"Napoleonic Skirmishers Questions" Topic

Brechtel198:

Those aren't sources for your conclusion statements on the Prussian Artillery.

Just to remind you, you wrote:

Field artillery is much more than a collection of companies/batteries of horse or foot artillery.
There should be command and control of the artillery, by trained senior artillery officers, to coordinate the employment of artillery on the battlefield. Further training, leadership, and a solid artillery doctrine for employment is necessary for artillery to be effective.

The Prussians did not have this in 1806 which is why the Prussian artillery arm was in the same sorry state it had been under Frederick the Great.

Don't give me 'it's common sense by example' or the claim that the French 'Systeme Gribeauval' was a 'genuine system.'

Tell me sources where you got your statements about the Prussian artillery. Apparently you believe that the Prussian artillery arm had:
1. No command or control of the Prussian artillery on or off the battlefield.
2. No trained senior artillery officers to coordinate employment.
3. A lack of training, leadership or 'solid' artillery doctrine.'

Again, this isn't about the French, and if you believe there is some value in comparing the two systems, tell me where you got your ideas about the Prussian system.

@McLaddie,

Of the many sources of woe for the Prussians in 1806-7, is there any particular evidence that Prussian artillery performance was meaningfully responsible? I'm not sure that I can think of any useful examples. Even the much-criticized use of regimental guns was actually subsequently copied by Napoleon! The French artillery also moved to the combination of 6lb and 12lb weapons used by the Prussians. The Prussian artillery system doesn't seem horrendously worse than the British, the most tactically successful army of the Napoleonic Wars. Any ideas?

And the comparison with the Gribeauval System and the Prussian artillery arm is most certainly valid.

Frederick William's 'expressed wish' was 'To make our army more like the French' but that didn't happen prior to Jena and Auerstadt. Further, it was noted that 'few officers knew the technical nature of the other arms.'

And it should be noted that the Prussian artillery was nearly destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt and the pursuit that followed with 'only a few batteries and companies of artillery' that actually 'survived the catastrophe of 1806…'

The Knechte, 'a non-military personnel…served in the artillery and baggage trains when the army took the field.' They were 'conscripted from among Prussian subjects only on the outbreak of war and…received no training in peacetime.' These were the Prussian train troops, who were essentially civilians conscripted to move the artillery and trains.

And, again, finally, 'Artillery had been a neglected branch of the Prussian army since the time of Frederick the Great…'

Even the much-criticized use of regimental guns was actually subsequently copied by Napoleon! The French artillery also moved to the combination of 6lb and 12lb weapons used by the Prussians. The Prussian artillery system doesn't seem horrendously worse than the British, the most tactically successful army of the Napoleonic Wars.

The Prussian use of battalion guns was antiquated and took away from the overall strength of the Prussian artillery. The French had abolished them in 1798.

Napoleon wanted regimental cannon companies, which did not take away from the overall strength of the French artillery arm, to supplement the larger infantry regiments that resulted from the 1808 reorganization. That is somewhat different from 'battalion guns' in that it was a regimental organization and asset. Unfortunately too many infantry regimental commander had no idea how to employ them with their regiments. Most of them were lost in Russia in 1812.

Napoleon did not 'copy' the Prussian example.

French artillery calibers were placed in their own artillery companies and usually were not mixed. And the older 8-pounders were still being used in the field as late as 1809 in Germany, especially in Davout's III Corps (see Saski, Volume I).

The Prussians did not have an artillery system until 1816 and their artillery employment was not innovative nor was it as effective as either the British or the French. In those armies, the artillery arms were considered to be elite-that was not the case in the Prussian Army.

As an observer, I am curious as to the relevance of the merits of French artillery organisation to a question relating to skirmishing drills practised by infantry of the period.

Prove me wrong. I sincerely doubt that you can. I suggest that once again you have clearly demonstrated as you have in the past that you have little or no understanding of period artillery.

Thanks for the source of your historical opinions.

1. No command or control of the Prussian artillery on or off the battlefield.

At the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the Field Artillery was under the command of:
since 1756: Colonel C. W. von Dieskau (promoted to Inspector General on 28 February 1757)
1st Battalion (Berlin): Colonel von der Osten
2nd Battalion (Breslau): Colonel Ernst Friedrich von Holzmann (until October 14 1759)

On March 17 1762, the Field Artillery was reorganised in two distinct regiments, each counting 3 battalions of 5 companies. These regiments were placed under the command of:
1st Field Artillery Regiment: Major-General C. W. von
Dieskau
2nd Field Artillery Regiment: Colonel C. F. von Moller

2. No trained senior artillery officers to coordinate employment.

Dieskau and Moller were battlefield officers.

3. A lack of training, leadership or 'solid' artillery doctrine.'

In 1754, a first "Artillery Manual" was issued by artillery officers for training the gun crews. Live firing training took place outside the Oranienburg gate of Berlin.

