"How badly beaten up was Wellington's army at Waterloo?" Topic

One of the questions I have always had in the back of my mind was the degree to which Wellington's Allied army at Waterloo was pushed to breaking. Most commentators suggest that Waterloo was a close run affair (and I believe Wellington said much the same thing) but when I read accounts of the battle I don't get the sense that this is case. Certainly Wellington's army was roughed up at Waterloo but how close did it come to falling apart. Any thoughts?

On what basis do you conclude it was not the case? High casualties in a number of units, heavy cavalry arm goosed, allied units flinching and refusing to advance, a high proportion of officers hors de combat, army organisation at breaking point, all seem to indicate it was a close thing.

It is too easy to just look at figures for deaths. Add to that wounded. Add to that "not accounted for". Add to that exhausted. Recall that not all units were experienced, veteran, elite or entirely sold on their cause.

Consider Wellington's criticisms of the artillery, which were not entirely unfounded…just a bit exaggerated.

Think of the supply problems down the Brussels road as things grew pear shaped.

Think of the pounding the Allies had taken from artillery, especially when forced into square

Think that the real crisis was the fall of LHS, when the centre really was wide open. Heavy cavalry defence was almost non existent by then, good job the French version was little better.

Even the seemingly hopeless Guard assault actually threw some units into confusion, to little purpose I admit.

Arguably the French were just as pushed to breaking point of course. But they started it! They did the pushing.

Both (I could have said all three) sides were pushed to breaking point. One did break and who can blame them?

Wellington's second in command had lost a leg, Picton was dead so was various other high command.
This would have been the biggest problem.

But Wellington did have many thousands not engaged (a whole corps if I remember)
Lack of useful heavy cavalry would hinder offence capabilities. But if he still had a decent reserve of light cavalry, that would help operational stuff.

The campaign didn't completely end at Waterloo, right? There was a pursuit right through to Paris as I recall it.

AFter D'Erlon's repulse, the battle settled down into a long period of attrition. The French pinned the Allied army with their superior cavalry and pounded the Allied squares with the superior French artillery and skirmisher fire. The Allies took massive casualties, even though there was no dramatic / decisive movement by the French.

If Boney had a larger intact infantry reserve, he would have broken through the Allies and destroyed them. As it happened, he had little to throw in as a decisive end game power move and Wellington survived and won.

I'm not sure what the unit of measure is for how close an army is to breaking. ("The Army was five Badoglios from collapse?" "We were within a milliwrede of heading for the hills?") And you note that some units break early, there are always men "knocked loose" or helping injured comrades to the rear--and always units which don't disintegrate with the rest of the army.

But I think Wellington would have had every reason to be worried about a large and critical portion of his army late in the day. You can't reasonably expect even well-trained horse and musket units to function beyond about 25% killed and wounded, and much of his center was at or beyond that point. The next question would be what the relatively intact reserves would have done if the units to their front disintegrated. Not really answerable at this range. But if it were a wargame, I'd be counting my Combat Effectiveness very carefully on the last two turns.

Well, I think Wellington's opinion ought to be worth something

Both the Anglo-Allied army and the French were very beat up, the French just broke first

There was (and maybe still is) a useful article by Ron McGuigan on the Napoleon Series site about the Anglo-Allied army at and after Waterloo.

It contained a lot of detailed information about what reorganisations were made, such as command of 1st Corps devolving upon Major-General Byng, who had only been a brigade commander, because all the division commanders were down as well as the original commander, the Prince of orange. Local Lieutenant-General Howard took over later.

Sir Edward Paget and the Earl of Dalhousie, Peninsular veterans, both declined a role in the army since active operations had ceased. The post of Quartermaster-General had been left unfilled until Sir George Murray could join, and it was as well he did, since his deputy, de Lancey, was dead.

The survivors of Ompteda's brigade were folded up and added to what had been du Platt's KGL brigade. Realistically, those units were never going to be brought back up to full strength.

There were a great many other changes as the army transitioned to an occupation role. The article is worth reading.

Good point

and even that thought does not reflect the temporary state of play in the late afternoon, on that reverse slope. There must have been some element of recovery having won a famous victory and not facing the immediate threat of death or maiming.

A few of have made the point now that both sides were just about done, but one broke first. Not unreasonably….

