"Napoleonic Skirmishers Questions" Topic

>>The Prussian army had undergone many changes, but still projected the image of the army of Frederick the Great.

I don't buy it at all.
The 'country' hardly projected anything after withdrawl from the alliance coalitions; other than economic pressure on neighbourig 'Germanic' states.

The bio on Blucher (a Non-Prussian) gives his yearly attendance at the Kings 'Review' as a singular event of pomp and 'old days' glory- but thats just because that's all they did.

What interpreters- revisionists/ Germanic/Prussian promoters want you to believe and what was happening (read between the lines) were IMO totally different things.

The 'victorious' rolling up of the European Kingdoms by France were no guaranteed success, sadly I've come to understand, and that the archaic [meaning less intuitive and responsive] administrations were predominantly responsible for their own losses.

Not the common soldier that games rule writers love to deny with punitive penalties. Austrian battalions, in fact all arms except under Mack, stood up well during 1805 and in direct 1:1 conflict at Austerlitz; similarly many Prussian units engaged at Jena/Auerstadt well enough. Their commanders let them down.

I think you just wanted to be post #200! ;-)
cheers dave

You have me there, Dave, I really wanted to be #200 :D.
Not really, I was inspired by the new Perry 1806 Prussians (and helping Alan and Hans-Karl Weiss with more uniform information from my Kling Volume IV) to read some more and came across this discussion. I have a fairly large library on the subject, and on the Prussian invasion of Holland in 1787. I know how well the new Fusilier battalions fought in that campaign.
To give a football/soccer analogy, I see the 1806 army as having the image of a former World Cup winner that hasn't played any matches for years. The team might think the are still as good as in their glory days, and their opponents might still fear them, but in reality a lot has changed.
I'll try to find some proper sources to back that up.

I have a fairly large library on the subject, and on the Prussian invasion of Holland in 1787. I know how well the new Fusilier battalions fought in that campaign.

Ah well we will wait with the usual 'A'= anticip.____
Good to see more info coming on board(!)
I have no doubts about the Prussians, but I allow [inspired by the new Perry 1806 Prussians] inspiration to flow past me. I have enough work on my hands with the 'enemies' of 1805!

**I never knew you could drag and drop in these text boxes!! Hah!!

To give a football/soccer analogy…. The team might think the are still as good as in their glory days, and their opponents might still fear them, but in reality a lot has changed.
Sounds like the All-Blacks as well ;-)
cheers d

"Sounds like the All-Blacks as well ;-)"

Them's fighting words . . .

Cheers,
John

The Prussians of 1806 and later Prussian Armies as well, certainly felt as heirs of those armies (which varied quite a lot) of Frederick.

To project the image without Frederick is difficult and the army of 1806 fought completely different to those of 7YW fame, were differently armed, clad and so on, also differently lead – no Frederick any more.

The void of Frederick created a massive leadership problem, the same as with Nabulieone.

Despite this, even the sneered upon generals – such as Hohenlohe were quite forward thinking, Hohenlohe introducing to train the third rank skirmishing for his inspection.

However the greatest problem was 10 years of peace – compared to the French war hardened armies, how could an army cope with that?

Dave/SHaT1984 scores some first points. I had in mind to start with Die Feldzüge von 1806 und 1807 as it is written in 1807. The anonymous author (Stein?) claims -as Dave did- that the Prussians squandered their glorious past at the "shameful" Peace of Basel in 1795. Before that "Preussen war fortdauernd in ganz Europa geachtet und geehrt" (p3). "So sehr schadet sich besonders ein militairischer Staat, dessen Ansehen hauptsächlich auf der Meynung beruht, die Fremde sowohl als seine Unterthanen von seiner Kraft haben, wenn er sich von dem Wege der Ehre entfernt/ A military state in particular, whose reputation rests chiefly on the opinion of foreigners and its subjects on its strength, hurts itself enormously when it strays from the path of honor (p.8). Napoleon himself reminds his soldier of Valmy, not of Frederick the Great. On the other hand, Prussian officers have constant comparisons to how Frederick would have done things – more in line with von Winterfeldt.

Already, Die Feldzüge has many of the same objections to the Prussian army of 1806 as later books: age of officers, enormous size of baggage trains, lack of leadership, poor negotiations, poor pre-planning, lack of training and experience…

I'll dig a bit deeper. Would a recent book like Karen Hagemann (2015) "Revisiting Prussia's Wars against Napoleon" help in this regard?

It is much more complex than this, as to lack of training, compared to whom? The French – yes, they had continuous training by the war.

