"Normandy 1944" Topic

I watch private Ryan again the other day, great film.

Tom Hanks was saying how not taking Caen an issue, he obviously had not read General Bradley's comment 'that the 3rd British division had the hardest job on D-Day, fight off the beach through house to house to house fighting, through a swampy area, take Hillman and Cod, take a forest then fight its way through a Panzer Division.

Where our American cousins should taken St Lo about the same time and in fact took it with a day of Caen falling.

I wonder what you thoughts are on this failing of information and why it is omitted each time the subject of Caen comes up?

I watch private Ryan again the other day, great film.

Tom Hanks was saying how not taking Caen an issue, he obviously had not read General Bradley's comment 'that the 3rd British division had the hardest job on D-Day, fight off the beach through house to house to house fighting, through a swampy area, take Hillman and Cod, take a forest then fight its way through a Panzer Division.

Where our American cousins should taken St Lo about the same time and in fact took it with a day of Caen falling.

I wonder what you thoughts are on this failing of information and why it is omitted each time the subject of Caen comes up?

I watch private Ryan again the other day, great film.

Tom Hanks was saying how not taking Caen an issue, he obviously had not read General Bradley's comment 'that the 3rd British division had the hardest job on D-Day, fight off the beach through house to house to house fighting, through a swampy area, take Hillman and Cod, take a forest then fight its way through a Panzer Division.

Where our American cousins should taken St Lo about the same time and in fact took it with a day of Caen falling.

I wonder what you thoughts are on this failing of information and why it is omitted each time the subject of Caen comes up?

I watch private Ryan again the other day, great film.

Tom Hanks was saying how not taking Caen an issue, he obviously had not read General Bradley's comment 'that the 3rd British division had the hardest job on D-Day, fight off the beach through house to house to house fighting, through a swampy area, take Hillman and Cod, take a forest then fight its way through a Panzer Division.

Where our American cousins should taken St Lo about the same time and in fact took it with a day of Caen falling.

I wonder what you thoughts are on this failing of information and why it is omitted each time the subject of Caen comes up?

Interesting point. Thanks for bringing it up.

I suspect that Tom Hank's character, being a captain in the midst of battle would not have the time, inclination or knowledge to comment on how the D day operation was proceeding? Most junior officers would rely on gossip and conjecture for their information about what was going on.

He should be busy concentrating on his secret mission.

Trouble for poor old Tom is that the attendant sound crew, makeup artists and others would constantly give his position away.

Another TMP contributor taking something said in an entertainment production as a true statement.

Taking Caen on the first day was unrealistically optimistic.
It is 9 miles/14&1/2 km from Sword Beach to the center of Caen.
Average march rates, foot troops, day: on roads 4 kph; cross-country 2.4 kph.
Do the math. About 4 hours on the road, 6&1/2 hours cross-country.

Add some time to assemble and form the troops on that beach. …and if the first wave stops on the beach, and a second wave must then push through… Not forgetting (in best Gene Hackman/Maj. Gen. Sosabowski voice) "The Germans, the Germans!".

I don't know who's responsible for the planning, so I'm not naming any names here, but there does seem to be a pattern. Primasole Bridge, Caen, Arnhem; just sayin'.

Only agree for the first 30 minutes it's a great movie.
Lots of planning goals for the landing and days after were wishful thinking.
The boy scout hike through occupied territory ruins it for me after the beach landing.

"Just sayin" Walking Sailor? No, you're just looking to start another Monty bashing rant.

SPR was a great movie and many vets have commented on how well done the landing scenes were. But I wouldn't know I wasn't there. Doubt many contributors on TMP were! Beyond the Beach Scene SPR leaves a lot to be desired historically. IIRC I don't think any Tigers engaged US troops until long after the film's time frame. In fact did any SS engage US troops within the first 72 hours? The battle was pretty fluid but I agree that it probably would have been hard to hike for hours through the area without running into LOTS of Germans. But hey it was a fun movie! Cheers!

