"Napoleonic Skirmishers Questions" Topic

1.Old sources, as well as those Kevin has listed, are just fine and to be used the same way as any source: Tested.

You have not demonstrated that the ‘old sources' that I have referenced are incorrect in fact or that their narrative is ‘out of date.' If you're going to criticize recognized historical authorities, then you should actually do it correctly, by doing research on the books in question, instead of making sweeping statements as to their accuracy and the amount of research that has been done in producing them. All you're doing in these threads is taking inaccurate, cheap shots that have no merit.

2.My problems with the authors that Kevin has listed are:
a.The authors didn't have the internet. They had to have in hand any sources they used, either by purchase, library exchange or going to the sources, such as Shannahan going to Germany for research. Because of that, one shortcut was to quote other authors or lift quotes from those who did have access to sources, often for divergent purposes. That practice could lead to a repetition of conclusions and quotes taken out of context, even among the best historians.

The authors who wrote before the internet did archival research in German sources. Further, relying on the internet can lead to gross error as too many sites are just wrong and are not sourced.

Having the internet or not is irrelevant. And I have found that relying on the internet for historical material can be dangerous as at least half of the history websites are wrong and Wikipedia is completely unreliable. When I was in graduate school for a military history degree, the use of both Ospreys and Wikipedia was not allowed for obvious reasons.

Having the internet precludes in large part actual archival research and can make one lazy. The internet should be used with care. That being said, much material that is out of print and/or out of copyright can be downloaded from Google Books. I have as many as 1,000 volumes downloaded for the purpose of historical research. Volumes there have to be checked to see if they are accurate and therefore credible.

It isn't so prevalent if a German author such as Jany or Goltz wrote about German history, as much as an English author writing about German history. Because of that tendency, their conclusions have to be tested, like any historian's. Jeremy Black's book, Rethinking Military History discusses this issue at length in Chapter 2.

You're forgetting, or you didn't know or understand, that White, Shanahan, and Craig used German source material profusely all of them going to Germany to do their archival research. White when researching his book on Scharnhorst was allowed to use the archival material in the then East Germany. The nationality of the authors is superfluous; the research they conduct is what matters.

B. Because of this completely understandable practice among English-speaking authors, an echo-chamber effect could result, with lots of authors saying the same thing. This is particularly true of English authors writing about foreign histories between 1945 and the advent of the internet. With so many voices, a statement repeated by so many authors could be accepted as 'the truth' without question. We see that in Oman's Column vs Line argument for the Peninsular War even though Oman later reascended that conclusion. It is still repeated today.

‘Echo-Chamber? Really? None of the sources I have used have relied on this type of ‘research.' If you're going to promote such false ideas about credible historians you have to demonstrate it, not just make sweeping statements or false accusations. That is intellectually dishonest as well as not being a result of historical inquiry.

C.The same is true of a quote by Radetzky in 1813 that the troops don't 'understand skirmishing.' A statement in a memorandum about the Army forming on the Austrian borders which was filled with recruits. He then recommends bringing in more experienced soldiers for the task. This quote has been used to prove that the Austrians didn't understand skirmishing from 1792 to 1815.

Again, what does this have to do with the Prussians of 1806?
Once again, I don't believe that you understand skirmishing tactics of any type and in my opinion you are doing nothing but giving excuses for the Prussian collapse in 1806.

D.With the internet and google, anyone can look up or have a huge source of materials, some earlier authors could only dream of. For instance, I have every single source of the 200 listed in Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon on my computer in pdf. That doesn't make me a better historian, but certainly one with a huge advantage in access to the heart of historian's work.

What does this have to do with the topic at hand? If you take a quick look, if you actually have the volumes to hand, at the bibliographies of White, Shanahan, Paret, Craig, among others, you might find that the source material is both extensive and rich in content and credibility.
And it should be noted that not all of Chandler's references were credible such as Bourrienne's ghosted ‘memoir'; Chaptal's memoirs; Fouche's memoirs; Talleyrand's memoirs (both of these betrayed Napoleon and France); Metternich's memoirs; Marmont's memoirs (another who betrayed Napoleon and France); and the memoirs of Clarie de Remusat.
Further, I have found through decades of study on the period that the Esposito/Elting Atlas is much superior to Chandler's Campaigns. And in the Recommended Reading List of the 1999 edition are listed about 370 references, the greater majority of them being annotated.

Since you brought up Chandler, what he says about the Prussian Army of 1806 is not only interesting, but it falls in line with the references that I have posted with citations:

‘Notwithstanding his faith in his army, Napoleon did not underestimate the military prowess of the renowned Prussian army. In fact, however, beneath an imposing façade of Prussian invincibility there existed serious flaws…In doctrine…the Prussian army was hopelessly outdated in its concepts. Everything was related to the days of Frederick the Great, and deviations from the master's precepts were not countenanced. The tradition of ferocious discipline had produced an army of automatons or ‘walking muskets.' Tactically, ‘the Prussian army was a museum piece,' clinging without question to a rigid linear system of shoulder-to-shoulder drill better suited to an earlier age. Precision was accounted far more desirable than speed or flexibility…'slow but sure' was the general rule.'

‘Indeed, the cult of the past was deliberately carried to extraordinary lengths, and no arm of the Prussian service escaped its deadening hand. The infantry were brave and well-dsiciplined, but their muskets were the worst in Europe, being mostly of the pattern of 1754, while over-regimentation had led to formalized tactics that discouraged initiative. The cavalry was bold and dashing, though intensely conservative in organization and role. The artillery was large in size, but badly handled and often misemployed. The morale of the army was, however, very high. Feelings of effortless superiority pervaded all ranks, but, as Clausewitz remarked, ‘behind the fine façade all was mildewed.'-Chandler, Campaigns, 454.

E. The third problem is the one you see with Kevin' list. He claims that all those authors agree with his assessment about the nature of Prussia's army and government in 1806. Simply by listing them, it gives the idea there is credence to his claim. However, if you actually read the books, they don't same what he claims: That the Prussian Army of 1806 is 'essentially the same' as Frederick the Great's [at some as yet undetermined point]

You've misquoted what I orginally said in that you left out the second half of the quotation. Further, I didn't just list them, I cited them where what they stated supported my quotation. Did you forget about that or did you just leave it out because it ruined your ‘thesis'?

The original thesis statement I made which prompted this ahistorical tempest in a teapot was:

"All four emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late."

Apparently, you stopped after the first sentence and ignored the second one, regarding Prussian reforms before 1806. Context is everything.

F.I just got done reading Andrew Limm's first book, Walcheren to Waterloo He has 20 pages of references in his bibliography. An impressive list, but actually looking at the books, it is obvious that 1. he did not use the information in many because he contradicts them without reference and 2. Many have nothing to do with his topic.

This is not germane to the topic of the Prussian Army. If you want to discuss Limm's book then start a thread on it. This is nothing but obfuscation. I've seen this done before when people wanted to attempt to belittle a book based on whether or not references listed in the bibliography were cited or not. That is a nonsensical argument and just doesn't hold water.

So, when I point out to Kevin that all his sources are English texts before 1985, that is what I am talking about. That doesn't make them wrong, only needing to be tested.

You are incorrect.

All of the sources I listed were not done before 1985. The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White certainly isn't. The Esposito/Elting Atlas was republished in 1999 and the text was changed when needed as was the Recommended Reading List. The Uniforms of Frederick the Great's Army was published in 2011.

Lastly, when was the last study of the 1806 campaign done and published in book form and who was the author?

Do you know or do you have any idea?

C.The same is true of a quote by Radetzky in 1813 that the troops don't 'understand skirmishing.' A statement in a memorandum about the Army forming on the Austrian borders which was filled with recruits. He then recommends bringing in more experienced soldiers for the task. This quote has been used to prove that the Austrians didn't understand skirmishing from 1792 to 1815.

The following can be found in Gunther Rothenberg's Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1815:

‘The regulations of 1807 also provided instructions for fighting in open order and skirmishing but the two sections dealing with these matters gave skirmishers little scope…Skirmishing was conceived basically as defensive, screening the closed formation against hostile skirmishers. Though the individual skirmisher was given some latitude in the use of terrain and in loading and firing, the skirmish screen was tightly controlled with orders transmitted by the battalion drums.'-145.

‘Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were equal to the French…The able Radetzky…observed ruefully that ‘operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting'…And the Austrian official history concluded that ‘it was not realized that the soldier, unless he has natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independence.' Instead, the Austrians tried to get quick results by following the totally wrong approach of relying on formalized drill.'145-146

‘Skirmishing was not given much weight in the new instructions. The Austrian high command remained convinced that poorly trained troops could not execute it properly. As Radetzky observed in September [1813], ‘fighting en tirailleure should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailler.'234-235.