Otherwise I cannot see that the Prussians had less training than any other European states, they had large scale manoeuvres of all arms.

I will supply this afternoon two good sources on that topic.

French training went much further that just 'by the war.'

The Grande Armee, born on 18 May 1803 (not named as such until August 1805-previously named the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean) underwent rigorous and thorough training in the Channel camps from June 1803 until it left the Channel to face the Austrians in August 1805.

Further, General Delaborde trained new conscripts thoroughly at the Camp of Pontivy in 1806-1807.

Sweeping statements are seldom, if ever, an accurate portrayal of actual events.

For the Prussians, and their system of training, an excellent book covers the subject quite well: Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan. Shanahan had access to the library of the German Kriegsakademie in Berlin, and that of the Great German General Staff, the Deutsche Heeresbucherei. He also used material from the Preussische Staatsbibliothek and the Preussiche Staatsarchiv as well as the library of the University of Leipzig.

As to the comment '…they [the Prussians] had large scale manoeuvres of all arms.' Apparently not…at least not prior to the massive defeat of 1806.

Some of his comments as to training are very helpful:

'Artillery had been a neglected branch of the Prussian army since the time of Frederick the Great…'-20.

'Artillery was the least trained branch of the Prussian army…Practice firing at unknown ranges was rarely attempted in peacetime, for the state's supplies of powder and shot were limited…Batteries were judged by the speed of unlimbering and the smartness of appearance rather than the rate and accuracy of fire.-23-24.

'The training and organization of the Prussian army developed many smart and well-drilled regiments without bringing together in peacetime units as large as divisions or corps. It was impossible for the several arms to train with one another. Commanding officers were therefore inexperienced in handling large bodies of troops, and the men were unaccustomed to any drills or exercise that involved more than one regiment…After 1798…annual training was provided only in the Brandenburg regiments, which were personally inspected by the king. All other regiments trained their cantonists every other year.'-21

'The light infantry troops of the Prussian army were among the best trained units. Experience in Poland and in the Rhine campaigns of 1792-1795 had shown that the thin lines of infantry required protection in front and on the flanks. Sharpshooters and the type of light infantry known as fusiliers had been developed to supply this need. By all accounts they were well versed in their art of deploying, fighting from irregular positions and repelling attacks of enemy light horse. Accurate shooting was particularly stressed and they were armed with a rifle instead of the smoothbores carried by other foot soldiers. Yet the Prussian light infantry was not numerous enough to meet the army's requirements, and like other units, had perfected individual training at the expense of cooperation.'22-23.

'The cavalry of the Prussian army was less thoroughly trained than the infantry…Cavalry was placed on the wings of the infantry line to neutralize the opposing horsemen, or to assist the infantry in throwing the enemy lines into disorder. The cooperation that this entailed was never practiced in time of peace, so that on the battlefield of Jena the Prussian cavalry fought individual actions without regard for the objectives of the infantry. On the march the cavalry was not trained to range far ahead. There was no cavalry screen and reconnaissance was unknown.'

The old military axiom, you fight the way you train, is certainly applicable to the Prussian catastrophic failure in the field in 1806.

Dear Eltjo

Warfare in Europe
1792 – 1815

edited by

Frederick Schneid

Kindle edition

It is quite expensive but contains a lot of thought provoking articles, as for the Old Prussian Army

Dennis E. Showalter : Hubertusberg to Auerstädt : The Prussian Army in Decline?

Give a good assessment of the overall picture, though containing quite some errors – notably about the very well trained Schützen and Jäger.

And

Peter H. Wilson : German Military Preparedness at the Eve of the Revolutionary Wars.

Warfare in Europe 1792 – 1815 edited by Frederick Schneid

Is there a link for this book?

Are there links for the other two?

Thank you Winterfeldt, lack of training was certainly not across the board, more in specific areas that Brechtel brings up too. Die Feldzüge (1807) even quotes that "Die Preußische Armee war vortrefflich geübt, und keine Infanterie einer andere macht in Europa hatte so grosse schöne Leute/ The Prussian army was excellently trained, and no infantry of any other power in Europe has such big beautiful men" p32. The main issue was lack of training in combat situations- as Brechtel wrote. The well-mounted cavalry was not used to fighting opponents using piercing attacks instead of slashing. Light infantry wasn't used to fighting an opponent who was a master in forested areas. The comparison between a parade army and Caesars veterans was already made in 1807 (p40).

However, the defeat would not have been necessary if the King had appointed one of the generals as Commander in Chief. Now there were several factions (Rüchel, Hohenlohe and Brunswick) competing for attention with the king. This caused such operational delays, that it ensured the war was lost before it even began (p59).