Re Monty bashing rant. Interesting question … who had the bigger failures at Normandy? Bradley or Monty? Monty had the lions share of Germans arrayed against him which delayed his capture of Caen. What was Bradley's excuse for the long delay in The Breakout? Everyone still argues who failed to close the Falaise Pocket. Seems to me that Bradley could have done more rather than gloating over Montys problems which allowed thousands of Germans to escape. Including the ones that beat BOTH the US and Brits in Market Garden. And BTW a close study of Market Garden shows it was largely the failure of the US 82nd Airborne to secure Nijmegan and it's bridge until XXX Corps came up that put the final nail in the campaigns coffin. And we've already discussed in prior threads how Monty fished the USs chestnuts out of the fire on the northern flank of the Bulge. OK. I'm going to spend the nite in my bunker. Cheers!

I never cease to marvel at how even to this day nationalism colours historical analysis – especially amongst amateurs (which I certainly am). What is really fascinating is how unco-operative the generals were between each other (and I'm not just talking about a perceived US/UK divide) – all competing for fame and glory – egos on steroids.

The thing about SPR that I never understood was fighting for that bridge. It's rigged with explosives, why not blow it and leave. But they take all those casualties and then blow the bridge. Oh yeah, the mission itself is ridiculous.

Also did not like the assault on the MG bunker in the middle of nowhere or all the chatter while they were marching along. But those 15 to 20 minutes of Omaha Beach was fantastic.

Why is there so much Monty bashing? Because there is so much to bash.

The generals that did worst in Normandy spoke German. The measure of success is winning and Monty won in Normandy.
The Arnhem adventure was a reasonable military venture to re energise a stagnating advance. Montys true cockup was failing to liberate Antwerp and its approaches. This compounded Allied supply problems at a moment when supply was the brake on quick victory.

Another TMP contributor taking something said in an entertainment production as a true statement.

This was a common theme in post-war memoirs from US authors. It most certainly is not a Hollywood invention.

Montys true cockup was failing to liberate Antwerp and its approaches.
Monty had a superior officer by then and he was never asked to clear Antwerp until after MG. 21st AG could supply itself and the shortage was mainly a US problem. This was the result of success. Operation CHASTITY was cancelled because of the speed of the German collapse and this meant the US lost its major supply base.

For some reason Monty's failure to reach the D-Day objectives is seen as proof of his 'failure' but the US failure to take its D-Day objectives is completely ignored.

Here is the plan and you can clearly see the extent of Bradley's 'failure' on D-Day itself.

A better visualisation of the extent of Bradley's 'failure' on D-Day. The planned line at top and the reality beneath.

Mkenny, Monty did have a superior and was pushing Eisenhower to make Monty the Ground Forces CinC for Europe. This to my reading took Montys eye eye off the obvious need to open up the islands in the Antwerp approaches.
It is disingenuous to say Monty was not told to capture the approaches. It was for Monty to understand what was needed and propose upward.

This to my reading took Montys eye eye off the obvious need to open up the islands in the Antwerp approaches.

What was Eisenhower doing whilst all this was going on? If you are in charge you give orders. It was Monty's job to look after 21st AG. It was Eisenhower's job to allocate tasks to 21st AG. Eisenhower did not make Antwerp a priority until after MG so all the blame heaped on Monty is misplaced. If, as you claim, the need for Antwerp was so obvious then why did Eisenhower not see it?
It is the usual irrational blaming Monty for everything that went wrong.

Why did Monty not see it?. Because he was pissed that he was not overall ground commander.
Are you irrationally absolving Monty of everything?

Why did Monty not see it?. Because he was pissed that he was not overall ground commander.

I think something else was taking up all his time. The gamble to end the war in 1944. The gamble approved by Eisenhower by the way.

Are you irrationally absolving Monty of everything

The usual loaded question about Montgomery. It automatically assumes there is blame and as such Montgomery must be in some way responsible. I realise there are those who are determined to traduce and slander the man no matter what he does so I never try and change that type of mindset. I content myself with illustrating the rank hypocrisy of such believers. That is why I gave you the D-Day maps that show Bradley 'failed' to take his D-Day objectives. Perhaps your time would be better spent looking for the reasons why Bradley 'failed'. Can you do your Psychobabble analysis on Bradley and find reasons for his clear failure to take his D-Day objectives-or would you prefer to totally ignore him and continue to blindly blame but one man for every Allied military reverse in NWE 1944-45?

