"Napoleonic Skirmishers Questions" Topic

The light infantry regiments were the primary light infantry of the Grande Armee.

All four emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late.

The first three volumes emphasize the fact that the Prussian light infantry arm was insufficient to fight the French on their terms. In short, Prussian tactical methods, especially in light infantry fell below the standard set by the French since 1792.

Paret makes the case that while the Prussians did increase their light infantry arm prior to 1806, it was noted by General von Hopfner that ‘the fusiliers trained for duty in the field much like the heavy infantry; in one case as in the other, hilly terrain was avoided as far as possible' and that ‘the riflemen lacked any training in extended order.' Further, General von Witzleben noted that ‘the tirailleur system was little known in our army.'

Brechtel:

Uh huh. First, I've read those books and you are misrepresenting their conclusions.

Second, they are all secondary sources where authors are making conclusions about practices before Jena. I've been relating what the Prussians did at the battle, regardless, most admitted to by those authors. Paret, for instances simply says that the Prussians did deploy skirmishers at Jena, just not enough of them. I can agree. The French had them out-numbered 2:1 at every point of the battle.

And third, the 'tirailleur system' the general is speaking of is the French system, not that the Prussians has no system.

I have not misrepresented anything. And to make that false accusation is at best ludicrous, and at worst disingenuous.

If you actually have those books, perhaps you should read them again.

And it should also be noted that Bressonet is also a secondary source.

The Prussian army's problems with light troops goes back to at least 1787 and that information was provided to give background to their failures in that area in 1806. If you can't understand that, then you have larger problems, historically, than I thought.

You made a false accusation and then fail to back it up with anything substantial with the exception that you have those books that I referenced. You are in error here, just as you were with the Talavera/Friedland discussions on artillery.

The French had them out-numbered 2:1 at every point of the battle.

And do you know why? That is explained quite thoroughly in the references and it is because the French use of light infantry/skirmishers/tirailleurs was common practice in the Grande Armee and not in the Prussian army of 1806. That is the conclusion that makes the most sense in the discussion.

Giving 'historical' excuses for why the Prussians were defeated helps no one. It certainly is not historical inquiry nor does it follow any historical methodology.

The Prussian army's problems with light troops goes back to at least 1787 and that information was provided to give background to their failures in that area in 1806. If you can't understand that, then you have larger problems, historically, than I thought.

And what problems were those?

After the participation of the Prussians in the Revolutionary Wars, French General Moreau declared the Prussian Fusiliers to be the best light troops on earth.
Quoted in Paret. Now, if you know anything about Moreau, you know he was a caustic, taciturn fellow and not one to give out compliments.

Giving 'historical' excuses for why the Prussians were defeated helps no one.

That wasn't an excuse, Kevin, just a fact. That the Prussians were outnumbered 2:1 is both a strategic failure of the Prussian commanders and a major reason they were defeated at Jena. So, there is no way the Prussians could have deployed as many skirmishers as the French.

You constantly quote 50+ year old conclusions by authors who, through no fault of their own, did not have access to primary sources we do though the internet.

And one of the things I keep finding is that their conclusions don't match the actions on the ground or contemporary reports and opinions in significant ways.

You made a false accusation and then fail to back it up with anything substantial with the exception that you have those books that I referenced.

I didn't see the need. You didn't in making those statements.

The French indeed outnumbered the Prussians in overall strength at Jena, if that is what you're saying in the above posting.

However, while Napoleon had 96,000 troops on the field, nearly 40,000 were not engaged.

The Prussians were defeated because they were outthought as well as outfought.

In the morning, the first engagement saw Tauentzien 12,000 attacked by Lannes Corps of 22,000, supported by the Guard with Saint-Hilaire with 7,000 coming up on the flank and
Desjardin's Division on the left flooding the Isserstadt woods.

Holtzdorf's 3,500 faced Soult's corps led again by Saint-Hilaire's 7,000

When Lannes first attacked VH, Tauentzien probably had around 2,000 defending the village against Sachet's division of 11,000, though probably only two brigades were in the attack, say 4-5,000.

Once Ney's 6,000 and the rest of Augereau's corps arrived, with Tauentzien withdrawn and Gawart's division appearing, The Prussians, with von Prittwitz's and part of Zeschwitz's Saxon division [von Burgsdorff is never engaged] Hohenlohe fought the rest of the battle with between 25,000 to 30,000 troops of all arms.

The French had more than 60,000 on the field at the same time, with 30,000 showing up later. All the way through the battle, each engagement saw the Prussians constantly outnumbered around 2:1 or more.

Obviously, the Prussian command was definitely out-thought. Napoleon, when he met with the King of Prussia well after the Battle, complimented the army and condemned their commanders.

That was definitely true at Auerstadt…Davout out-thought and the French outfought the Prussians.

All four emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army.

I'd also like to address this long-standing misconception, or perhaps just hyperbole.

First of all, which "Frederick the Great Army" is that, the SYW army or the one twenty years after in 1787 that is called the same in 1806 twenty years after 1787???

They were far different for good and bad reasons. The army that took the field. Army in 1786 when Frederick died was quite different from the army during the SYW twenty years after. Two decades later, the army 1806 was organized, commanded, trained, financed, recruited quite differently than the Prussian Army of 1786.

It is these simplistic descriptions that make good copy but don't stand up at all when you actually look at the history.

I disagree.

From Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, page 22:

'The Prussian army was soundly beaten in 1806, and the factors which were mainly contributory to its defeat in the field were defects of organization, training, and leadership which had been apparent since 1763.'

'Despite some professional criticism of the operation of the canton system, Frederick's principles were maintained by his successors.'-23.

From Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813, 61:

'Neither of the successors of Frederick the Great was inclined to make radical alterations in the government or the armed forces.'

'The long period of peace in Prussia from 1795 to 1806 offered a great opportunity for military reform. Except for a few minor changes the Prussian military institutions dating from the time of Frederick the Great remained much the same. It is almost unbelievable that a state which owed almost all of its fortune to the excellence of its army could watch with complacence the transformation of the French republican armies into a formidable military machine. This lethargy was almost entirely due to the timorous and procrastinating character of the monarchs.'-69.

Here's another aspect on the same subject from the Esposito/Elting Atlas, Map 57:

'Prussia, however, still suffered an uneasy, periodic hangover from the glories of Frederick the Great. Avid of further territorial expansion and prestige, her rulers reacted with unthinking arrogance…The army itself was largely a parade-ground façade, composed in large part of mercenaries, both officers and men. Prussian enlisted men were drafted exclusively from the lower classes; for reasons of economy, they were placed on leave most of the year, being recalled only for emergencies or minimum training. Pay, food, and clothing were scant; discipline harsh; training little more than close-order drill. The supply system depended on an elaborate system of depots and supply trains. Soldiers were accustomed to regular deliveries of rations and firewood; units were encumbered with amazing amounts of baggage…Thoughtful officers remembered that the Prussian Army had performed poorly even during Frederick the Great's last campaigns and again in 1792-93.'

And these comments apply to the army that fought the Jena campaign. And some Prussian officers still dressed ranks with surveying instruments and one skirmishing instruction dictated even the number of steps the troops were to take when being ordered to deploy as tirailleurs.

I enjoy these debates here, always something to think about or go off and check.

regards

David F Brown

'The Prussian army was soundly beaten in 1806, and the factors which were mainly contributory to its defeat in the field were defects of organization, training, and leadership which had been apparent since 1763.'

Brechtel: You need to read the rest of the page. Craig was writing about the POLITICS of the Prussian army 1640-1945. So, it is the politics he focuses on writing on page 22.

The decline of the army which had won such signal triumphs in the seven Years war can be traced back to Frederick the Great himself; and even Treitschke, on of his greatest admirers, is forced to admit that Frederick left the army 'in a worse condition than that in which he found it on ascending the throne.' There can be little doubt, for instance, that he watered down the canton system to a dangerous degree. Although he was willing to admit on occasion that native soldiers that native soldiers fought Prussia's battles better than foreign mercenaries, Frederick always felt that his subjects served the state better as taxpayers and producres of goods than as soldiers.

the defects Craig talks about in 1763 is basically the Autocratic leadership of Frederick, which no single king could fill after he passed away… in the meantime he starved the army for money to rebuild the State after 1763, created the inspectorate districts which became independent commands as he declined and could not personal inspect the army has he had done for years.

Most all that Esposito/Elting describe is what happens to an army starved of funds…it is difficult to reform or keep pace with other armies without money. And those problems were being slowly rectified, but slowly because of the lack of leadership from the Kings and money.

The bottom line is that organizationally, in command structure, in leadership, in funding, in training the army of 1789 was not the army of 1763, and neither was the army of 1806. To suggest that "the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army" is just plain wrong regardless of who has written it. I would be glad to detail the differences.

'Despite some professional criticism of the operation of the canton system, Frederick's principles were maintained by his successors.'-23.

Actually, they weren't maintained, as Craig just stated, but as there was a concerted effort to bring native Prussians into the army, the canton system operations was changed. It required the French capturing Frankfort, denying the Prussians their main recruiting area before 1795. None the less, there was a major shift in Native/non-Prussian ratios in the army after 1795.

From Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813, 61:

'Neither of the successors of Frederick the Great was inclined to make radical alterations in the government or the armed forces.'

That is true, mostly from Royal indifference. However, that didn't stop Commission for Reform, from becoming the defacto Head of the Army after 1795 and making changes.

As I said, however you define it, the Prussian Army which took the field in 1806 had very little in common with Frederick the Great's Army in 1763 or 1786 on the year of his death.

As I said, however you define it, the Prussian Army which took the field in 1806 had very little in common with Frederick the Great's Army in 1763 or 1786 on the year of his death.

As I have shown, that is an incorrect statement with which I disagree.

As I have shown, that is an incorrect statement with which I disagree.

Right, so the army of Frederick the Great, by whatever year he was alive was

*commanded by committee
*A far older group of general officers
*Had few if any non-noble regimental or higher ranked officers
*Had Fusiliers and Schutzen for each battalion armed with rifles, let alone three battalions of Jagers.
*Infantry organized with five companies
*Far simpler uniforms
*Regiment organized into permanent brigades by Inspectorate.
*Individual Inspectorates training their troops without reference to other Inspectorates.
*Limited training or regular exercises for most troops [lack of funds.]
*Most all new recruits gleaned from inside Prussian borders, including the new territories of Poland.
*Last minute reorganization of the entire army into divisions.

I could go on, but you get the idea. Far different from when Frederick was alive. The idea that nothing had changed from 1763 [or even 1787] is on the face of it, ludicrous. It's like suggesting that nothing changed in the U.S. army from 1945 to 1985.

The idea that nothing had changed from 1763 [or even 1787] is on the face of it, ludicrous.

I didn't say that. You have misrepresented what I posted. What I stated in the posting on the same thread on 6 August at 6:07 PM was:

"All four emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late."

