Piquets and Tirailleurs, you are of course right that this practise dates well into the Ancien Regime – as far as I know 50 fusiliers and the grenadier company could be used for that.

Seemingly in the 7YW – the tirailleurs gained much importance – even on the battle field as tirailleurs de combat.

This could be seen at the campaigns on the Rhine, expecially under Broglie.

Colin writes in his tactiques of 18e siecle – L'infanterie au XVIIIe siècle :
la tactique / par le
commandant d'artillerie Colin:

Enfin, l'emploi de tirailleurs ou de petits détachements faisant le feu de billebaude en avant ou sur les ailes c'est généralisé depuis la guerre de la succession d'Autriche ; dans les camps d'instruction de 1754 il n'y a pas de manœuvres sans tirailleurs.

p.56

About the tirailleurs de combat, I am puzzled that you did not read about those,Gerome covers that subject in his

Essai historique sur la tactique de l'infanterie …

starting at page 155 les tirailleurs en grandes bandes, also it is covered well in the

Rogniat / Marbot feud where Marbot clearly defines those different tactical roles of tirailleurs.

As to how tirailleurs were employed, my hypothesis is – in case they cover a line of battle of their respective battalions – and those were in column, they would not only cover the frontage of the column, but cover the ground this battalion would cover when deployed in line, so overlapping the frontage of the column.

You doubt that tirailleurs were employed in front of battalions deployed in line – I cannot agree on this, in case of a defensive role, it well could be – just to hold off enemy tirailleurs to pick on the units in dense order.

As for the attack, the French did not always necessarily attack in column, as Jena shows, plenty of examples in Colins tacticques – and as Bressonnet or also battle of Maida

As to the eclaireurs, according to my reading they were picked soldiers from the whole center companies of a battalion, and were usually full of pride to be in those ad hoc units, there you used the memoires of Francoise, in your book about French soldiers of Egypt you know about this.

They were not formed from grenadiers, those would have to used their own when concentrated in elite battalions.

The eclaireurs, in case not used as tirailleurs de combat in the classical sense could well be placed in larger units, to fullfil classical roles of light infantry.