On 30 June 1758, for the first time, two colonels serving in the artillery (Dieskau and Moller) wrote down how artillery was to be used as the primary arm to destroy enemy lines.

Of course this artillery command system continued into the post-Frederick era.

Of course, this was during the SYW, where at Kolin and Breslau, the Prussians lost most of their artillery, forcing them to use 24 pounders and siege guns as battlefield artillery. The actual artillery organization was very ad hoc at times during the war.

A FEW of the changes and reforms:

After the Revolutionary wars, the Reform Committee established in 1795, confirmed that battlefield artillery,was now organizationally divided into battalion guns and line guns [not done until after the the SYW]

The battalion guns were formed into eight gun batteries officered by a captain of artillery and the crews were now paid and trained separately from their infantry battalions. The guns could still be divided into sections and fight with their battalions, but also fight as a battery, which is what you see them do at Jena and Auerstadt.

Not something Frederick ever approved of.

Gohlke, W.; Versuche zur Erleichterung des Feldgeschütze im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert, Zeitschrift für historische Waffenkunde, 1906-8, p. 92-93

Großer Generalstab, Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung II (commissioner). ie Kriege Friedrichs des Großen, Dritter Teil: Der Siebenjährige Krieg 1756-1763. Berlin 1901-1914, vols. I to IX

Tempelhof, Georg Friedrich von, Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges in Deutschland zwischen dem Könige von Preussen und der Kaiserin Königin mit ihren Alliirten als eine Fortsetzung der Geschichte Lloyd, J. F. Unger, Berlin, 1783-1801

As an observer, I am curious as to the relevance of the merits of French artillery organisation to a question relating to skirmishing drills practised by infantry of the period.

42flanker:
Good question. Like many TMP discussions, this one wandered. First it was skirmishing, then the supposed inability of the Prussians/Allies to skirmish, which led to how the Prussian army of 1806 was 'essentially' Frederick the Great's army, which wandered into artillery as the 'proof' of that.

We do need to get back to skirmishing practices.

@McLaddie,

Of the many sources of woe for the Prussians in 1806-7, is there any particular evidence that Prussian artillery performance was meaningfully responsible? I'm not sure that I can think of any useful examples. Even the much-criticized use of regimental guns was actually subsequently copied by Napoleon! The French artillery also moved to the combination of 6lb and 12lb weapons used by the Prussians. The Prussian artillery system doesn't seem horrendously worse than the British, the most tactically successful army of the Napoleonic Wars. Any ideas?

At Jena and Auerstadt, the Prussian artillery had a few successes, significant enough to be mentioned by the French, but over all, like the infantry and cavalry, the Prussian artillery operated as an independent entity rather than in any coordination with the other arms. That in itself is very unFrederician.

At Jena and Auerstadt, the Prussian artillery had a few successes, significant enough to be mentioned by the French, but over all, like the infantry and cavalry, the Prussian artillery operated as an independent entity rather than in any coordination with the other arms.

Yes, quite. So that doesn't argue the inefficiency of any of those arms taken singly but points to wider problems of command and higher-level doctrine. It doesn't, in and of itself, suggest that any of those arms was inferior to their French counterparts.

As a thought experiment one can replace Prussian artillery organization and training with French – would it have made any difference?

As a thought experiment one can replace Prussian artillery organization and training with French – would it have made any difference?

It did after the Prussian reform period of 1807-1813.

So that doesn't argue the inefficiency of any of those arms taken singly but points to wider problems of command and higher-level doctrine. It doesn't, in and of itself, suggest that any of those arms was inferior to their French counterparts.

All of the problems the Prussian army of 1806 had and which showed up and were clearly demonstrated point to both singly and as a group the Prussians were inferior in capability of the French. No defeat was as complete as the Prussian in 1806.

The Prussian artillery was not well-trained nor well-organized and certainly was not well-led. By individual artillery battery/company and as a group they were outshot and outfought by the French even though they outnumbered the French artillery arm on both fields.

That in itself is very unFrederician.

How so? Frederick won only about half of his battles.

And the Prussian army of 1806 had one very great difference in 1806-Frederick was not there to command it.

That in itself is very unFrederician.
How so? Frederick won only about half of his battles.

And the Prussian army of 1806 had one very great difference in 1806-Frederick was not there to command it.

Kevin: Now you're just being silly. His win-loss ratio isn't the issue.

Frederick the Great's army fought in a very coordinated fashion, all working towards the same mission goals. Leuthen and Rossback are the classic examples. Frederick certainly got too ambitious or suffered from a bout of Hubris a number of times, such as Kolin and/or simply faced unbeatable numbers, but his cavalry, infantry and artillery didn't act like independent entities [Up and down the chain of command] regardless of orders as many officers did at Jena and Auerstadt.

The uncoordinated actions of the Prussians army at Jena and Auerstadt had many causes, including the absence of an effective, autocratic commander/king like Frederick II and the death of Brunswick at Auerstadt early in the battle.