No one failed at D Day, they all did the best they could, with the intelligence available at the time. On the evening of 5th of June it was as good as it could be. I know some on here won't believe it, but the Generals in 1944 didn't plan with the benefit of hindsight. I'll bet they really wished they could have had the advice of some 21st century wargamers.

"Are you irrationally absolving Monty of everything?"

Short answer – Yes. Let us bear witness to yet another spectacular example of mkenny military acumen and insight.

B

Let us bear witness to yet another spectacular example of mkenny military acumen and insight.

Praise indeed from the man who always has 'a book' that is the final authority on every aspect of WW2.
Which tome should we consult to find the reasons for Bradley's 'failure' to take his D-Day objectives?
Was it because he was 'too slow' or because he was 'too cautious'?

We can set our watches by you, mkenny. Right on time.

LOL.

B

So what exactly were the allied "failures" in the 1944 NW Europe Campaign? And who failed? And why? Here's my take.

1. Bogged down and delayed breakout in Normandy. Minimal failure since the allies were more than back on track by the end of the summer. Both Monty and Bradley share this "failure".

2. Failure to take/clear the channel ports including Antwerp. This was a more important failure and did impact the allied advance. Both Monty and Bradley could have done better but they were focused on being the first into Germany.

3. Market-Garden. Yes it failed to end the war by Christmas but I'm not sure how long it lengthened the war. Monty and the US Paras share the blame.

4. The Bulge. Colossal intelligence failure but did it lengthen or shorten the war? In the end The Bulge was a major allied victory. No thanks to Bradley. Some credit to Monty. Ike and Patton really won the battle.

5. Rhine Crossing. Perhaps not a failure just not the wipe out it could've been. Not sure any blame is needed other than the ill advised airborne drops.

All in all it's hard to see where the battlefield "failures" had much impact on lengthening the war. The bigger failures were in logistics. Running out of or low on gas, artillery ammo, tank replacements, infantry replacements, etc. Not sure you can lay those at Monty's or Bradley's doorstep. Were they the great generals history tries to make them out to be? No. But they didnt suck either! Cheers!

I believe Eisenhower advised Montgomery that Antwerp needed to be taken and that the Canadians were given that task by the 21st Army Group. Unfortunately, I don't think it was stressed and was only one of many targets that were pointed out. It seems the Allies had their eye on the prize (crossing the Rhine) and by September believed the German forces were about to crumble.

Don't forget the allied planners didn't expect to be as far east as they were, by that time, and they had done so without a major port.

To take Antwerp meant diverting forces headed east and away from the main goal (at that time); Germany. Besides, didn't the German 15th Army along the coast still have to be dealt with? The Canadians tasked with the job were stretched to the limit. Antwerp was just one of several ports they had to besiege.

I think if you consider what the top brass knew, or thought they knew, it's easier to understand the decisions that they made.

On a side note, I believe blaming the para's has little to do with a plan that depended on one major route. A route that could be assailed along much of it's length. A job made easier after much of the 15th Army was allowed to escaped the coast and rejoin the front lines; who botched that?

At least that's my take on the subject.

The British navy certainly told Monty that Antwerp without taking the estuary was useless. Also Eisenhower had highlighted the need for a major port to be taken to reduce the supply bottleneck. So Monty knew the problem. But his orders to the Canadians were to tidy up the minor ports of Calais Dieppe etc before pushing down the coast to the Schelt and across to Walchern.
Eisenhower's command style was very broad picture allowing each Army commander to run his own army within the broad advance strategy.
Arnhem is in the scheme of things was a minor action that while failing to gain its primary objective still pushed the Germans further back. It was never a war winning move, the Allies were too hamstrung by logistics. If the effort had been put instead in to securing Antwerp completely they could have bagged 15th Army and brought supplies in through Antwerp a month sooner.

I won't weigh in on who did a better or worse job during the battle. However, i have been struck by the many months of focus on just getting on the beaches that psychologically I wonder if the Allied forces could have stayed focused on driving any great distances inland. They were thrilled to be on the ground. Human nature is a powerful thing to overcome.