Here my findings about them

La formation des compagnies de tirailleurs remonte à cette époque, chaque bataillon avait la sienne, composée d'hommes de choix et de bonne volonté : tous les officiers ambitionnèrent d'en faire partie, afin d'avoir plus d'occasions d'approcher l'ennemie et d'acquérir de l'honneur. Les tirailleurs ne cessèrent pas de compter dans l'effectif de leurs compagnies, et leur réunion n'avait bien qu'en présence de l'ennemi.
Souvenirs Militaires et Intimes du Général Vte de Pelleport, erster Band tome Premier, Paris 1857
p. 47 (67 google books)
CASSAGNE (Louis-Victorîu, baron), lieutenant-général, naquit le 5 juin 1774. Il entra au service en qualité de lieutenant dans une compagnie franche, le 1"février 1795, et devint capitaine de la 6° compagnie du 8' bataillon du département de la Haute-Garenne, le 25 mars suivant. Employé avec ce bataillon à Parmée des Pyrénées Orientales, il se distingua, le 4 avril de la même année , en défendant à la tête de sa compagnie le passage de la rivière de la Tela, au village de Corncilla. Il continua à servir à la même aimée, on 179.'; et 1795, et passa à celle d'Italie, en 1796. Commandant les éclaireurs de l'aile gauche du corps du général Masséna, il fut chargé de poursuivre les Autrichiens après leur défaite à Lonato, et fut blessé très-grièvement d'un coup de feu à ‘la poitrine, le 5 août, près du lac de Garda. A la tête de ces mêmes éclaireurs, il fit mettre ‘bas les armes à un corps de cavalerie ennemie, le 16 janvier 1797, près de Mantoue. Il
commença Attaque du camp autrichien à la bataille de Tarvis, le 25 mars suivant, et reçut dans cette affaire un_ coup de feu à la jambe gauche. Après avoir continué à servir à l'armée d'Italie et en Suisse, il fit partie de l'armée expéditionnaire dÏÉgypte, qui partit des ports de France, en
1798. Il eut le commandement des éclaireurs de la division du général Bon, et: combattit à leur tète aux batailles de Chebreyss et des Pyramides. Employé dans l'expéditi0n de Syrie , il servit au siége de St.-Jean-d'Acre. Chargé , le 29 mai 179g, d'attaquer un des ouvrages des assiégés, il fut obligé de combattre à outrance, et d'ég0rger les Turcs qui le défendaient. Il reçut dans cette action cinq coups de poi-
CH AMORIN (Vital-Joachim , baron),général de brigade, naquit à Bonnelles, en l'Ile de France (actuellement département de Seine-et-Oise) , le 16 août 1775. Il entra au service comme soldat dans le 7° régiment d'infanterie de ligne , le 25 décembre 1788; y fut fait caporal, le 27 avril 1792 , et fourrier, le 27 mai suivant. Il fit la campagne de cette dernière, année en Savoie et à l'armée des Pyrénées Orientales. Il passa adjudant-sous-officier au 6° bataillon de PI-Iérault, le 11 juillet 1795, et y devint sous-lieutenant, le 11 octobre suivant. Employé à l'armée des Pyrénées-Orientales, il se trouva, le 50 avril 1794 , à la bataille de Boulon; entra, lui troisième , dans la redoute dite de Montesquiou , s‘empara des canons qui la défendaient, et en dirigea le feu sur l'ennemi (1). Il fut blessé d'un coup de feu dans cette action brillante , et obtint le grade de capitaine, sur le champ de bataille. Il passa en cette qualité dans le 8' bataillon de la Cóte-d'0r, le 8 septembre suivant, et devint capitaine de grenadiers à la 12‘ demi-brigade d'infanterie de ligne, où il fut incorporé, le 21 avril 1796. Employé, la même année, à Parmée d'Italie, dans la division du général Dallemagne, il se distingua, le 24 août, à Borgo-Forte , où il entra , après avoir forcé la ligne ennemie à la tète-des grenadiers et des éclaireurs de la 12° demi-brigade de ligne. Le grade de chef de bataillon fut demandé pour lui par le général de division Girardon(1),comme récompense de la bravoure qu'il avait déployée en cette occasion. Chamorin refusa ce grade , préférant alors commander les braves grenadiers de son corps. Il continua de servirà Parmée d'Italie, en 1797, 1798 et 1799. En décembre 1798, il fit partie de Pexpédition de Circeo dans l'Etat ecclésiastique; entra le premier, à la tôle des grenadiers polonais , dans la ville de Frossinone , prise (Passant, et se conduisit dans cette action avec une telle bravoure , que le grade de chef de bataillon fut demandé une seconde fois pour lui par le général Girardon (a). Il se trouva , le 14 iuiu‘ 1800 , à la bataille de Marengo, s'y distingua particulièrement, et y eut a chevaux tués sous lui. Il passa capitaine au 6' régiment de hussards, le 20 du même mois. Il fut blessé,le 25 décembre suivant, au passage du Mincio, et n'en continua pas moins de rester à la tète des tirailleurs qu'il commandait. La bravoure qu'il montra en cette occasion futcitée avec éloges par le général Dupont, et luivalut le grade-de chef Œescadron qu'il obtint sur le champ de bataille. Il compta en cette qualitédans le 1 x‘ régimcntde hussards, à partirdu me. me iour. En 1801, il fut attaché comme aide-de-camp auge'néral Watrin ,

5045. — ARRÊTÉ.
Paris. 13 thermidor an VIII (1" août 1800).
ARTICLE 1"". — Les grenadiers et éclaireurs des 5", 6', 35°, 64° de ligne et 26' légère seront campés entre Beauvais et Amiens. Les compagnies de grenadiers et d'éclaireurs de chaque demi—brigade formeront un seul bataillon. .
ART. 2. — Ils seront commandés par le général Murat.
ART. 3. —— Il y aura à ce camp deux escadrons du 24e de chasseurs, deux escadrons du 5° de dragons, et douze pièces d'artillerie, dont six servies par l‘artillerie légère.
ART. _4. — Toutes les compagnies de grenadiers et éclaireurs passeront à Paris pour s‘habiller; elles n'en partiront qu'après avoir passé la revue du ministre de la guerre.
ART. 5. — Au 20 thermidor, le camp entre Beauvais et Amiens sera formé. Les troupes seront baraquées si le local est favorable, sinon elles seront campées.
ART. 6. —— Les troupes composant ce camp jouiront d'un supplé— ment de solde pour remplacer la viande. Il leur sera donné de l'eau de – vie toutes les fois qu'elles manœuvreront.
ART. "1. —- Il y aura deux généraux de brigade attachés au camp.
BONA PART E. Dépôt de la guerre.
Le 4 novembre, il prit position à Cre\ Lmulen; le prince de Ponte-Corvo culbuta l'arrière garde, mais il ne put entamer ce corps, parce qu'il n'avait que six cents hommes de cavalerie, et que celle de l'ennemi était beaucoup plus forte. Le général Vattier a fait, dans cette affaire, de très-belles charges, soutenues par les généraux Pactod et Maisons , avec le vingt-septième régiment d'infanterie légère et le huitième de ligne.
On remarque, dans les différentes circonstances de ce combat, qu'une compagnie d'éclaireurs du quatre-vingt-quatorzième régiment, commandée par le capitaine Razout, fut entourée par quelques escadrons ennemis : mais les voltigeurs français ne redoutent point le choc des cuirassiers prussiens; ils les reçurent de pied-ferme, et firent un feu si bien nourri, et si adroitement dirigé, que l'ennemi renonça à les enfoncer. On vit alors les voltigeurs à pied poursuivre la cavalerie à toute course: les Prussiens perdirent sept pièces de canon et mille hommes.
Œuvres DE NAPOLÉON
BONAPARTE.
LIVRE CINQUIÈME.Paris 1822, p. 97
Au général Bonaparte. 1 \ • •