However, anyway you want to slice it, Frederick's army and the army of 1806 acted in distinctly different ways on the battlefield.

The Prussian army of 1806's performance was very unFrederician.

And that was my point.

Yes, quite. So that doesn't argue the inefficiency of any of those arms taken singly but points to wider problems of command and higher-level doctrine. It doesn't, in and of itself, suggest that any of those arms was inferior to their French counterparts.

Whirlwind:

Actually, it points to many problems, but I don't think Prusian artillery's isolated successes argue for equal effectiveness with French artillery.

As a thought experiment one can replace Prussian artillery organization and training with French – would it have made any difference?

I can't think of a reason why it wouldn't have made a big difference. The Prussian artillery

1. Suffered from a decade of peace time.
2. It was understaffed and underfunded for a decade: i.e.
old equipment and too few men to man the batteries.
3. It was without adequate numbers of horse, most of whom
were given to farmers for draught horses a good
portion of the year. Horses themselves were untrained.
4. The artillery rarely if ever practices with infantry and cavalry.
5. The separate inspectorates acted like independent fiefdoms, both in training and doctrine in many cases. In Frederick Williams first stab at reforming the army, he issued his 1798 Instructions. In his preamble he asked that there be uniform training from one manual. It fell on deaf ears for the most part because it wasn't a king's command reinforced by consequences, only a request.
6. Like the British artillery, the Prussian artillery was handled by a separate department which was funded by a separate department which had the ammo provided by a separate department which all had to be run through a bureaucracy of accounting departments, all of whom fought for their budgets and independence. The King refused a number of Reforms simply to avoid displeasing one or more of these entities.
7. So, even if the Prussians enjoyed the 'organization and training' of the French, they still wouldn't have been able to perform as well as the French.

I will say, even with all those problems, a number of Prussian artillery units did far more than anyone could reasonable expect, all due to individual initiative and extraordinary performances.

@McLaddie,

That wasn't quite my point. My point was that your statement

the Prussian artillery operated as an independent entity rather than in any coordination with the other arms

doesn't of itself say anything about the quality or performance of the Prussian artillery.

To argue that the poor performance of the Prussian artillery made a difference, then you have to point to those actual differences during the campaign: specifically, what happened at Saalfeld, Jena, Auerstadt or Prenzlau when the perceived problems made a difference to the outcome.

Look at the battles – neither Jena nor Auerstedt were co – ordinated, in fact a fiasco in leadership or non leadership, Scharnhorst failded abysmaly as chief of staff.

For those reasons it is difficult to asses how good that or that arm worked, cavalry – used in piecemeal fashion (completely not like Frederick the Great way) Blücher's great charge at Auerstedt, a mere 10 squadrons from 3 different regiments.

The Prussian Army did do the job in 1792 – 1795 – no catastrophes here, with the exception of Brunswick's refusal to fight it out at Valmy.

The Prussians lost 1806 in the art of operational war, no match whatsoever compared to Boney and in leadership failures as Jena and Auerstedt in particular.

Neither the artillery, cavalry nor infantry was able to show their potential due to those failures, in 1813 the artillery situation was no better regarding material, still the Prussians gained one victory after the other as part of an Allied Army who beat Boney in his domain, in the operational art of war, despite the alleged superiority of training, equipment and leadership, the French artillery lost hundreds of guns.

The Prussian Army performed poorly in both the War of Bavarian Succession and in 1792-1795. The Prussians withdrew from the coalition to take advantage of Poland and her dismemberment.

The Prussians lost in 1806 because they were defeated at every level-tactically, operationally, and strategically-which included leadership, training, and organization.

And none of the limited reforms before 1806 basically changed the Prussian army so that it significantly or essentially was different from the army of Frederick the Great. And the information and evidence provided supports that thesis.

And none of the comments that disagree with that thesis have proven differently.

I agree that without reading key sources in German language only a superficial and most distorted assessment of the Prussian artillery is possible.

If that is indeed the case, then why don't you post material from the reference(s) you are alluding to?

Shanahan, White, and Craig all used original German archival material.

Perhaps you can illuminate all of us as to what they got wrong?

The Prussian Army performed poorly in both the War of Bavarian Succession and in 1792-1795. The Prussians withdrew from the coalition to take advantage of Poland and her dismemberment.

Actually, no one thought the Prussians performed 'poorly' during 1792-1795, least of all the French. Note Decker's quote that I gave previously. The Prussians left the coalition because the British stopped paying them to fight… again, Prussia didn't have the money, particularly with their land grabs in Poland.