Definition of 'essentially': used to identify or stress the basic or essential character or nature of a person or thing or to say that a description is basically true or accurate; fundamentally.

Definition of 'fundamentally': with regard to what is basic, essential, or fundamental

Perhaps you should get your facts straight before criticizing another forum member?

To help you understand the myriad self-inflicted problems the Prussians had in 1806, perhaps the following would be of assistance?

From John Elting's Swords Around A Throne, Chapter XXV, 516-517:

'The Prussian Army the French met in 1806 was essentially the ghost of Frederick the Great's reputedly invincible host…The titular commander in chief, the Duke of Brunswick, was seventy-one…Its fountainhead of authority, young King Frederick William III, was simple, brave, and soldierly but weak-willed…
There were many elderly generals, with leather lungs and entirely unjustified illusions of infallibility, who insisted on arguing over their orders than obeying them.'

'Most of the army's peacetime enlisted strength were mercenaries from the world's four corners…the artillery and engineers, arms that Frederick never quite comprehended, were in bad condition, their officers poorly trained and considered something less than gentlemen. The administrative services had ossified; the medical service was outstandingly inefficient…the Prussian service meant scant pay, short rations, skimpy clothing, and harsh discipline.

From Gordon Craig's The Politics of the Prussian Army:

'The decline of the army which had one such signal triumphs in the Seven Years War can be traced back to Frederick the Great himself…Frederick left the army 'in a worse condition than that in which he had found it on ascending the throne'…Although he was willing to admit on occasion that native soldiers fought Prussia's battles better than foreign mercenaries, Frederick always felt that his subjects served the state better as taxpayers and producers of goods than as soldiers. Whereas in the army of Frederick William I natives had outnumbered foreigners by two to one, Frederick set out deliberately to reverse that ratio…'-22.

Frederick also extended the practice of furloughing natives for most of the year and reduced the annual maneuver period.-24.

The senior officers, old as they were in the period after Frederick's death (they had been junior officers during the Seven Years War), were also incredibly conservative and inflexible and dutifully maintained what they believed to be Frederick's 'standards' and generally refused to admit that warfare, especially that practiced by the French, had changed things immeasurably.-26.

As a sidenote, it should also be noted that there was no Prussian artillery school until 1791 and that would be abolished during the 'reform period' in 1808.

Definition of 'essentially': used to identify or stress the basic or essential character or nature of a person or thing or to say that a description is basically true or accurate; fundamentally.

Uh-huh. If the organization, command structure, funding, recruiting, training, uniforms, types of troops, strategic and tactical thinking and actions on the battlefield were not the same as Fredericks, where in the blazes is that 'essentially?'

"The heroic standard of the Old Prussians had been perverted by a long period of peace, and by the effeminacy which came over their mode of life…"

—Freiherr von der Goltz, Jena to Eylau Page 68

Quoting Craig back to me doesn't disprove those changes or prove any assumed similarities to Frederick's army.

This simply isn't true:

The senior officers, old as they were in the period after Frederick's death (they had been junior officers during the Seven Years War), were also incredibly conservative and inflexible and dutifully maintained what they believed to be Frederick's 'standards' and generally refused to admit that warfare, especially that practiced by the French, had changed things immeasurably.

For instance:

"The Prussian army had a decentralized and even chaotic administration… The lack of integration reflected the absolute monarch's practice of creating administrative organs form time to time and fitting them haphazardly into the framework of the existing government. And by 1806, offices which had only a cursory significance under Frederick the Great, had become under his successors centers of independent authority."

[pp. 25-26] Shanahan

IF the Prussian officers were sooo inflexible and focused on 'maintaining' what they thought were Frederick's 'standards', then explain to me:

1.Why the Prussians immediately formed a Committee of Reform, Immediat-Militär Organisations-kommission
right after their exit from the Revolutionary wars in 1795. This reform committee became, according to Paret, Shannahan and Craig, the de-facto head of the army in the command vaccuum left by Frederick's death.

2. Why all those defenders of 'Frederick's standards' such as Brunswick, von Möllendorf, and Hohenlohe introduced new--and very unFrederickian--instructions and military procedures into the army at this time and later?
[also note that each had their own Inspectorate which practiced different training from other inspectorates.]
Name a incrediably conservative and inflexible and dutiful Prussian general and I'll provide examples of how they weren't all that conservative or dutiful.

3. These same Frederickian stalwarts are the very same army generals who hired Scharnhorst and let him devise the curriculum for the army. Scharnhorst really, really wasn't a Frederick and only Frederick advocate and neither was his curriculum.

4.

Frederick also extended the practice of furloughing natives for most of the year and reduced the annual maneuver period.-24.

Yes, and how did the post-Frederickian generals change THAT practice?

'The Prussian Army the French met in 1806 was essentially the ghost of Frederick the Great's reputedly invincible host…The titular commander in chief, the Duke of Brunswick, was seventy-one…Its fountainhead of authority, young King Frederick William III, was simple, brave, and soldierly but weak-willed…
There were many elderly generals, with leather lungs and entirely unjustified illusions of infallibility, who insisted on arguing over their orders than obeying them.'

Uh, does that sound anything like the army under Frederick the Great? Again, where is that 'essentially'
Ghost or not?

The Prussian army and it's officers didn't maintain Frederick's 'standards' in any measurable way at any level. Even Frederick didn't after the SYW…

30 years after Frederick died, the Prussian Army was nothing like Frederick's army in most every way other than maintaining the pride of his victories…and we know how far that got them.

The problem here is that you keep quoting the conclusions of writers from 50+ years ago without looking at the primary sources or even the evidence they provide, often contrary to the oft-repeated judgements.

As a sidenote, it should also be noted that there was no Prussian artillery school until 1791 and that would be abolished during the 'reform period' in 1808.

Great example of how the Prussian Army in 1806 was not like Frederick's army. One of the first things Frederick did after the SYW was jettison all the non-noble officers from the army. That is why Scharnhorst was elevated to nobility simply to be hired by the Prussians in 1801.

One of the things he did do was open military schools.In 1765--after the war, Frederick II built the Académie des Nobles (also Académie militaire) in Berlin. There young nobles were trained for military and civil service. [Note, only nobles] The classes related to history, geography, philosophy, rhetoric, geometry, fortification, grammar, French, drill, dancing and horseback riding. The students went either directly to the academy or to the cadet schools. [Another addition after the war 1765] The twelve best graduates Frederick took to Potsdam to personally train in the higher art of war (Kriegskunst). These officers were the squad for staff officers.

After the king died in 1786, this tradition continued as one of secondary education until 1801.

In 1801 is when Scharnhorst became the director of all the military schools. He changed the curriculum and graduation requirements for the cadet schools and academies.

After Frederick died, the curriculum and assignment of top students changed several times…

30 years after Frederick died, the Prussian Army was nothing like Frederick's army in most every way other than maintaining the pride of his victories…and we know how far that got them.

The problem here is that you keep quoting the conclusions of writers from 50+ years ago without looking at the primary sources or even the evidence they provide, often contrary to the oft-repeated judgements.

The problem is at least twofold: in the face of irrefutable evidence you cannot admit that you are wrong. And, apparently, you have no idea of the Prussian Army as it was between 1763 and 1807.

All of the material that has been quoted to you is available and you say you have the books. Perhaps you should read them if you do?

Lastly, you misquote or ignore what has been provided to you. This is the same 'methodology' that you have used on two previous subject on this forum: the 'comparison' of artillery employment at Talavera and Friedland and the long discussion on the Holy Roman Empire.

In all three discussions you have erred repeatedly, misrepresented at times what I have provided to you, and have ignored material from five bona fide historians who backed up their conclusions with proof, two of them, White and Shanahan, having used to old pre-war Prussian archives. White especially is an authority on Scharnhorst. He is very interesting to talk to and his presentations are interesting.

As for the dates of publications, White's book on Scharnhorst was published in 1989 and Swords was published in 1988. Those are 30 and 31 years ago, respectively, and while the Esposito/Elting Atlas was first published in 1964, it was updated Col Elting and republished in 1999.

So, once again you have erred, this time in basic arithmetic.

Lastly, you have not provided any source material for your opinions, merely attempted unsuccessfully to refute what I have posted.

The problem is at least twofold: in the face of irrefutable evidence you cannot admit that you are wrong. And, apparently, you have no idea of the Prussian Army as it was between 1763 and 1807.

Uh huh, irrefutable. You simple quoted 50 year old conclusion statements that don't fit the facts at hand. I have no idea what the Prussian army was like 1763 and 1807. Right. Even after all the specifics I gave you.

No source material…none whatsoever, huh? Certainly as many and as detailed as you did. What I pointed out about the army structure [or lack thereof] is easily found in Shannahan and Craig if you don't want to go to primary sources.

As for the dates of publications, White's book on Scharnhorst was published in 1989 and Swords was published in 1988. Those are 30 and 31 years ago, respectively, and while the Esposito/Elting Atlas was first published in 1964, it was updated Col Elting and republished in 1999.

I don't remember you quoting White and there isn't anything different with Elting's Description of the Prussian Army from 1964 to 1999 if you were quoting the 1999 edition. And Craig and Shannahan are from the 1950s and 1960's, so I am not sure where my math is in error.

And so ends another discussion with you of historical evidence.

What specifics backed up by what source material?

The facts supplied from the five sources I used clearly demonstrated the points that I made and that your opinions are generally incorrect.

What specifics backed up by what source material.

Okay Kevin, I'm going to make the effort. Here is Duffy's take on the Prussian Army under Frederick,

"In the Age of Reason warfare and the military machines were managed in two ways. One was the style of Frederick Great, and the other was followed by everyone else. From the beginning, Frederick concentrated the control of politics and strategy in his person… The Frederickian war ministry was reduced to little more than an office of clerks, and it was allowed no authority over the personnel of the army, which was managed by Frederick in person."

Duffy, Christopher, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason. p.151

What happens to that organization of clerks when the sole manager is dead?

You've read Craig and Shannahan, you must have read this: [I have paraphrased to reduce the length of the quotes, but page numbers should work, right?

After the war, Frederick spent the rest of his life cleansing the officer corps of what he saw as objectionable, middle-class material. This policy was upheld after his death. By 1806 there were only 695 non-nobles in an officer corps of over 7,000. The vast majority were isolated in the artillery, Fusiliers and subsidiary branches of the service.
Craig Page 17

The same army officer corps?