It should be noted that the new Grande Armee in 1813 which was filled with new conscripts, fought well in open order as skirmishers in units as large as regiments deployed as such.

I don't see the problem with old sources, especially in areas where there has been no substantive new research or, as in the case of Germany, where a great deal of information was destroyed in WW2.

Agree completely. Old does not equate to unreliable. Jany, von der Goltz, and Lettow-Vorbeck are 'old' but I don't see anyone saying that they are not reliable. If old is 'unreliable' then memoirs from the Napoleonic period should not be used-and that is nonsense.

…the internet has opened up access to all sorts of material that was simply not available 40-50 years ago, and the various German archives contain a mass of information for further research.

The internet is a good thing. The problem with it is that anyone and everyone can post 'historical' material that may or may not be reliable or credible.

And, again, it should be noted that Craig, Shanahan, and White have used German archival material. And White was granted permission to go into the old East Germany to conduct research on Scharnhorst.

And some of the old German material was brought to the United States after War II.

The bottom line is that denigrating useful and accurate material because someone considers it 'old' is nonsense and ahistorical.

As a footnote to the Prussian Army of 1806, a couple of things:

First, the Prussian Jager Regiment had its beginnings in 1740-1744 under Frederick who wanted a light infantry arm.

Second, Battalion Guns were not an example of 'artillery flexibility' or infantry/artillery cooperation 'just like the French. It was an old and obsolete practice that had been abolished by the French in 1798. The only thing it really did accomplish was violate the principle of mass and dilute the Prussian artillery which allowed it to be defeated in 1806 by better handled artillery under the command of artillery officers, not infantrymen.

My comments being responding to in bold on your Sept. 4 post.

Your conclusion above isn't 'offensive', rather it is at once wrong [All four authors don't say that. Certainly not Shannahan or White] and still unproven.

All four authors most certainly do say that and it has been posted. Both Shanahan and White most certainly did and it has already been posted. Do you wish to see it again? You made a comment dismissing the evidence posted without providing anything to prove otherwise.

An example from The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, 33, certainly illustrates that the Prussian Army of 1806 was still Frederick's army:
‘Doubts about the Prussian army were widespread in 1801. Were its senior officers fit to command? Could the army of Frederick the Great withstand the French under Napoleon? Many believed that only a genius like Frederick the Great could meet the challenge of the French. Scharnhorst sensed this anxiety and used it to his advantage in a series of lectures entitled, ‘Observations on Progress in the Art of War.':
‘An army makes progress in the art of waging war whenever pedantry decreases, whenever the slavish oppressive obedience of officers transforms itself into attention and reverence for disciplinary laws, and does not shackle intellectual activity with fetters that kill the spirit.'
‘Here Scharnhorst implied that the fraternal, aristocratic character of the Prussian officer corps resembled a clique, with a quasi-official rigidity that bordered on hypocrisy. Too many officers demanded unconditional obedience, loyalty, and respect from their subordinates, but were themselves unwilling to give the same to their superiors.

'

I simply asked WHERE the army in 1806 was 'essentially' the army of Frederick the Great. That's it. I made it easy by listing the areas where Frederick's government and army would have to be the same in some 'essential' way for that statement to be true. All you've done is continually repeat statements that don't address those areas at all.

It was clearly demonstrated for the most part in the citations posted from the various source material. Perhaps you should read it again.

Kevin:

Really? They all say that the Prussian army was ‘essentially' Frederick the Great's army?

Let's see now, you're saying the quote you provide from White above ‘clearly demonstrates' that the army of 1806 was ‘essentially' Frederick the Great's army?

So, ‘according to Charles' White' Frederick the Great's army during the SYW and on into 1795, there were wide-spread:

1. Doubts about the fitness of the army's senior officers.
2. Doubts that the Prussian army could defeat the French
[even though they did during the SYW and 1792-1795.]
3. Belief that Frederick the Great was the only reason the
Prussians were victorious.
4. Intellectual fetters across Frederick's army during the
SYW to 1795 ‘that killed the spirit.'
5. The Prussian officer corps resembled a ‘clique' with
‘quasi-official rigidity.'
6. Officers were unwilling to give obedience, loyalty and
respect to their superiors.

THAT was Frederick the Great's army during the Seven Year's War??? During the Revolutionary Wars? That was the army of Rossbach and Leuthen? That was the army of 1792-1795. Hans Delbrück, for example didn't agree. He wrote in his The Dawn of Modern Warfare [1991] p.449

"The Frederican system of warfare had collided with the new French system for the first time at Valmy, had then continued the struggle for two more years, 1793 and 1794, and in this time had still shown itself to be qualitatively superior."

The rest of you post is kinda of odd because you seem to be disagreeing with the quotes I provided rather than me… unless you disagree with White etc.

‘Deceptive'? What is that supposed to mean?

It's White's word, not mine.

Where did you find number 3?

It is right there where I said it was, page 28, bottom of the first paragraph.

As if that were not enough, he sent yet another proposal to the king and his senior commanders shortly after his arrival in Berlin. This recommended strengthening the artillery and integrating it with the infantry and cavalry.

What is discussed on page 108 is the general staff, not divisions of all arms. That's another error in fact that you have posted.

Uh, that wasn't at all the issue being discussed and I never suggested that 1o8 said anything about the general staff. The quote makes that clear. I was pointing out before and after page 108 that Rachel, Brunswick and other Prussian generals were not blocking Scharnhorst's first proposals and had actually implemented a number of them.

"Despite these initial setbacks, Scharnhorst and Massenback continued their modernization efforts as members of the Militarische Gesellschaft. They were joined by Ruchel, Lecoq, Phull and Stein [a Prussian minister]. Significantly, this association was not new." [but had begun in 1795] </q?

So, is Ruchel really the hinderance you say he is? It is the same Ruchel who established Military Schools in 1795.

Your argument is that Rachel was a hindrance to reform for a decade because of some unexplained actions during the campaign? That Brunswick was old?

The Grande Armee, with all the improvements and new organizations was anything but militarily ‘conservative.' All of the innovations that were developed from 1763 onward were anything but ‘conservative.' In point of fact excellence was now the basis for the Grande Armee and it was part of that army's culture.

Right. The 1791 regulations were based on the Prussian's 1788 regulations, the 1792 instructions were based on French instructions adopted thirty years before. Ney was advocating in his instructions skirmishing with the third rank in 1804, a la Brunswick 1791. That's the same year that Guyard, someone well-respected by contemporaries, in his Instruction pour le service et les manoeuvres de l'infanterie légère, (Year 13) [1804], felt deploying line infantry as skirmishers by files was correct…very much the way the British did in Holland ten years before.

There was more going on, Kevin, than your ‘johnny-one-note' approach to history.

Response to the second post of Sept 4th.
Scharnhorst's suggestion to upgrade the artillery and integrate it into the infantry and cavalry was not only something that NONE of the other Continental armies were doing, the French hadn't to the degree that Scharnhorst suggested.

Why would you ‘integrate' the artillery into the infantry and cavalry? That isn't what the French did and…

Kevin:

Why? Well, as it is White saying that Scharnhorst recommended it in 1801, I guess you'd have to go back to the source. I gave you the page 28.

…the Prussians never did anything of the kind in 1806 or earlier. And their artillery rebuilding from 1807-1813 never matched what the French had done.

Uh, I don't remember this being the issue. The question was, and remains, How is the Prussian army of 1806 'essentially' the same as Frederick the Great's army?? So why the French history lesson on artillery compared to the Prussian…of sorts?

It really doesn't address the issue at all--which is between two periods of the Prussian army.

Unfortunately, you haven't proven your case. And you have used source material very poorly. Further, you have not refuted the initial thesis and you have ignored the material used to support the initial thesis.

Regarding the artillery question, please show if you can how 'Scharnhorst's suggestion to upgrade the artillery and integrate it into the infantry and cavalry was not oly something that none of the other Continental armies were doing, the French hadn't to the degree that Scharnhorst suggested.'

The French were already 'integrating' artillery with infantry and cavalry units in the field, and this infantry/artillery cooperation was being taught in the French artillery schools.

Please show where Scharnhorst's suggestion was different or more progressive than what the French had already done.

And you failed to note that Scharnhorst's suggestions were rejected by the king and his senior commanders.