Feldzüge also describes the image of the army in 1806, as "einer Armee…die sonst wegen ihrer strengen Ordnung und Disciplin berühmt war, und der in Hinsicht auf Harmonie un Präcision des Exercitums und in der pünktlichen Ausführung der Evolutionen keine andere Armee gleich kam/ an army…which was otherwise famous for its strict order and discipline, and which no other army equaled in terms of harmony and precision of the exercise and in the punctual execution of the evolutions." p57. Smells like the image of Frederick's army, doesn't it?

I like your Showalter, he even recommends Chandler's Osprey Jena 1806 for less patient readers 😊 Now that is daring for a historian.

@Brechtel198 this is the link to the book that Winterfeldt recommended. It includes the two articles by Showalter and Wilson.
Warfare in Europe 1792–1815

And for Dave/SHaT1984, I wholeheartedly agree with your points

Not the common soldier that games rule writers love to deny with punitive penalties. Austrian battalions, in fact all arms except under Mack, stood up well during 1805 and in direct 1:1 conflict at Austerlitz; similarly many Prussian units engaged at Jena/Auerstadt well enough. Their commanders let them down.

That is why I prefer General d'Armee for 1806. Prussians do not just get a skirmish factor of 0, but an actual skirmish screen, to which you can feed any units. The French can do that much more efficiently, though. You're not stuck with poor generals either, although your command and control is likely to be worse than the French. Here is a piece of my AB 18mm Prussian army I am working on.

And the start of my French

Thank you Eltjo, I like to think my own thoughts and make my own assessments; am not as biased as some would think after 40+ years of French research and discovery.

Love your troops and scenes; 1806 is going to become a 'boom' year once again I can see.

I liked what I read about the active and effusive G.Blücher in the '94 campaign countering his opponents, rather than the senility and rancour of the later period. Nonetheless his personality was every bit his driving force as was Napoleons.

Perhaps a scenario for 'Blucher as C-in-C' for 1806 comes to mind.
cheers

>>The Prussian army had undergone many changes, but still projected the image of the army of Frederick the Great.

I don't buy it at all.
The 'country' hardly projected anything after withdrawl from the alliance coalitions; other than economic pressure on neighbouring 'Germanic' states.

SHaT1984:
Howdy. I'm surprised to see this thread start up again. Congrats to Greuthungi for being #200.

That's not quite true. They were projecting more than just economically. in 1787 they quickly ended the revolts in the Netherlands with troops, who by all accounts operated successfully. In 1789, Prussia and Austria were quarreling over Poland and both sent troops to their mutual boarders. Austria backed down. Neither were 'economic' pressures. The Prussians did tolerably well during their 1792-95 stint in the Revolutionary Wars.

Prussia's economy was not in good shape, so I am not sure what pressures you were thinking of during this period. They did present military pressure several times to the smaller states in the face of French advances with the same success.

The bio on Blucher (a Non-Prussian) gives his yearly attendance at the Kings 'Review' as a singular event of pomp and 'old days' glory- but thats just because that's all they did.

That review was with the Guard units in the Berlin Inspectorate. Money was short and there was no way they were able to get the whole army [now far larger than Frederick the Great's ever was] together for maneuvers. A real weakness, to be sure. However, few Nations did that. The entire French army training around Boulogne in 1803-5 was a singular event during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars.

I have an letter in an American paper written in 1803 about the Berlin maneuvers. He was impressed with the exercises…which included Fusiliers and Shutzen screening the main 'attack'. He mentions as an aside that the maneuvers were 'supposed to involve 36,000 men' and that much fewer were actually involved. Never says exactly how many there were.

What interpreters- revisionists/ Germanic/Prussian promoters want you to believe and what was happening (read between the lines) were IMO totally different things.

Not sure which revisionists and promoters you are talking about. We all have to 'read between the lines' regarding promoters of both sides.

The 'victorious' rolling up of the European Kingdoms by France were no guaranteed success, sadly I've come to understand, and that the archaic [meaning less intuitive and responsive] administrations were predominantly responsible for their own losses.

That is quite true of the Prussians. Under Frederick the Great, there was only one administrator. All the various departments, created as needed, were simply clerks for the King. When Frederick died and Frederick Willian came to power, he spent a huge treasury reserve to nothing while each department, in a power vacuum, became separate powers, each jealously guarding their segment of the government and finances. After 1795, Prussian army created a committee review the army's performance in the war and carry out reforms--all of which, if they had been achieved in the next decade would have seen a very different army than the one which took the field in 1806. The committee too almost became the head of the army in the power vaccuum, but most all of their reforms required the cooperation of many of the other, now independent ministries. Few were interested in giving up their power. So, very little happened. In the end, the 1806 army was basically a reform half done.