For I think Monty did an exceptional job as ground force commander in Normandy. He had 3 core objectives.
1. Get a viable secure beach head.
2. Keep the Germans from building up a critical mass of forces that could break the beach head.
3. Launch a breakout with sufficient force to expand the lodgement in France.

He did all 3 broadly in line with the expected time table.
Where he made himself hostage to history is in overselling individual elements promising break throughs then coming up short. But what successful commander in history gets the best from his troops by promising minor victories?

Where he made himself hostage to history is in overselling individual elements promising break throughs then coming up short.

So instead of telling his soldiers they can expect a huge victory that will smash the enemy he should have said something like: 'We are going to attack the Germans but I doubt I can make a break-through. Despite this I expect those of you about to die recognise your futile gesture will be much appreciated'

In this discussion think it is important to not lose sight of the important fact that the alliance that carried out the Normandy invasion and the subsequent advance into Germany was the biggest and most successful international alliance in in history. The fact that some of the generals involved were ego driven dicks that were as concerned with their image in the papers as they were with delivering victory for the fewest casualties does not make it so less true.

The air forces and the navies involved seemed to co-operate hand in glove, it was only the army that had this squabbling and post war willie waving competition.

I also think it is true to say that the man that should get the most credit for the way the alliance functioned so well was Eisenhower. The right man in the right job and absolutely the correct choice as supreme commander. Having said that, as the overall ground commander he is responsible for some mistakes. Saying 'he had a broad picture commander style' or 'he advised Montgomery' does not cut it. A general give subordinates orders. A general can have any command style he chooses, what he can't do is delegate responsibility. As Eisenhower was the ground force commander – where should the buck stop for the ground force campaign?

As for Montgomery – there seemed to be two complaints – he was to slow and cautious or that he set targets that were to bold (Caen / Arnhem). This seems incoherent. He was to cautiously bold? Or to boldly cautious? He seemed to do an excellent job in the Normandy campaign. His plan had to change after contact with the enemy – as all plans do but the landing and breakout were overall hugely successful. If people think that someone else should have been directing the Normandy campaign I would genuinely be interested in hearing who you think it should have been and why you think they would have been more successful that Montgomery.

Durrati.
Eisenhower was the overallCinC of all Allied forces in Normandy land air and sea. Monty was land forces commander until the breakout when he lost that role and reverted to commanding his army group. This was not as a result of failure but a pre agreed structure. Thus in Normandy Bradley reported to Monty. After the breakout Bradley and Monty were level both reporting to Ike.
On Ikes command style he set very broad strategic objectives. The individual army commanders developed plans and they were signed off by Ike. I can think of no occasion of Ike specifying operational level plans of his own invention.
His relationship with Monty was good at the start of Normandy but as weeks went by the pressure on the Allies to deliver made everyone techie. Goodwood, where to get max air support Monty oversold his plan soured things. The breakout saved an awkward situation developing of maybe sacking Monty!
Eisenhower was too good a politician to have let it come to that but many senior officers, both American and British had their knives out for that annoying little man.
Monty was an efficient tidy general who offered stretch targets that he seldom reached. But he offered clear planning and objectives to a civilian army that wanted the war over.

Goodwood, where to get max air support Monty oversold his plan soured things.
GOODWOOD was planned to be double blow. Bradley on left, Monty on the right. However Bradley was unable to get his troops to the start line on time and Monty had to go ahead without one arm of the offensive. When the Germans were spent Bradley then found the will to attack. If it had been the other way around I have no doubt it would be claimed Monty hung back and let Bradley do all the heavy work and then only joined when the Germans were reeling. However since there is no industry devoted to criticising Bradley he gets a pass and all the vultures peck at Monty.

many senior officers, both American and British had their knives out for that annoying little man.

Are you sure of that?
Some might counter that the bulk of the attacks occurred in post-war memoirs when US Generals were attempting to salvage their reputations after the Bulge fiasco.

Deste say:

The First Army staff, already resentful of the change of command, is alleged to have been less than pleased to be under British command. Such resentments, and many seem to be of postwar creation, were not evident to James Gavin, the 82d Airborne commander, when he dined with Hodges and his staff several days later. "The staff spoke of Montgomery with amusement and respect. They obviously liked him and respected his professionalism." For his part, Gavin was impressed with Montgomery as a soldier. "I took a liking to him that has not diminished with the years." 6

link

Footnote 6. James M. Gavin, On To Berlin (New York, 1978), pp. 244 and 184.