(Duplicated post)

Thanks for the observations. I realize what I am asking is really a qualitative question and therefore hard to answer. The Allied army took heavy casualties for sure so we have a quantitative measure. But were they just about done as Deadhead suggests? It sure don't seem that way from the various accounts of Waterloo that I have read. Wellington's army still seems to have quite a bit of fight left in it when the French break. Maybe I am missing something.

Marcus Brutus

Perhaps the reality is that both sides had suffered heavily but still had a fair degree of fight in them. The result depended on who would arrive first to tip the balance-Grouchy or the Prussians. And luckily for the Duke it was the Prussians. I'm not saying that had Grouchy arrived the British would have instantly broke but I am pretty sure Wellington would have ordered a retreat, if not a hasty one.

Here is, I think, the article to which footslogger referred: link

Scroll down past all of the OB list until you get to the post Waterloo reorganization data.

Jim

Don't forget the Allied Army only had to have more desire to fight than the French at 8pm. It is a relative not absolute scale.

Garry

I suppose, to be fair, Uxbridge didn't lose his leg till 'almost the the very last shot' of the battle, by which time the French were in full retreat.

Wellingtons right flank which was defending the Belgium ports were unengaged. It wasn't a token force, but a good percentage of the entire army. Could he not swing them around and hit the French in the flank or the very least reinforce the current positions.

That's a what-if I would like to play some time.

@Marcus Brutus,

Yes, I draw the same conclusion as you. There were certainly specific Allied units that one imagines must have been very close to breaking point, primarily in the centre (although it has to be remembered that the French infantry that took LHS tried and failed several times to advance but were still driven back, so presumably not 'that' close'); but overall it is clear that it was the French army's morale that was significantly lower by that point, whilst Wellington still had some relatively fresh units in hand.

I'm always struck by how many large, experienced British regiments were relatively untouched by the end of Waterloo. The 71st Highland Light Inf, for example, had over 600 men in good order by the end of the battle. The Royal Welch Fusiliers had something similar, the very experienced 40th Foot too.

Yes, the Brigades of Pack, Kempt and Halkett were knocked up and reeling, but there were many strong regiments – from Mitchell in the west to Lambert in the east – who had not been at Quatre Bras and who were not about to crumble.

For me the unanswerable question has always been; if elements of the main army had started to break, how would Wellington's reserve have responded?

As has been mentioned, there were significant numbers of troops that were unengaged or only committed at the very end. Good scholarship has (I hope) finally put paid to the notion that the Netherlands troops were unreliable or poor quality. However, Chasse's division were only required to help deliver the killing blow, while Stedman's men weren't needed at all. If they had been needed to make a final stand, would they have been up to saving the army? The same can be asked for the uncommitted Hanoverian brigades and yes, even the British.

All that is true, but put it this way: there was almost nothing in the events of the day, or the campaign, which would justify an expectation any of those troops would do badly in such circumstances.

"the notion that the Netherlands troops were unreliable or poor quality" was, of course, one shared by all sides. It wasn't about troop quality but political loyalty. Wellington and Napoleon alike thought that under pressure the Netherlands units might peel away.

The Allies had only to choose between standing and running, whilst the French had to move forward. Inertia was therefore on the side of the Allies, paralysed with fear still provided a frontage. An individual who might be on the point of running themselves but might take heart from those frozen around them.

The key psychological effect would be seeing/hearing deaths and wounds, particularly from artillery. The cavalry attacks gave a respite, but prevented evacuation from the squares, increasing the gruesome spectacle. Ironically, being less homogeneous than the French gave the Allies an advantage. British xenophobia meant there was no "Save qui pert" if a few 'Brave Belges' or Hanoverian Landwehr ran for example.

We also need to understand that accounts written after the battle became definative and for public consumption are likely to draw a veil over any true assessments. The letters of officers written immediately or for private circulation, many unearthed by modern authors such as Gareth Glover and John Franklin are more honest.

I personally think that if the Guard attack had been delivered a little sooner and at the center rather than where they did then I think defeat was a real possibility.

The value of the British allies at waterloo is an interesting subject. In the latter years,the Dutch had never been great supporters of Napoleon nor were their troops well regarded by the French. The same was not true of the Belgians, who were well regarded by the French and were not very enthusiastic of their new Dutch 'masters.' However, the likelihood of a battlefield changing of sides had been proven to be an illusion at Quatre Bras, so there seemed no likelihood at Waterloo. However, the true battlefield effectiveness of the Dutch-Belgians, Nassau and Brunswick troops was something different. Many were young, inexperienced troops whose loyalty seemed strong, but their effectiveness was more suspect. As with any inexperienced troops, no one could have expected them to fight with the same effectiveness as the far more experienced and cohesive British troops.