Even so, that staid, backward Prussian military created a reform committee, the Immediat-Militär Organisations-kommission to "investigate and ameliorate the defects that had appeared" as well as to direct the expansion of the army necessitated by the newly acquired Polish territories. [Shanahan, p.73] The commission, headed by Field Marshal von Möllendorf, became in effect the administrative head of the army, even though another command agency formed in 1787, the Oberkriegskolleguim, was supposed to act in that capacity. [Paret: p.100-101] The court sycophants and bureaucracy emasculated that agency. The only reason that Möllendorf's functioned at all was that it remained completely under military control and financing, such as it was.

A series of reform proposals came from that committee from 1795-1798. Some, the least expensive, were put into effect, such as the changes in the battalion gun organization and command. However, as Craig points out, it was the King's lethargy and Paret's 'special interests' [i.e. the Government balkenized departments and ministers] that blocked a number of the reforms. All three, Shanahan, White and Craig note this.

The Bavarian Succession 'action' was hardly a combat test. The only thing that was a fiasco was the logistics.

Shanahan, White, and Craig all used original German archival material.

So did Rothenburg, but that didn't keep him from error with the Radeztky quote. The point being, without reading key sources in German language only a superficial assessment of the actual sources concerning Prussian artillery is possible. …If only because most English sources are superficial, such as Rothenburg's analysis of the Austrian skirmish capabilities.

And none of the limited reforms before 1806 basically changed the Prussian army so that it significantly or essentially was different from the army of Frederick the Great. And the information and evidence provided supports that thesis.

Kevin, the evidence you have provided doesn't support that thesis at all, and I have provided examples of how the two armies were different. I have asked you repeatedly to show where the two armies were 'essentially' the same, which you haven't.

What you have done is bombard us with quotes detailing the failings of the 1806 army and command while repeatedly condemning the Prussian military for failing to reform, without any evidence that they did block reforms [You have never been clear WHOSE reforms were blocked.]

Scharnhorst was only in the Prussian army for less than five years before the war. In that time, he generated some major changes in how the military operated. Not something most five year enlistments can claim.

…without reading key sources in German language only a superficial and most distorted assessment of the Prussian artillery is possible.

Perhaps you can comment on this from Shanahan, Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813, 23-24:

'Artillery was the least trained branch of the Prussian army. Although Scharnhorst was an artillerist who had been in Prussian service since 1801, his influence was confined to academic instruction rather than the practical training of the army. Practice firing at unknown ranges was rarely attempted in peacetime, for the state's supplies of powder and shot were limited and had to be conserved for a more serious use. Drill engaged as much of the artillerist's time as it did that of the infantrymen. Batteries were judged by the speed of unlimbering and the smartness of appearance rather than the rate and accuracy of fire. Even less attention was paid the technical troops, whose training was not undertaken seriously.'

The references cited by Shanahan for this paragraph are:

-Volume III of Jany, 500-505; Scharnhorst's Handbuch der Artillerie; and Clausewitz's Nachrichten uber Preussen in seiner grossen Katastrophe (Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, II, Heft 10, Berlin 1888, 443.

Perhaps you can cite supporting material for you ideas from Malinowski and Bonin's study of Prussian artillery arm, Geschichte de brandenburgisch/Preussen Artillerie?

The Prussian Army did not perform poorly in 1792 to 1795, I wouldn't say stellar either – but they held the front and their part of the Rhine and had successes – Kaiserslautern for example as well, sets backs, yes sure but also the French Revolutionary forces did not have a run of continuous victory.

Scharnhorst main contribution was to intellectualize his fellow officers to motivate them to devote their time with diligent studies, like he did, one memorandum after the other, his performance in the field, not up to his intellectual qualities.

'Artillery was the least trained branch of the Prussian army. Although Scharnhorst was an artillerist who had been in Prussian service since 1801, his influence was confined to academic instruction rather than the practical training of the army.

It continues to amaze me how authors determine that because a new hire [and Raised to the rank of colonel] and surprisingly made one of two 'chiefs-of-staff' of the entire army, somehow was 'confined' to training ALL officers for the army…and the military was faulted for not agreeing to every reform he suggested immediately. When does that every happen???

Shanahan's evaluation leaves off some 'details', some of which White provides:

In the Spring, students [all, not just artillery cadets] took part in artillery live-fire demonstrations 'with every current caliber." Scharnhorst's objective was to provide the officers with "a clear idea on the service and operation of standard cannon." significnately, noncommissioned officers conducted this instruction. This was a novelty for young Prussian infantry and cavalry officers, "another instance of Scharnhorst's attempt to break down the artificial barriers in the study of war."

White p.93

Somehow, Scharnhorst was able to get a hold of that precise gunpowder and shot for school. It is also continually overlooked, and documented by White, p.89-90 that the King was delighted with the curriculum and new schools Scharnhorst proposed, as well as the continued academic 'subversion' of the Prussian army culture.

Practice firing at unknown ranges was rarely attempted in peacetime, for the state's supplies of powder and shot were limited and had to be conserved for a more serious use.

So, why didn't the Prussian army have sustained artillery practice? A lack of M_O_N_E_Y--not some backward view of artillery.

