"Patton: The German View" Topic

"General George S. Patton Jr. died on December 21, 1945, as a legend, praised even by his defeated opponents. German general Günther Blumentritt, a key planner of the invasions of France and Poland, wrote in a study for the U.S. Army after the war, "We regarded General Patton extremely highly as the most aggressive Panzer General of the Allies, a man of incredible initiative and lightning-like action…. His operations impressed us enormously, probably because he came closest to our own concept of the classical military commander." Alfred Jodl, who served as Hitler's chief of operations from 1940 until the end of the war, told American interrogators, "He was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes." General Heinz Guderian himself, after Germany's surrender, told his Allied captors, "From the standpoint of a tank specialist, I must congratulate him for his victory since he acted as I should have done had I been in his place."…."
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Amicalement
Armand

You can't get a much better testimonial than that.

The other is how well "Patton's D-Day Invasion Army" (you know, the imaginary one) pinned down the Germans for so long in France.

That was a brilliant ruse by the Allies. Not sure who thought the idea up, but they should be commended for it, and I suspect it turned out better than they could have possibly hoped.

Much doubt has since been cast on these 'after the war reports' written by German Generals. These were smart guys and well able to divine what their captors wanted to hear.

Didn't we recently discuss how Patton simply didn't register on the German radar at the time he was most active?

The loosing army praising the tactics of an enemy general is a good thing ?

I'd ponder a bit on that if I were you.

Didn't we recently discuss how Patton simply didn't register on the German radar at the time he was most active?

Indeed we did. There was a fair amount of brown nosing on the part of the German generals post WW2 and horse trading to secure mutually beneficial reputations. An example being Liddell-Hart's suggestion to Guderian that he might insert a reference to him as an inspiration for his ideas in his book.

Patton wasn't universally popular in the American camp, let alone in the Allied camp. If the German generals wanted to "brown-nose", seems to me other Generals would have been a better choice. Hence I am inclined to think that their praise of him him was mostly genuine.

MH

If the German generals wanted to "brown-nose", seems to me other Generals would have been a better choice.

On the contrary post war the Patton myth was well established. They also said complimentary things about Monty and he wasn't universally popular either.

Most people that get the job done are not popular with those who couldn't get the job done.

Lucky that over-rated Patton fellow was around to relieve Bastogne, though.

B

+1 GReg BRad …

Lucky that over-rated Patton fellow was around to relieve Bastogne, though.

True, although he took his time about it. There is also the view that Bastogne should not have been defended and a staged withdrawal to the Meuse been implemented, tempting the Germans further and giving the allies a better chance of cutting off the salient and trapping the Germans inside. But I doubt that would have been possible with the American obsession with holding every scrap of ground.

"True, although he took his time about it."

Please explain, Fred.

B

I always wonder why there is never any complaints about the US 'failure' to encircle and capture all the Germans in The Bulge given their Generals were pretty vocal in castigating others who they think failed to close an earlier bulge.

I think it wasn't possible to encircle and cut off the retreating Germans operationally or logistically given the starting points of the reinforcing units tasked with closing the bulge, their supply lines and road network. Not to mention the weather was still pretty poor.

If the Allies could've, they would've.

I think it wasn't possible to encircle and cut off the retreating Germans operationally or logistically given the starting points of the reinforcing units tasked with closing the bulge, their supply lines and road network.

Is that just another of saying the US Generals were 'too slow'?

Please explain, Fred.

4th Armoured kicked off its attack to relieve Bastogne from Bigonville on the 22nd December. They broke through on the 26th 4 days later. Bigonville is about 16 miles from Bastogne. 4 miles a day is hardly Blitzkrieg. For most of that time they were opposed by elements of 5th FJD, described by its commander prior to the start of the offensive as a 4th grade outfit. So certainly not Patton's fastest advance.

Fred,
I think you're being a bit unkind.

Go to the CARL Digital Library on the web and search for "Armor at Bastogne". 4th Armored had been on the go, marching day and night since the night of 18/19 Dec to get to the Bastogne area. Once there, they had to fight, rather than drive, their way those 16 miles, advancing blind with no prior reconnaissance information, having no info on enemy opposition until they themselves developed their own through captures, dealing with ambushes, icy roads and a succession of blown bridges. 5th Parachute was reinforced with tanks and most of a artillery division (408th VG).