Further on page 28 of White, the second paragraph:

'The critical nature of Scharnhorst's memoranda was deceptive. He truly believed in the soundness of Fredercik the Great's methods and wanted only to improve them. 'Never have I written anything detrimental to the Prussian army,' he explained in a memorandum to Frederick William III. 'I have always been, because of conviction, its greatest admirer and eulogist.' Unfortunately, the king and his entourage saw otherwise. The revolutionary tone of Scharnhorst's message was clear. Each of his proposals, according to Peter Paret, 'denied the continued validity of a particular aspect of the Frederician system, and each was potentially damaging to special interests. All were rejected.'

This also reinforces the subject thesis that the Prussian Army of 1806 was essentially the army of Frederick the Great and Frederick William and his senior offices and advisors wanted to keep it that way.

So, again where is it indicated that Scharnhorst's ideas on 'upgrading' the Prussian artillery were far and above what the French had already accomplished since 1763 with artillery reform and doctrine?

There was more going on, Kevin, than your ‘johnny-one-note' approach to history.

Not in Prussia before 1806 and that has been clearly demonstrated.

What do you know about the French reform period from 1763-1789?

It was much more extensive than that of the Prussian reform era from 1807-1813 and clearly demonstrates that what a few reformers were trying to accomplish before 1806, even though they had the French example to go by, to be too little, too late.

As a brief summation, you are wrong regarding the Prussian army of 1806.

And your lack of understanding of the artillery of the period has been clearly demonstrated by your own words.

You have accused me in this thread of not knowing or understanding the Prussian army of 1806. Seems to me that you have clearly demonstrated that you don't at all. Further, you seem to have no idea about the French army from 1763-1804 or the Grande Armee from 1805-1815.

C.The same is true of a quote by Radetzky in 1813 that the troops don't 'understand skirmishing.' A statement in a memorandum about the Army forming on the Austrian borders which was filled with recruits. He then recommends bringing in more experienced soldiers for the task. This quote has been used to prove that the Austrians didn't understand skirmishing from 1792 to 1815.

The following can be found in Gunther Rothenberg's Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1815:

‘The regulations of 1807 also provided instructions for fighting in open order and skirmishing but the two sections dealing with these matters gave skirmishers little scope…Skirmishing was conceived basically as defensive, screening the closed formation against hostile skirmishers. Though the individual skirmisher was given some latitude in the use of terrain and in loading and firing, the skirmish screen was tightly controlled with orders transmitted by the battalion drums.'-145. [Page 111]

‘Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were equal to the French…The able Radetzky…observed ruefully that ‘operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting'…And the Austrian official history concluded that ‘it was not realized that the soldier, unless he has natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independence.' Instead, the Austrians tried to get quick results by following the totally wrong approach of relying on formalized drill.'145-146

‘Skirmishing was not given much weight in the new instructions. The Austrian high command remained convinced that poorly trained troops could not execute it properly. As Radetzky observed in September [1813], ‘fighting en tirailleure should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailler.'234-235.

Kevin:
Thank you for providing a perfect example of the practices of Post-WWII military historians writing in English, including the echo effect.
Let's start with your first Rothenberg quote, which I think is on page 111 and not page 145.

He makes conclusion statements about the ‘restricted scope' of the 1807 regulations based on the fact that "The skirmish screen was ‘tightly' controlled with orders transmitted by the battalion drums. First, all period regulations don't establish whether the methods provided are for offensive or defesive use… Certainly the French 1791 Regs and 1792 provisional regulations don't. Second the judgment that the orders transmitted by drum ‘tightly' controlled the Austrian skirmishers is all Rothenburg, not in the Regulations… ALL skirmishers by 1807 including the French had bugles or drums transmitting orders for skirmishers… ‘tight or loose' control is never mentioned.

Now, Rothenberg echos himself, using Radetzky's one quote to produce two quotes references to prove 1. That the Austrians were rigidly controlled, which is what ‘the able Radetzky' says in the quote, and that Skirmishing wasn't given much weight in the ‘new instructions, because poorly trained troops could not execute it properly, again with another form of the original quote.

The question is what was Radetzky talking about and which quote/translation is the correct one?

Other authors of the same period echoed Rothenberg:

Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon,‎ by Rory Muir (1988), page 51
"By 1813 the Austrians had virtually given up, believing that the great bulk of their infantry lacked the training and aptitude needed for the the role. As Radetzky observed in September 1813, 'fighting en tirailleure [skirmishing] should be done only in a very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailleur.'"
This passage in Muir is footnoted as follows:
"Quoted in Gunther E. Rothenberg, Napoleon's Greatest Adversaries: The Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army (London, Batsford, 1982), p.184. Austria had, of course, lost her traditional source of light infantry when Napoleon annexed Croatia (part of the Illyrian Provinces) in 1809."

So, Mr. Muir went with the second quote form.

The British Light Infantry Arm 1790-1815, by David Gates (1987) has the version as per Muir (who himself cites Rothenburg, who has the other version). Redcoat: the British soldier in the age of horse and musket‎ by Richard Holmes (2002) also has this version. Both spell "tirailleur" correctly, though Muir and Rothenburg do not.

You Kevin, don't bother to actually quote Radetzky, but have him say:
Once There Were Titans: Napoleon's Generals and Their Battles 1800-1815‎ by Kevin Kiley (2007) offered a paraphrase that expanded the quote attributed to Radetzky with an assertion of Radetzky's "belief" and his "the conclusion."

"The Austrian General Radetzky observed that neither the Austrians nor the Russians understood fighting in open order and believed that skirmishers could be used in a very small, limited way. The conclusion that was reached was that the Austrians were not the equal of the French when fighting in open order."

So, where did this quote come from in 1813 and what was Radetzky talking about?

All these trace to a citation something like "KAV Alte Feldakten 1813 Deutschland Hauptarmee F/10 436b". There is no prior citation of this source before the anglophone authors listed above – first in 1982 or 1987 (depending on which version you are looking at). Since they have substantially different versions, I assume both Gates and Rothenburg saw the text in the original language.
The Radetzky quote is from a General Staff Order (that's what's in those document files), from the staff of the Army of Bohemia. It was not an analytical comment 20 years of Napoleonic warfare, not a summary judgment voiced in retrospect, not a part of a staff history, nor anything similar.

I don't know what the original document said, not least because it is quoted in several different versions. Still unless we have the original (in German? in French for the benefit of the Russians?), we really have no idea of the exact wording (or of who mangled the French language). What we do know is that it applied ONLY to the Army of Bohemia just before Leipzig.

That army was filled with new Austrian and Russian levees and the percentage of light troops was less than half the typical army levels.

So, whatever Radetzky determined and then ordered, it applied to the recently re-built, rather ill-trained conscript "heavy" "line" infantry units in the skirmishing role. There is no general comment being made about all Austrians and Russians, no comparison to the French, no element of national characteristics, unless one has already decided (in advance) that this is what you wish he had said.

What did the Russians and Austrians do about the problem of the large numbers of new recruits? They detached large numbers of experienced troops to act as skirmihsers. For example, The Graf Raevskiy detached whole Grenadier regiments (experienced, selected men) from the Reserve to act as skirmishers and help make up a more typical light infantry ratio. That is why you see the three battalions of the Pavlov Grenadiers deploying as skirmishers in the woods during the Battle of Bautzen.

So, from this one quote regarding the initial conditions of the Army of Bohemia, everyone echoes Rothenburg's uses while adding conclusions of their own, so that the one quote proves that the Austrians[and Russians]:
1. Couldn't skirmish and never did it well, 1792-1813
2. Training in skirmishing was restrictive and not given enough importance.
3. All skirmishers, Russian and Austrians believed, should be used in limited fashion and were for the wars.
4. The Austrians were not equal to the French in open order.
5. Couldn't skirmish because they lost Croatia.
6. Russians and Austrians simply didn't understand skirmishing.
One quote repeated and expanded on, in the 1980s and on to Holmes in 2002 you, Kevin in 2007.

Echoes. Authors reading each other and taking one piece of evidence [mangling the quote into three different translations] and using it to produce more and more 'proofs' of whatever. That is the reason I don't accept the conclusions from that period at face value… as much as I respect those authors in general.

A friend just gave me the Radestky quote and sources:

Radetzky's original passage is in Beiträge zur geschichte der befreiungskriege, 1910, p. 22. [Contributions to the history of the wars of liberation,]

Radetzky wrote that note to Langenau on 15 October, which was inserted into the Army's records:

5. Eine Generalregel, daß nie alle Truppen zugleich aufgelöst, sondern stets eine Reserve behalten werden solle. Wegen Auflösung en tirailleurs könnte eine Bemerkung nicht überflüssig werden: daß solche in sehr beschränkter Zahl bestimmt werden, denn wir beide, Russen und Österreicher, verstehen das Tirailliren nicht.