It is forgotten that Frederick II spent government taxes first and foremost on the army. When He died that changed… His successor spent it on other things and much of the money became locked up in bureaucratic hording.

"How much mischief had been done to Prussia by the unsteady government of Frederick William II was…very little suspected at the time. …Some time passed before it could be understood that Prussia had entered upon a new age under the guidance of incompetent statesmen."

— Seeley, J. R.
The Life and Times of Stein, or Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age. p. 173

McLaddie

I don't think it is fair to state that 'The Prussians left the coalition because the British stopped paying them to fight' – the British only stopped paying the subsidies when it became clear that the Prussians had no intention of fielding the forces they had agreed to – by then, Prussia was far more interested in Poland than fighting the French

I don't think it is fair to state that 'The Prussians left the coalition because the British stopped paying them to fight' – the British only stopped paying the subsidies when it became clear that the Prussians had no intention of fielding the forces they had agreed to – by then, Prussia was far more interested in Poland than fighting the French.

Paul Demet:

After three years of not fielding those forces? The Prussians were fielding a good number of forces in Poland. The Prussians left the war within weeks of the British decision to stop payments. Why the British stopped the payments and what the Prussians were or weren't interested in pursuing militarily, the reason the Prussians left the war was that they couldn't pay for it,
regardless of motives.

I suspect the Prussians, because of the costs of subsuming parts of Poland, that some of the British money was paying for those efforts…part of the reason the British decided stop the payments.

I think that sometimes, we expect too much of Scharnhorst. When he began his tenure with the Prussian army, he was:

1. One of two Chief-of-Staffs for the army
2. The head of all the military schools in Prussia
3. With the King's approval, creating the Miltarishe Gesellschaft and as director creating the structure and agenda for that influential Officer association.
4. Teaching an extensive course on the art of war
5. Writing the first of several proposed regulations and instructions for the army, his 'Handbook on Gunnery.'

I find that while Scharnhorst met with opposition from a number of fronts, including officers like rabid Knesebeck, I think much of the resistance to Scharnhorsts ideas the kind you would see among any group facing change. Even White seems determined to make the case with evidence that doesn't support his arguments. For instance, on page 38 he writes this:

implicit in Scharnhorst's proposal was Bildung.
[Realism and intellectual independence] It was clear to him that the traditionalism and formalism of Prussia's senior military leaders were its greatest enemies.

Then he gives an extensive quote of Scharnhorst's to support this statement:

It is not carrying this matter too far when it is asserted that many a staff officer knows nothing more about field warfare [Feldkriege] than any good and experienced noncommissioned officer. Indeed, it cannot be otherwise. Nothing of the kind is being required of him during the time when he is still capable of a sound Bildung. In peace he spends the greatest period of his life with the ordinary routine of training, the mechanical maneuvers, economic administration of the companies, battalions, etc., and solely from this is he judged. Even his advancement and military reputation stem from this alone.

How this proves "the traditionalism and formalism of Prussia's senior military leaders" isn't clear to me at all, particularly when they aren't mentioned.

What Scharnhorst is describing very well is the plight of any army after ten years of peace and inadequate funding. The US has suffered similar issues after long periods of peace. He certainly is incorporating his belief in Bildung in his description.

White's statement

It was clear to him that the traditionalism and formalism of Prussia's senior military leaders were its greatest enemies.

is injected between discussions that have nothing to do with that notion.

White and others often did this and he does on several pages 30-38. And yet, he can write this on page 39:

Looking back on his first six months in Prussian service must have reassured Scharnhorst. The initial animosity toward him was gone, and he was a respected officer of the Berlin-Potsdam community. He was director of a military society whose reputation and membership were rapidly increasing. In September, Frederick William had entrusted him with the reform of the Berlin Institute for Young Officers.

While Scharnhorst certainly faced opposition from a number of quarters,some out of simple jealousy, the general/conventional view of Prussian opposition needs serious revision to provide a more realistic analysis of those first four years of Scharnhorst's tenure with the Prussian army.

You have erred significantly in your analysis of Scharnhorst's activities and responsibilities when he was first commissioned as a Prussian officer in 1801.

I think that sometimes, we expect too much of Scharnhorst. When he began his tenure with the Prussian army, he was:
1.One of two Chief-of-Staffs for the army

No. Not until 1806 when Scharnhorst was appointed chief of staff to Brunswick and Massenbach as chief of staff to Hohenlohe. Those were operational assignments as well as staff appointments. And these positions were not for the entire army, but for the separate commands as noted.

Scharnhorst went to Prussia and was accepted by them into the Prussian service as an artillery lieutenant colonel in the spring of 1801. That was his second attempt applying for a Prussian commission.

Scharnhorst's ‘reception' in Berlin was ‘polite but cool.' He was known for his written criticisms of the Prussian army.

