"Troop quality...in general" Topic

I've recently added troop quality categories to my home-brewed ACW rules, which had previously just considered troops all the same in regards to combat effectiveness and morale. Now I have three categories: Green, Experienced and Veteran, with the differences being pretty much the same that you are familiar with from other rule sets.

My question is: what in your opinion were the percentages of each category for both the Union and Confederacy during the war? In general. I'm not looking for particular units, we know about them, but break it down to theaters; Eastern and Western and period of the war, early, mid or late. Or however you want to divvy it up.

Obviously this is purely subjective but I'm very curious to hear other's opinions…

30,40,30 1863 in the East

30,30,40 in the West as a Baseline

Whatever percentage you use should reflect more experienced and veterans for the South as the war progressed. The Confederates tended to funnel new troops into existing units while the Federals created new units, (this allowed the appointment of new officers for the new units – patronage!).

The Union practice of creating new units, with new officers had the one merit – as at Gettysburg – of small fighting units with experienced men, with many officers – better "command and control."

GdeP

A case could be made for a fourth category – jaded. Experienced troops who will defend themselves but who are no longer enthusiastic about making charges against prepared positions or receiving charges likely to result in melee. Apt to give ground if pressed but not necessarily break. Would tend to be late war and may be situational as at Cold Harbor.

Good point, Chris. Such as veteran units who refused to charge at Petersburg when new units would and did (and got shot up).

I think some rules call the fourth category "seen the elephant"

Good troops, solid morale on defense, shoot well but hard to get to charge

30,40,30 1863 in the East

30,30,40 in the West as a Baseline

Saber, I'm assuming that's for both sides?

Whatever percentage you use should reflect more experienced and veterans for the South as the war progressed. The Confederates tended to funnel new troops into existing units while the Federals created new units, (this allowed the appointment of new officers for the new units – patronage!).

Dn, Yes that's something I've already considered.

Time can have a significant effect in other ways.

Once the Overland Campaign took hold not only did Experienced Union units get more wary, Confederate units suffered a progressive degradation in Command as more and more quality Officers were killed or invalided out.

I used to use three classes simply because Terry Wise did! Later I made the Raw troops more likely to charge but less likely to stand and the Veterans vice-versa. Now I just have 'crack' troops – those units historically highly rated – and the rest.

Once the Overland Campaign took hold not only did Experienced Union units get more wary, Confederate units suffered a progressive degradation in Command as more and more quality Officers were killed or invalided out.

I never realized what a big problem Lee had maintaining skilled and experienced commanders until I read Lee's Lieutenants by D. S. Freeman. It would have driven me to drink. More.

It's a difficult thing to categorize (but for a game you have to). Sometimes green troops can outperform veterans, like at Brawner's Farm where the Union brigade which eventually became known as the Iron Brigade saw its first combat. Veteran troops would have known they were in a terrible situation and withdrawn, but these newbies just said: "Oh boy! Rebs! Let's go get 'em!" and tore the hell out of Jackson's surprised men.

Blackhorse,

Absolutely, I am not Lee's number one fan, in terms of his Generalship, probably because of the overly high opinion some have given him but there is no question that he held the ANV together in a manner no one around at the time could have even considered.

It does indeed come out well in Freeman's work and probably even more so in Gordon C. Rhea‘s series of books on that part of the War.

The Confederates tended to funnel new troops into existing units while the Federals created new units, (this allowed the appointment of new officers for the new units – patronage!).

While this is somewhat true, there were numerous exceptions. First, in late '63/early '64 Union units who voluntarily reenlisted (at least 75%) got to go home on furlough before the spring campaign, and many, probably most, recruited quite a few reinforcements while there. Second, drafted men were fed into existing units, not formed into new ones. Unfortunately, these included a lot of men who were useless, or who did more harm than good to morale of the others.

As Don says feeding new troops into existing units isn't quite as good as it sounds.

Given some losses exceeded 60% topping them up with raw recruits meant the fighting quality and campaign awareness of the unit took quite a hit. If you look at some of the Confederate Regiments losses at Gettysburg its amazing that they ever functioned at all in 1864.

It isn't that amazing, considering a number of factors, including the retention of experienced cadre remaining even with serious losses, that and defending their homes.

The Union created 30% more new units as a percentage of their total recruitment than the Confederates. Even at Gettysburg, the Confederates had new units such as those in Davis's brigade, but as an overall count, the Union Army at Gettysburg had more new or inexperienced regiments than the Rebels, 20-30% more depending on what you rate as inexperienced.