The author quoted that from Heller von Hellwald's Erinnerungen aus den Freiheitskriegen, p. 93: [Memories from the wars of liberation]

Translated:It was the fifth point in Radetzy's missive to
Langenau:

5. A general rule is that all troops should never be dissolved at the same time, but always keep a reserve. Because of dissolution en tirailleur, one remark could not be superfluous: that such are carried out in very limited numbers, for we, the Russians and the Austrians, do not understand Tirailliren.

Here, what is being remarked on is the large scale 'dissolution' of all troops of a unit into skirmishers, the "Tirailliren".

That is what 'Tirailliren' was, entire units being deployed as skirmishers. It's easy to see why the word would be mangled from German to French to English…

Thank you Google:

link

But that was 1813.

Obviously the Austrians could do it in 1814:

A later account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi , published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814.

"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march. The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines."

@McLaddie

Awesome investigation and analysis.

Stoppage:

Thank you. I can't take credit of a good portion of it. Frayer provided a lot of this on the TMP a couple of years ago and my friend had to remind me that he'd given me the actual Radetzky quote some time back. I had it on my computer.

What I see is this same echo effect when folks talk about Prussia in 1806 and Frederick the Great's army. Conclusions repeated by several authors and quotes taken out of context to support them.

OR any deviation from the Prussian/Allied story line is seen as a challenge to the belief in French superiority, which most of the time it is not.

McLaddie wrote:

What did the Russians and Austrians do about the problem of the large numbers of new recruits? They detached large numbers of experienced troops to act as skirmihsers. For example, The Graf Raevskiy detached whole Grenadier regiments (experienced, selected men) from the Reserve to act as skirmishers and help make up a more typical light infantry ratio. That is why you see the three battalions of the Pavlov Grenadiers deploying as skirmishers in the woods during the Battle of Bautzen.

The Pavlov Grenadier Regiment fought in skirmish order in the woods at Bautzen not because in was "detached to act as skirmishers", but because it was ordered to attack the enemy infantry in the woods, and then to defend these woods. The Pavlov grenadiers attacked not in skirmish order, but in a usual line. They drove the enemy infantry out of the woods, and then they had to dissolve as skirmishers to defend the woods, although their old-fashioned grenadier caps made them not well suited for the task.

These actions of the Pavlovsky Grenadier Regiment fighting are mentioned by George Cathcart:

A gallant attack was made at this time by three battalions of the Pavlofsky regiment, who were then grenadiers, but have since been made guards. They were led forward in line through the broken ground and coppice wood à pas de charge, preserving their line and formation with as much regularity as such ground would permit, and arrived in sufficiently close and good order to enable them to drive all before them, with considerable loss to the enemy.
…
their own subsequent loss was far more severe when extended as light infantry in the wood and maintaining the ground they had gained, their conspicuous brass grenadier-caps rendering them ill adapted for that particular duty. However, during the whole day they maintained their ground, until the final retreat was ordered, and were then obliged to leave behind them in the wood a very large proportion of killed and wounded to the mercy of the enemy.

Cathcart G., Commentaries on the War in Russia and Germany in 1812 and 1813. London, 1850, p. 161-162.

In the Russian army, jagers were usually sent to skirmish. Jagers could fight in skirmish order by whole battalions. There were many jager regiments in the army, but there were no jager regiments in grenadier divisions, these divisions consisted of grenadier regiments only.

The Pavlov grenadiers attacked not in skirmish order, but in a usual line. They drove the enemy infantry out of the woods, and then they had to dissolve as skirmishers to defend the woods, although their old-fashioned grenadier caps made them not well suited for the task.

Zhmodikov:

So the entire three battalions were used as skirmishers. And where were the Jagers? Certainly the Russians 'usually' sent them to skirmish but the Jagers that were in the Army of Bohemia for the most part few and filled with new recruits or line infantry changed into jagers without combat experience.

The size of the "specialist" light infantry of the Army of Bohemia, [totaling 317 battalions, 167 squadrons and 72 batteries outside of the Russian/Prussian Guard.]

With the Austrian divisions -
-- 5 Austrian Jager battalions
-- 10 Grenz battalions

With the Graf Vitgenshteyn -
16 Russian Jager battalions (all still in the process of
rebuilding with conscripts after the 1812 and early
1813 campaign)
1 Prussian Schützen battalion (equivalent)

Total of 32 battalions, or about 10% of the infantry
The specialist light infantry arm was clearly very understrength (and mostly raw recruits for the Russians). The usual Russian ratio was 33% Jager/light infantry.

Line infantry units were used to skirmish, but again, they were filled with new recruits, hence Radetzy's observation.

McLaddie wrote:

So the entire three battalions were used as skirmishers. And where were the Jagers?

The jager regiments were included only in the standard infantry divisions: in 1812, there were four infantry regiments and two jager regiments in each infantry division. In 1813, there were infantry divisions with only five or even four regiments, while some jager regiments were detached from their divisions and put into the advance- or rear-guard. In the grenadier divisions, there were only grenadier regiments. The Pavlov Grenadier Regiment was in the 2nd Grenadier Division, together with four other grenadier regiments: Count Arakcheyev's, Yekaterinoslav, Tauride, and St.Petersburg.

Zhmodikov:

Yes, I was aware of that. Ideally, jagers made up 1/3 of those infantry divisions.

Mine was a rhetorical question:

Why use three entire battalions of Grenadiers for skirmishers for the entire day of battle [headgear not withstanding] if there were sufficient light infantry,competent light infantry, for the job? Again, this was 1813 after serious Russian losses. The Allied decision, where they felt it was necessary, was to use experienced, dependable troops for skirmishing.

Scharnhorst's suggestion to upgrade the artillery and integrate it into the infantry and cavalry was not only something that NONE of the other Continental armies were doing, the French hadn't to the degree that Scharnhorst suggested.

Kevin wrote:

Perhaps your statement would be better put by stating that artillery should cooperate with the other combat arms in the field, which is how the French were trained. The Prussian artillery of 1806 was not.

Kevin: What White wrote on page 28 about Scharnhorst's artillery reform for artillery was:

This recommended strengthening the artillery and integrating it with the infantry and cavalry.

The footnote takes you to Scarnhorsts Briefe and his actual recommendation article:

"Ueber die Starke und Vertheilung der Artillerie bey einer in Division oder Corps getheilten Armee." ["On the strength and distribution of artillery in an army divided into division or corps."]

link

Scharnhorst did more than recommend 'cooperation' between the three arms. He went further, suggesting that the artillery should be integrated permanently in the same way a divisional staff was permanent within the French army. His idea was there would be no separate artillery arm just as there was not separate 'divisional staff' organization. In 1801, nobody was talking about doing that, including the French.

In an effort to support this idea, Scharnhorst's schools trained all officers in artillery methods, firing artillery and maintenance with artillerymen, not just text book theory and and fortifications. White describes this.

That was beyond what the French did, and of course, the Prussians never did either.

McLaddie wrote:

Mine was a rhetorical question:
Why use three entire battalions of Grenadiers for skirmishers for the entire day of battle [headgear not withstanding] if there were sufficient light infantry,competent light infantry, for the job? Again, this was 1813 after serious Russian losses. The Allied decision, where they felt it was necessary, was to use experienced, dependable troops for skirmishing.

The answers to your rhetorical question are very simple: the Russian generals did not use three entire battalions of Grenadiers for skirmishers for the entire day of battle. They used the grenadier regiment to attack in line the enemy troops in the woods in the middle of the day, and then to defend those woods for the rest of the day. They did not use jager regiments, because there were no jager regiments at that point of the line of battle in that moment. One can find similar cases in 1812, for example, at the battle of Borodino, in the second half of the day, the commander of one battalion of the Taurida Grenadier Regiment deployed two companies in skirmish order and kept two other companies in close order in reserve behind the skirmishers (General Baggovut's report on the battle of Borodino).

The footnote takes you to Scarnhorsts Briefe and his actual recommendation article:

"Ueber die Starke und Vertheilung der Artillerie bey einer in Division oder Corps getheilten Armee."

I cannot find it in the link you provided, on what page is it?

VW:

The link takes you to the pages 241-242 listed in White, though I gather from the footnote that the Briefe only has the first two pages of the article.

The article was independent of any publication in 1801.

The point being:

…and then to defend those woods for the rest of the day. They did not use jager regiments, because there were no jager regiments at that point of the line of battle in that moment.

…or the entire day.

One can find similar cases in 1812, for example, at the battle of Borodino, in the second half of the day, the commander of one battalion of the Taurida Grenadier Regiment deployed two companies in skirmish order and kept two other companies in close order in reserve behind the skirmishers (General Baggovut's report on the battle of Borodino).