In 1803, two years after Scharnhorst went to Prussia, the general-quartermaster's staff was reorganized according to Massenbach's ideas, not Scharnhorst's. The chief of the general-quartermaster staff was General-leutnant Geusau, not Scharnhorst nor Massenbach. The staff was organized into ‘three brigades of the staff' the chiefs of those staff sections appointed were von Phull, Massenbach, and Scharnhorst. The new organization was called the General Staff but there were no clear ideas on its functions or what authority it had within the army or in relation to the king.

2. The head of all the military schools in Prussia

In 1801? Which ones? So a newly appointed Hanoverian lieutenant colonel was appointed to head all of the Prussian military schools? When was he appointed to head the Prussian artillery school?

3. With the King's approval, creating the Miltarishe Gesellschaft and as director creating the structure and agenda for that influential Officer association.

Scharnhorst agreed to ‘direct the activities of the newly-founded Militarische Gesellschaft' which was a military society, not a military school. Apparently, Scharnhorst might not have created the organization, but was appointed to head it as it might have been in existence already.
He was invited to join the society by its members and ‘named its Director.' The society functioned like a military club. Scharnhorst had ‘displeased' the king by his criticisms of the Prussian army and apparently the king was not involved with the Militarische Gesellschaft.

4. Teaching an extensive course on the art of war

Where? What was the name of the course?

5. Writing the first of several proposed regulations and instructions for the army, his 'Handbook on Gunnery.'

The gunnery section of Scharnhorst's Handbuch is the first volume of the three volume publication and was, as noted, written before Scharnhorst was in Prussian service. The other two volumes covered the attack and defense of fortified places and fortifications (Volume II), and tactics (Volume III).

Scharnhorst published his first book in 1787 while still in the Hanoverian service, Handbuch fur Officiere in den anwendbaren Theilen der Kriegswissenschaften. When promoted to captain his Militarisches Taschenbuch, zum Gebrauch im Felde was published in 1792. This was Scharnhorst's most popular work and was translated into English in 1811 as the Military Field Pocket Book.

So, Scharnhorst was writing and being published before he entered the Prussian service.

Much, if not most, of Scharnhorst's military writing was completed and published before he was accepted into the Prussian army in 1801.

Regarding new regulations for the Prussian army, Scharnhorst recommended that a commission of officers of all arms be appointed in order to prepare new Prussian regulations ‘based on ‘the actual state of the art of war.'

Source material:

-Charles White, The Enlightened Soldier.
-Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army.

No. Not until 1806 when Scharnhorst was appointed chief of staff to Brunswick and Massenbach as chief of staff to Hohenlohe.

You see, there can exist officers with the title 'Chief-of-Staff outside of wartime appointments. The position of overseeing all military schools was a chief-of-staff position and in 1804 Scharnhorst was appointed to head [chief-of-staff] the Western Section [France] of the newly reorganized/reformed General Staff [Generalquartiermeisterstab], after the King approve the the reform of the general staff based on the recommendations of Scharnhorst's Militarishe Gesellschaft. "On January 1804, Prussia officially had a new General Staff." White p. 111

Gosh, another difference from Frederick's army and a major reform following Scharnhorst's recommendations less than three years after his appointment as lt. Colonel. He was promoted to Colonel in January 1804.

Where? What was the name of the course?

Page 94 of White. Take it up with him.

So, Scharnhorst was writing and being published before he entered the Prussian service.

Much, if not most, of Scharnhorst's military writing was completed and published before he was accepted into the Prussian army in 1801.

Uh huh. It remains that he was 1. writing At THAT TIME 1801 the first of a planned series of regulations and instructions while 2. dealing with a whole raft of new responsibilities. Again, White p. 94

Source material:

-Charles White, The Enlightened Soldier.

Gordon Craig does not cover Scharnhorst's activities in any detail before 1807--certainly not the details you just gave. However, at the end of White's chapter on the Military Society started by Scharnhorst in 1801, the Militarische Gesellschaft, the last sentence is:

Scharnhorst's impact was profound.

even though the Society was ended with the 1806 war.

And your point is…what?

You have erred consistently regarding the Prussians of 1806 in general and now Scharnhorst in particular.

I started studying them in my third year at West Point and have at least tried to keep up with the material that has been produced. You continually err when discussing the Prussians. How can that be?

You certainly have not proven my initial thesis incorrect

Bleckwen is a good source and the 1812 Prussian artillery regulations are available as a reprint…

2. The head of all the military schools in Prussia
In 1801? Which ones? So a newly appointed Hanoverian lieutenant colonel was appointed to head all of the Prussian military schools? When was he appointed to head the Prussian artillery school?

You have read White and Shanahan, right? Why are you asking that question?

Scharnhorst agreed to ‘direct the activities of the newly-founded Militarische Gesellschaft' which was a military society, not a military school. Apparently, Scharnhorst might not have created the organization, but was appointed to head it as it might have been in existence already.