Here is part one of "Armor at Bastogne" – link

It has a link to part two.

B

One should take most of what the Germans said AFTER the war with a grain of salt, if not the whole salt shaker. Much was said to curry favor with their allied captors and dump on Hitler as the major reason for their defeat.

As for Patton most of his "legendary" successes came against a worn down and largely already beaten army in Tunisia, empty territory largely devoid of defense in his "race" to Palermo in Sicily (new topic – was Bradley or Patton most responsible for success in Sicily?) and German remnants in his "blitz" across France after Bradley did the Breakout.

Don't read me wrong, Bradley had his issues as well, save for his close ties with Ike he probably would have been sacked over the Bulge, as it was he was just pushed to the side so others could clean up his mess. This thread is Patton.

Not sure he performed much better than other Generals when confronted with real German resistance. And as for the Bulge, the weather, lousey roads and lack of significant air support held him up as much as the Germans. Just my thoughts.

Cheers!

Blutarski,

True, but 5th FJD has been in action since 16th. 4th AD was also liberally supplied with artillery having an additional 2 battalions of 105's and 2 of 155mm attached, plus being able to call on corps support and all well supplied with ammo. It also had more tanks than all the German units around Bastogne at the time combined. It had air support when the weather was clear, 24th IIRC was very clear and TAC air mounted a large number of sorties around Bastogne. It wasn't the only division attacking. Patton attacked with 3 divisions abreast. Much is made of the Germans failure to press home their advantages in numbers during the early part of the offensive, but the truth is Patton's crack 3rd Army did no better.

As I recall the American generals were all in favor of pinching off the Bulge and trapping the Germans, but it was Montgomery (in command of the northern side of the Bulge) who didn't want to play ball.

Fred,
At the end of the day (as they say rhetorically) 4th Armored Division, which pretty much acted as the spearhead, left Sarralbe, France on the night of 18/19 December (about 135 miles from Bastogne) and Bastogne was relieved one week later on 26 December.

From a command point of view, how long should it take to pull a corps out of an existing tactical situation, draft an all new attack plan, alter the corps' axis of advance 90 degrees, re-organize all its logistics, move everything along an icy road network in the middle of winter and fight a battle to relieve Bastogne?

Just asking.

B

I always fine these threads about Patton confusing. This may be because my level of knowledge of WW2 is probably no more than 'good general knowledge' and I have not carried out any specific research into Patton's career.

But my confusion is this; in a discussion about 'THE GREAT GENERALS OF WW2', what were Patton's military achievements that even make him part of the discussion? As I say, I have a general knowledge of his role and I do not see anything as particularly standing out as brilliant.

Honestly not trolling here. What am I missing? What did Patton achieve that marks him out as one of the greats?

From a command point of view, how long should it take to pull a corps out of an existing tactical situation, draft an all new attack plan, alter the corps' axis of advance 90 degrees, re-organize all its logistics, move everything along an icy road network in the middle of winter and fight a battle to relieve Bastogne?

I think that is the main accomplishment of General Patton, moved an entire corps 90 degrees to the left flank of the Bulge in one of the most brilliant maneuvers of World War II (some say). Abrams was the one leading the advance.

An armor advance without infantry support and recon in the snow sticking to roads in extremely poor visibility could have easily ended in tragedy – but it didn't. This is much more difficult than breaking through the enemy MLR and advancing unopposed on good roads through his undefended rear until you run out of gas. The fact that they did have supporting arms and artillery makes it even more impressive. The Company and Battalion commanders deserve praise too.

Wolfhag

As I recall the American generals were all in favor of pinching off the Bulge and trapping the Germans, but it was Montgomery (in command of the northern side of the Bulge) who didn't want to play ball.

Is there ever any other excuse for American failures?

Maybe Monty had a good reason.

The Americans had just fought the most desperate defensive battle in the war in what was a "quiet" sector. To immediately conduct a mobile offensive operation with 6 to who knows how many divisions(?)coordinating with the British including getting offensive units in place, recon/intel, logistics buildup, designate artillery and air support sectors, etc would take weeks. Adding to the difficulty was the terrible terrain, unknown condition of bridges, no route recon, etc. What did the intel reports show of the German strength after Bastagone? The delay would have allowed the Germans to dig in on the defensive or withdraw. Maybe Monty had a good reason.