Yep, for probably the same reasons mentioned above… Using grenadiers for that purpose was quite common in all the Napoleonic armies. However there is a big difference between two companies and three battalions being committed to skirmishing…

The complete memoire by Scharnhorst can be found here:

link

(unfortunately, only a limited preview)

Thanks but you will not learn anything form those 2 pages in the Briefe, the memoire supplies more information but I fail to see in what context it would be used by Brechtel, maybe he can be so kind to give some citations from the memoire, Oliver pointed out.

In case failing to read the basic German sources on this topic – I see also a failure in comprehending how drastically the Prussian Army changed from the 7YW to 1806 – relying on English sources alone, and cherry picking on them – won't do.

…I see also a failure in comprehending how drastically the Prussian Army changed from the 7YW to 1806…

Now you have time to give examples of this.

And you can also comment on your opinions of White, Craig, Shanahan, and Paret.

By the way, since you are always so ready and eager to criticize others work, what have you produced that can be used for research and to further study on the period?

@McLaddie

As far as I know, Pavlovsk Grenadier Regiment did not use 'three entire battalions of Grenadiers for skirmishers for the entire day of battle' on the second day of Bautzen.

A rough translation from its regimental history:

Suddenly, behind our skirmishers, at the close order part of the Pavlovsk Regiment, there was a loud unanimous welcome, then there was our former dashing commander of the division, Graf Osterman-Tolstoy. He had recently arrived from Berlin, and therefore had not yet managed to take a command in the army. As a result, he acted as a volunteer, went to the battlefield to his beloved Pavlovsk regiment. Having greeted the close order part, he rode along the skirmish line and was amicably and enthusiastically welcomed by all.
The Graf remained with our skirmish line and began to manage it.

Istoriya Leyb-gvardii Pavlovskogo polka 1726-1875, p. 217.
link

Obviously, this regiment did use both close order and skirmish order at the same time.

Wu:

Two points:

1. When skirmishing, it was common practice to have the supports/reserve in close order, often 1/3 to 1/2 of a force, that 'close order part' that Osterman-Tolstoy greets. Why would Osterman manage the skrimish line and not the 'close order part'? Because in the skirmish systems the close order part was part of the whole skirmish process… to manage the skirmish line was to manage the reserves.

2. The Pavlov Grenadiers, all three battalions, were committed the whole day to defending the woods, which means that regardless of what parts were close order or not, the principal mission was skirmishing.

I first saw a reference to this in Steven Ross's From Flintlock to Rifle 1979 a[p. 142] and his references to Cathcart and Langeron.

McLaddie wrote:

Yep, for probably the same reasons mentioned above…

Yes, exactly: there were no jager regiments at that point of the line of battle in that moment.

Using grenadiers for that purpose was quite common in all the Napoleonic armies. However there is a big difference between two companies and three battalions being committed to skirmishing…

As Wu Tian demonstrated, the battalions of the Pavlov Regiment didn't dissolve as skirmishers completely. George Cathcart explained that it was a general rule that "every extended line of tirailleurs was invariably sustained by adequate small supports formed in rear, and, as far as might be, sheltered", and that there always was a sufficient reserve further in the rear, so "when people talk of a cloud of light troops, although the appearance may have warranted that figure of speech, the duty was nevertheless conducted with method, and in accordance with these principles."

There is another example from the battle of Borodino: in the middle of the day, the 2nd battalion of the Life-Guard Lithuanian Regiment was sent to hold a hill against numerically superior enemy forces. Vasily Timofeyev, the commander of the battalion, deployed six platoons in skirmish order and kept two platoons (the 1st and the 8th) as a reserve.

I first saw a reference to this in Steven Ross's From Flintlock to Rifle 1979 a[p. 142] and his references to Cathcart and Langeron.

Langeron fought at the right flank of the allied army at the battle of Bautzen, he described the fighting at the left flank, but without details, and he didn't mention the Pavlov Regiment in his account of the battle, he mentions only "grenadiers de Raeffskoï" (the grenadiers of General Raevsky).

Langeron A. de, Mémoires de Langeron, général d'infanterie dans l'armée Russe. Campagnes de 1812, 1813, 1814. Paris: Alphonse Picard et fils, 1902, p. 175-176.

As Wu Tian demonstrated, the battalions of the Pavlov Regiment didn't dissolve as skirmishers completely.

Zhmodikov:
I never said 'completely dissolved as skirmishers', I said 'deployed' as skirmishers and 'committed to skirmishing.'

However there is a big difference between two companies and three battalions being committed to skirmishing…

The three battalions did nothing other than defend the woods for the day. That is what they were committed to do, and do as skirmishers. How many were in the skirmish line and how many were in the reserves, I don't know.

The three battalions did nothing other than defend the woods for the day.

Not so.

The Pavlovsk Regiment only had two weak battalions then (some German sources like Holleben and Caemmerer even indicated only one battalion). Maybe Cathcart included the Kiev Grenadier Regiment into his 'three battalions'.

Pisaev, the chef of the Kiev Regiment, wrote the following paragraph in his report:

[I] was sent to occupy a village in the mountains lying on the right of the town of Bautzen, my regiment used skirmishers to occupy and hold it. Then, when the whole enemy line began to be pushed out, when the skirmishers drove them from the bushes to the mountains, I was ordered to pursuit the enemy with this regiment and clear the main height. The enemy had several columns on that height, not allowing us to place our batteries on. Since my regiment pushed out some skirmishers and sent two divisions to Major General Lisanevich, it only had no more than 75 men (! a note by Wu Tian: Kiev Regiment only had 23 officers and 384 rank and file on May 5). This detachment, together with another regiment the Pavlovsk Life Guards, rushed forward with bayonets, overthrew all the enemy crowd to the bottom of that mountain, and then my skirmishers pursued them almost up to the town of Bautzen.

Pisarev A. A. Voyennyye pis'ma. M., 1817, vol. 1, p. 323-324.
link

Pisarev's citation reads as follows:

when the infidel (French) gathered behind the village in columns, you (Pisarev and the Kiev Regiment), along with the Life Guard [Grenadier] Regiment and Pavlovsk Regiment, attacked the enemy with bayonets, overthrew and scattered them so thoroughly that they fled to all directions, cleared the mountains and pursued more than one and a half versts to Bautzen.

Ibid., p. 326.
link

So, these two or three Russian grenadier regiments used both close order and skirmish order, close order for bayonet charges, skirmish order for firefights, pursuits and village combats.

Wu Tian:

I am willing to stand corrected, however, to play the devil's advocate here, what is written is:

This detachment,[together with another regiment the Pavlovsk Life Guards, [which we know had skirmishers out] rushed forward with bayonets, overthrew all the enemy crowd to the bottom of that mountain, and then my skirmishers pursued them almost up to the town of Bautzen.

It's not clear who only had 75 men, the skirmishers or the troops sent…2 divisions [four companies or four brigades?]

attacked the enemy with bayonets.

Nowhere does it indicate the Russians were in column, only the French, though it might say so before or after the excerpts you provided. [I find it interesting that the French columns are mentioned as well as the skirmish deployment, but no columns for the Russians.] A standard Russian practice was the bayonet while in skirmish formation.

As I don't read Russian cyrillic, I can't read for context.

McLaddie,

Sorry for any misunderstanding I have caused. Neither English nor Russian is my first language.

In my opinion, Pisarev, the commander (not chef, sorry for my typo in the last post) of the Kiev Regiment, meant his regiment, after sending out some skirmishers and four companies (two divisions), only had 75 men in close order then (they were not dissolved as skirmishers).

Nowhere does it indicate the Russians were in column

Yes, the Russians could be in close order (column or line) or even skirmish order during their bayonet charges. In this case, based on Cathcart's account and Pisarev's report, they might be in line.

McLaddie wrote:

The three battalions did nothing other than defend the woods for the day. That is what they were committed to do, and do as skirmishers. How many were in the skirmish line and how many were in the reserves, I don't know.

The Pavlov Regiment fought in skirmish order not because the veteran grenadiers were better skirmishers than newly recruited jagers, but because there were no jager regiments at that point in that moment. This is a problem with separation of the infantry into dictinct "light" and "line" regiments: there were occasions, when no "light" infantry was near, while skirmishers were necessary, either to attack or to defend a piece of rough terrain or a wood, or to protect the main body from enemy skirmishers, and commanders of "line" infantry regiments had to push out skirmishers from their battalions. We can find such cases in the Russian army in earlier campaigns, for example, General Gregor von Berg wrote in his memoirs that at the battle of Amstetten in 1805 he send several hundreds men from his brigade to skirmish against French tirailleurs, who tried to outflank the Russians.