The general lack of learning among noble junior officers became so obvious that by the mid-1790s Major von Rüchel instituted a major reform of the cadet schools and the Army established four higher military academies--including the artillery school. Craig p.26

As a result of this lack and the lack of enough nobles,
foreign nobles gained commissions in large numbers. Although many capable officers came to the Prussian service this way, including Scharnhorst, Blücher, and Gneisenau, many 'adventurers of dubious character', to use Treischke's phrase, entered as well. page 25

In speaking of foreign officers in this context, 'foreign' means outside the established boundaries of the Prussian nation up until 1806, rather than men who were strictly Prussian by birth. For instance, Scharnhorst came from Hanover, Blücher from Mecklenburg, and Gneisenau was born a Saxon. Craig p.25

However, the notion of who could be considered a native "Prussian" changed substantially during the period 1756 to 1795. Prussia doubled in size. With the addition of Silesia and then over several decades the addition of large portions of Poland, who could be considered a citizen of Prussia expanded. Craig p.25

And of course you've read Shannahan:

Another outcome of this manufactured shortage of officers was that a large number of nobles remained at their posts far longer than in most armies. Older officers in other European armies would often retain their rank and seniority, but not hold any positions of responsibility, particularly during peacetime. In Prussia, there was no one to replace them. By the time of Jena, of the more than 244 senior officers in the Prussian army, no less than half were over sixty-five, 166 were over sixty, and only 13 were under fifty. All Prussian infantry colonels were over sixty, and 12 more than seventy. In the cavalry, the situation was not much better. Of 44 regimental colonels, only six were under fifty. Shannahan p. 29-30

Even 25 percent of battalion commanders were past the age of sixty. Craig p.26

Between 1763 and Frederick's death, one-third of the men reaching the rank of general in the Prussian Army were foreign-born. Paret p. 47n

Same army?

Comparatively, the British had the same size army in 1806. Yet the British Army had more than twice the number of general officers, 425, 126 lieutenant generals alone, and only 160 of the total were sixty or older. Osprey "Wellington's Generals", p.6

At the end of the Seven Years War, native Prussians outnumbered foreigners in the army by more than two to one if only because most of the foreign recruiting areas were contested during the war. Frederick set out to deliberately reverse this ratio. By 1804, foreign mercenaries comprised nearly fifty percent of the army at full strength. [5:23] Only the loss of recruiting areas in Germany to the French after 1800 and reform efforts to increase the number of native Prussians in the army helped reduce this to forty percent by October of 1806. This was a far different composition than found in Frederick the Great's army of during the Seven Years War.
Shannahan p.23

I have provided a very small set of examples from those and other books. I didn't even go to primary sources to be sure you can check those references.

Now, you must have read those items. You still insist that the Prussian Army of 1806 was 'essentially' Frederick the Great's army, the one which gained fame during the SYW?

And how much have you taken out of context or cherry picked (to use a favorite phrase used on this forum) to 'prove' your opinions?

And how much have you taken out of context or cherry picked…

Kevin: That is what the sources are for, so you can see whether I have taken those out of context or cherry picked the sources.

See, you can answer that question without my response. Guess what my answer will be. Do you want more evidence, sourced of course.

Here is your evidence of your repeated errors:

John Elting is quite clear in his accurate assessment of the Prussian Army of 1806 in Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV, 488.

‘Considering the late 18th Century Prussian Armym that mysterious, wandering Welsh soldier of fortune, Henry Lloyd, who had served both in and against it, described it as made up chiefly of foreigners of all nations, manners, and religions. Frederick the Great had drilled and disciplined it into a ‘vast and regular machine', but-were Frederick removed-it probably would fall to pieces.'

‘The Prussian Army that went confidently against Napoleon in 1806 was Frederick's army still in most regards-a framework of foreigners, enticed into its harsh service, filled up with part-trained native Prussian reservists. A few days of fighting shattered it.'

1.After the war, Frederick spent the rest of his life cleansing the officer corps of what he saw as objectionable, middle-class material. This policy was upheld after his death. By 1806 there were only 695 non-nobles in an officer corps of over 7,000. The vast majority were isolated in the artillery, Fusiliers and subsidiary branches of the service.
Craig Page 17

This is an example of how the Prussian Army was essentially the same as it was in Frederick's reign. And it was Frederick's goal. Frederick believed that a sense of honor could only be found in the nobility and not in other classes, and ‘certainly not in the bourgeoisie, which was driven by material rather than moral considerations and was too rational, in moments of disaster, to regard sacrifice as either necessary or commendable.'-Craig, 16.

It should be noted that Craig did not mention the fusiliers, either in the text or in the footnotes. Where did you get that information? The fusilier battalions were not created until 1787, a year after Frederick's death (see Shanahan, 69), so how could Frederick assign his non-noble officers to the fusilier battalions?

Shanahan, not Craig, mentions the lower prestige of the fusilier battalion on page 29.

2.The general lack of learning among noble junior officers became so obvious that by the mid-1790s that Major von Rüchel instituted a major reform of the cadet schools and the Army established four higher military academies--including the artillery school. Craig p.26

And further on the same page Craig notes that the graduates of the four higher military academies ‘were few in number, and constituted an inadequate leaven in an officer corps which, in the ranks below major at least, was characterized by abysmal and arrogant ignorance.

Why did you leave this out?

This tends to reinforce the idea that the Prussian officer corps was not in favor of further education. This would not even be attempted to be addressed until after 1801 when Scharnhorst entered the Prussian service. And no notable improvements would take effect until after the old Prussian army was destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt and the actual Reform Period would begin because of that ‘catastrophe.'
Further, on page 25 Craig notes that ‘the education tone of the Prussian Army had been set by Frederick William I and the ‘Old Dessauer': ‘A general was not regarded as uneducated, even though he could barely write his own name. Whoever could do more was styled a pedant, inksplasher, and scribbler.'

3.As a result of this lack and the lack of enough nobles, foreign nobles gained commissions in large numbers. Although many capable officers came to the Prussian service this way, including Scharnhorst, Blücher, and Gneisenau, many 'adventurers of dubious character', to use Treischke's phrase, entered as well. page25

Craig mentions Scharnhorst, but not Blucher nor Gneisenau. That being the case, why did you add them to your list? Do you know when Blucher and Gneisenau entered the Prussian service?

Here, what is your point?

Craig notes on 24-25 that ‘the flower of Frederick the Great's officer corps was killed off in the Seven Years War' and his prejudice against bourgeois officers ‘deprived the army of talented and experienced officers.

So it was Frederick's practice that allowed foreigners with ‘noble patents' to enter the army to make up the heavy losses suffered in the Seven Years War.

4.In speaking of foreign officers in this context, 'foreign' means outside the established boundaries of the Prussian nation up until 1806, rather than men who were strictly Prussian by birth. For instance, Scharnhorst came from Hanover, Blücher from Mecklenburg, and Gneisenau was born a Saxon. Craig p.25

Foreign means not Prussian. They may have been from other countries in Germany, but they were still foreigners, and not native Prussians.

Again, where are Blucher and Gneisenau mentioned on page 25?

5.However, the notion of who could be considered a native "Prussian" changed substantially during the period 1756 to 1795. Prussia doubled in size. With the addition of Silesia and then over several decades the addition of large portions of Poland, who could be considered a citizen of Prussia expanded. Craig p.25

And…what? That is only common sense.

Again, however, this is not mentioned on page 25.

6.Another outcome of this manufactured shortage of officers was that a large number of nobles remained at their posts far longer than in most armies. Older officers in other European armies would often retain their rank and seniority, but not hold any positions of responsibility, particularly during peacetime. In Prussia, there was no one to replace them. By the time of Jena, of the more than 244 senior officers in the Prussian army, no less than half were over sixty-five, 166 were over sixty, and only 13 were under fifty. All Prussian infantry colonels were over sixty, and 12 more than seventy. In the cavalry, the situation was not much better. Of 44 regimental colonels, only six were under fifty. . Shannahan p. 29-30

Craig also addresses the issue of age on page 26 and states that age itself was not ‘reprehensible.' However, he also states that ‘age accompanied by inflexible conservatism may be dangerous, and it is in this sense that years militated against efficiency in the Prussian Army.' Further many of the senior officers ‘combined a veneration for Frederician methods with a stubborn reluctance to admit that the practices of warfare may change. They were almost completely blind, therefore, and certainly unresponsive, to innovations which were being introduced abroad.' And this was the unreasoning military conservatism that Scharnhorst faced from 1801-1806.

How was it ‘manufactured'? It was because of heavy losses in the Prussian officer corps from 1756-1763 (and it should also be noted that Frederick only won about half of his battles, and he was only saved from catastrophic defeat by the death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth).

7.Even 25 percent of battalion commanders were past the age of sixty. Craig p.26

See the answer to number 6.

8.Between 1763 and Frederick's death, one-third of the men reaching the rank of general in the Prussian Army were foreign-born. Paret p. 47n

And the statement that was footnoted on page 47 is:
‘National and regional loyalties could still accommodate themselves without undue strain to the high degree of professional mobility. A more elusive, self-assertive nationalism was gradually encroaching on this freedom, most seriously in Great Britain, without even there erecting insuperable barriers to the movement from service to service. On the Continent, especially west of the Rhine, obstacles to a change of allegiance had little real force.'
Why didn't you speak of this in your comments?

9.Comparatively, the British had the same size army in 1806. Yet the British Army had more than twice the number of general officers, 425, 126 lieutenant generals alone, and only 160 of the total were sixty or older. Osprey "Wellington's Generals", p.6

And the point of this is…?

And using an Osprey may or may not be an acceptable source as too many Ospreys are not well-researched. And this one, by Michael Barthorp, was published in 1990. Are you not concerned about its age? You certainly were about the references I used and mentioned that twice.

10.At the end of the Seven Years War, native Prussians outnumbered foreigners in the army by more than two to one if only because most of the foreign recruiting areas were contested during the war. Frederick set out to deliberately reverse this ratio. By 1804, foreign mercenaries comprised nearly fifty percent of the army at full strength. [5:23] Only the loss of recruiting areas in Germany to the French after 1800 and reform efforts to increase the number of native Prussians in the army helped reduce this to forty percent by October of 1806. This was a far different composition than found in Frederick the Great's army of during the Seven Years War.Shannahan p.23

There is nothing on page 23 regarding native Prussians and foreigners in the Prussian army. Page 23 covers light infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

11.Now, you must have read those items. You still insist that the Prussian Army of 1806 was 'essentially' Frederick the Great's army that gained fame during the SYW?

I did read the material, all of the material not the cherry-picked comments that you chose to support your opinions, which have been shown again to be wrong. You left out or ignored material that was not supportive, thus skewing the material and giving a completely different ‘perspective' of the issue. That was a misrepresentation of the material, and the Prussian army of 1806, than was given in the sources.

So, in short, your opinions are wrong and that has been clearly demonstrated once again.

"Once more, this is what I posted which you have apparently paid attention to the first sentence ignored the second:

All four (authors) emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late."

Further, according to Shanahan, 69-70, ‘The long period of peace in Prussia from 1795 to 1806 offered a great opportunity for military reform. Except for minor changes the Prussian military institutions dating from the time of Frederick the Great remained much the same. It is almost unbelievable that a state which owed almost all its fortune to the excellence of its army could watch with complacence the transformation of the French republican armies into a formidable military machine. This lethargy was almost entirely due to the timorous and procrastinating character of the monarchs.'

So the answer to your question regarding my point of view on the Prussian army of 1806 being essentially the same as Frederick the Great's army is an unequivocal "yes."