The decision to keep the Germans under pressure with a frontal/attrition type offensive may have been the best of the worst choices.

Wolfhag

Blutarski,
As Mark 1 has pointed out before reorientating Corps/Armies through 90 degrees was practiced quite regularly on the eastern front. Patton does it once on the western front and that makes him a genius? Also as has been pointed out on this forum and others many times before logistics and the art of getting there fastest with the mostest is what the Americans did best. The brightest and best went into the support services to ensure the efficient running of such things. Patton had already ordered his staff to prepare plans to reorientate north prior to the big conference so when the decision was made he only had to phone the code word through to get things underway. The expectation, not least on the part of the 101st, was that once Patton kicked off he would punch through in a day or 2 at most.

One should take most of what the Germans said AFTER the war with a grain of salt, if not the whole salt shaker.

Well stated.

Somehow, this whole discussion seems to have taken it's vector from the title of the article Tango linked to, without anyone (or many) actually bothering to read the article.

Yiede has been clear on where his own research has taken him on this subject. From the article in the link:

One piece of the Patton story, however, is pure myth: that Patton was the subject of close scrutiny by the Germans, who anticipated his attacks in fearful admiration. General Patton was not, as his biographer Martin Blumenson wrote in The Patton Papers: 1885–1940, a "hero even to professional German officers who respected him as the adversary they most feared in battle." Nor was he, as Ladislas Farago claimed in his book Patton, regarded by the Germans "as their most dangerous adversary in the field…. For a while the Germans watched the comings and goings of Patton like rubbernecked spectators following a tennis ball at Wimbleton." In fact, for most of the war the Germans barely took notice.

Maybe some authors think that the Germans were watching Patton's every move. But Yiede clearly doesn't.

During the Second World War, the Germans first encountered Patton in Tunisia, where he took charge of II Corps on March 6, 1943. The Afrika Korps and the Fifth Panzer Army had given the green Americans a drubbing at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, and Lieutenant General Dwight D. Eisenhower, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, ordered Patton to whip the corps back into fighting shape. Patton's discipline quickly paid off: after seizing an advantageous position from the Italians, II Corps halted the advancing 10th Panzer Division on March 23 at the Battle of El Guettar—the first American victory against the experienced Germans. Patton's momentum, however, was short-lived: Axis troops held him to virtually no gain until April 7, when they withdrew under threat from British Lieutenant General Bernard Montgomery's Eighth Army.

Hardly a campaign history that would justify promoting Patton to genius level tactition.

There is no indication in the surviving German military records—which include intelligence reports at the theater, army, and division levels—that Patton's enemies had any idea who he was at the time.

Here is the key. Research into German archives show a different picture than the Patton fans promote. The Germans faced a LOT of Corps level formations in their war. Patton was a blip that didn't even register on their screens in Tunisia.

The first mention of Patton in German documents appears in a mid-May 1943 report by the Detachment Foreign Armies West, which simply noted that Patton had taken command of II Corps. By then, Patton had already left the corps to prepare for the invasion of Sicily.

They didn't even know he was in command of II Corps until he wasn't!

But after Tunisia (where Patton was an unknown), he did register on their screens as commander of the 7th Army in Sicily. And what did they think of what they saw?

The Axis powers had known before the landings on Sicily that Patton was in command of American ground forces in the western Mediterranean, and knew he led Seventh Army on Sicily. But his race to Palermo through country they had already abandoned left the commanders unimpressed. Major General Eberhard Rodt, who led the 15th Panzergrenadier Division against Patton's troops during the Allied push toward Messina, thought the American Seventh Army fought hesitantly and predictably. He wrote in an immediate postwar report on Sicily, "The enemy very often conducted his movements systematically, and only attacked after a heavy artillery preparation when he believed he had broken our resistance. This kept him regularly from exploiting the weakness of our situation and gave me the opportunity to consolidate dangerous situations." Once again, Patton finished a campaign without impressing his opponents.

That's what the link gives us. Not quite the "You can't get a much better testimonial than that" level of praise.

And as to:

The other is how well "Patton's D-Day Invasion Army" (you know, the imaginary one) pinned down the Germans for so long in France.