Mon général, nous n'avons aucune voile à vue. Nos deux éclaireurs {'Indépendant et la Foudre que j'ai fait réappareiller, a dix heures du matin, sont à 7 ou 8 lieues dans le nord-ouest. Les frégates seront absolument prêtes demain, elles auront tout à bord. Je n'attends plus guère que votre ordre positif. Ganteaume. P.14
Devant Aboukir, le 12 ihermidoran 7 (3o juillet 1799). Au général Bonaparte.
Mou général,
Bonne nouvelle, le général Davoust s'est conduit avec la plus grande distinction; a la tête de la vingt deuxième, un bataillon de la vingt-cinquième, de la dix-huitième et de trois compagnies d'éclaireurs, il a repris le village entier jusqu'au fort, une pièce de 8 et deux pièces de 16 qu'on vient d'enclouer. On a tué une grande quantité de Turcs dans les maisons : ils ne s'attendaient pas à une attaque aussi vigoureuse. Actuellement ils sont privés d'eau; j'ai ordonné sur-le champ de retrancher toute la tète du village, de manière à ce qu'il ne puisse plus être repris.
Nous n'avons eu que peu de blessés. Le chef de la vingt-deuxième l'a été légèrement à la tête : nous n'avons que six a sept morts.
Une pièce de 24 a forcé un vaisseau a fuir à toutes voiles, un aviso a été culbuté. Les canonniers se conduisent bien, nos bombardiers sont mauvais. Cette nuit, cinq pièces de 24 seront en batterie.
J'ai ordonné une distribution générale d'eau de vie , de munitions et d'un peu d'argent.
Abdallah-menou.
p. 67
•Au général Bonaparte.
Comme je vous l'avais annoncé, mon général, dans ma lettre du 19 du courant, j'ai marché dans la nuit
1 Suivant l'ère des Mahométan».
du 18 au 19 sur le camp des Arabes. Le hasard voulut que, pendant ma marche et a moitié chemin , les éclaireurs rencontrassent les troupeaux d'un village qui, sans doute, évacuaient à notre approche, et, au premier bruit, l'un des gardiens tira un coup de fusil auquel les éclaireurs répondirent, ce qui éventa nécessairement le secret de ma marche : aussi, en arrivant au point du jour entre Zemran et Delingat, avons-nous rencontré les Arabes, les uns a cheval, les autres levant le camp, et les chameaux filant vers la montagne de Rosaf: quant aux moutons et autres équipages, je n'ai pu savoir où ils avaient passé, ce qui m'a fait présumer qu'ils ont été cachés dans quelques villages.
p.90

Correspondance inédite officielle et confidentielle avec les cours étrangères, les princes, les ministres et les généraux français et étrangers en Italie, en Allemagne et en Egypte, Band 7 (Google eBook) Paris 1820
link
Dépôt de la guerre.

6652. — AU GÉNÉRAL BERTHIER.

Paris, 4 germinal an XI (25 mars 1803).

Je vous prie, Citoyen Ministre, de donner ordre que les différents généraux des divisions réunissent, pendant les mois de floréal, prairial, messidor, thermidor et fructidor, tous les détachements que pourraient avoir les différents régiments; quand le local le permettra, la demi-brigade entière ou tous les escadrons de cavalerie seront réunis; et, dans les petites places, il y aura au moins un bataillon ou deux escadrons.

Sous aucun prétexte, il ne sera fourni ni ordonnance, ni petit détachement, quelques réclamations que puissent faire les autorités locales. On n'exceptera de cette règle que les détachements d'éclaireurs qui sont envoyés sur les frontières pour empêcher la contrebande.