And nothing that you have posted refutes that idea. And that idea is not only supported by Shananhan as quoted above but by Col Elting, Gordon Craig, Charles White and Peter Paret.

Another helpful volume on the Prussian 'situation' is Clausewitz and the State: The Man, His Theories, and His Times by Peter Paret.

On page 125 Paret describes Clausewitz in combat under the command of Prince August, the latter's battalion being described as 'among the few in the army that had been trained to copy some of the French methods.' Clausewitz apparently took one-third of the battalion to act as skirmishers in both attack and defense and as Prince August had taken command of four Prussian grenadier battalions, Clausewitz assumed command of his own battalion and performed efficiently.

Clausewitz actual combat experience in command of an infantry battalion clearly demonstrates his competence and that gives him the advantage over his later 'intellectual rival' Jomini, who never led troops in combat and was a staff officer only, and not a very good one to all accounts.

On page 123 Paret also recounts some of Clausewitz's comments on the Catastrophe of 1806, including 'his strictures on the army's antiquated and inefficient organization, administration, equipment, and tactics.' And he also states Clausewitz's position on the ''intellectual poverty' and moral cowardice ' of the Prussian leadership.

The Prussians did indeed have standard practices, in place longer than 1804 which is when the French established their voltigeur companies. Before then, there wasn't a standard set of methods other than their specialist Leger regiments.

The French developed their skirmishing practices long before the voltigeur companies were formed in both the legere and ligne infantry regiments (March 1804 for the former and September 1805 for the latter).

Some infantry regiments had already formed light infantry companies before those dates (between 1796 and 1801), according to Teste, Thiebault, and Coignet. They were called eclaireurs (scouts). In 1796 an eclaireur was recorded capturing an Austrian color at the battle of Dego in 1796. Napoleon formed 'temporary' elite companies, which were called eclaireurs, in 1800.

During the French army's reform period after their defeat in the Seven Years War, Minister of War St Germain, possible prompted by Marshal de Broglie's experiments and maneuvers in the field in Normandy, ordered each infantry regiments' 2d Battalion to form a company of chasseurs (light infantry) to replace the battalions' grenadier companies.

And the Royal Army also formed 12 battalions of chasseurs a pied (light infantry) which replaced the irregular Free Corps that had previously been formed and organized for each previous war to confront the Austrian and Prussian light troops that had taken the field since at least 1742.

The 12 chasseur battalions, named for the regions where they were recruited (Provence, Dauphine, Corse, Alpes, Vosges, Cantabre, Pyrenees, Bretagne, Cavennes, Gevaudan, Ardennes, and Roussillon) would later become the senior light infantry regiments.

The French venture into regular light infantry units came from the old Royal Army and was not influenced by any Prussian regular units. And they also predated the Prussian fusilier battalions. When the voltigeur companies were finally authorized in 1805 and 1806, the French light infantry traditions, operations, techniques, and tactics were already part of the army's practices.

And you can read the Prussian reaction to the French employment of light infantry in Charles White's The Enlightened Soldier, White makes it clear, using primary source material (Scharnhorst's writings and publications), that French light infantry practices were well advanced with the proof in the pudding being light infantry employment in 1806.

…they are all secondary sources where authors are making conclusions about practices before Jena. I've been relating what the Prussians did at the battle, regardless, most admitted to by those authors…

Perhaps you can actually show 'where authors are making conclusion about practices before Jena'?

Further, whether or not the references are secondary sources, they are referenced with primary source material with some of that being quoted in the text. And credible secondary sources, all of those I have referenced are, are both useful and valid source material to use in any discussion or book.

Oyi. Where to start.

Here is your evidence of your repeated errors:
John Elting is quite clear in his accurate assessment of the Prussian Army of 1806 in Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV, 488.

‘Considering the late 18th Century Prussian Armym that mysterious, wandering Welsh soldier of fortune, Henry Lloyd, who had served both in and against it, described it as made up chiefly of foreigners of all nations, manners, and religions. Frederick the Great had drilled and disciplined it into a ‘vast and regular machine', but-were Frederick removed-it probably would fall to pieces.'

Kevin:

Probably fall to pieces?? Wonderful generalizations. And is it "Frederick's Army" on the field after it falls apart? You can't have it both ways, say that the army went to pieces, but then insist it is still essentially ‘Frederick's Army' which took the field in 1806. What army is that?

You really should be clear. I have stated that there are three periods for the Prussian Army and they are three different armies in composition etc. You haven't provided anything to suggest otherwise, but have added to the reasons for that division.

There is Frederick's army up until 1763. Then he purposely went about changing a great deal about it afterwards. Then when he dies 1786, there are twenty years without him until Jena and Auerstadt where all sorts of mischief was done.

So, which army [1756-1763 OR 1764-1786?] is the template for ‘essential' Frederickian army and what made the army taking the field in 1806 essentially ‘the same?' Which is it, Kevin? The orgization, funding, command structure and ages of the commanders, the war ministry organization, recruiting and even recruiting pools were different for those different periods, not counting after Frederick died.

Give me an idea of what you [or Etling or whoever] think is ‘essentially' Frederick's army and we can compare it against the evidence.

I will try and address all your comments. Thank you for numbering your responses.

‘The Prussian Army that went confidently against Napoleon in 1806 was Frederick's army still in most regards-a framework of foreigners, enticed into its harsh service, filled up with part-trained native Prussian reservists. A few days of fighting shattered it.'

That wasn't ‘Frederick's Army during the SYW, a ‘framework of foreigners and part-trained native Prussian reservists. [There were no Prussian reservists in 1756 or 1763 or 1806 taking the field… He is using an loose analogy at best] So, you [and Etling] are talking about Frederick's army after 1763?

1. After the war, Frederick spent the rest of his life cleansing the officer corps of what he saw as objectionable, middle-class material. Craig Page 17

This is an example of how the Prussian Army was essentially the same as it was in Frederick's reign.

Not before 1763, it wasn't, so you are strictly speaking of Frederick's changes afterward.

Craig writes: Pag 25
"Frederick the Great's officer corps was killed off in the Seven Year's War. Frederick's rigid exclusion of bourgeois officers from the army after 1763 not only deprived the army of talented and experienced
Officers but imposed a military burden upon the native nobility which it could not bear alone."

So, before 1763 the bourgeois did have officers in the army in large numbers, experienced officers which he jettisoned. Not the army of the SYW.

And it was Frederick's goal.

Uh, yeah, as I brought that up

Frederick believed that a sense of honor could only be found in the nobility and not in other classes.'-Craig, 16.

As Craig states in the first half of page 16, the Junkers or nobility were to be protected because it was the sons of the nobility that defended the state. Frederick secured their loyalty. As Craig states, it was a partnership begun in 1653. Honor was something Frederick 'required of his nobility,' to quote Craig.

But again, supporting the Junkers was long-standing deal the Prussian kings made, purging the army of non-noble officers is quite different, something Frederick alone did after 1763 as part of shrinking the army and cutting expenses.

It should be noted that Craig did not mention the fusiliers, either in the text or in the footnotes. Where did you get that information? The fusilier battalions were not created until 1787, a year after Frederick's death (see Shanahan, 69), so how could Frederick assign his non-noble officers to the fusilier battalions?
Shanahan, not Craig, mentions the lower prestige of the fusilier battalion on page 29.

Well, first, there were Fusiliers in the army before 1787. Get to know the army, Kevin. You are right, Craig said "subsidiary branches of the service" and footnotes Jany. I looked up the reference to find out what ‘subsidiary branches' consisted of. They included the Fusiliers.

2.The general lack of learning among noble junior officers became so obvious that by the mid-1790s that Major von Rüchel instituted a major reform of the cadet schools and the Army established four higher military academies--including the artillery school. Craig p.26

And further on the same page Craig notes that the graduates of the four higher military academies ‘were few in number, and constituted an inadequate leaven in an officer corps which, in the ranks below major at least, was characterized by abysmal and arrogant ignorance.
Why did you leave this out? This tends to reinforce the idea that the Prussian officer corps was not in favor of further education.

"Tends to?" Really? That the military academies were ‘inadequate' speaks to what? That fact that they instituted them at all is quite different than Frederick's time. HE was the only instructor and wrote the only instructions. And that inadequacy was recognized and one reason Sharnhorst was recruited and given charge of ALL those school. You know, by those ultra-conservative, Frederick-loving Prussian generals.

This would not even be attempted to be addressed until after 1801 when Scharnhorst entered the Prussian service. And no notable improvements would take effect until after the old Prussian army was destroyed at Jena and Auerstadt and the actual Reform Period would begin because of that ‘catastrophe.'

No notable improvements? Really. Conclusion statement. What constitutes "notable"? Evidence, or at least a definition of 'notable.'

Further, on page 25 Craig notes that ‘the education tone of the Prussian Army had been set by Frederick William I and the ‘Old Dessauer': ‘A general was not regarded as uneducated, even though he could barely write his own name. Whoever could do more was styled a pedant, inksplasher, and scribbler.'

Yes, that was a common belief among nobility to some extent in all nations including Britain. [Gentlemen never worked for a living]

The question for you is whether that describes the officers under Frederick's command during the SYW, or only after Frederick turned his attention to rebuilding Prussia, letting the army deteriorate.

Craig says on page 22,
"The decline of the army which had won such signal triumphs in the Seven Years War can be traced back to Frederick the Great…and even Tritschke, one of his greatest admirers, is forced to admit that Frederick left the army ‘in worse condition than that in which he had found it on ascending the Throne.'"

Not the same army.

3.As a result of this lack and the lack of enough nobles, foreign nobles gained commissions in large numbers. Although many capable officers came to the Prussian service this way, including Scharnhorst, Blücher, and Gneisenau, many 'adventurers of dubious character', to use Treischke's phrase, entered as well. page25

Craig mentions Scharnhorst, but not Blucher nor Gneisenau. That being the case, why did you add them to your list? Do you know when Blucher and Gneisenau entered the Prussian service?

Blucher? Way before Scharnhorst and Gneisnau was in and out and in again, again before Scharnhorst. They were all foreigners.

Here, what is your point?

Craig notes on 24-25 that ‘the flower of Frederick the Great's officer corps was killed off in the Seven Years War' and his prejudice against bourgeois officers ‘deprived the army of talented and experienced officers.

So it was Frederick's practice that allowed foreigners with ‘noble patents' to enter the army to make up the heavy losses suffered in the Seven Years War.

So he jettisoned experienced and talented boureois officers who were IN THE ARMY before his changes. Not the same army afterwards. That's the point.

4.In speaking of foreign officers in this context, 'foreign' means outside the established boundaries of the Prussian nation up until 1806, rather than men who were strictly Prussian by birth. For instance, Scharnhorst came from Hanover, Blücher from Mecklenburg, and Gneisenau was born a Saxon. Craig p.25

Foreign means not Prussian. They may have been from other countries in Germany, but they were still foreigners, and not native Prussians.