What Yiede's work "Fighting Patton: George S. Patton Jr. Through the Eyes of His Enemies" indicates on that subject, per the Hoover Institute Review:

What is significant, however, he notes, is that the German High Command did not identify Patton as the commander of this fake U.S. 1st Army Group until well after they had fallen for the Calais ploy. So Patton's presence in Kent was not the decisive factor in the German miscalculation.

"The Germans did not track Patton's movements as the key to allied intentions. They never raised his name in the context of worthy strategists." Hence their intelligence efforts were much more focused on people like Montgomery and Eisenhower, because this was the level on which strategic decisions were made.

I think pretty highly of Yiede's work in general. He is a professional researcher -- he digs in to the primary source materials and brings the patterns in those documents to light, and while he generally does not shy away from reaching conclusions, he goes where the research takes him rather than cherry-picking factoids to justify his preconceived notions.

At least that's what I have found in his rather impressive body of work, this being only one portion. His work on Tank Destroyers, on Independent Tank Battalions, Amphibious Tanks in the Pacific, the Roer Campaign, etc. all demonstrate first rate research and assimilation of primary sources.

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

Why did the Allies use Patton as the deception for the D-Day invasion? Was it because the Germans anticipated he'd lead or to keep him out of the way until the Allies successfully landed?

Wolfhag

Patton was available because of his slapping incidents. He was chosen for fictional leadership because he was the general they had sitting on the bench.

I guess there is no such thing as bad PR.

Wolfhag

There was already some history of using Patton as an agent of diversion.
The US Press loved him, and he loved being visible. Prior to the D-Day Calais vs. Normandy deception they used him for another deceptive campaign. They flew him around the Med doing visits to various bases, with lots of gratuitous press coverage, to mask the transfer of forces from Med to England.

Was it because the Germans anticipated he'd lead or to keep him out of the way…

I have never seen any primary source documents describing why he was chosen. But I fully believe it was some combination of reasons, not just one.

I think the core is that the US policy makers had no idea what the world looked like from the German perspective. So they projected their own perspectives onto the Germans.

Patton put all kinds of pressure onto his superiors just because he was so visible in the press. And not all of it was good visibility -- the mothers of US soldiers didn't LIKE the idea of a General slapping a poor scared boy. But the Germans? They probably ate that stuff up! So why not use that to a US advantage, and spread the word that the big tough guy is leading a newly formed army?

Or not. Hard to say at this point…

-Mark
(aka: Mk 1)

By choosing Patton, Eisenhower justified retained him. Despite pressure for dismissal.
Patton had combat experience and hasn't totally incompetent so he was a reasonable choice if the command had been real.

Who else was available that qualified?

+1 Andy … If you replaced everyone who was not "Excellent" … you'd have very few left.

In the military you have many, many slots to be filled. Or even in business, in either case you only have a few "Top Guns".

That being said, Patton was overall generally effective … and in most cases got the job done. If you look at the performance of any leader in any capacity. No one's accomplishments are 100% positive.

It appears the general consensus here is that Patton was nothing very special.

Interesting.

B

Frankly … I have a positive opinion of Patton … and even, Mac and Rommel. They had faults, made errors, etc., etc. But again they generally got the job done.

Leadership/Command is not a popularity contest. A good leader knows how to lead his men[or women] to get things done. Whether they like him[or her] or not. It's more about respecting the rank … then earning the respect for the man[or woman] wearing the rank.

But orders are orders … as long as they are legal/lawful … the Military is not generally a democracy …

Popularity raises an interesting point.
You might think slapping sick men is rather off and would get a general a bad rep with the men.

Patton was fairly popular with his men.
Eisenhower ordered him to apologise during a speech.
When the men realised what he was about to do they interrupted to stop him, so he never actually apologised.

At this time Patton i find it difficult to see how anyone might have decided he was some sort of a genius commander.
He was a lot better than some of the alternatives though.
Competent easily beats incompetent.

I wonder what would have happened if Fredendall hadn't been quite so awful.

This article may not be new to some of you but I was surprised by it. I think it gives a lot of insight into the machinations behind the scenes with the US, Russia and the OSS. It may also explain the death of Patton.

It also mentions Patton selling war bonds. If that's the case I'm sure there was an extensive PR campaign to present him as a great general and hero.

link

Wolfhag