Recommandez aux généraux des divisions de veiller à ce que l'on travaille à l'instruction, et qu'il y ait de l'ensemble dans les mouvements; à ce que les conscrits soient sur-le-champ habillés, au moins en vestes, et qu'aux manœuvres d'automne ils soient tous à l'école de bataillon, et puissent dès cette année faire l'exercice à feu.
P. 257

Correspondance de Napoléon Ier, 8: publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III
link

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G'Day Hans-Karl,

I shall be out and about for a few days, but I support your posting 100% -well done

I'll throw more supportive information on your thread when I return…

Best Regards
Art

Prior to the voltigeurs if you needed light infantry, you used light infantry demi-brigades.

This seemed to be the case, in my opinion only in the early par of the Revuliton, later seemingly it became meaningless – and the preferred method was to form units form the éclaireurs.

Lecourbe's division fighting the alpine warfare campaign of 1799 did not have any db légère.

There might be a swing back in the early Empire, to use predominantly light infantry battalions along with light cavalry to form advance guards of corps or divisions.

But I fail to see that light battalions were used mainly for light infantry duties in the classical sense.

Art:

This is an older thread, but I haven't been able to get back to this until now. I have a few questions for you, based on what you wrote previously about Davout's 1811 Instructions:

1. You seemed to hint that Ney's 1803 Instructions could have been part of the training efforts in the Boulogne camps during 1803-1805. What do you see as the relationship between Ney's instructions and the camp training?? What was being trained [Use of the 3rd Line] or was Ney just being impulsive in the face of different methods for skirmishing?

2. Davout states at the beginning of his instructions:

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre.Hambourg, 16th October 1811.

We recognized that it was generally harmful to take a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers, and that it was preferable to take entire companies.

Now, this introduction strikes me as odd for a couple of reasons:

A. He is bringing up alternatives to deploying companies for skirmishing SIX YEARS after it had apparently been established as the army-wide practice in 1804-1805 for both Leger and Ligne. Apparently, from Davout's comments, the the Leger and Voltiegeurs were currently deploying by company. So, why comment on what eems Davout and Morand's "preference in 1811?

B. Davout is writing to very experienced officers about this 'preference'. Why is this argument being presented to these military men aa a 'preference' in 1811?

This strikes me as suggesting that taking "a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers" was still being used among the French armies in 1811. IF not, why mention it at all??

What is your take on these two questions?

Bill

Good Day Bill,

While we are waiting for Art's own answer ; ) , i try to provide some elements

those instructions seems to put in light a double opposition :
first the *technical opposition* between skirmishers from the third rank vs skirmishers from whole peloton/compagnie.
this seems to me of lesser importance and involve 1808 decree and the rules of endivisionnent. eventually bringing *uniformity* in the way things are done.

Second it might be related to the switch between heavy infantry vs light infantry which became the switch between infantry de bataille vs reserve infantry.

for me, the main idea of Morand/Davout 1811 instructions is that the whole infantry de bataille must be trained for the "service des tirailleurs", not just a fraction of them, ie.the elite compagnies.

best regards

I agree, the French infantry seemingly – at least those with Davout – their general skill to be able to skirmish as it had been in the past.

Also Davout just liked to introduce some uniformity for his units, so that he knew what they were capable and in what way, of doing.

Cdr Luppo and VW: Thanks for not waiting for Art. *grine*

technical opposition* between skirmishers from the third rank vs skirmishers from whole peloton/compagnie.
this seems to me of lesser importance.

I am not sure what you mean by 'lesser importance'. I wasn't placing some importance on it, rather wanting to know why there was those differences.

I am not sure how a switch between heavy and light infantry explain it. The eclairs being formed into companies was not a uniform practice, and only references Napoleon's Italian Army before 1800 as far as I can see.

WV: If the instructions were simply to introduce some uniformity to his units, then what were they doing before, and how 'uniform' were the practices outside his Corps in 1811???

About the eclaireurs, I was under the impression it was common practise, but I see that I did only chose d'Italie or d'Orient examples.

As to your last question – I don't know.

Good Day Bill,

"I wasn't placing some importance on it, rather wanting to know why there was those differences."

well, as far i can tell, there was differences in practices calling for some uniformity from higher authorities. so those instructions. you have way more knowledge overall on those questions than me, so the ref. to waiting for Art's input.

what i can say as a French reading French, and reading the whole instructions is that the main point of those instructions *seems* to be that that the whole "infanterie de bataille" should be instructed in the "service des tirailleurs", not just the *specialized* pelotons (elite pelotons as "chosen men").
the technical aspect of tirailleurs from the third ranks vs tirailleurs as a whole peloton *seems* to me of lesser *importance* when considering the whole text(s).
but of course i can be wrong on that : i just try to provide some comments on your questions related to what can be gathered from those instructions.
but again you know all that stuff by heart, so i suspect your question is a very specific one, and i can't give a sufficiently precise answer ! ; )

so the reference about the evolution of infantry, from light vs Heavy (VS) to de bataille vs De Reserve.. which give a "perspective" on those instructions by Morand/Davout for a larger point of of view, in the way of how to understand them in a larger approach.