I am sure Wellington did not expect any more from them than they delivered. The Dutch saving Wellington from embarrassment at Quatre Bras was not due to their fighting effectiveness, but the decisions of the more experienced senior commanders who deployed them there in the first place. Chasse's relatively fresh, but mostly militia battalions could hardly have been expected to save the day for Wellington if the attack of the imperial guard had been launched earlier or with more cohesion.

I think it is fair to say the Dutch-Belgians were enthusiastic (if their own accounts are to be believed), but lacked the experience, cohesion and stoicism of British troops, some of whom, as Lord Hill points out, were still relatively fresh and almost at full strength. No one could have expected the Dutch-Belgians, Nassauers or Brunswickers, to have performed as well as the British troops; Wellington least of all. Many had already taken a mauling at Quatre Bras. What might have happened if Napoleon had won at Waterloo and occupied Brussels is a different matter altogether.

I personally think that if the Guard attack had been delivered a little sooner and at the center rather than where they did then I think defeat was a real possibility.

I can't see the logic here at all. The Allied Army would simply have been stronger. The point of attack wasn't crucial because wherever they attacked Wellington could move troops there quicker than the Guard could move. Plus an attack directly in the centre would have had to perform a passage of lines as well.

The most likely event of an earlier attack would simply have been a more devastating defeat of the French. Considering what a howling rout it was anyway, the mind boggles at how much worse it would have been with another hour of daylight for the pursuit.

The key psychological effect would be seeing/hearing deaths and wounds

I was thinking more about the effect of seeing one's army begin to melt away. The reason I think it's an unanswerable question is contained in Whirlwind's point, i.e., nothing that had happened up to that point would predict a poor performance. There's the rub; how do we imagine those troops reacting to circumstances to which they'd never been exposed, particularly if those circumstances are catastrophic? I said "even the British" was precisely because it was outside of their experiences. They'd never been on the ugly end of a serious defeat, so it's hard to know how they'd reposing to watching masses of their comrades streaming to the rear.

Whirlwind

I think there was more ebb and flow, the real 'crisis' being sometime earlier to the Middle Guard attack. There are references to Wellington having to bring back the Brunswickers and rebuild his centre. LHS had fallen, alowing a French battery to be deployed at close range. Ompteda had been decimated and Kielmansegge had retreated en masse, as had The Cumberland Hussars. The fact that Chasse was being brought over, and that the two light cavalry brigades were having to be deployed is noteworthy. For me, the key indicator of how desperate it was getting was the sending of Colours to the rear. In that centre, the 27th was described as "lying dead in square" Even those "Richard Sharpe Supermen" were thinning out, a fact admitted privately by Barnard.

In this respect the actions of the Prussians 15 Bde were key, as having to stabilise Plancenoit meant that the Guard attack could not exploit this hiatus and had it been intended it would have to have been delayed. Many of the British officers were either dead or had left the field wounded by then, and those who hadn't were now seriously overworked. Several of the battalions were commanded by Captains. And of course the French did not exploit the yawning opportunity. For this, and matters of tact and hubris, the narrative for this period remains quiet.

It is not surprising that non-military trained historians and gamers miss it therefore. In boxing terms, the guard was dropped, the chin exposed, but only body blows landed. Although by all accounts Napoleon didn't though when he criticized Ney for his erroneous direct of the Guard attack.

As wargamers we work on quantitive measures, morale points, dice rolls etc with a gradual reduction through the game. The officers of the day knew that there was a difference beween a repulse and a rout. Troops can be rallied, running away can be stopped and order restored. Morale can even go back up again. Ascendancy therefore see-saws, the art of war is apply your stength to the oppositions weak points. It is a matter of timing and positioning. Had Napoleon and Ney made a better fist of it and Bulow not spoilt their party, I think there was a point when it really was "A close run thing".

Handlebarbleep,

All that applies to the French, and more so. The point remains that at whatever time, and whatever direction, Napoleon sends in his Guard, Wellington has the troops in hand to defeat it. There is no point in the battle where that is not true.