He was invited to join the society by its members and ‘named its Director.' The society functioned like a military club. Scharnhorst had ‘displeased' the king by his criticisms of the Prussian army and apparently the king was not involved with the Militarische Gesellschaft.

Page 30. Scharnhorst made the suggestion [and indeed advocated for such societies for a long time] and at a meeting he was invited to in forming said society, was asked to direct it. Nowhere did I suggest it was a 'school.' I did suggest, as does White, that it was Schornhorst's idea and would never have happened without him. The reason he had to be 'invited' was because he was a lowly lt. colonel and new to the army.

I'm asking the questions because of your repeated errors, badly worded responses, and too many errors in fact. It is apparent that you are either misrepresenting or misinterpreting what is being written in the source material or you just don't understand it.

Comments such as the following do not support your stated position nor do they contribute to the discussion. To use your words, they are 'silly.' They are also without merit.

Page 94 of White. Take it up with him.

You have read White and Shanahan, right? Why are you asking that question?

Further, comments such as those are an indicator that you didn't read the material, didn't understand it, or are misrepresenting it.

And your point is…what?

You missed that? That Scharnhorst did have serious reform successes and a great impact on Prussian thought before 1806…according to White.

You have erred consistently regarding the Prussians of 1806 in general and now Scharnhorst in particular.

You say it repeatedly, but don't come up with anything in response to my facts, such as my points about Prussian artillery changes in organization and command for battalion guns.

Could it be that you don't know and understand as much about the Prussians that you believed you did?

The way you dodge and weave, I am beginning to think one of us doesn't.

I started studying them in my third year at West Point and have at least tried to keep up with the material that has been produced. You continually err when discussing the Prussians. How can that be?

You could start by correcting my 'errors' with some some actual information rather than irrelevant information, your 'study history' and repeated conclusion statements.

You certainly have not proven my initial thesis incorrect, though you are busting a gut trying to.

I have simply been responding to your gut-busting efforts, no more, not less.

But that is is what it is, a thesis, that the 1806 Prussian army was 'essentially' the same as Frederick's army.
I have given you examples from the Staff organization, artillery, governmental oversight, Leadership, army organization, training etc. etc. etc. demonstrating the many differences between the armies including battlefield performance.

And? Nothing you have provided has established what is 'essentially' the same, let alone any counter-evidence that those weren't differences. All you've done is provide evidence of how bad the 1806 Prussians were and irrelevant information like your suggestion below…

Perhaps you should read and study more on the subject?

Patronizing as ever.

Bleckwen is a good source and the 1812 Prussian artillery regulations are available as a reprint…

A great example of your typical responses. We are talking about the Prussian Army from 1740 to 1806 and you suggest studying 1812 artillery regulations..? without any explanation as to why, which I think would be necessary with such a odd suggestion.

Dodge and weave.

So you have nothing of substance to add to support your 'position.'

I can read multiple languages and have moved beyond English-only historiography from the 80s. Fortunately, the community benefits from Bill and others consistently exposing you as knowing precious little beyond what you read in English.

Cheers, Bill, vW, et al..

What percentage of a napoleonic unit* sent out to the skirmish line would…

…actually be on the skirmish line skirmishing?
…be in transit either to or from the skirmish line?
…be held in reserve behind the skirmish line?
*Unit in this case could be the battalion's light company, the third rankers, or an entire light battalion.

I hope Desert Fox got the information he was looking for.
The problem with skirmishing was that there were a variety of methods used from 1792-1815 depending on the period, the commander and circumstances.

One thing that isn't readily known is that the uniformity we expect from the military wasn't the same. That is why most commanders of the period issued instructions at one point or another, either full instructions or 'Day of Battle' instructions regarding skirmish procedures.

Having said that, there were many common practices that would be used. For instance, most all nations had skirmishers deploy about 100 yards ahead of the formed troops. So Hohenlohe in 1803 has 100 yards, Davout in 1811 has the skirmishers deploy at 200 paces [@130 yards]. All nations did provide reserves. It was assumed that if reserves were not thrown forward with the skirmish line, the formed troops were considered the skirmish line support.

Other practices were shared that aren't generally known today, such as the deployment of skirmish 'shields.' Kutuzov in his 1798 Jager instructions allowed skirmisher to deploy in double lines. The French referred to them as double bouclier or double rideau

Gareth Glover's excellent Waterloo Archive books has an example of this in volume I, page 142. In a letter from Lt Col Francis Home of the 2nd Bn, 3rd Foot Guards. About 2/3rds of the way down the page he writes about Hougoumont. He describes the reinforcement of the position until the entire 3rd regiment and 8
Coldstream Guard companies were there.

" The whole force employed there never exceeded 1,200 men. The French having reformed their troops came down to the attack forming what is called a double shield of sharp shooters. They got possession of the wood but were
chased out by an attack & charge by the light companies under Colonel MacDonnell."

The numbers deployed by what units was always open to variations and you could see a number of methods used in a single battle.