Again, where are Blucher and Gneisenau mentioned on page 25?

Ya got me. Yes, I added them and their origins.

5.However, the notion of who could be considered a native "Prussian" changed substantially during the period 1756 to 1795. Prussia doubled in size. With the addition of Silesia and then over several decades the addition of large portions of Poland, who could be considered a citizen of Prussia expanded. Craig p.25

And…what? That is only common sense.

And it is common sense to see that the changes in the size of Prussia, the recruiting area AND system and the large number of ‘new' recruits would change what constituted the army. Shannahan speaks to some of the issues on page 45.

Again, however, this is not mentioned on page 25.

This is true.That was my addition. I misplaced the page reference which then included that. Mea culpa

6.Another outcome of this manufactured shortage of officers was that a large number of nobles remained at their posts far longer than in most armies. Shannahan p. 29-30

Craig also addresses the issue of age on page 26 and states that age itself was not ‘reprehensible.'

Right. No, but see below to compare the ages of the SYW commanders to the 1806 commanders. In the field, age makes a difference.

However, he also states that ‘age accompanied by inflexible conservatism may be dangerous, and it is in this sense that years militated against efficiency in the Prussian Army.' Further many of the senior officers ‘combined a veneration for Frederician methods with a stubborn reluctance to admit that the practices of warfare may change. They were almost completely blind, therefore, and certainly unresponsive, to innovations which were being introduced abroad.' And this was the unreasoning military conservatism that Scharnhorst faced from 1801-1806.

Here is a great example of a sweeping generalization with such words as 'blind,' 'veneration' and 'unresponsive' to innovations that does not hold up to scrutiny. Evidence is not provided to support those incisive adjectives.

How was it ‘manufactured'? It was because of heavy losses in the Prussian officer corps from 1756-1763 (and it should also be noted that Frederick only won about half of his battles, and he was only saved from catastrophic defeat by the death of the Russian Empress Elizabeth).

It was manufactured because he purposely jettisoned all those middle class talented and experienced officers. And how many battles or lost isn't the issue here.

7.Even 25 percent of battalion commanders were past the age of sixty. Craig p.26
See the answer to number 6.

Ditto.

8. Between 1763 and Frederick's death, one-third of the men reaching the rank of general in the Prussian Army were foreign-born. Paret p. 47n

And the statement that was footnoted on page 47 is:
‘National and regional loyalties could still accommodate themselves without undue strain to the high degree of professional mobility. A more elusive, self-assertive nationalism was gradually encroaching on this freedom, most seriously in Great Britain, without even there erecting insuperable barriers to the movement from service to service. On the Continent, especially west of the Rhine, obstacles to a change of allegiance had little real force.'
Why didn't you speak of this in your comments?

Because that explains why it could occur as it did in all armies, but not to the extent of 1/3 of all generals… not in any army of the time and certainly not in the 1756-1763 Prussian army.

9.Comparatively, the British had the same size army in 1806. Yet the British Army had more than twice the number of general officers, 425, 126 lieutenant generals alone, and only 160 of the total were sixty or older. Osprey "Wellington's Generals", p.6

And the point of this is…?

Well, you see Kevin, it's called comparisons. You do it when you want to highlight how different the age of Prussian generals were to other armies of comparable size, British generals in this case. Historians do it some times.

For instance, here are the ages of the commanding generals and Marshals of the Prussian Army at Rossbach:

At Rossbach 1757

Commander and Chief Frederick II age 45

Right Wing Cavalry Seydlitz age 35

Infantry Commander Center Prince Heinrich age 31
[Friedrich Heinrich Ludwig]

Infantry Right Wing Ferdinand of Brunswick age 36

1st Line infantry Moritz, Pr. von Anhalt-Dessau age 45

2nd Line Infantry Von Forcade age 58

Left Wing Heinrich Prince von Preussen age 31

The oldest Brigade commander was Major-General von Itzenplitz age 64

That is a quite different organization and age range from the army that took the field in 1806. Comparisons.

And using an Osprey may or may not be an acceptable source as too many Ospreys are not well-researched. And this one, by Michael Barthorp, was published in 1990. Are you not concerned about its age? You certainly were about the references I used and mentioned that twice.

Fifty or sixy years ago is three times the decades from 1990 to the present. But I was staying with your authors to keep it at least a little corralled. Is there a problem with the information?

10. At the end of the Seven Years War, native Prussians outnumbered foreigners in the army by more than two to one if only because most of the foreign recruiting areas were contested during the war. Frederick set out to deliberately reverse this ratio. By 1804, foreign mercenaries comprised nearly fifty percent of the army at full strength. [5:23] Only the loss of recruiting areas in Germany

increase the number of native Prussians in the army helped reduce this to forty percent by October of 1806. This was a far different composition than found in Frederick the Great's army of during the Seven Years War.Shannahan p.23

There is nothing on page 23 regarding native Prussians and foreigners in the Prussian army. Page 23 covers light infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

Sorry. A mistake in going back and applying sources. That is Craig 23.

11.Now, you must have read those items. You still insist that the Prussian Army of 1806 was 'essentially' Frederick the Great's army that gained fame during the SYW?

All four (authors) emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army.

I do not find those authors supporting that supposition and giving a lot of evidence to the contrary.

So, Kevin, which period of time are you taking about here:

1. The army from when Frederick took command in 1740 to 1763
OR
2. The army that Frederick changed the composition and funding for from 1764-1786.

Or are you trying to say that each was ‘essentially' the same army all the way through that period?
Here are some context for you: How are those ‘essentially' the same from 1740 to 1806 or even 1740 to the death of Frederick.

1. Organization/OOB
2. Recruiting
3. Tactics
4. Command structure
5. Training
6. Government agencies, support and funding
7. Commanders

Those authors say it as generalizations, but the specifics of what constitutes ‘essentially' are missing in their own works.

You haven't proven your opinions and you made too many errors in your original posting that I pointed out to you. In short, your research and citations were shoddy-they were either errors or were not complete in that you left out critical material which I pointed out to you.

You made this comment earlier in the thread:

From 6 August at 0809:

Kevin: You don't seem to know that much about the Prussians and their 'standard practices', certainly less than the French practices. The Prussians did indeed have standard practices, in place longer than 1804 which is when the French established their voltigeur companies. Before then, there wasn't a standard set of methods other than their specialist Leger regiments.

From your own postings it is clearly demonstrated that 'You don't seem to know that much about the Prussians and their 'standard practices.'

I have posted quotations that prove my point that the Prussian Army in 1806 was essentially that of Frederick the Great. All you seem to have done is present semantics in place of research, sources, and credible reference remarks.

I also addressed your remarks point by point using the pages you referenced in Craig, Shanahan, and Paret. Your points were either muddled or incorrect and nothing you have written is either clear, concise, correct, or on point. In short, it's long and talkative, but makes nothing clear either logically or by using sources. What you have done is muddy the waters, so to speak, and this is not historical inquiry or the proper way to use source material.

I have posted quotations that prove my point that the Prussian Army in 1806 was essentially that of Frederick the Great. All you seem to have done is present semantics in place of research, sources, and credible reference remarks.

Kevin:

I'm sorry, did the numbers, dates, comparisons and such from Craig and Shannahan make no impression?

All you have to do is give me the specific reasons that the 1806 army is 'essentially' the same as Frederick's army--of any date. I've given you the points of reference:

1. Organization/OOB
2. Recruiting
3. Tactics
4. Command structure
5. Training
6. Government agencies, support and funding
7. Commanders

How are those 'essentially' the same in 1806 as Frederick's army, either 1763 or 1786? Craig and Shannahan have provided reasons to doubt that… It might help to provide what you think are the essentials of Frederick's army.

Can you do that without simply quoting authors laying out sweeping generalizations the they were 'essentially the same'…without specifics?

I think the old Frederickian army going into battle in 1806 is kind of like Oman's column and line conclusion. Historians simply picked it up and repeated without really looking at the evidence. It was a simple answer, just not supportable.

You did not use the sources you cited properly and if not accurate, they were incomplete which skewed the material.

I posted the material that clearly showed that the Prussian Army of 1806 was essentially the same as that of Frederick's time.

Apparently you are choosing to ignore the information or you are skewing the information to conform to what you want it to say instead of what it actually says.

At best that is obfuscation; at worst it is misrepresenting the information in the reference material.

John Elting, Gordon Craig, Peter Paret and William Shanahan are all in agreement as to the composition and motivation of the Prussian Army of 1806. It was indeed essentially the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great.

From Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, page 22:

'The Prussian army was soundly beaten in 1806, and the factors which were mainly contributory to its defeat in the field were defects of organization, training, and leadership which had been apparent since 1763.'

'Despite some professional criticism of the operation of the canton system, Frederick's principles were maintained by his successors.'-23.

From Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan, 61:

'Neither of the successors of Frederick the Great was inclined to make radical alterations in the government or the armed forces.'

'The long period of peace in Prussia from 1795 to 1806 offered a great opportunity for military reform. Except for a few minor changes the Prussian military institutions dating from the time of Frederick the Great remained much the same. It is almost unbelievable that a state which owed almost all of its fortune to the excellence of its army could watch with complacence the transformation of the French republican armies into a formidable military machine. This lethargy was almost entirely due to the timorous and procrastinating character of the monarchs.'-69.

On page 123 of Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret:

Paret also recounts some of Clausewitz's comments on the Catastrophe of 1806, including 'his strictures on the army's antiquated and inefficient organization, administration, equipment, and tactics.' And he also states Clausewitz's position on the ''intellectual poverty' and moral cowardice 'of the Prussian leadership.

John Elting is quite clear in his accurate assessment of the Prussian Army of 1806 in Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV, 488.

‘Considering the late 18th Century Prussian Army that mysterious, wandering Welsh soldier of fortune, Henry Lloyd, who had served both in and against it, described it as made up chiefly of foreigners of all nations, manners, and religions. Frederick the Great had drilled and disciplined it into a ‘vast and regular machine', but-were Frederick removed-it probably would fall to pieces.'

‘The Prussian Army that went confidently against Napoleon in 1806 was Frederick's army still in most regards-a framework of foreigners, enticed into its harsh service, filled up with part-trained native Prussian reservists. A few days of fighting shattered it.'

And if you would like to review an excellent work on the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great, I recommend Christopher Duffy's work on the subject, The Army of Frederick the Great (Second Edition).

'It would be misleading to talk of the failure of the old Prussian military system in 1806-07 in terms of a contrast with the achievements of Frederick at his prime, for the two things were so closely connected. The Prussians would not have been so soundly beaten by the French at Jena-Auerstadt if they had not already routed them at Rossbach in 1757. What had been so sagely conservative in the 1740s and 1750s, one hundred years after the Great Elector, became stagnation half a century later.'-327.

John Elting, Gordon Craig, Peter Paret and William Shanahan are all in agreement as to the composition and motivation of the Prussian Army of 1806. It was indeed essentially the Prussian Army of Frederick the Great.