Not badly beaten up enough to stop them winning – and conducting the advance on Paris with minimal delay. Wellington was an arch pragmatist – to suggest he would have placed his army in jeopardy of a catastrophic defeat is to show you have no idea of his character or military experience.

Whirlwind

It's only opinion, but after the fall of LHS Wellington is extemporising. The reconstruction of his centre took time, there was a window of opportunity which had it been exploited he could have been in real trouble.

Apart from my analysis, I must also trust Wellington's own opinion. His displeasure at the conduct of his artillery at this point is well known. Batteries were falling silent or replenishing, the later contrasting with the smart fire of a fresh Van de Smissen, which was commented on by many.

Lastly of course is his own assesment of "a near run thing". That is taken by most commentators to be the defeat of La Garde or the arrival of the Prussians. History bears you out, Wellington was perfectly capable of countering what arrived, when he did, and where he did. The same was not true an hour or so earlier or 1km to the east. That I think was the near run thing he was referring to, but it is perfectly understandable that he never elaborated on just how close. That was neither politic or good for morale. He belived there was glory enough, and no value in pointing out embarassing deficiences.

Historical hindsight blinds us to the uncertainties and ebb and flow of the battlefield. It is a cognitive bias and a circular argument that just because that is what happened that is what would always have happened. Wellington's own words reveal that he did not necessarilly share your confidence. Remember his pre-battle assessment about the British infantry "If I have enough of that, I'm sure"? Well at one point he had a yawning gap in his centre, and for a brief point not enough. So more beat up than the hindsight, xenophobia and the hagiography might suggest.

Again, only my opinion, but down the centuries Waterloo has had almost as many pundits as participants!

more beat up than the hindsight, xenophobia and the hagiography might suggest.

You don't think there's any of that in the Prussian revisionist accounts?

"I think there was a point when it really was "A close run thing"."

Isn't that the point?

Wellington's reported observation to Creevey, "It has been a damned nice thing — the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life, " was a frank admission of how precarious the position had been: the attrition of his infantry and the vulnerability in the centre after LHS, the timing of the Prussian arrival on the left, and the buckling of the line at the furthest extent of the Garde's advance.

He was had troops in reserve to bolster the line but when that card is played it has to be successful, and in battle nothing is guaranteed.

If the cap fits 4th Cuirassier, I think that phrase works in several languages!

Couldn't agree more 42Flanker

I think the moment when the British infantry battallions sent their colours to the rear is very instructive. That's the experts in 19th century warfare (the officers on the ground) saying "We are no longer in a state where we can guarantee to adequately defend a stand of colours". That's almost the equivalent of the US calling the codeword "Broken Arrow". It means you think you are on the point of being overrun.

How many British battalions are known to have taken that measure?

Bear in mind that much of Wellington's army was Hanoverian militia, Netherlands militia or Brunswick half-trained boys. They were in the third line, but seriously were not going to hold up if under serious pressure.

The fact that some Allied units were unattrited is not going to help you when the Allied units at the point of decisive attack are hitting 30% casualties; because when those units crack, the whole front is going to fold.

And units 20 miles away guarding the route to Antwerp may as well have been on the Moon for all the use they are going to be.

How many British battalions are known to have taken that measure?

Only the battalions of Halkett's brigade sent their colours to the rear as far as I am aware.

Wellington was a pretty plain-spoken guy, and he was not much given to spin- his summation of Fuentes d'Onoro was, "if Boney had been there, we should have been beat."

He did not have much confidence in his force ("an infamous army"), and his strategy for fighting Waterloo was to pick a good piece of ground and hold on to it ("I will show Bonaparte how a general of sepoys defends a position"). I think his reputation as a strategist depends on his campaigns in Spain- but his reputation as the greatest field commander in British history depends on the way he chose to lead this army at Waterloo- riding from point to threatened point, and directing the tactical defense personally at each of the battle's many crises. He didn't often do that- even in Spain, where he famously micromanaged his generals- but I think he set out to do it deliberately at Waterloo- and I think he did it because he realized that his newly formed army lacked the cohesion, the staff, and the subordinate leaders to maneuver effectively in the face of Napoleon and the main French army.

I think you can take him at his word when he says "it was a damned near-run thing."

On the day after the battle Wellington wrote to Sir Charles Flint: Never was there in the annals of the world so desperate or so hard-fought an action, or such a defeat.