Not the common soldier that games rule writers love to deny with punitive penalties. Austrian battalions, in fact all arms except under Mack, stood up well during 1805 and in direct 1:1 conflict at Austerlitz; similarly many Prussian units engaged at Jena/Auerstadt well enough. Their commanders let them down.

Oh, I agree there. So does Napoleon. It is interesting how a good commander, like Napoleon or Frederick the Great, will lead those in later years to instead focus on organization, training and tactics as THE battle winner. The same is true of the losers. The poor decisions of specific leaders or the decision-making at the army-level is forgotten and it is antiquated tactics that was the primary cause of the defeat. In most cases, when the actual battle actions are investigated, the actual tactics play a far more complicated and not as starkly different as supposed. One example: It is often noted that the Prussian divisions used the echelon formation to advance at Jena, something that Clausewitz supposedly felt was antiquated.[He didn't, it was the Prussian's slavish adherence to just that advance a la Frederick that was questioned.] Thus it is seen as an example of the backward performance of the Prussian army. However, The French General Lannes used divisional echelon formations in the first attack of the morning and then the first attack on Vierzehnheiligen…which was driven back.

Sweeping statements are seldom, if ever, an accurate portrayal of actual events.

One point where Kevin and I agree.

>>The Prussian army had undergone many changes, but still projected the image of the army of Frederick the Great.

I agree with SHaT1984. They 'projected' the image of Frederick's army because 1. they still had proven formidable in 1792-5, 2. were still seen by others as the model for other armies, which is why the British 1798 and French 1791 Regulations were based on the Prussian regulations of 1787. 3. Did have a pride in the army, the center of Prussian Society, however over-stated it might have been. Sooo, it was more than just a projected 'image.'

It was the Prussian Pride that got them into war with Napoleon. He embarrassed them before the other nations with their double-dealing over Hanover, then with their national pride smarting, Napoleon continued to needle them, goading them into declaring war.

Everyone one in the Prussian general staff knew that the Prussian army was not prepared for war. There were a series of last-minute scrambles that only confused the already ill-prepared army. One example is Scharnhorst's insistence to organize the army into divisions. There weren't enough experienced officers at that level of command and NOBODY had commanded a division… so, it was a mess. This included placing cavalry and artillery in the same divisional organization as the infantry, where none of the arms had any serious training in that kind of cooperation. The army would have been better off fighting in the brigades organized in the old columnar system. They would have still lost with the commanders they had, but the confusions and lack of agency would have been less.

they still had proven formidable in 1792-5…

That is incorrect. The Prussians didn't do well at all from 1792-1795. That was the reason the Prussian reformers wanted to modernize the army.

were still seen by others as the model for other armies, which is why the British 1798 and French 1791 Regulations were based on the Prussian regulations of 1787

The French 1791 Reglement was based on the maneuvers and tactical experiments in Normandy and Metz. See Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare.

The French reformers did not want to 'convert' the French army to ersatz Prussians; they wanted to develop a system to defeat the Prussians because of the disasters of the Seven Years' War.

Everyone one in the Prussian general staff…

And which 'Prussian general staff' would that be? In short, there wasn't one in 1806 or before which is why Scharnhorst and Gneisenau wanted to create and develop one. And it was still in embryonic form in 1815 and inferior to the French staff system.

Greuthungi,

Thanks very much for the link to the book.

@MacLaddie, Eltjo

In case you like to learn more about the training and manoeuvres, you could consult for example

Neues Militärisches Journal, Siebtes Stück, Hannover 1790, page 9 onwards whic covers an autumn field exercise manoeuvre of the Prussian Army of 1788.

That is incorrect. The Prussians didn't do well at all from 1792-1795. That was the reason the Prussian reformers wanted to modernize the army.