Kevin:

I can tell when you refuse to respond to my questions, because you repost the same quotes again. You aren't listening to or looking for the details and cherry-picking yourself--all generalizations without substance:

From Gordon Craig, The Politics of the Prussian Army 1640-1945, page 22:
'The Prussian army was soundly beaten in 1806, and the factors which were mainly contributory to its defeat in the field were defects of organization, training, and leadership which had been apparent since 1763.'

The NEXT paragraph explains the source of those defects:
Page 22

The decline of the army which had won such signal triumphs in the Seven Years War can be traced back to Frederick the Great himself; and even Treitschke, one of his greatest admirers is forced to admit that Frederick lef the army ‘in a worse condition than that in which he had found it on ascending the throne.' There can be little doubt, for instance, down the canton system to a dangerous degree… Whereas in the army of Frederick William I natives had outnumbered the foreigners by two to one, Frederick set out deliberately to reverse that number.

The paragraph you quoted gives the date 1763, after the end of the SYW as when Frederick started that ‘watering down.' We will come back to that.

'Despite some professional criticism of the operation of the canton system, Frederick's principles were maintained by his successors.'-23.

Again, cherry-picking that doesn't explain anything. This is what Shannahan says on page 25 under "Military Administration.'

The Prussian army had a decentraalized and even chaotic administration. Frederick the Great had directed the army in person, but neither Frederick William II nor his successor, athough they were both intereseted in the more spectacular aspects of the army, had any taste for the actual routine of military administration. Their indifference for work of this character had resulted in the creation of a number of officers which were without order or plan in their division of business. The lack of intergration reflected the absolute monarch's practice of crating administrative organs from time to tiem and fitting them haphazardly into the framework of government. And by 1806, offices which had only a cursory significance under Frederick the Great, had become under his successors, centers of independent authority.

An example of this is given on page 28, second paragraph, put just one of many.

Although there was a department of supply in the High Council of War, food and munitions for the army in the field were gathered and stored by three War Magazine Administrations, which were not only independent of the central authorities but had their own treasuries.

From Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan, 61:

'Neither of the successors of Frederick the Great was inclined to make radical alterations in the government or the armed forces.'

Who didn't want to make ‘radical altercations? Your quote states who:

'The long period of peace in Prussia from 1795 to 1806 offered a great opportunity for military reform. Except for a few minor changes the Prussian military institutions dating from the time of Frederick the Great remained much the same. It is almost unbelievable that a state which owed almost all of its fortune to the excellence of its army could watch with complacence the transformation of the French republican armies into a formidable military machine. This lethargy was almost entirely due to the timorous and procrastinating character of the monarchs. '-69.

What, not the conservative military men? And what constitutes ‘minor' changes if new bueauacracies sprung up and each became independent authorites. THAT is a radical change from Frederick the Great's army. Lots of changes, a consequence of that ‘lethargy.'

On page 123 of Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret:

Paret also recounts some of Clausewitz's comments on the Catastrophe of 1806, including 'his strictures on the army's antiquated and inefficient organization, administration, equipment, and tactics.' And he also states Clausewitz's position on the ''intellectual poverty' and moral cowardice 'of the Prussian leadership.

According to Shannahan, that Prussian leadership was ‘almost entirely due' to the monarchs.

John Elting is quite clear in his accurate assessment of the Prussian Army of 1806 in Napoleonic Uniforms, Volume IV, 488.
‘Considering the late 18th Century Prussian Army that mysterious, wandering Welsh soldier of fortune, Henry Lloyd, who had served both in and against it, described it as made up chiefly of foreigners of all nations, manners, and religions. Frederick the Great had drilled and disciplined it into a ‘vast and regular machine', but-were Frederick removed-it probably would fall to pieces.'

Probably?? Again, Shannahan and Craig say it did ‘fall apart.'
So, is it Essentially "Frederickian" if it has fallen to pieces?

Elting again: ‘The Prussian Army that went confidently against Napoleon in 1806 was Frederick's army still in most regards-a framework of foreigners, enticed into its harsh service, filled up with part-trained native Prussian reservists. A few days of fighting shattered it.'

That simply isn't true. Period. The ‘framework of the 1806 was not ‘in most regards' Frederick's army, either before 1763 or after until Frederick's death.

The composition was different, the recruitment by cantons was different, the training was different [and lacked any ‘Frederickian' uniformity], the administration was balkanized, as were tactics.

I recommend Christopher Duffy's work on the subject, The Army of Frederick the Great (Second Edition).

'It would be misleading to talk of the failure of the old Prussian military system in 1806-07 in terms of a contrast with the achievements of Frederick at his prime, for the two things were so closely connected. The Prussians would not have been so soundly beaten by the French at Jena-Auerstadt if they had not already routed them at Rossbach in 1757.

What had been so sagely conservative in the 1740s and 1750s, one hundred years after the Great Elector, became stagnation half a century later.'-327.

I love these sweeping generalizations you continually through out, apparently accepting them without any analysis or specifics because they are made by other historians/authors you accept as authorities. Duffy says they are closely connected, but never explains how… mostly because it is outside the focus of his book on Frederick the Great's Army.

There were continual efforts to reform the military, ALL proposed by military commissions made up of all those conservative, staid, weak-minded military men. For instances, on page 46, Shannahan in speaking of the Canton Law of 1792…, he starts the section by saying
"Despite the sincere efforts of the commission, the canton regulations adopted on Freruary 12, 1792 bore the same stamp as their predecessors." The problem wasn't the commission, but the beaucratic maze such laws had to jump through to be passed… and the lack of money available which each governmental department was loath to spend on changes… [Frederick William spent the large treasury he inherited down to nothing on music and women.]

There were proposed changes to the canton system recommended by the military in 1795, 1798 and 1804. Hardly the acts of Military Frederickian worshipers who refuse to change with the times.

That touches on the differences between what was essentially a Frederickian army and the one which took the field in 1806, an entire generation later.

Again, what are the ‘essential' aspects of the Frederickian army that lasted from 1740 to 1806? Specifics. Please, no more sweeping generalizations without substance or reference.

@McLaddie,

Where do you think the idea that Frederick the Great's and Frederick William III's armies were pretty much the same? Does it come from von der Goltz' Rossbach und Jena (I can't read German and I have never seen an English translation)? It looks to me as if it came from him into Petre and Maude and was then repeated by the Anglophone writers of the mid C20.

Where do you think the idea that Frederick the Great's and Frederick William III's armies were pretty much the same? It looks to me as if it came from him into Petre and Maude and was then repeated by the Anglophone writers of the mid C20.

Whirlwind:

And Decker. Historians often relied on each other for conclusions, such as Oman's Column vs Line paradigm being continually repeated without question for decades. Like other arena's, [such as wargaming], there can be an echo-chamber effect of group-think that effects the work of the best of historians from time to time. It becomes conventional wisdom because 'someone' already 'proved' it.

Bagration1812:

Thank you for that. I know the routine. Once he starts reposting the same quotes, the "discussion" is over. I have no hope of ever changing his mind or even actually getting into a real discussion of specifics behind his many global generalizations, but it is good practice and if others find it interesting, then it is worth it.

And, regardless of the historical topic, I already know Kevin's opinions. Rather comforting, really.

10 Aug 2019 2:18 p.m. PST

And how much have you taken out of context or cherry picked (to use a favorite phrase used on this forum) to 'prove' your opinions?

12 Aug 2019 4:18 p.m. PST

Apparently you are choosing to ignore the information or you are skewing the information to conform to what you want it to say instead of what it actually says.

At best that is obfuscation; at worst it is misrepresenting the information in the reference material.

For some reason these observations resonated with me especially.

With all the wailing and gnashing of teeth over my previously posted opinion on the connection between Frederick the Great's Army and the state of the Prussian army of 1806, nothing has been posted that negates that opinion, which was based on research in the aforementioned source material.

The 'offending' quotation is:

All four (authors) emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late."

Nothing that has been submitted and posted to contradict this quotation negated or changed the opinion expressed. And I submit that enough evidence has been submitted to support that idea.

Curt Jany's work has been referred to but nothing quoted from it to negate the idea either. On the contrary, the four books and their historian authors are quite succinct in their supported opinions, the overwhelming majority of their sources being German sources, including Jany.

The idea that the source material that I referenced were 'old' and therefore not relevant any longer. Jany's work is even older (written in the 1920s if I recall correctly). And if any sourcing from Jany is available to support your opinions, then please use a citation as I can reference it in my copies of Jany's Volumes III and IV.

A more recent work, published in Germany in 2011 is Volume I of The Uniforms of the Prussian Army under Frederick the Great from 1740-1786 by Daniel Hohrath. He is a German military historian and was the Chief of Collections in the Military Artefacts Section of the Deutsches Historisches Museum in Berlin from 2006-2011 and beginning in 2011 is the staff conservator at the Bayerisches Armeemuseum in Ingolstadt, Bavaria.

He writes on page 25 '…Frederick William III (1770-1840) came to the throne in 1797; unlike his father he leaned more towards some of Frederick's traditions, yet he cannot be considered a traditionalist. Nonetheless, at its core, the army remained-in its self-image and the image it projected to the rest of the world-the army of Frederick the Great.'

Lastly,

Again, what are the ‘essential' aspects of the Frederickian army that lasted from 1740 to 1806? Specifics. Please, no more sweeping generalizations without substance or reference.

Those with references have been given to you. If you choose to ignore them and engage in nothing more than senseless argument, personal comments and condescension, that is up to you.

The bottom line is that you are wrong and have not given any evidence or source material that negates the initial idea and quotation.

Quod Erat Demonstrandum

Where do you think the idea that Frederick the Great's and Frederick William III's armies were pretty much the same? Does it come from von der Goltz' Rossbach und Jena (I can't read German and I have never seen an English translation)? It looks to me as if it came from him into Petre and Maude and was then repeated by the Anglophone writers of the mid C20.

Where did you come up with this nonsense? Have you actually read the sources referenced in the thread, or at least taken a look at the bibliographies of the books?

The authors conducted in-depth research and came up with their own opinions. Neither Maude nor Petre were main sources of information as the footnotes will show if you take a look at them.

Perhaps the following short table will help you:

The following sources on the Prussian Army used the source material listed:

1.Von Rossbach bis Jena und Auerstadt by Colmar von der Goltz:
-Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan (published 1966).
-The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White (published 1989).
-Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret (published 1966).
-Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret (published 1976).

2.Rossbach und Jena: eine kriegsgeschichtliche Studie by Comar von der Goltz:
-The Politics of the Prussian Army by Gordon Craig (published 1956).

3.Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807 by Oskar von Lettow-Vorbeck:
-The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White.
-The Politics of the Prussian Army by Gordon Craig.
-Clausewitz and the State by Peter Paret.
-Yorck and the Era of Prussian Reform by Peter Paret

4.Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia by F Lorraine Petre:
-Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan.

5.The Jena Campaign 1806 by FN Maude:
-The Politics of the Prussian Army by Gordon Craig.
-Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan.