Berg G. von, Leben von Gregor von Berg, Russisch-Kaiserlischer, der Dienstes entlassener General der Infanterie, Dresden, 1871, S. 180.

Berg was the chef of the Malorossiysky (Little Russia) Grenadier Regiment. His brigade consisted of his regiment and a musketeer regiment. Some Russian grenadiers fought in skirmish order at the battle of Krems in 1805.

McLaddie wrote:

It's not clear who only had 75 men, the skirmishers or the troops sent…2 divisions [four companies or four brigades?]

Russian battalion consisted of 4 companies, in battle it was divided into 8 platoons or 4 divisions. Alexander Pisarev writes that he had only 75 men of the Kiev Grenadier Regiment at hand, all other men were either in the skirmish line, or were sent to another point.

I wrote:

four companies (two divisions)

in my last post, which was wrong.

1 Russian division consists of 2 platoons in this era, not 2 companies.
So Pisarev sent 2 companies or half a battalion to Lisanevich.

he Pavlov Regiment fought in skirmish order not because the veteran grenadiers were better skirmishers than newly recruited jagers, but because there were no jager regiments at that point in that moment.

Zhmodikov:

Yes, I am aware of that. The difference would be in experienced/elite soldiers vs recruits or untrained line. That is why you see grenadiers used--better soldiers/better discipline even if not better skirmishers.

The issues at this point are 'at the moment' vs committed all day and how many troops are we talking about here?

Regardless, having found Radezky's quote, what it meant is clear and not referring to the lack of experienced light infantry or seasoned soldiers.

Scharnhorst did more than recommend 'cooperation' between the three arms. He went further, suggesting that the artillery should be integrated permanently in the same way a divisional staff was permanent within the French army. His idea was there would be no separate artillery arm just as there was not separate 'divisional staff' organization. In 1801, nobody was talking about doing that, including the French.

If this is an accurate interpretation of Scharnhorst's ideas on artillery, then he learned little from his training as an artillery officer.

If true, it did fit in with Prussian artillery employment up to 1806 as well as during the Prussian reform period from 1807-1813.]

One of the principle objectives during the period was to make artillery a separate branch with its own training, schools, and commanders who were artillerymen. This was most certainly the object in France during their reform period from 1763-1789-to make the artillery equal on the battlefield and in the army to the infantry and cavalry as independent combat arms.

What you're describing is an idea or effort to make the artillery disappear as a separate branch and make the artillery arm subordinate to the infantry and cavalry, which is what Frederick the Great did. The idea is a move backwards, not forwards. What did Scharnhorst want? A move back to the old artillery guilds?

In short, it's ridiculous.

And a combat arm cannot be compared to the staff organization at any level.

Further, it was not 'ahead' of the French artillery organization on campaign and in combat. It was a giant step backwards.

I was hoping there might be more information on the Bautzen skirmish engagement. It is far more difficult to establish skirmish events from the narratives and AARs because unlike columns and lines, exactly where troops are and how many are engaged often isn't clear. As Jean Colin writes on the first page of his famous study, L'Infanterie au XVIIIe siècle: la tactiques [The Infantry in the 18th Century: Tactics] 1907:

"To study the methods of combat with only the official documents or the combined accounts of battles, one risks distorting the character of them. It is a general fact in the history of wars, for example, that the skirmishers have played a role, often essential, always important, yet one seldom mentioned."

Of course, wargamers usually had to rely on generalizations and conclusion statements from a few scholars. It can help to review the ‘proofs' that Kevin provided:

The following can be found in Gunther Rothenberg's Napoleon's Great Adversary: Archduke Charles and the Austrian Army 1792-1815:

‘The regulations of 1807 also provided instructions for fighting in open order and skirmishing but the two sections dealing with these matters gave skirmishers little scope…Skirmishing was conceived basically as defensive, screening the closed formation against hostile skirmishers. Though the individual skirmisher was given some latitude in the use of terrain and in loading and firing, the skirmish screen was tightly controlled with orders transmitted by the battalion drums.'-111.

So, while instructions were provided and individual skirmishers were given ‘some' latitude, these were basically defensive and ‘tightly' controlled.

What does that mean on the battlefield? Where are the examples of this? When one looks at actual battlefield reports, one doesn't see skirmishing restricted to defensive actions, let alone ‘tightly' controlled, whatever that means.

For example:

Source: Anon.: "Geschichte des kaiserlich-östreichischen 7. Linien-Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Toskana [former 'Von Schröder']", in 'OMZ' 3. Band, 8. Heft (Wien 1824) pp. 195-196:

"[1809] (…) In dem heftigen Gefechte bei Ebersberg (3. Mai) fand eine Division des Regiments, von dem Hauptmann Siegler geführt, Gelegenheit, sich besonders hervorzuthun. Die Feinde suchten durch die Vorstadt von Ebersberg über den Graben vorzudringen, um das, unter Befehl des Major Grafen Salis, in der Stadt fechtende Bataillon der Wiener Freiwilligen abzuschneiden. Hauptmann Siegler, der dieß bemerkte, eilt unaufgefordert aus dem 2. Treffen mit seiner Division dem Feinde entgegen, wirft ihn zurück, macht 150 Gefangene, und befreit das Bataillon Salis. Der Hauptmann erhielt für diese tapfere, freiwillig unternommene That durch das Kapitel den Theresien-Orden."

"During the fierce fighting at Ebersberg (3 May), a division [i.e. 2 companies] of the regiment, commanded by Captain Siegler, had the opportunity to distinguish itself. The enemy tried to cross the ditch moving through the suburbs of Ebersburg, in order to cut off the battalion of Wiener volunteers fighting in the city, commanded by Major Graf Salis. When Captain Siegler noticed this, ON HIS OWN ACCOUNT he left the second line and charged the enemy, throwing them back, taking 150 prisoners, and liberating the battalion 'Salis'. The captain received, for his brave VOLUNTARY deed, the Order of Theresia from the Kapitel." [my capitals].

Or 1805:

Austrian skirmishers of IR 36 capture a French battery at Haslach

Feldwebel Friedrich Köppler des Regiments stürtzte mit einigen Plänklern auf die Geschütze los, und als die feindliche Bedeckung die Flucht ergriff, gelang es ihm mittelst einer schnell herbeigeholten Bespannung, Kanonen und Karren nach Ulm zu schaffen*). Der Feind war inzwischen auch am.

also

Ueber das Betragen unseres Regiments im Gefechte bei Alpeck besteht ein glänzendes Zeugniss °) des F.-M.-L. Gottesheim. Nachdem er erwähnt, wieder geringe Verlust des Regiments **) hauptsächlich dem raschen, entschlossenen, durch kein langwieriges Plänkeln aufgehaltenen Vordringen desselben zuzuschreiben ist,

Source : Geschichte des k.k. 36. Linien – Infanterie – Regiments, Prag 1875, google books, page 545, 546
Seem to be both independent actions and fairly aggressive.
But this is the same Austrian army in 1794 so impressed Dusheme

[1864 reprint of Duheme's Essai historique sur l'Infantrerie Legere page 72.] Duheme was present in Flanders during this time and had a great deal to say about the Austrians:

"These advanced guards, well handled, only disputed their ground long enough to make us waste time and men. They brought us from one position to another till they reached that which they really meant to defend. There they let us use up and scatter our last battalions whose ardour generally shattered itself against their entrenchments. Then fresh troops issued from them in the most perfect order, they in their turn, threw out skirmishers upon our flanks, and thus they charged at advantage troops dispersed and fatigued, corps in disorder and unable to rally most of their men.

H.P.R. von Porbeck, provided an Austrian description of this same tactic in 'Neue Bellona' I (Leipzig 1802): "Die Schlacht bei Tourcoing". Porbeck was present during the battle. The article contains the complete, official 'Hauptdisposition'. It says about the Austrian "Hauptarmee"

"Hauptdisposition, fur die verschiedene Armee-theile."

Hauptquartier Valenciennes, den 1ten April 1794."
"Den 7ten April"
"Da dieser Feind besonders geschwind zum weichen gebracht werden kann, wenn man ihm seine Flanken oder Rucken gewinnt, so sind bei jeder Kolonne gleich Anfangs 200 Freiwillige zu bestimmen, und bei jedem 100, dieser ein Kapitain und 2 Offiziers beizugeben, welche insgesammt bekannt kuhne und entschlossene Leute sein mussen. Diese Leute sind bestimmt mit der leichten Infanterie und zur Unterstutzung dieser, rechts und links an der Strasse, die Flugel und Flanken, der feindlichen Truppen, Stellungen und Posten zu umgehen, und dadurch das Vordringen der Kolonnen zu erleichtern, oder die vorkommenden Verschanzungen des Feindes zu umgehen, oder zu sturmen."