Kevin:
Ah, yes, the sweeping conclusion. No, that wasn't the reason. It was tradition. After every Prussian war under Frederick the Great there was a 'reform committee' formed to address any specific issues discovered during that war--even such non-wars as War of the Bavarian Succession in 1778. As for their performance during the 1792-95 war. After Valmy:

Tactically and operationally, Prussia's performances improved exponentially in a short span of time… Another encouraging aspect o the army's performance was its morale…Prussian light units developed a strong identity as the army's elite, who performed their missions or went down fighting. In particular the Jager, barely respectable when the war began, won a reputation as a fighting force second to none on either side…. All other armies, even the British, either fought a major battle, a Jemappes, Fleurus, or Tourcoing. Prussian troops, true to their role in Prussian strategy, managed to avoid serious combat. The only exceptions were the two engagements during the Rhineland campaign of 1793. The broken, mountainous terrain and the dense nextwork of small but strong fortifications combined to restrict the scale and the states of combat to stereotypcial eighteenth-century parameters. In that environment, the Prussians played a leading role in the two neat victories, Pirmasens and Kaiserslautern. European Armies of the French Revolution 1789-1802 p. 46-47

>>were still seen by others as the model for other armies, which is why the British 1798 and French 1791 Regulations were based on the Prussian regulations of 1787

The French 1791 Reglement was based on the maneuvers and tactical experiments in Normandy and Metz. See Robert Quimby's The Background of Napoleonic Warfare.

Read the Prussian regulations and then the 1791 Reglement. Whole swaths of the Prussian regulations were lifted and used in the French Reglement.

The 1791 regulations remained in use by the French throughout the Napoleonic wars, even though such officers as Duhesme and Augereau complained about the Regléments, having French troops trained "in the Prussian style" as early as the Revolutionary Wars. Elting, John R. Swords Around a Throne p. 531-534

The French reformers did not want to 'convert' the French army to ersatz Prussians; they wanted to develop a system to defeat the Prussians because of the disasters of the Seven Years' War.

True, and yet, and yet they copied whole sections of the Prussian regulations without any changes for their 1791 Regléments. Go figure.

>>>Everyone one in the Prussian general staff…
And which 'Prussian general staff' would that be? In short, there wasn't one in 1806 or before which is why Scharnhorst and Gneisenau wanted to create and develop one. And it was still in embryonic form in 1815 and inferior to the French staff system.

Right. Try to see that statement as describing the 1806 Prussians, not later notions of "General Staff" you hold. In 1801, Scharnhorst was made one of two "Chiefs of the General Staff." As that was his title in the Army, then there must have been a "General Staff" of some sort, if not the perfection of the French version or the later Prussian model.

Duke Frederick William introduced the term Generalstabsdienst (General Staff Service) for the Prusso-Brandenburgian army in 1640. Dale O. Smith. "Observations on the German General Staff pp. 29–34". Academia

von Winterfeldt;

Thank you for the resource. Much appreciated.

Funnily enough all my sources agree that the Prussians did well in the Revolutionary Wars – also recent sources published in English.

So it is incorrect to say that the Prussians did not do well, to use newspeak.

'Day Bill

Just a question, why did you choose the manual published in 1798 over the one published in 1792 for your example?

"…British 1798 and French 1791 Regulations…"

Best Regards
Art

So it is incorrect to say that the Prussians did not do well…

Yep, the Prussians sure demonstrated their superiority at Valmy, didn't they…🤣

And they withdrew from the coalition in order to help dismember Poland. Apparently they didn't want to be deprived by the Austrians and Russians of their loot.🤦‍♂️

By the way when FWII started to modernize the Prussian Army he reshaped the regiments, one regiment under his command was of 3 battlions of 4 companies each, one of those battalion was a grenadier battalion, one of the reasons to increase the grenadiers was to use them as light infantry – this alone shows those big brakes to the army of the 7YW.

Of course then he went a step further by creating the Füsilier battalions.

"…The French 1791 Reglement was based on the maneuvers and tactical experiments in Normandy and Metz…"

This is not what Robert Quimby's source wrote. But it is true that the source did not consider the French 1791 Regulations as Prussian. Can you explain why?

"French training went much further that just 'by the war."

"The Grande Armee, born on 18 May 1803 (not named as such until August 1805-previously named the Armee des Cotes de l'Ocean) underwent rigorous and thorough training in the Channel camps from June 1803 until it left the Channel to face the Austrians in August 1805."

"Further, General Delaborde trained new conscripts thoroughly at the Camp of Pontivy in 1806-1807."

"Sweeping statements are seldom, if ever, an accurate portrayal of actual events."

Could you please explain in detail (just some of it) what this instruction consisted of, or even Ney's instructions in comparison to those of the Grande Armee.

Was Ney's instruction for his Corps only, or what was it a set of instructions that the entire Grande Armee was also learning?