In September 1836, the Duke was recorded as saying, in reply to being asked whether he felt 'secure of the victory when the [British Foot] Guards withstood the famous charge that was made upon them'-

"At the time you mention, I was by no means secure of the victory, nor till long afterwards… My thoughts were so entirely occupied with what was to be done to improve the victory, to replace the officers that were lost, to put everything in proper order…"

Major Snort

"Only the battalions of Halkett's brigade sent their colours to the rear as far as I am aware"

And that's exactly the schwerpunkt I was thinking of ;)

Of course the neighbouring 5th and 8th KGL battalions only had 1 colour, having each lost one that day.

There are reports of the 30th and 73rd sending their colours to the rear- Brussels, even.

The 69th had already lost the King's colour at QB, so, 'greatly chagrined' at this dishonour, may have been keen not to lose the Regimental colour.

However, they were in square with the 33rd who appear have still had their colours with them at the crisis, when Halkett himself seized a colour from the hands of a dying subaltern and bore it aloft until he too was wounded- although I am not sure about the true timing of this incident.

Bear in mind that much of Wellington's army was Hanoverian militia, Netherlands militia or Brunswick half-trained boys. They were in the third line, but seriously were not going to hold up if under serious pressure.

The fact that some Allied units were unattrited is not going to help you when the Allied units at the point of decisive attack are hitting 30% casualties; because when those units crack, the whole front is going to fold.

Except that these Hanoverian Landwehr you are disparaging actually did take a very creditable part in the defeat of the French Guardsmen; and the Dutch and Brunswickers had fought very well all day.

The whole premise of all this is that Wellington is frozen at a certain point in time and can't move troops to combat the French Guards' attack at whatever time it is delivered. The obvious falsity of this should demonstrate what should be simple: the Guards' attack didn't fail because it was delivered at the wrong time or the wrong place: it failed because the French had failed to cause sufficient damage to the Allied Army before throwing in the last attack. Napoleon had to chuck in his final reserve before Wellington had to throw in his.

Well enough to occupy Paris and to make Wellington fed up with the tune:

YouTube link

Personally, I still prefer this march from a year earlier:

YouTube link

Whirlwind

Chasse was already on the move before the Middle Guard attack was made. He wasn't being "thrown in" in response, he was being brought across to bolster the crumbling centre.

Your view is simplistic, and it works on a certain level. It's a matter of interpretation, but I don't believe it fits all the evidence.

Didn't N say that if he could have broken 3 or 4 squares he would have caused enough panic to win the battle.

There was no Middle Guard in 1815.

Chasse was already on the move before the Middle Guard attack was made. He wasn't being "thrown in" in response, he was being brought across to bolster the crumbling centre.

Except the centre didn't crumble and he was able to take a creditable part in the fighting against the Guard.

Your view is simplistic, and it works on a certain level. It's a matter of interpretation, but I don't believe it fits all the evidence.

Obviously opinions differ. I find the Francophile/Anglophobic suggestions that if only Napoleon has done this one thing different then he would have won simplistic in the extreme with no real evidence to back that up, but each to their own.

4th C: 'There was no Middle Guard in 1815'

I think this has been discussed before. Technically, of course, you are right; on his reorganisation of the guard on his return in 1815, Napoleon officially disbanded the middle guard regiments of 1814 and the new 3rd and 4th Regiments of grenadiers and chasseurs were officially designated as old guard.

However, it is clear that although they were officially considered old guard, many in the army classified them as middle guard. Many of the French officers that were present at Waterloo, including some rather well informed ones, continued to refer to these regiments as 'middle guard.' These included Napoleon himself, Ney, Gourgaud, Rulliere, Mauduit, de Stuers, Beraud and Pontecoulant. Even the account of the battle that was published in le Moniteur refers to the 'middle guard'.

And, if Macready of the British 40th is to be believed, it seems that those in the junior regiments also saw themselves as being middle guard, as Macready claims to asked one of the wounded what regiment he was in and he replied, 'moyenne guard.'

I mention this not to contradict 4th C, who I have agreed with, but to clarify the point for general consumption.

The Middle Guard infantry regiments, mainly the two regiments of fusiliers, were disbanded by the Bourbons, not Napoleon.

They were not reraised by Napoleon in 1815, he opted to have 4 Old Guard regiments of grenadiers and 4 of chasseurs instead.