Translation:

"Because the enemy is very easy being pushed back, when we can advance into his flanks or in the back, each column reserves 200 volunteers at the start [of the fighting/attack], each hundred with a captain and 2 officers, which have to be bold and determined men. These men are destined, together with the light infantry and to support these, left and right from the road [formed movement was mostly only possible along the roads, see former messages], to turn the wings and flanks, [of] the enemy troops, positions and post, to facilitate the advance of the columns, or to turn, or storm, the enemy entrenchments when present." 1)

[my italics]

This is definitely an offensive tactic, the ‘volunteers' being line infantry. The Austrians were quite aware of offensive skirmish tactics.
Or in using battalions of line troops to skirmish:

The battle of Ostrach (21st March 1799) We fought in broken terrain. During the heavy fights in the woods around Ostrach the Austrians used their line infantry as skirmishers, too. This is FML Baillet's message to Archeduke Charles (signed Specht, [Baillet's HQ], 21st March 1799).

"(…) I will not refrain from informing Your Royal Higness that 3 battalions Lacy & 2 battalions By Schröder have already arrived in the encampment left of the road from Ostrach to Foulendorf; the 3rd battalion By Schröder however, which was used for the first house in Specht ['Spöck' nowedays] "skirmishing inside the forest, is still dispersed and will arrive late."

A lot of skirmishing remains unexplained. For instance, Arnold in his book Marengo and Hohenlinden: Napoleon's Rise to Power, describes the Austrians at Ampfing where Ney found "…his tactical touch could not contend against overwhelming force. With both flanks turned and a cloud of Habsburg light infantry in his rear, Desperrièrs ordered a retreat." p. 218

While interesting for the offensive use of skirmishers, Arnold fails to mention that the Austrian forces had no light infantry units. The only infantry which could provide that ‘cloud' were line troops.

Rothenburg says:

‘Rigidly controlled and regimented, the Austrian skirmishers rarely were equal to the French…The able Radetzky…observed ruefully that ‘operations en tirailleure can only be conducted in a very limited manner because we do not understand this kind of fighting'…And the Austrian official history concluded that ‘it was not realized that the soldier, unless he has natural aptitude for skirmishing, must be carefully trained for independence.' Instead, the Austrians tried to get quick results by following the totally wrong approach of relying on formalized drill.'145-146

Apart from the misuse of the Radetzky quote, the Austrian history being quoted is the Krieg 1809. This was in reference to the wide-spread belief that skirmish ability was a ‘natural' or innate ability based on environment. That is why the British hired Germans for their light infantry or that troops from Croatia and Tyrol were valued as light infantry, even by Napoleon. This realization wasn't limited to the Austrians. It was something that all nations had to come to terms with.

However, the question after this–-again--is ‘so what?' What effect if any was this supposed ‘rigidity' or the Austrian Military's observation in 1809 on actual battlefield performance?

‘Skirmishing was not given much weight in the new instructions. The Austrian high command remained convinced that poorly trained troops could not execute it properly. As Radetzky observed in September [1813], ‘fighting en tirailleure should be done only in very restricted fashion because neither the Russians nor we have mastered the manière de tirailler.'234-235.

Any poorly trained or new troops are not going skirmish very well. And? What it means that "Skirmishing was not given much weight' is vague and or course, examples are not given.

So, what how did the Austrians perform in 1809 and 1813-14?

Source: Anon.: "Geschichte des kaiserlich-östreichischen 7. Linien-Infanterie-Regiments Großherzog Toskana [former 'Von Schröder']", in 'OMZ' 3. Band, 8. Heft (Wien 1824) pp. 195-196:

"Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively firefight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods".

In other words, the skirmishers were out in front of an advance, not a defensive action.

From the same source:

"Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively firefight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods".

In Volume IV, of Krieg 1809 there is yet another description of IR7 deploying skirmishers at Urfahr from the third rank, also to reinforce the jäger and grenzer.
The Austrian history of the 1809 battle Krieg 1809 is filled with examples of line troops skirmishing in conjunction with Grenz and Jagers or by themselves. I was fortunate enough to get my hands on a copy of volumes II and IV--in German, of course, but the parts I did translate gave many examples. Here are some:

1. The third Zug of several line regiments are thrown foreward at the beginning of the battle (page 224, volume II )

2. The IR33 deploys skirmishers during the engagement at Landshut, later together with IR3 they repeatedly deploy skirmishers at the orders of GM Radetsky.(vol. II)

3. In volume II and IV, there are numerous instances of line regiments reinforcing Jager and Grenzer skirmish lines which are advancing or in firefights with the French.

At Znaym 1809,

"The advanced pickets of the Mittrowsky IR10 engaged, and were supported by their battalion, and covered by a 12 pdr position battery, obstructed the enemy's advance, until one battalion of Kollowrath IR11, and two pieces of ordnance came up commanded by Lieutenant Loffler." Later, "a second battalion was detached to this height, and a chain of riflemen formed, to force those of the enemy back into the village."

Carl Varnhagen von Ense, an officer in IR47 Vogelsang, left an account of his regiment at Wagram in Die Schlacht von Wagram, last published in 1909. In this he describes how his regiment was lying down to avoid enemy cannon fire when "almost all" the company commanded by Hauptmann von Marais was deployed as skirmishers. The company "dissolved into skirmishers, behind willow tree trunks and high corn", and then later "The skirmishers were called back from the Russbach and stepped back into line."
And from the same account:

"To the left, and not far from the fifth Corps the first was formed in two lines on the heights before Brenditz; it occupied with one battalion the entrance to the ravine on its right flank, and the neighboring vineyards with riflemen and Jagers."

In October of 1813, at Hanau, 2nd battalion IR14 "moved forward to support the Bavarian skirmishers in front of the Lamberwald. When the skirmishers were driven back, skirmishers of this battalion moved forward, established a lively fire and halted the enemy advance."
And to pull a Kevin, I'll repeat an earlier quote: an account, by an officer in 3rd battalion IR63 Bianchi, published in Mitteilungen des kuk Heeresmuseum (1902-1907), describes masses deploying skirmishers at Valeggio in February 1814
Valeggio in February 1814.

"GM Baron Stutterheim rode up and ordered us to form division masses, then to wheel to the left and march off towards the enemy; muskets were to be loaded on the march. The masses were drawn up in a chequer board arrangement with IR63 on the left. Our masses sent out skirmishers (from IR3 Erzherzog Karl, IR4 Deutchmeister and IR63); the four guns, which were attached to our brigade, unlimbered and took up their firing positions and now the firing was general. The enemy deployed gradually across a longer front and forced us to dissolve the masses into open order skirmish lines."

I can come up with lots more examples. The point being, what you see the Austrians doing between 1792 and 1814 doesn't overtly show any relationship to Rothenburg's analysis of Austrian skirmishing. Wargamers want to know what actually happened on the ground and many of those 1980s scholars
simply don't provide that information.

Note also, that this only addresses what the Austrians did skirmishing, not how well they did in general against the French. That is a separate question.

What you're describing is an idea or effort to make the artillery disappear as a separate branch and make the artillery arm subordinate to the infantry and cavalry, which is what Frederick the Great did. The idea is a move backwards, not forwards. What did Scharnhorst want? A move back to the old artillery guilds?

In short, it's ridiculous.

And a combat arm cannot be compared to the staff organization at any level.

That could be why the Prussians didn't accept that 'reform.' My comparison was an attempt to describe how Scharnhorst wanted to organize the artillery, making them a permanent part of a division and/or corps, something along the lines of the Russian permanent divisions, brigades etc., but more 'integrated.'

The Prussians were behind in artillery since Frederick the Great. They had been innovators in the 1740s and their field artillery arm badly defeated that of the Austrians in the War of the Austrian Succession. That sparked Liechtenstein's artillery reforms in the Austrian service.

Frederick's interference and substandard treatment of both Prussian artillery and engineer officers resulted in the Prussian artillery stagnating through 1806. Even though they outnumbered the French artillery at Jena an Auerstadt, they were outfought and outshot.

Prince August led the reform and rebuilding of the Prussian artillery arm from 1808, but that also included closing the Prussian artillery school in 1808 after only a 17-year existence.

Two problems that faced the Prussians artillery-wise in 1813-1815:

-there was no army-level artillery reserve.

-the corps artillery chiefs were senior field grade offices, and not general officers-it makes a difference.

The Prussians had the French artillery to use as an example/model, 'there was little change in the use of guns.' The new 1812 artillery regulations contained 'no new methods' for the employment of artillery. It was a battery-level regulation. The regimental artillery was finally abolished 'which had long been the most inefficient in the army.'