the eventual switch, if there is one, is more about light vs de reserve. the service of tirailleurs becoming "universal" among the infantry de bataille.

the éclaireurs and similar troops assuming those duties seems different from what is expected from tirailleurs working closely with lines of battle (for the lack of better words !)

now if the question really about the technical aspect of third rank vs whole peloton , i have no statistical data to provide – unfortunately – on those practices, in order to get a clearer point of view of what was done under battlefield conditions.

there was a thread recently about "enfants perdus" where i shared some elements, honestly we can end up with of rather long list of troops types like this one, and may be it's not even the complete list !

TIRAILLEURS
-- TIRAILLEUR A PIED
-- TIRAILLEUR A CHEVAL
CHASSEURS
-- CHASSEURS A PIED
-- CHASSEURS A CHEVAL
GRENADIERS
-- GRENADIERS A PIED
-- GRENADIERS A CHEVAL

VOLTIGEURS
ENFANTS PERDUS
FLANQUEURS
CARABINIERS
TROUPE D' ELITE (hommes choisis – choses men)
TIRAILLEURS DE MARCHE
TIRAILLEURS DE COMBAT
TIRAILLEURS EN GRANDE BANDE
TIRAILLEURS A LA DEDANDADE

TIRAILLEURS DU TROISIEME RANG
TIRAILLEURS EN COMPAGNIE-PELOTON
TIRAILLEURS EN COMPAGNIE-DIVISION

PIQUETS
GRAND' GARDE
EXPLORATEURS
VEDETTES
PATROUILLES DE CAVALERIE
AVANT POSTE DE CAVALARIE

INFANTERIE DE LIGNE
-- INFANTERIE DE BATAILLE
-- INFANTERIE LEGERE
---- CHASSEURS
---- TIRAILLEURS
INFANTERIE DE RESERVE

DETACHEMENT

with my best regards, : )

I've been enjoying the knowledgeable discussion. The topic does hit on a research project I've been pursuing regarding the use of voltigeur companies at Austerlitz. The orders were issued in September 1805 to convert one company to voltigeurs within the line regiments. Most sources say that since the Armee was on the move it wasn't or was only partially implemented. I've read that Ney and Davout issued orders in October to their Corps. Did the other commands catch up by Austerlitz? Was there mixed implementation? I've been combing through memoirs etc to see if one can find evidence (someone bragging they got their yellow collars, or were told). Does anyone have any insights?

ChaosMan:

I'm on a tangent quest. I want to know the French skirmish practices up to and through the 1806 Campaign. What I am finding in drips and drabs is that there were a variety of methods for deploying tirailleurs, particularly the ligne infantry up through that time. Obviously the 1804-5 changes with the Voltigeurs was a step towards that uniformity, but obviously there were something still not 'uniform' by 1811 from Davout's opening remarks and then the need for a written set of instructions for the center companies.

Nothing conclusive, but difficult to say there was one universal way it was done in the French army during that time, even with the 1799 orders that Art mentions. [Which those are, I'd like to know.] The creation of the voltigeurs by converting a company in each battalion doesn't suggest the size requirements Napoleon laid out were being used with that implementation. The soldiers in the center companies would have generally not met the small size requirements set out by the 1804 decrees/

see memoires de Fesenzac, page 76 – according to him also the ordre de bataille of a battalion changed, I would suggest to read what he said and then discuss further on that.

Just read Arnold's book October Triumph about the 1806 campaign.

He talked a lot about French units breaking down into skirmish.

For what its worth in this crowd.

von W: What I could find with "memoires de Fesenzac" doesn't seem to have anything pertinent on page 76 [one version only had 48 pages.

Which book are you thinking of for which Fesenzac?

odd, it is in the souvenirs militaires de 1804 – 1814 par. M le duc de Fezensac, Paris 1870, it is on google books, 547 pages, it is in campagne de 1805, 2e partie

Well, I was looking for a separate book, not souvenirs militaires de 1804 – 1814…. Fezensac has some interesting descriptions of the training camps at Boulogne

Anyway, are you taking about this segment?:

The day before the attack on Scharnitz,[Nov 3rd?] was the time of the creation of companies of voltigeurs. We had tested it at the Montreuil camp, under the command of M. Mazure, my captain. As such the command of the new company belonged to him in the first battalion. We choose the smallest, the most agile men, and the battalion found itself framed between two elite companies, the Grenadiers on the right, the voltigeurs on the left. From the first momentswe felt the advantage of this creation: also, everyone knows the the services rendered by the voltigeurs, the reputation they have acquired.