As for having more officers and smaller units to command in the Union Army, considering the performance of the Union Army and the performance of those officers over the two years before Gettysburg compared to the Confederates, you don't see having more officers a real benefit.

Look at it this way, the Commander of the Union Army at Gettysburg had 9 Corps to command [Counting the Cavalry and Artillery Reserve] compared to 3 for the Confederates [Or 4 IF you count CSA cavalry] , while each Corps commander on both sides had 3 Divisions to command [save two commanders and one, Sickles with just two divisions still screwed up.]* So, the ANV had nine divisions and the AoP had twice as many. Which number would be easier to control in general?

The real problem was that for the first two years or more, MOST brigade and Division commanders were inexperienced political appointees. Generally, only the Corps and army commanders were West Point graduates with any experience [not trusted by Congress] and at Gettysburg, only one Corps commander of the seven was a non-West Point/non-military political appointee.*

If the officers were all equal in experience and ability, it would still be difficult to make a case that the Union army chain of command was better than the Confederates… though the Confederates had their weaknesses too… such as Lee's refusal to have a full complement of Army staff officers.

God may or may not be on the side of the bigger battalions, but command and control is harder.

The real problem was that for the first two years or more, MOST brigade and Division commanders were inexperienced political appointees. Generally, only the Corps and army commanders were West Point graduates with any experience

Even most of the West Pointers had never commanded anything larger than a company!

Even most of the West Pointers had never commanded anything larger than a company!

donlowry:

Well, that depends on what you mean by 'most.' As a total up till 1861 or those of Division and Corps level command?

A good many of them did command regiments. The most important thing is that West Pointers had experience and knowledge of how the military works and why. While not the same thing as real Division and Corps command experience, it was miles better than knowing nothing at all going into command. Also remember that a good number of them had been in the Mexican-American War as well as some Indian wars.

But both sides started from basically nothing. The U.S. Army was gutted by Rebels leaving [Which is why Congress suspected the remaining West Pointers.

The reason that the Confederates built up larger divisions has to do with how early commands were formed, sort of starting with a command of a few regiments and adding on to them. By the time Lee took command during the Peninsula campaign, you had these large commands of brigades attached, but no real divisional command structure.

For the Union, the states raised the regiments and appointed officers, lots of states with lots of politically ambitious men who wanted a command. The U.S. Army had little control over who was appointed. It was basically states raising or incorporating state militias.
So, you had a lot of brigades, often with few regiments to accommodate all those officers.

I remember reading Bruce Catton many years ago00don't remember which work--but he specifically mentioned that it was always helpful to have a few Wisconsin units handy because they intentionally tried to keep their numbers up through recruiting back home. Not sure where he got his info, but Catton was pretty accurate from what I have read.

IIRC, Catton was quoting Sherman on that, but I've never seen the original statement.

For the Union, the states raised the regiments and appointed officers, lots of states with lots of politically ambitious men who wanted a command. The U.S. Army had little control over who was appointed. It was basically states raising or incorporating state militias.

I'm pretty sure the same was true in the Confederacy: the states raised the regiments, batteries, etc. and passed them on to the Confederacy. In both cases, some of the regiments were basically militia units, but others were brand-new, made-out-of-thin-air volunteers.

The most important thing is that West Pointers had experience and knowledge of how the military works and why.

True. (If anyone every really knows those things.) And Jeff Davis, being a West Pointer himself, favored his fellow West-Pointers to the extent that few non-WPers ever made it beyond brigade command in his armies. Whereas in the Union army many corps and army commanders were "amateurs." (Butler and Banks spring immediately to mind … and McClernand.)

The Confederacy, however, caused itself one problem with a rule (probably a law) that officers leaving the U.S. Army to join the Confederate Army would keep their relative seniority -- before ever seeing which of them had any actual talent for commanding large formations. Another problem it caused itself was in having (eventually) four grades of generals, which limited Davis's options when it came to assignments -- a lieutenant general could not be subordinated to a major general, for instance. On the Union side there were only two grades of general (until the third grade was reinvented in time for the last year of the war, and even then there was only one 3-star general). So Congress gave Lincoln the power to appoint major generals to whatever position he wanted, regardless of seniority, so that, for instance, Meade could have corps commanders who actually had seniority to him on the list of major generals.