>>So it is incorrect to say that the Prussians did not do well…

Yep, the Prussians sure demonstrated their superiority at Valmy, didn't they…🤣

And they withdrew from the coalition in order to help dismember Poland. Apparently they didn't want to be deprived by the Austrians and Russians of their loot.🤦‍♂️

Uh huh. That isn't the 'reason' the Prussians withdrew. It had to do with their inability to pay for continuing the war. And of course, Valmy was the entire Prussian performance in the war. Brunswick went on to capture Mainz a few months later.

Interesting note about Valmy. When the Prussians deployed, they threw out a screen of Fusiliers before the main line. How backward of them. [The following has been filled with sarcasm…]

well indeed

Sweeping statements are seldom, if ever, an accurate portrayal of actual events.

Intersting clarifications coming out, thank you gentlemen.

It is easy to confuse the mixture of internal military changes with the external 'masters' geo-politics and often economic interference, and create unequal cause-effect theorims which I believe we have been delivered over many years of written history.

Undoubtedly the lack of 'war' experience drove down the skills and necessary leadership attributes in Prussia over that decade plus; as contrarily the continual (not static) development and creativity of implementing methods and manpower of command, if not tactics, and concentration of military drills AND practice c1803 contributed to the 'lucky' success of the French.

I hazard to note after the vast amount of analysis that has been conducted, I believe that Napoleon won campaigns and marches, whereas nearly all his battles were often more precariously balanced than written history allows.
regards d

'Day Bill

Just a question, why did you choose the manual published in 1798 over the one published in 1792 for your example?

"…British 1798 and French 1791 Regulations…"

Hi Art:

No particular reason other than the British 1798 regs are better known….

Undoubtedly the lack of 'war' experience drove down the skills and necessary leadership attributes in Prussia over that decade plus;

The Prussian Army suffered all the woes of any peace-time army.

McLaddie wrote:

No particular reason other than the British 1798 regs are better known….

There is no such thing as the British 1798 Regulations. The 1792 Regulations were re-printed several times, and may have the date of the reprint in the introduction, but they remained uncharged (apart from a couple of very minor additions or changes) and in force until 1824.

An abridged version was published for NCOs in 1801, but they were still the 1792 Regulations.

It's worth pointing out that the Regulations for Riflemen and Light Infantry were first published in 1798, but from the context of the above messages (I.E. their being based on Prussian Regulations) this is not the work in question.

Read the Prussian regulations and then the 1791 Reglement. Whole swaths of the Prussian regulations were lifted and used in the French Reglement.

Perhaps you can show what sections were 'lifted' from the Prussian regulations?

Or, are you making a similar error as you did with the skirmisher question in the French regulation?

While Bill is preparing that list for you…

In the meantime can you show me what Robert Quimby's source wrote, that explains why he did not consider the French 1791 Regulations as Prussian.

The source is actually very detailed in his explanation, and his argument is impressive.

There is no such thing as the British 1798 Regulations. The 1792 Regulations were re-printed several times, and may have the date of the reprint in the introduction, but they remained uncharged (apart from a couple of very minor additions or changes) and in force until 1824.

Major:

Thank you for the correction. I was thinking of Dundas' 1788 version, pre-regulations, the one which says on the cover "Illustrated by Manoeures of the Prussian Troops." I have copies of the 1792 Regulations, the 1795 Rules and Regulations for Field-Exercises etc, the Cavalry regulations, the 1803 Eight Manoeuvres as well as the Rifle/Light Infantry Regulations of 1798 as well as Torrens 1824 regs., etc. etc. etc. Keeping the dates all straight is the problem.

Perhaps you can show what sections were 'lifted' from the Prussian regulations?

Ya know Kevin, you request these 'proofs' and once I provide them, there is no acknowledgement other than to dismiss them--or ignore them and go on demanding more proofs for something else. I think I am going to leave this question for you to determine. All you need are the 1787 Prussian Regulations and the French 1791 regulations. However, if you have the 1803 English translation of the French regulations, the Translator has a Preface which can help you.

He writes, speaking of the French regulations:

The French system of tactics was composed from the compared experience of centuries; was issued under the monarchy; and during the revolutionary wars, …Many of the general principles are analogous to those of the Prussian movements.

He goes on to write:

The British tactics are principally deduced from the Prussian art of war… though there is a difference in the application of principles, whoever attentively compares both, will discover a striking similarity between the general structure, arrangement, manner, turn of expression, precepts, and reasoning, in the British and French Rules and Regulations. There is in the two works, a concordia discors, which, when examined, will be found to involve a difference more in minute method and detail of description, than in general matter common to both.