This is interesting for several reasons:

1. This is Ney's corps.
2. The French 'tested' the concept at the camps, but implemented the notion nearly a year later in the middle of a campaign. Picking the smallest men from the regular infantry in the battalions in Nov. 1805 means they would not be as small [smaller than the regulation limits for recruiters.] as recommended by Napoleon.
3. He mentions the reputation the voltigeurs acquired but that would be some time in the future, not the day they were created.
4. It also doesn't address my question about how center companies were deployed, particularly when Ney had mandated 3rd rank in 1803.
5. The descripitions of the attack on Scharnitz the next day makes not mention of the voltigeurs in attacking a strong point.

Indeed – this is the segment, I was under the impression that I did read also in other memoires about the transformation – but have to find it.

vW – thanks for the reference
McLaddie – I had many of the same observations

1. It was Ney's corps. So his was one of the two known to implement the change in the run up to Austerlitz.
2. I find it interesting that it was Ney's corp playing around with the concept when there are the comments that his camp was not the model of rigorous training (vs Davout, others). " Ney at Montreuil, hardly a model of assiduity, needed a kick up the rear from Napoleon to get on with the task of instructing his troops. "I hardly need tell you to manoeuvre your troops diligently. The last time I saw them it looked as though they needed it. I had issued instructions to form squares in any direction at all"."
3. Find it interesting they would implement the change on the eve of the attack on Scharnitz. They had to be pretty confident that it would work. Also interesting that it was done to implement an attack on a town/fixed point – a classic use.
4. This very informed discussion is driving home the impression that sweeping statements about the Grande Armee (best trained, finest army, etc) cover up the reality of a far more heterogeneous state – better to talk about the state/character of each corps. McLaddie – perhaps that's what's behind Davout's complaining in 1811 – rogue corps doing it their own way (or is that a "duh, that's obvious" observation). This would also imply for war gaming purposes we should be going to corp based factors vs national ones (!)
5. And for those looking to paint 1805 French line units, fascinating to read Fezensac complaining that the sword and epaulettes he ordered from Paris couldn't catch up to him because they were marching so fast, so that he had to use a borrowed sword. Tells me it's hard to believe that yellow collars and other elements of the voltigeur company uniforms made it to the units in time for Austerlitz (but that's a supposition that needs to be researched)

I know not of what 'testing' you refer- eclaireurs and tirailleurs were well established long before this campaign and to elaborate that issue is to falsify it.

Neither Ney nor Davout implemented anything as far as I know. They at most 'passed on' an official regulation now promulgated.
He also issued (Colin & ALombert 1905?) his marching orders and guard duties- are you suggesting that these too were not already common practice? And that he was as much reinforcing his role as CinC and setting discipline in his corps.

>>Tells me it's hard to believe that yellow collars and other elements of the voltigeur company uniforms made it to the units in time for Austerlitz (but that's a supposition that needs to be researched)

That you repeat such an epithet indicates that you have swallowed the English translations- have you read the French yet?- of this manicured and pervasive falsehood completely.

I suggest a thorough reading of multiple pages of Frederic Berjauds excellent regimental histories.
cheers d

I am in line with ChaosMan in this case, those new voltigeur companies would have no time nor opportunity to bei issued with the chamois collar (which was in fact more jonquille than chamois) – neither to have the equipment and would carrly their usual fusils d'infanterie or Austrian muskets which replaced worn out French ones.

Of course they would know how to work due to being testing it in the camps and as well as using eclaireurs, the Voltigeurs just makes those eclaireurs a permanent establishment lasting also after the campaign.

Otherwise I agree with SHat1984 – more reading is required at least from my side.

A pity that Terry Crowdy dropped out of the discussion, there he wrote a book about that subject.

G'Day Scot

In your message:

"I've noted that in Napoleon's instructions on the six company organisation in 1808, he notes to the effect that when all six companies are present, the battalion manoeuvres by divisions. When the grenadiers and voltigeurs are absent the remaining fusiliers manoeuvre by platoons. Its almost as if the expectation is the voltigeurs and grenadiers are detached as a norm."

No this is incorrect, the notions generals de tactique have changed. It was understood that at times both the grenadiers and voltigeurs would be detached, and not the norm.

As I mentioned in my previous message to you, the principles and tactical role of grenadier compagnies of 1792 were not the same as in 1808.

Article 6 is explaining that there are four factions for un bataillon en bataille (en ligne), of which there are two divisions and not three divisions.