Or:

With the exception of Patton, Montgomery was the only senior commander to regularly visit his troops at the Ardennes front. Montgomery's presence and his decisions to reassign responsibilities and realign units of both First and Ninth Armies was precisely the fitting remedy. For American commanders, to cede ground was considered sinful, however, after visiting St. Vith and determining that if the 7th Armored remained it would be annihilated, Montgomery decreed that further defense of the town was futile and, with Hodges's concurrence, ordered what was left of the division to withdraw to new positions on December 22. The 7th Armored's brilliantly orchestrated defense of St. Vith against near-impossible odds had stemmed the advance of Manteuffel's Fifth Panzer Army until December 23, when the last elements evacuated the shattered town. The defense of St. Vith was a key factor in the German failure in the Ardennes. The official U.S Army historian wrote that Montgomery's decision reflected his "ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats [of the British 7th Armored Division] in North Africa: ‘They can come back with all honor. They come back to the more secure positions. They put up a wonderful show.'" The defenders of St. Vith were unambiguous about their feelings toward the field marshal.

"Montgomery saved the 7th Armored Division," said Robert Hasbrouck.

I can provide more examples but I think I am talking to a brick wall on this subject.

Alas I cannot offer quotes from the battle of the bulge period when I am refering to Goodwood 6 months earlier.
Certainly Tedder the deputy Supreme commander was briefing Monty down. Bradley was also keen to get out from under Monty. Eisenhower was annoyed that Monty had forgotten to update Ike on changes to Goodwood. There was a lot of frustration within the staffs that the casualty count continued to grow with little gain.
As I said above I think Monty did a good job delivering victory but his personality made few friends.
As to brick walls I think your have that specialty cornered.

Monty was an efficient tidy general who offered stretch targets that he seldom reached.

Like in Tunisia? TORCH was meant to land and then advance into Libya and take Rommel from the rear. However things did not go as planned and 'slow' Monty was the one who had to come to Tunisia and help them out.

How many miles is 'the stretch' from Alamein to Tunisia?

Eisenhower was annoyed that Monty had forgotten to update Ike on changes to Goodwood.

What changes would that be? The fact that Bradley could not get his troops in place for his half of the attack?

Bradley was also keen to get out from under Monty.
Can I have a source for that. Remember you are talking about Normandy so an example of Bradley having problems with Monty in June/July is what we need.
We know Bradley had it in for Monty from December 1944 so nothing after that date is reliable.

There was a lot of frustration within the staffs that the casualty count continued to grow with little gain.

That all depends on what side of the hill you are on. My reading of the German Staff accounts show they knew they were beaten after EPSOM and did all they could to try and get permission to fall back. They knew once the front broke they would be destroyed. The lunatic in charge (Hitler) refused them permission and they were forced to stand and fight to the inevitable destruction of their Army. What we are seeing here is the insane German decision not to retreat is being used to 'prove' Monty's tactics got 'little gain' when in the world of the sane these tactics were stunningly successful and had degraded the Germans to the point where they were completely destroyed. The irrational actions of a man who was certifiably insane are not the best validation for your theory.

I think Proverbs 26.4 is a good reference here.

I think Proverbs 26.4 is a good reference here.

Is it something along the lines of :

'Be not suprised when thy argument is smote because ye is unable to provideth references.

JimDuncanUK

That is not what I meant and you have jumped to an assumption so be sure of the statement before you jump in both feet.

Having friends in the USA they do go on about the Brits not taking Caen.

Well, this is going well isn't it.

Shall we do 'What if Patton was in command at Arnhem' next?

Obviously if Patton were in command at Arnhem he would not only have taken The Bridge but would have been in Berlin before Christmas. Ike wanted Monty to do it to drag out the war so the military industrial complex made millions more in profits and would be certain to support his run for President. It's all a Conspiracy didn't you know? Cheers!

Ike wanted Monty to do it to drag out the war so the military industrial complex made millions more in profits and would be certain to support his run for President. It's all a Conspiracy didn't you know?