Happily for you, he goes on to help with your research, Kevin:

To prove the reality of this concordance, where there may be an apparent difference, we will take the instance in our tactics, of the wheel on the moveable pivot…

The translator spends some time with this, however, in the next several pages indicates several similarities between the British regulations [based on the Prussians'] and the French. This will lead you to sections that you can compare with the British, French and Prussian regulations. Remember, the Prussian Regulations were published in 1787, the British Regulations in 1792--from Dundas' work on the Prussian system in 1788,[got that right this time] and the French Regulations of 1791. The unpublished French Regulations of what, 1789[?] was far more innovative, [dare I say liberal?] including deploying in two ranks, but conservatism won out.

So, Kevin, I will leave you to be attentive to this.

…

you request these 'proofs' and once I provide them, there is no acknowledgement other than to dismiss them--or ignore them and go on demanding more proofs for something else. I think I am going to leave this question for you to determine. All you need are the 1787 Prussian Regulations and the French 1791 regulations. However, if you have the 1803 English translation of the French regulations, the Translator has a Preface which can help you.

I already posted a link to the French 1791 Reglement. Once again, perhaps you can show where anything was 'lifted' from the Prussian to the French regulations.

Unfortunately, you apparently don't show or demonstrate the claims you make about regulations, skirmishing, and other topics.

And, once again, the French 1791 Reglement was produced based on the winners of the tactical argument which was experimented on in Normandy in the mid-to-late 1770s-the proponents of the ordre profound against the ordre mince.

Sometimes in attempting to explain your point of view, less is actually more.

Bill et Kevin,

Let me assist you both in ending your argument, since it seems that neither side have given answers that have been asked with clarity.

I have listed two categorized of principles; they are A and B, each has three principles, and one of them support each of your arguments.

One set of principles supports Bill, and one set of principles support Kevin. Please decide whether A or B best supports your claim and add three more principles that French military authors say are French in origin or Prussian influence.

A:

Systeme des plesions
Colonne a demi-distance
Fractionnes sur la ligne de bataille

B:

la contre-marche
deploiements des colonnes a distance entieres
Bataillon de direction

Best,
Art

Art:

Thank you for that. My problem with Kevin is this: Regardless of the effort put into the providing the evidence, Kevin's answer will always be the same, simply a repeat of previous conclusion statements like:

the French 1791 Reglement was produced based on the winners of the tactical argument which was experimented on in Normandy in the mid-to-late 1770s-the proponents of the ordre profound against the ordre mince.

and never with counter-evidence, continue to repeat:

you apparently don't show or demonstrate the claims you make about regulations, skirmishing, and other topics.

The actual 'argument' was simply whether the French 1791 Regulations repeated parts of the Prussian 1788 regulations. I never raised the issue of what or how many Prussian principles were or were not addressed by the French Regulations.

If you want to continue your line of discussion, I can make a decision.

Hello all,
I have just finished writing a book for Helion on French light infantry. I have studied the development of skirmishing tactics in great detail and how they develop from before the Seven Years War. In the Napoleonic period, the companies sent out to skirmish were advised to retain one third of their men in close reserve. This reserve was often divided into three parts, the largest of which remained with the captain, but there were two smaller 'escorts' for the lieutenants, each of whom commanded a wing of the skirmish cordon. The cordons were formed of pairs of soldiers, and the typical gap was 10-15 paces between each pair.
Although all infantry could skirmish (there are even examples of heavy cavalry skirmishing), it was recognised that light infantry were better at it. There was a difference in mindset between line and light.
I believe the book will be out later this year.
Terry

Terry

I'll look forward to that. In a wargame context I've never really fathomed how to handle light infantry as whole battalions. If you have a 24-figure French light battalion how many would be actively skirmishing, i.e. loading and firing in extended order; how many formed up as support somewhere (where?) in the rear; and how many in transit between the two. Deploying the entire battalion into loose order seems wrong, yet it appears to have happened.