-It should also be noted that Craig used Shanahan as a reference and that work is footnoted several times.

-Shanahan referenced Petre's Jena volume once in a footnote:
From page 90, note number 2:

‘The best accounts of the battle of Jena are in Oscar Lettow-Vorbeck, Der Krieg von 1806 und 1807 (Berlin, 1892-1899, 4 v.); and P. Foucart, Campagne de Prusse 1806 (Paris, 1890). In English both FL Petre, Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia-1806 (London 1907), and FN Maude, 1806, The Jena Campaign (London 1909), can be recommended.'

In A Miltiary History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, Vincent Esposito and John Elting give the following notation regarding Petre's and Maude's works on 1806 in the Recommended Reading List:

The Jena Campaign 1806:
‘Maude was a staunch champion of the Prussian army, though his advocacy of it was based in large part on incomplete knowledge of its actual organization and functioning. As usual, however, he raises interesting speculations on the art of war in general. Contains a detailed order of battle of the Prussian army before Jena.'

Napoleon's Conquest of Prussia 1806:
‘Petre produced some of the better English-language books on the Napoleonic campaigns. Making ‘some conscience' of his work, he did much original research. Unfortunately, he did not fully understand the organization and tactics of the period. Also, he was an Englishman of the old school-Napoleon was a bloody tyrant, and that was that. Finally, he was inclined to exaggerate casualties-especially French casualties. He must be highly commended, however, for his unwillingness to accept the usual authorities at face value, and for his attempt to strike a balance between various accounts.'

The overwhelming number of sources in all of the sources listed used German source material. At least three of them, Shanahan, White, and Craig, used German archival material. Jany's work was used by all of them as a source, one of many.

Now the inevitable note about how your/my bona fides v. Elting, Duffy and Paret et al., don't compare and they are gentlemen and I/we are not…and therefore not to be believed.

This posting is both insulting and of no consequence or germane to the discussion.

The personal comments, condescension, and general disingeuousness of the posting is noted. And it says more about you than about anything else.

Regarding Prussian reforms between Frederick's death in 1786 and 1806, any that were done were few and far between and they were blocked or hindered by senior Prussian general officers such as Ruchel and the Duke of Brunswick.

Some progressive-minded officers, headed by Scharnhorst as of 1808, did push for reform and understood that a new era of warfare had developed because of France. 'Yet if timely reform was necessary to maintain Prussia's military capability and thus her external security, precipitate change could endanger it.' (Brendan Simms, The Impact of Napoleon, 127). Further, Clausewitz noted that 'it would have been very risky to have provoked a great discontent through far-reaching changes, which might not be allayed in time, and which could be dangerous in a time when one needed the support of all estates and classes of the people.' (as stated in Simms, Impact, 127 taken from Clausewitz, Politische Schriften und Briefe, 216-217).

Charles White in his Introduction to his book on Scharnhorst covering the period 1801-1805, succinctly sums up what happened to the Prussian Army at Jena and Auerstadt on 14 October 1806:

'Disaster at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806 shook the foundations of Prussian military theory and practice, furnishing an impetus for analysis and reform. Never before had any first-class army been so swiftly and decisively reduced to impotence…Some of the crucial defects in military leadership might have been surmounted had the Prussian army possessed a unified command structure and a sound tactical doctrine. But it did not. Furthermore, complacency and senility had led to a refusal to consider the new conditions of citizen armies, while overconfidence had resulted in a complete miscalculation of Napoleon as a general who represented the will of the people. So Prussia, clinging to the great traditions of the Frederician past, marched to war in 1806 engulfed in a conceit of invincibility. The true extent of the mental deterioration that had afflicted leaders, who believed that an unthinking Spartan obedience was the key to success, was never fully recognized until that October afternoon at Jena and Auerstadt. There, the veteran French army, imbued with the deadly national enthusiasm that comes from opening careers to talent, annihilated the Prussian army and left little doubt that a drastic overhauling of the robot-like Prussian war machine was necessary.'-xi.

Scharnhorst and like-minded junior officers repeatedly attempted reform initiatives, but older senior officers continually stifled their attempts.

Scharnhorst himself remarked at the beginning of the 1806 campaign: 'What ought to be done I know only too well, what is going to be done, only the gods know.'-cited by White in The Enlightened Soldier as found in Scharnhorsts Briefe from a letter written by Scharnhorst, 283.

One of the problems with your response is that you have provided no 'new' material with which to discuss the subject. Do you have any to hand with which we can discuss the matter?

The other problem is that your posting is nothing more than an ad hominem attack which in itself is a historical fallacy. That being the case, then the premise of your two postings is wrong.

Have you read the source material that I listed?

Further, perhaps you could recommend material, other than Ospreys, that have been published after 1979? I for one would be most interested in your list.

And if you disagree with the material I posted, find something from a credible source that negates it. If you cannot or will not, then the point is moot.

Bagration I think it's called Intellectual Vanity

@Chad – haha! All too true. There can be no ‘discussion' with Kevin.

"your posting is nothing more than an ad hominem attack which in itself is a historical fallacy."

The bottom line is that whether that statement actually means anything is moot.

I don't see the problem with old sources, especially in areas where there has been no substantive new research or, as in the case of Germany, where a great deal of information was destroyed in WW2. For example, little has been produced to better Sichart or Ditfurth, writing in the 19th Century. Many more modern works simply repeat old well-established myths, sometimes losing the sense and context of the originals.

Having said that, the internet has opened up access to all sorts of material that was simply not available 40-50 years ago, and the various German archives contain a mass of information for further research.

With all the wailing and gnashing of teeth over my previously posted opinion on the connection between Frederick the Great's Army and the state of the Prussian army of 1806, nothing has been posted that negates that opinion, which was based on research in the aforementioned source material.

The 'offending' quotation is:

"All four (authors) emphasize the fact that the Prussian Army that took the field against the Grande Armee in 1806 was essentially Frederick the Great's army. There had been some reform done, guided by Scharnhorst, but those reforms were too little, too late."

Kevin:

Your conclusion above isn't 'offensive', rather it is at once wrong [All four authors don't say that. Certainly not Shannahan or White] and still unproven.

I simply asked WHERE the army in 1806 was 'essentially' the army of Frederick the Great. That's it. I made it easy by listing the areas where Frederick's government and army would have to be the same in some 'essential' way for that statement to be true. All you've done is continually repeat statements that don't address those areas at all.

Regarding Prussian reforms between Frederick's death in 1786 and 1806, any that were done were few and far between and they were blocked or hindered by senior Prussian general officers such as Ruchel and the Duke of Brunswick.

Really? That is again a sweeping generalization. Let's look at that.

White, in his book The Enlightened Soldier writes on page 28 about Scharnhorst's very first recommendation to 'reform' the Prussian army during his application process.

White writes:
<q."The critical nature of Scharnhorst's memorandum was deceptive. He truly believed in the soundness of Frederick the Great's methods and wanted only to improve them."

His recommendations? 1. reorganize the army into corps or
divisions of all arms; 2. Training the 3rd rank of line infantry to fight as skirmishers; 3. strengthen the artillery and integrating it with the infantry and cavalry.

First, the organization into divisions had already been proposed, but was hampered by the individualist nature of each Inspectorate, some leaning toward such a reorganization [and establishing it within the inspectorate as an administrative form]
However, according to White, p.108,

Despite thises inital setbacks, Scharnhorst and Massenback continued their modernization efforts as members of the Militarische Gesellschaft. They were joined by Ruchel, Lecoq, Phull and Stein [a Prussian minister]. Significantly, this association was not new.

[but had begun in 1795]

So, is Ruchel really the hinderance you say he is? It is the same Ruchel who established Military Schools in 1795.

The suggestion to train the third rank as skirmishers is also rather insulting. The Duke of Brunswick wrote instructions for using the 3rd rank as skirmishers in 1791, which was used in the 1792-95 battles. The third rank was regularly deployed as skirmishers during that time. Scharnhorst even uses that as an argument for the practice… These are the same instructions used in the Reforms after 1807 for all infantry. So, Brunswick was a conservative hindrance to reform?

Scharnhorst's suggestion to upgrade the artillery and integrate it into the infantry and cavalry was not only something that NONE of the other Continental armies were doing at the time, the French hadn't either in 1800 to the degree that Scharnhorst suggested.

As with all army's, Prussia's was conservative, and Scharnhorst's first recommendations were seen as 1. insulting, like a junior officer suggesting his superior do something they had been doing for a long time or do something that no other army had contemplated.

And yet, these same conservative military men agreed to induct Scharnhorst into the army and give him charge of officer training schools, as well as induct him into the Junker class.

Your conclusion statement isn't offensive, it just doesn't hold up to scrutiny.

I don't see the problem with old sources, especially in areas where there has been no substantive new research or, as in the case of Germany, where a great deal of information was destroyed in WW2.

Paul Demet:

Old sources, as well as those Kevin has listed, are just fine and to be used the same way as any source: Tested.

My problems with the authors that Kevin has listed are:

1. The authors didn't have the internet. They had to have in hand any sources they used, either by purchase, library exchange or going to the sources, such as Shannahan going to Germany for research. Because of that, one shortcut was to quote other authors or lift quotes from those who did have access to sources, often for divergent purposes.

That practice could lead to a repetition of conclusions and quotes taken out of context, even among the best historians.

It isn't so prevalent if a German author such as Jany or Goltz wrote about German history, as much as an English author writing about German history. Because of that tendency, their conclusions have to be tested, like any historian's. Jeremy Black's book, Rethinking Military History discusses this issue at length in Chapter 2.

2. Because of this completely understandable practice among English-speaking authors, an echo-chamber effect could result, with lots of authors saying the same thing. This is particularly true of English authors writing about foreign histories between 1945 and the advent of the internet. With so many voices, a statement repeated by so many authors could be accepted as 'the truth' without question. We see that in Oman's Column vs Line argument for the Peninsular War even though Oman later reascended that conclusion. It is still repeated today.

The same is true of a quote by Radetzky in 1813 that the troops don't 'understand skirmishing.' A statement in a memorandum about the Army forming on the Austrian borders which was filled with recruits. He then recommends bringing in more experienced soldiers for the task. This quote has been used to prove that the Austrians didn't understand skirmishing from 1792 to 1815.

With the internet and google, anyone can look up or have a huge source of materials, some earlier authors could only dream of. For instance, I have every single source of the 200 listed in Chandler's Campaigns of Napoleon on my computer in pdf. That doesn't make me a better historian, but certainly one with a huge advantage in access to the heart of historian's work.

3. The third problem is the one you see with Kevin' list. He claims that all those authors agree with his assessment about the nature of Prussia's army and government in 1806. Simply by listing them, it gives the idea there is credence to his claim. However, if you actually read the books, they don't same what he claims: That the Prussian Army of 1806 is 'essentially the same' as Frederick the Great's [at some as yet undetermined point]

I just got done reading Andrew Limm's first book, Walcheren to Waterloo He has 20 pages of references in his bibliography. An impressive list, but actually looking at the books, it is obvious that 1. he did not use the information in many because he contradicts them without reference and 2. Many have nothing to do with his topic.