Strange as it seems there is a US book that claims that Churchill and Monty conspired to deliberately let the Germans escape from Normandy because they wanted the war to last longer. The book also says Eisenhower knew about this plan but was so concerned with keeping up the appearance of an Alliance that he got Bradley to forge his 'Halt Order' for The Falaise Gap so as to protect Monty. Bradley willingly did Eisenhower's bidding!
I am not making this up. This is the book:

link

It is just the more absurd of this type of trash but anti-British sentiment is a common theme in a lot of US Authored books.

[ 1 ] Read the Amazon reviews.

[ 2 ] The British army had been facing manpower shortages since before Alamein. When that is taken into account, many of Montgomery's otherwise inscrutable decisions make a great deal more sense.

B

Read the Amazon reviews.

I did. There are 22 'positive' reviews.
For example:

2nd British Army to come down from Falaise to close the gap and trap the Germans. This was a tactical maneuver that they were never able to completely accomplish and most of the Germans escaped to fight in the future Battle of the Bulge and subsequently killed many Americans and caused the war to last longer than it would have otherwise. Mongomery would rather have lost the chance to trap 150,000 Germans than permit the Americans take credit for the entrapment.……………………………Field Marshall Montgomery refused to allow the Americans to move north to close the gap. It appears to have been a political decision to prevent the Americans from gaining too much credit in defeating the Germans………….. I believe the idea that Montgomery planned to ride to Berlin on the backs of the American GIs makes admirable sense……………I wasn't at all surprised at Montgomery's poor showing…………The frank pronouncement of Montgomery's mental illness (page 210) and later articulated as OCD (Chapter 10, page 323) was sensational and makes perfect sense……….. The British, in fact, duped the United States………the German escape for Falaise was, of course, a ruse, wholly concocted at British 21st Army Group Headquarters……….the author squarely blames ground forces commander Bernard Montgomery. His motive---deny an American victory that was politically unacceptable because it would contrast with British and Canadian failures…………. Moreover, he was determined to not to let the Americans be seen as achieving more battlefield successes than British forces……..

With 'Allies' who think this who needs enemies? Indeed The Germany Army gets more positive mentions in this book (I actually have a copy) Than Montgomery or 'The Commonwealth' in general

The British army had been facing manpower shortages since before Alamein. When that is taken into account, many of Montgomery's otherwise inscrutable decisions make a great deal more sense.

Which 'inscrutable' decision(s) do you mean? Its difficult to form a reply to such a fact-free nebulous complaints about Montgomery. The use of the word 'inscrutable' means 'impossible to understand'and that tells me you have the idea that Monty's actions were in no way those of a normal person.
Do you think there could be any any merit in the charge Monty deliberately let the Germans escape?

mkenny,
The meaning of the word 'inscrutable' has a far more nuanced range of meanings than that which you so arbitrarily selected. Your leap from there to an accusation that I was somehow darkly suggesting Monty to have been some sort of deviant personality is an exemplar of awesome irrationality. You seem to see monsters under every bed.

Under normal circumstances, I would be happy to discuss my impressions in more detail, but you have demonstrated over time an unwillingness, or perhaps an inability, to carry on a civil discussion.

Have a nice day.

B

The meaning of the word 'inscrutable' has a far more nuanced range of meanings than that which you so arbitrarily selected

Which is why I asked you for specific examples of this 'inscrutability'. I do not believe you do not have any such example but am willing to be proven wrong. The usual way this goes is when a disparaging claim is made against Monty I ask the poster if he could be more specific. This confounds many as they have nothing other than their opinion. Unable/unwilling to admit their ignorance they run away citing pathetic spurious excuses for their cowardice. I am sure you are not one of those frauds and look forward to you giving examples of Monty's behaviour that confounds you. I am sure you won't emulate the last fraud a few posts above who started quoting scripture to hide his ignorance.

Under normal circumstances, I would be happy to discuss my impressions in more detail, but you have demonstrated over time an unwillingness, or perhaps an inability, to carry on a civil discussion.

Thank you for confirming you have no examples. I suggest you stop using George C Scott and the film Patton as your 'go to' reference on Montgomery.
Sorry I exposed your ignorance.