Article 7 is explaining that when en colonne; when the grenadiers and voltigeurs are present and formed en colonne, it is formed en colonne par divisions, and Napoleon doesn't even mention the colonne d'attaque for it is contrary to his purpose.

There is a reason for this and it has nothing to do with;" Its almost as if the expectation is the voltigeurs and grenadiers are detached as a norm."

Nor has Article 7 anything to do with forming squares as once thought.

For Hans-Karl, Eric, and Dave W,

Could one of you please validate this for me.

Since this has been posted more than once, but I let it go, I have now decided a correction must be made. -but I could be wrong.

The fire of skirmishers is best of all, is said to be found in Correspondence, XV, No. 12416, pages 102-110 is wrong.

What is actually found in Correspondence, XV, No. 12416, pages 102-110, 12416.

- OBSERVATIONS SUR UN PROJET D'ÉTABLISSEMENT D'UNE ÉCOLE SPÉCIALE DE LITTÉRATURE ET D'HISTOIRE AU COLLÈGE DE FRANCE

To Bill, I will answer your questions shortly

Best Regards
Art

Hi Art,

You are absolutely Korrect, there is nothing in that letter about skirmishers.

12416. -OBSERVATIONS SUR UN PROJET D'ÉTABLISSEMENT D'UNE ÉCOLE SPÉCIALE DE LITTÉRATURE ET D'HISTOIRE AU COLLÈGE DE FRANCE.
Finkenslein, 19 avril 1801.

; )

the quote is to be found in Volume 31 of the Correspondance : page 521
in PROJET D' ORGANISATION DE L' ARMEE.

link

that quote is used in Colin, La Tactique et La Discipline, (p20 of the excellent Jakub edition) hereafter a longer citation to give a larger and truer context to what is written..
; )

« Le feu des tirailleurs est le meilleur de tous ; celui d'un rang seul vient après ; celui de deux rangs est encore bon, mais celui de trois rangs est mauvais. Le troisième rang ne peut rien faire qui puisse accroître le feu des deux premiers rangs, ce qui prescrit la formation de l'infanterie sur deux rangs.
« Mais, dit-on, la présence du troisième rang tranquillise le premier et le second rang sur leurs derrières et leur permet de combattre sans inquiétude ce qui est devant eux. Eh bien ! nous placerons à 10 ou 20 toises derrière la droite et la gauche du bataillon la valeur de ce troisième rang. La présence de cette réserve, placée si près, sous les ordres des capitaines en premier, remplira ce but avec avantage.
« On dit aussi que la baïonnette du troisième rang donne de l'assurance, de la force à la charge à la baïonnette. Mais la pointe de celle du troisième rang arrive à peine au ventre du premier. Les charges en ligne à la baïonnette sont rares : le bataillon, pour charger, se forme en colonne. Si on n'évalue point les forces de la charge par le nombre de rangs qui servent à appuyer, les derniers rangs pourront charger, se déployer, se former sur quatre rangs. »

---

"The fire of the skirmishers is the best of all; that of a single row comes after; the two-row one is still good, but the three-row one is bad. The third rank cannot do anything to increase the fire of the first two ranks, which requires the formation of the infantry in two ranks.
"But, they say, the presence of the third row calms the first and second row behind and allows them to fight without worry what is in front of them. Well ! we will place at 10 or 20 fathoms behind the right and the left of the battalion the value of this third rank. The presence of this reserve, placed so close, under the command of the captains first, will serve this purpose with advantage.
"The third bayonet is also said to give confidence, strength to the bayonet charge. But the tip of that of the third row barely reaches the belly of the first. Bayonet line charges are rare: the battalion, to charge, forms a column. If the forces of the charge are not evaluated by the number of ranks that are used to support, the last ranks can charge, deploy, form into four ranks. "

Best Regards

Getting way above my pay grade I'm afraid.

But, to observe- we do not discuss the skills, the experience, the elan etc- merely the 'technical construct'.

Those who hang every word on 'dictum and regulation' should observe the results. What pronouncement, admonishment and indeed empirical decree ever results in 100% compliance?

Given the 'technical' aspect of choosing skirmishers; suitable candidates and sourcing manpower, one expects 'la Garde Imperiale' to be the ultimate in compliance. HIS most cherished, coddled and expensive units- and still they don't shape up.

Go read the paper by Paul Dawson (2010) Grognards: Grenadier a Pied de la Garde 1799 – 1815 for an analysis (yes it is full of spelling/ grammatical and other errors) of just who got in the Guard. Some of the graphs of 'factual' data are laughable for showing distortions of fact by deliberate 'massaging' going on.