So, when I point out to Kevin that all his sources are English texts before 1985, that is what I am talking about. That doesn't make them wrong, only needing to be tested.

So, Kevin, the question still stands: Where is that 'essentially the same' between Frederick's and the army of 1806.

All you have to do is give me the specific reasons that the 1806 army is 'essentially' the same as Frederick's army--of any date. I've given you the points of reference. Again, the the list of areas I can think of:

1. Organization/OOB
2. Recruiting
3. Tactics
4. Command structure
5. Training
6. Government agencies, support and funding
7. Commanders

You chose the dates for Frederick's Army to compare. Where are they essentially the same? Where, how, when and what. Those are the things that establish the whys.

For historians, any conclusions are based on evidence, not simply on 'authorities.' It doesn't matter who says it, it is their evidence that counts. That is a fundamental understanding in Historiography. That tends to follow Voltaire's dictum:

"I don't care what a man believes, I want to know why."

Voltaire? Really?

Your conclusion above isn't 'offensive', rather it is at once wrong [All four authors don't say that. Certainly not Shannahan or White] and still unproven.

All four authors most certainly do say that and it has been posted. Both Shanahan and White most certainly did and it has already been posted. Do you wish to see it again? You made a comment dismissing the evidence posted without providing anything to prove otherwise.

An example from The Enlightened Soldier by Charles White, 33, certainly illustrates that the Prussian Army of 1806 was still Frederick's army:

‘Doubts about the Prussian army were widespread in 1801. Were its senior officers fit to command? Could the army of Frederick the Great withstand the French under Napoleon? Many believed that only a genius like Frederick the Great could meet the challenge of the French. Scharnhorst sensed this anxiety and used it to his advantage in a series of lectures entitled, ‘Observations on Progress in the Art of War.':

‘An army makes progress in the art of waging war whenever pedantry decreases, whenever the slavish oppressive obedience of officers transforms itself into attention and reverence for disciplinary laws, and does not shackle intellectual activity with fetters that kill the spirit.'
‘Here Scharnhorst implied that the fraternal, aristocratic character of the Prussian officer corps resembled a clique, with a quasi-official rigidity that bordered on hypocrisy. Too many officers demanded unconditional obedience, loyalty, and respect from their subordinates, but were themselves unwilling to give the same to their superiors.'

I simply asked WHERE the army in 1806 was 'essentially' the army of Frederick the Great. That's it. I made it easy by listing the areas where Frederick's government and army would have to be the same in some 'essential' way for that statement to be true. All you've done is continually repeat statements that don't address those areas at all.

It was clearly demonstrated for the most part in the citations posted from the various source material. Perhaps you should read it again.

White, in his book The Enlightened Soldier writes on page 28 about Scharnhorst's very first recommendation to 'reform' the Prussian army during his application process. White writes: ."The critical nature of Scharnhorst's memorandum was deceptive. He truly believed in the soundness of Frederick the Great's methods and wanted only to improve them."

‘Deceptive'? What is that supposed to mean? I found Scharnhorst to be unusually clear except when he didn't completely understand an issue. An example of that are his comments on Marengo on pages 66-75 of White's book.

His recommendations? 1. reorganize the army into corps or
divisions of all arms; 2. Training the 3rd rank of line infantry to fight as skirmishers; 3. strengthen the artillery and integrating it with the infantry and cavalry.

Where did you find number 3? Integration means that the organizations would be combined. Usually, especially regarding the French the end result of the training would be for the arms to cooperate, as in combined arms operations which the French artillery schools had been teaching since the 1760s.

Where does Scharnhorst recommend to ‘reorganize the army into corps…?' He mentions corps on page 69 of White's book, when talking of Marengo, but it doesn't appear to me to be referring to corps d'armee especially on the French model. The French organized corps d'armee for the Marengo campaign. Scharnhorst did recommend the organization of divisions of all arms, but this again was a misread of what the French were now doing. The French were organizing homogenous divisions of infantry and cavalry. The French corps was the smallest organization of all arms. The Prussians did not organize corps d'armee in 1806 and their new division organization was not put into effect until just prior to going to war in 1806.

First, the organization into divisions had already been proposed, but was hampered by the individualist nature of each Inspectorate, some leaning toward such a reorganization [and establishing it within the inspectorate as an administrative form]
However, according to White, p.108,

What is discussed on page 108 is the general staff, not divisions of all arms. That's another error in fact that you have posted.

Despite thises inital setbacks, Scharnhorst and Massenback continued their modernization efforts as members of the Militarische Gesellschaft. They were joined by Ruchel, Lecoq, Phull and Stein [a Prussian minister]. Significantly, this association was not new. [but had begun in 1795] So, is Ruchel really the hinderance you say he is? It is the same Ruchel who established Military Schools in 1795.

Ruchel may have been a member of the Militarische Gesellschaft and whatever contributions he may have helped in, he apparently didn't take military reform to heart, witness his actions in the field in 1806, especially at Jena.

The suggestion to train the third rank as skirmishers is also rather insulting. The Duke of Brunswick wrote instructions for using the 3rd rank as skirmishers in 1791, which was used in the 1792-95 battles. The third rank was regularly used as skirmishers during that time. Scharnhorst even uses that as an argument for the practice… These are the same instructions used in the Reforms after 1807 for all infantry. So, Brunswick was a conservative hindrance to reform?

Brunswick was not only too old, he was an adherent to the old school of Prussian warfighting. Being mortally wounded at Auerstadt precluded any contribution he may have done in 1807-1813. He did, however, begin a family tradition of being killed in action by the French.

As with all army's, Prussia's was conservative, and Scharnhorst's first recommendation were seen as 1. insulting, like a junior officer suggesting his superior do something they had been doing for a long time, or do something that no other army had contemplated.

The Grande Armee, with all the improvements and new organizations was anything but militarily ‘conservative.' All of the innovations that were developed from 1763 onwards were anything but ‘conservative.' In point of fact excellence was now the basis for the Grande Armee and it was part of that army's culture.

And yet, these same conservative military men agreed to induct Scharnhorst into the army and give him charge of officer training schools, as well as induct him into the Junker class.

And Scharnhorst for all of his recommendations prior to 1806 for reforms was generally ignored. He pushed hard for a divisional organization for the Prussian Army, but that was done as the 1806 campaign opened, and they were modeled on the French all arms division that the French abandoned in 1800. And there was no training or experience for Prussian general officers to command the new division organization. Scharnhorst also missed the lesson of the French corps d'armee. As witness, see Scharnhorst's examination of the Marengo campaign where Napoleon organized the Army of the Reserve into corps d'armee.

Scharnhorst's suggestion to upgrade the artillery and integrate it into the infantry and cavalry was not only something that NONE of the other Continental armies were doing, the French hadn't to the degree that Scharnhorst suggested.

Why would you ‘integrate' the artillery into the infantry and cavalry? That isn't what the French did and the Prussians never did anything of the kind in 1806 or earlier.
And their artillery rebuilding from 1807-1813 never matched what the French had done. Nor did the Prussians ever organize or employ their artillery the way the French did habitually either before 1806, during the war of 1806, or after 1807. The mere facts that in 1813-1815 they had no army artillery reserve or corps artillery chiefs that were senior field grade officers and not generals clearly demonstrate that they did not follow the French example.

Perhaps your statement would be better put by stating that artillery should cooperate with the other combat arms in the field, which is how the French were trained. The Prussian artillery of 1806 was not.

Of all the major belligerents, the Prussians had the least efficient artillery arm and that fault can be traced back to Frederick the Great's ignorance of artillery and the harmful manner with which he treated his artillery officers-and Frederick was no artilleryman.

French artillerymen advocated the artillery as a combat arm equivalent to the infantry and cavalry, such as the du Teil brothers, and they taught Napoleon.

The excellent French artillery schools taught infantry/artillery cooperation which was the backbone of their tactical doctrine.

When did the Prussians do that? They didn't have an artillery school until 1791 and that was disbanded in 1808. Their new artillery manual of 1812 never went above the battery level. The French on the other hand introduced new tactics hand-in-hand with the Gribeauval artillery system which was designed for a war of maneuver.

Perhaps this will help with understanding the French artillery doctrine. Du Teil's publication was done in 1778 and it is the only artillery manual/instruction that talks tactics and procedures above the company/battery level. The Prussians did not do this either educationally, organizationally, or in training:

From Jean Du Teil's De l'Usage de artillerie nouvelle dans la guerre de campagne:

‘The proper execution of the artillery is based on the art of emplacement and the direction of the fire to cause the greatest possible harm to the enemy, and to give the greatest protection to the troops that it supports. Before the infantry and the artillery can protect each other, it is indispensable for the artillery to coordinate its tactics with those of the infantry, or at least with the results of their principle maneuvers, and the greater or lesser effect which it will produce on such or such a maneuver, and to judge their importance and the need to increase the rate of fire, or to change position. It is not less significant for the infantry or cavalry officer, who must command a force of all arms, including the artillery, to understand the main differences in the guns, the manner of placing them, and the results generated by their execution…With this knowledge he will be able to avoid hindering the artillery officer who will be under his command; he will have full confidence in him, because he will be in a position to judge intelligently the dispositions that are made, or to order some others, according to his own ideas, so that by his own skill can provide the protection which the infantry require.'

‘It is necessary to multiply the artillery on points of attack which ought to decide the victory, relieving the batteries which have suffered, replacing them by others, without the enemy's being able to notice it, nor to prevail from an advantage which redoubles his ardor, and discourages your troops. The artillery thus sustained and multiplied with intelligence, procures decisive results.'

From Prussian Military Reforms 1786-1813 by William Shanahan:

‘Artillery had been a neglected branch of the Prussian army since the time of Frederick the Great who had underestimated its importance…The tactical organization was backward; many guns were scattered among the battalions of infantry, where a contempt for gunnery prevailed…Artillery was the least trained branch of the Prussian army. Although Scharnhorst was an artillerist who had been in Prussian service since 1801, his influence was confined to academic instruction rather than the practical training of the army. Practice firing at unknown ranges was rarely attempted in peacetime, for the state's supplies of powder and shot were limited and had to be conserved for a more serious use. Drill engaged as much of the artillerists' time as it did that of the infantrymen. Batteries were judged by the speed of unlimbering and the smartness of appearance rather than the rate and accuracy of fire…'-20, 23, 24.

And it should be noted that Prussian artillery losses in 1806 were catastrophic. Of the four Prussian artillery regiments that were active in 1806, only the 4th Regiment gained respect and honor in the field. The other three were disbanded and the 4th Regiment was renumbered the 1st.
Prussian artillery losses included 800 field pieces. 200 of those were taken at Jena, and 115 at Auerstadt. The others were taken during the pursuit.