See Shanahan, 184-185. Prussian artillery General von Holtzendorf, who lost a hand at Ligny, was probably the best Prussian artillery senior officer of the period.

Frederick's interference and substandard treatment of both Prussian artillery and engineer officers resulted in the Prussian artillery stagnating through 1806.

So, first, the effective, innovative artillery of 1740-63 was later treated badly. Changed? really? Of course, Frederick died in 1786, twenty years before 1806, so nothing happened for two decades?

How is all that an answer to Scharnhorst's first suggested reform of the Prussian artillery?

So, first, the effective, innovative artillery of 1740-63 was later treated badly. Changed? really? Of course, Frederick died in 1786, twenty years before 1806, so nothing happened for two decades?

I thought I had been quite clear in what I posted-apparently not by your posting above.

First, the innovations in the Prussian artillery took place in the 1740s, not from 1740-1763. The Austrians took the defeat in the War of the Austrian Succession to heart, especially regarding their outdated artillery and went to work to fix it. Their reformed and much-improved artillery arm surprised Frederick when the Seven Years War began.

See Christopher Duffy's excellent work on the Prussian Army and his two-volume study on the Austrian Army of the Seven Years War. Both have excellent artillery sections that are most helpful in understanding the artillery reforms of both armies.

Second, Frederick the Great had not specialist training in either the engineers or artillery, but he interfered with both, especially the artillery as well as treating their officers and enlisted personal poorly.

As has already been posted, there were no significant improvements in Prussian artillery from 1763-1806, the artillery being in the same situation it had been since Frederick assumed the throne.

The Prussian artillery was the least efficient of the major belligerents of 1792-1815.

How is all that an answer to Scharnhorst's first suggested reform of the Prussian artillery?

First, Scharnhorst's 'recommendations were not 'reforms' but a backwards slide that would not have improved the Prussian artillery.

Second, if they had been accepted, the Prussian artillery would have been worse off than it was in 1806.

First, Scharnhorst's 'recommendations were not 'reforms' but a backwards slide that would not have improved the Prussian artillery.

Second, if they had been accepted, the Prussian artillery would have been worse off than it was in 1806.

And yet, those backward, nasty Military sluggards in command rejected it…

As has already been posted, there were no significant improvements in Prussian artillery from 1763-1806, the artillery being in the same situation it had been since Frederick assumed the throne.

Well, as I said, you haven't explained how they were the 'same', only that they didn't 'improve' compared to the French.

The situation wasn't the same, before SYW, during the SYW, after the SYW or after Frederick's death, regardless of any improvements you feel didn't happen.

There were a number of changes in artillery during that time, unless you are arguing that the 1806 Prussians were still using SYW artillery pieces, organizing them the same in parks, and employing private contractors to haul them. Is that what you are saying?

As has already been posted, there were no significant improvements in Prussian artillery from 1763-1806, the artillery being in the same situation it had been since Frederick assumed the throne.

seemingly the author of this quote completely ignores the Prussian Horse Artillery, expanded immensely compared to Frederick's one – who shows being quite ahead to many other states regarding this form of artillery.

Of course a lot did happen from 1756 – to 1806 it can be found easily in German sources, in case they are ignored you get a distorted view of the Prussian Army.

there were no significant improvements in Prussian artillery from 1763-1806, the artillery being in the same situation it had been since Frederick assumed the throne.

This literally makes no sense. Frederick II took the throne in 1740, Frederick William II in 1786. So whoever wrote it is saying that nothing changed in the Prussian artillery between 1740 and 1806 which is demonstrably absurd.

…seemingly the author of this quote completely ignores the Prussian Horse Artillery, expanded immensely compared to Frederick's one – who shows being quite ahead to many other states regarding this form of artillery.

Yes, exactly. Whoever wrote it probably hadn't read Kevin Kiley's Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars link which makes clear that the Prussian artillery was re-organized and the horse artillery greatly expanded.

On the other hand, possibly the author of the quote had read it but was confused by Kevin Kiley's insistence on the one hand that "the Prussian Artillery was outmaneuvred and outfought by the outnumbered French artillery" but on the other that the French artillery had been ordered to concentrate on the enemy infantry instead and ignore counter-battery fire, leading one to wonder by what process exactly the French artillerymen had achieved this miracle and concluded that the author was so quick to praise the French he had gotten himself into a muddle.

My apologies. It seems I repeated the quote below instead of providing the original German. I will provide that if anyone is interested.

,q>"Also not meeting any resistance further up, FML Lusignan's force had marched between the woods and he had arrived on the hill just beyond with the lead battalions of his brigade, which was deployed in battle order, when the sounds of a lively firefight could be heard from the direction of Teugen. Austrian skirmishers and patrols from the brigade, who had descended the slope to Teugen, together with sharpshooters from the Peterwardein Grenzers, who had advanced through Roith and across the Buchberg, had run into French units there. FML Lusignan now hastily despatched the forward closed up units onto the north-eastern slope of the Buchberg and positioned his main battalions, which were only now slowly advancing through the woods and gradually reaching the line, together with their battery to the north of the woods".

Please include the original language text (or at least the version used for the quote).

It might be useful for an actual native speaker to read – then they might have an opportunity to provide further insight when archaic words, phrases, and idioms have been (unwittingly) misinterpreted.

By the way, I am really enjoying this new information. I don't have any Austrians but this exchange is kindling my interest in them.

Field artillery is much more than a collection of companies/batteries of horse or foot artillery.

There should be command and control of the artillery, by trained senior artillery officers, to coordinate the employment of artillery on the battlefield. Further training, leadership, and a solid artillery doctrine for employment is necessary for artillery to be effective.

The Prussians did not have this in 1806 which is why the Prussian artillery arm was in the same sorry state it had been under Frederick the Great.

Technical innovations and the use of such innovations as the prolonge were not employed, and the old screw quoin, first developed in the 1740s, was still in use (and had been copied by the Austrians in the 1750s and the Russians as late as 1805).

Not much is actually known or understood about the Prussian artillery train troops, but they did not have anything like the French train d'artillerie, which was a well-organized and highly functional organization.

The Prussian 1812 artillery regulation is available in reprint and you can find illustrations of the Prussian artillery pieces, etc. in Unter dem Preussen-Adler by Hans Bleckwen as well as Die Bewaffnung: Das Heerwesen in Brandenburg und Preussen von 1640 bis 1806 by Heinrich Muller

Field artillery is much more than a collection of companies/batteries of horse or foot artillery.

There should be command and control of the artillery, by trained senior artillery officers, to coordinate the employment of artillery on the battlefield. Further training, leadership, and a solid artillery doctrine for employment is necessary for artillery to be effective.

The Prussians did not have this in 1806 which is why the Prussian artillery arm was in the same sorry state it had been under Frederick the Great.

Kevin:
As you often say: Sources?

It's common sense and by example, what the French fielded. If you disagree, then post something that proves otherwise.

See Shanahan for his take on the weaknesses of the Prussian artillery in 1806. You might also take a look at Artillery of the Napoleonic Wars, Volume I by Kevin Kiley.

What was the Prussian artillery chain of command in 1806?

Do you believe that artillery batteries/companies are merely assigned to units with no comprehension about what the mission is?

The French certainly had one and their command and control of artillery was excellent, as was their artillery organization in the field.

There was an army artillery reserve and their corps artillery chiefs were artillery general officers.

Again, if you disagree, then post something that disproves what I have posted. If you won't or can't, then the point is moot.

And if you believe that the Prussian artillery in 1806 was competently lead, well trained, and well-organized, then why did they lose so many field pieces at Jena and Auerstadt?-at least 315.

What I posted is common sense and it is what the French developed from long experience in the field.

And it should be noted that the Prussian army had no unified artillery system until 1816, although it was proposed in 1812. The French, British, and Austrians had one and even the Russians developed one, though it took longer than the other three.

Perhaps the following will help much better. It is taken from Howard Rosen, 'The Systeme Gribeauval: A Study of Technological Development and Institutional Change In Eighteenth Century France', 30:

'Often obscured by the large number of changes it introduced, was the fact that the systeme Gribeauval was a genuine system, a thoroughly integrated blend of organizational principles, tactical ideas, and technology. Gribeauval conceived of the artillery as a system in which each part was designed in functional relation to the whole. Men and material were both viewed instrumentally, as elements of this system. From the details of equipment to its social organization, every aspect of the systeme Gribeauval was designed to achieve a specific purpose: to create an artillery force with sufficient mobility to participate actively in offensive operations.'

Organization, training, tactics, command and control, education, both practical and formal, were inherent in the system and it was something the Prussian artillery arm did not have, not only in 1763 or 1806, but in 1815.