That shows how much adherence to 'rules and laws' was applied to the highest commands (to borrow the Russian epithet)- can we expect such at much lower levels of accountability and enforcement?

I submit yer honour, we cannot…

regards
dave

Yer Honour,

I request an adjournment in court to prepare my case.

I am certain that the Prosecuting Attorney Dave will also be lenient, as to permit me to prepare my defense for this weekend ;-)

I submit Yer Honour, We The People (or something like that) must have time to prepare a proper defense ;-)

Best Regards
Art

C'est la France.

Le procureur a écrit votre nom.

Vous êtes coupable, prouvé ou non.

are we allowed the use of Howitzers for defense in that case ?!
we have kept a few pieces in reserve according to our system .. !!!

; )

best regards

@cdr

Actually – I'd have thought that feeding a brace of howitzers up into the skirmish line might give the defenders a very nasty shock.

Is a French obusier very light to man-handle? Is it as light as a 3 pounder to move?

Those little 3-pdr unicorns the Russian Jaegers were meant to have might be useful at chucking grenades into a defensive line.

@ Cdr Luppo
Absolument!

Art- continué…? :-{
[I can't conjugate to save myself…]

Apparently Poniatowski would move artillery into the skirmish line.

@b

Arillery in skirmish line – Poniatowski – where to read about?

Hey Art: I thought I'd repeat my questions as you did say on April 4th you'd get back to me. I know you have other things going on. My original questions:

Art:

This is an older thread, but I haven't been able to get back to this until now. I have a few questions for you, based on what you wrote previously about Davout's 1811 Instructions:

1. You seemed to hint that Ney's 1803 Instructions could have been part of the training efforts in the Boulogne camps during 1803-1805. What do you see as the relationship between Ney's instructions and the camp training?? What was being trained [Use of the 3rd Line] or was Ney just being impulsive in the face of different methods for skirmishing?

2. Davout states at the beginning of his instructions:

To the generals: Friant, Gudin, Dessaix, Compans and Barbanègre.Hambourg, 16th October 1811.
We recognized that it was generally harmful to take a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers, and that it was preferable to take entire companies.

Now, this introduction strikes me as odd for a couple of reasons:

A. He is bringing up alternatives to deploying companies for skirmishing SIX YEARS after it had apparently been established as the army-wide practice in 1804-1805 for both Leger and Ligne. Apparently, from Davout's comments, the the Leger and Voltiegeurs were currently deploying by company. So, why comment on what eems Davout and Morand's "preference in 1811?

B. Davout is writing to very experienced officers about this 'preference'. Why is this argument being presented to these military men aa a 'preference' in 1811?

This strikes me as suggesting that taking "a certain number of men by company, for flankers and skirmishers" was still being used among the French armies in 1811. IF not, why mention it at all??

What is your take on these two questions?

Bill

Good Dy Bill,

waiting for Art answer of course, but see note (1) page 438 and note (1) page 440 of the infantry Manual .. that said, i'm sure you already know all that stuff by heart ! ; )

link

Best regards

according to foot note 2 – in case I understand it correctly, the voltigeurs are better placed, when manoeuvering at the side and the left of the grenadiers?

So in line at the right there would be the grenadiers, then the voltigeurs and then the rest of the fusilier companies/ pelotons?

Dear Day Hans Karl;

well, you are correct in your understanding, except that the comment in footnote 2, seems more about *what should be done* (Bardin's idea) in relation with art 6 of 1808 decree, taking into consideration what can be the natural system of "endivisionnement" .. between "Elite sub units" (G/V) and fusiliers "sub-units" ..
and it seems difficult to say that Bardin point of view is disconnected from "period reality" .. not to say that things were not eventually done differently .. !

there are many similar comments from him in his dictionary, on this question (endivisionnement), over several entries ..

a difficult subject for sure

; )

Kind regards

Indeed complicated, I checked Bardin in his Tabalux Synoptiques by a Major of Infantry – it is contrary to regulations as far as I see it, a division of elite companies makes some sort of sense, but then when the voltigeurs should act as tirailleurs de combat, it would brake apart the division which brings us back to skirmishing.

Hans Karl,

in some sort of a circuitous way, this also bring us back to Davout's 1811 instructions, and why both fusiliers pelotons and voltigeurs needs to be on *the same page of music* in order to execute le service des tirailleurs, in case the voltigeurs are detached … with the *other half part of the division* !

the case were both *elite compagnies" are together in a division is with a colonne d' attaque par bataillon, ie a column formed on the center .. but still acting as a single column. or a colonne de retraite, same thing but reversed ..

i try to send you the stuff i have on compagnie-peloton & compagnie-division ..
; )