G'Day Bill et al,

If I may please add a few words on this subject…

Déploiement en bouclier, double bouclier ou demi-bouclier c'est une expression vague. According to the French military it was also an expression used before the middle ages. Later it was a military expression / term used for "la langue de la guerre de siege", "bouclier les enemis".

It was also used in conjuction with "de bouclage".

The double bouclier is not to be confused with une rideau de tirailleurs (skirmish line) or déploiement en rideau double.
Le bouclage est une offensive inerte par laquelle des assiégeants enveloppent, insolent, assament, bouclent une place de guerre.

In this case it is an encirclement of a double skirmish line of "sharp shooters" surrounding a post de campaign, enemy body, une "place de guerre', quartier, key terrain, fortification, woods, "l'attaque des place"…

It was used as a double cordon to surround a location with tirailleurs, and hinder anything from going in or coming out….or…bouclent une place de guerre avec des tireurs.

The problem found with a double bouclier or double rideau, was that if the first line, on being forced back, it may endanger the disposition of the second line by precipitately "crowding" (when two bodies, or rank and files intermix causing a body to be thrown into confusion and disorderly state) on it.

Best Regards
Art

Thanks Art. I have that information copied from your explanation some years back. I don't remember whether it was TMP or to me personally.

Good debate guys and fairplay to you both . I have too many troops to paint to spend time joining in.

@mysteron

You've been smoked:

The Mysteronisation process alters the replicants at the sub-atomic level and subtly alters their genetic code. It is this alteration of DNA that leaves them vulnerable to detection, and as such all Spectrum personnel are subject to regular DNA checking.

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mysteron

By the way the Prussian Füsiliere employed usually a quarter strength of their unit as skirmishers, in need they could increase this to half strength which would mean full skirmish order there also the French did not dissolve a complete battalion at once and at all into skirmishing, there would be usually some formed sub units left.

The Prussian Jäger usually deployed half strength of their unit initially into skirmishing order.

Under Frederick the Great Füsiliere did not deploy at all into skirmishing – just to point out one of many different changes in the Prussian army.

Frederick had to fight against all odds, much in contrast to Boney who was on the loosing street when fighting continuously against odds – also France was a superpower – compared to Frederick the Great's rather middle power Prussia of 1756 – and not without any reason the Allied fighting Frederick termed his army as the Potsdam Guards perade (because it was so small)

VW:

Is your information found in the Fusilier and/or Jager regulations and instructions, or from someplace else?

it is in the 1788 regulations for light infantry, also FW III instruction for the infantry, 1798 Whitehall transcription detected by John Cook, and for Jäger Gumtau as well as Jany.

It amuses me immensely that TMP discussions about artillery always turn into a row about who had the second-best system of the wars.

The British system was so far ahead of all the others that everybody else eventually copied it. Nobody came up with anything materially better for another 100 years, until the internal combustion engine gradually started to supplant the horse. Even then that was only an incremental improvement to artillery movement – arguably the Congreve system was not materially bettered until the StuG III.

The real venom is then all about whose was the distant runner-up to Congreve.

Only on TMP could this happen.

@ Stoppage Off topic but brilliant !

@mysteron

You are welcome. I was trying to lighten the atmosphere.

It amuses me immensely that TMP discussions about artillery always turn into a row about who had the second-best system of the wars.

That would only be mildly amusing. What is immensely amusing is that TMP discussions about skirmishing always turn into a row about who had the second-best artillery system of the wars…

I believe it was Jomini who first said: "Whenever I hear the phrase 'Senarmont at Friedland', I reach for my duelling pistol…"

Getting my interest into this skirmisher subject one thing I have had a long opinion on is it was a lot of wasted ammunition without many casualties between the skirmish line

"a lot of wasted ammunition without many casualties"

It is a curious thing that when the British and allied infantry were facing the swarms of French tirailleurs that are supposed to have paralysed them during the retreat through Holland in the autumn and winter of 1794-95, not that many people seem to have been actually hit, and very few fatally.

While French infantry had a tendency to fire too high, as well as being the worse for drink, the main threat to life and limb seemed to be from artillery fire.

@14Bore

Bill Haggart ('McLaddie') has a long history on this distinguished forum on that very topic. I do hope he pops up soon.

If I may, this quote by Brechtel198/Kevin sums up the whole discussion succinctly:

'Frederick William III (1770-1840) came to the throne in 1797; unlike his father he leaned more towards some of Frederick's traditions, yet he cannot be considered a traditionalist. Nonetheless, at its core, the army remained-in its self-image and the image it projected to the rest of the world-the army of Frederick the Great.'

Daniel Hohrath (2011) The Uniforms of the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great from 1740-1786 p.25

The Prussian army had undergone many changes, but still projected the image of the army of Frederick the Great. In that sense, both McLaddie and Brechtel are right. Thank you for a very lively and interesting discussion – even though I am late to it.

Eltjo