It's a question of 'when'?
If we were talking about 1792-1794 then I'd say, throw everyone one into the skirmish line, stick a general right at the front, and trust your luck with the dice.
You can also use the system where the light infantry battalions form two ranks and just fight in open order – one metre between each file.
After 1794 (and this is something I have looked into and discuss in the book), then you draw men from each battalion and (in a 9 company battalion) you create a tenth company of éclaireurs. The French had been doing this sort of thing for nearly a century by then.
When the voltigeurs are created, you don't need éclaireurs any more. The voltigeurs skirmish, and the light infantry centre companies act as a support. Their main mission becomes one of rapidly marching to support light cavalry and voltigeurs, and to cover the deployment of the division.
Also from 1805, at regimental, brigade or divisional level, you can pool all your voltigeur companies and create special light infantry battalions. (The same was done with grenadier companies since 1791).
So the light infantry centre companies fight as line troops.
Every now and then Marshal Ney turns up 'shouts 'en tirailleur' waves his hat and causes and entire battalion of light infantry to become skirmishers. That's probably rare – in effect the battalion keeps it shape, but fights in extended order, in two ranks.
After 1812, if you detach your voltigeurs and then need skirmishers, one of the four centre companies becomes the light company -but only where required.
I quite like the system of drawing together the voltigeur companies at divisional level, two thirds deployed, with a chain extending across the front of the division. Each voltigeur company would then have a 'hub' with the remaining third formed up in reserve. (carabiniers don't skirmish. When light infantry had colours in the field before 1807, they protect them)
In the book I suggest some potential scenarios which wargamers might employ along these lines (including for skirmish games, a portion of the voltigeurs being armed with rifles).
Terry

Here an order by Général de Division Schérer for the Army of Italy, end of 1795. In a division of 4 line and 1 light demi-brigade, the latter's three battalions would form a line of two ranks, with 2 to 3 paces distance between the files, and thus cover the 12 line battalions which would be formed in columns of battalion by division (front of two pelotons):

demi-brigade.org/tirschfr.htm

>>Here an order by Général de Division Schérer

Hesitant as I am to get involved in such a learned discussion, I think Oliver you have overstated the importance of this.

It is clearly a guide, not an order, and it describes fully the mode of attack of both legere and line troops, neither singly, probably under the most perfect battlefield conditions.
And dare I observe, seems very '18thCentury' in mode. While the preciseness is understandable, what will happen on a less than perfect plain?

Clumps or rows of trees, walls and village or farm buildings, streams, ditches and ponds etc. all displace the perfect paper image of what is described.

But them I'm sure the General had a follow up instruction…
regards dave

Scherer's system is interesting, because it is simply a two rank, open-order system. The original chasseurs were taught to fight completely independently, to use cover, and never to use any formation so as not to attract enemy fire. They had no words of commands except 'deploy' and 'rally'. Of course, the original light infantry battalions were properly trained, but there were not many of them. When you need to fight on a larger scale, you need simple systems for less well trained soldiers to follow. Forming two ranks and opening the ranks by 3 paces is pretty simple. Scherer's system was written for troops fighting on the plain in Italy, where there was less cover. The object was not to act as 'snipers' but to lay down fire and disguise the movement of attack columns following.

I think maintaining the line in the open order precribed by Schérer is quite easy, as the files can move around smaller obstacles and regain the original alignment quite easily.

However I don't know whether this general order or guide was ever applied in practice, and whether it was maintained in 1796, when Buonaparte took over ccmmand of the Army of Italy.

Hi Oli,
I suspect not. The system of éclaireurs seems more normal. These volunteers drawn from every company act more like the old piquets of the mid-18th century.
Terry

The interesting thing from the Schérer quote is infantry columns moving through a 2-deep line of men who's files are not that far apart.

I leave it to others to contemplate if this is a theoretical sketch or actually implemented.

db

A battalion (8 pelotons plus the grenadiers at that time) formed in a column of 4 divisions will be 12 men deep (not counting the file closers. If the battalion is ca. 800 men strong, its front will have 800:12 = 66 files, or 45 meters.

Means that the skirmishers would have to run sidewards a maximum of 20-25 meters to open the space in front of the advancing columns. Or less, if the battalion is not at full strength.

It would always depend how the tirailleurs are used, as tirailleurs de combat – then they would cover in my hypothetical assumption the frontage of the battalion in line, as it would be deployed and not only just the front of the column.

The skirmishing screen, in case it is 10 to 15 paces distance, would be thin, you would cover as much as nothing for a line of sight.

I quite like the system of drawing together the voltigeur companies at divisional level, two thirds deployed, with a chain extending across the front of the division. Each voltigeur company would then have a 'hub' with the remaining third formed up in reserve.

Are there actual examples of that? For the tirailleurs de combat?
There are plenty of examples where those voltigeurs ad hoch units did serve as classic light infantry, as form bridge heads for example or crossing a river, I fail to see an example that such an ad hoc unit would cover a whole division – in two lines of battle, so to speak having a brigade frontage.

It is know of the eclaireurs that they did form often ad hoc battalions, but in what way there were used in tactical fashion is not that well known, e.g. be used as tactical reserve or as tirailleur unit to perform a tactical task of classic light infantry duty, like occupying a forest or village or also as tirailleurs de combat for a larger number of battalions??