"Napoleon was Quite Nice" Topic

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Of course he was. I'm not surprised by this at all. Account after account tells of how much Napoleon was adored – especially by his men.

Enchanting, dazzling – these are the markers of often great men and the literature is brimming with such tales.

My measure of such is this.

Imagine you are stuck, over a whole weekend, trapped in a lift (US Elevator, which is daft, can you not go down in an ..oh, forget it, a lift)……..

How would you feel about him by Monday morning? Boney, or Monty, or Nelson, or Wellington, or Patton, or MacArthur..and I have only chosen the arrogant egotists one could converse with, as they happened to speak the Queen's English…well OK Rod Stieger did

@dh

One look into his eyes and you would be smitten, ready to be bidden to do anything :)

If you are going to be stuck in a lift/elevator, you need to be with someone with a long waterproof boot.

And somewhere to empty it.

I can only imagine that for the French themselves Napoleon was the best leader to have come along for as long as French history could recall. Their monarchs failed them miserably and they made it quite clear what they felt about them in the end. I think we just need to look at the 1815 come-back to see how popular he was with the clear majority. The alternatives were always worse for them. It's only been recently that we have English speaking historians who have taken a balanced view.He had a 1000 faults but no more or less than all of his opponents. Soldiers love victory above all and he largely ensured they got it … but nothing lasts forever.

Wellesley was quite nice too.

Nice enough for his Brother to employ him in the sub-continent.

I think we just need to look at the 1815 come-back to see how popular he was with the clear majority.

A majority of the military, yes…but ultimately, his 1815 return was an out-and-out military coup – very little more.

Many of his problems in 1815 stemmed from the fact that the political class and general populace were pretty ambivalent to his re-appearance, given that it certainly meant another war. This placed severe limitations on what he could do.

Napoleon was forced to spend (or waste, if you prefer) much valuable time haggling with the political class over a constitution. He couldn't simply dispense with them and resume his dictatorship, due to a lack of popular support. His attempts to stir national enthusiasm were damp squibs – it was bad enough for him to have to temporarily play the Liberal; he could no more play at Jacobin than he could walk to the Moon.

Nor could he reverse the Bourbon abolition of conscription to rebuild his armies, for the same reason. It was only at the last minute that he even felt strong enough to hazard recalling the Class of 1815 raised the previous year – too late for them to make any difference.

An attempt to raise troops by calling for volunteers brought disappointing results. See the exchange of letters with Rapp for Napoleon's disbelief that even in Alsace – which he regarded as the most fertile 'patriotic' ground – very few came forward.

That's before you look at the South of France…insurrection in the Vendee, trouble in Marseille, and local authorities not exactly straining themselves to deliver the men and supplies ordered by Paris.

Napoleon himself calculated that he needed to military success to restore his authority enough to shake off the controls – one reason that he committed himself to an aggressive strategy.

Napoleon's dilemma was not unknown to his opponents, and paradoxically caused them a certain amount of worry. See Wellington's Dispatches & Supplementary Dispatches for an interesting discussion between the British leaders on whether events could lead to another Republic.

He wasn't always nice. I was surprised to discover that in May 1796 he resorted to the old Roman practice of decimation – executing every tenth man – to punish the French garrison of Pavia, as he felt they had surrendered too easily when the citizenry revolted. (This episode is mentioned by Clausewitz in his history of the 1796 campaign:
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Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
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bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com

The footnote to this alleged episode in the Clausewitz volume (page 90) references Montholon's Memoires pour server a l'Histoire de France sous Napoleon, Volume 3. There is also a reference to Napoleon's Correspondence.

Earlier in the Clausewitz volume there is a footnote on page 4 which casts doubt on the reliability of Montholon's work, noting that Montholon himself 'was a somewhat shady character' and that the work should 'be treated with extra caution.' In short, Montholon is not reliable.

In The Road to Rivoli by Martin Boycott-Brown, there is no mention of the garrison of Pavia being decimated by Napoleon, only that he had the garrison commander shot, and that is doubtful, as the author stated that no evidence had been found to support that idea. He also states that Napoleon had reported to the Directory that he had the town council shot, but that was not true.

I don't see it in Napoleon's character to have his own troops decimated as punishment. And, apparently, for the above reasons it wasn't done.

Hi Brechtel,

I agree it doesn't seem to be in Napoleon's character. As I say, I was surprised. Maybe it is indeed just an invention by Montholon. It is odd though that Martin B-B, who I think makes quite heavy use of the French translation of Clausewitz by Colin (which repeats the allegation) neither reports nor refutes such a striking claim.

Chris

Presumably, the footnotes referred to were made by the editor(s) rather than by Clausewitz.

The footnotes were made by the editors, and they point out the errors that Clausewitz made in his study. It should be remembered that this study by Clausewitz is a secondary work as he was not present in 1796-1797 in Italy.

For all of the myriad compliments that Clausewitz gives Napoleon on his generalship, it should be remembered that Clausewitz was an enemy and he had gone through the humiliation in the field in 1806.

In contrast to Jomini, Clausewitz had combat experience and was an outstanding soldier. Jomini had neither. Clausewitz, for a time, was the temporary commander during the Prussian retreat of Prince August's infantry battalion to which he belonged, as the Prince had assumed command of three battalions including his own. Clausewitz experienced 'on war' where Jomini did not.

Did Clausewitz cite Montholon as his source for that episode?

The references to Montholon and to the Correspondance are Clausewitz's original references; the footnote about Montholon being a shady character is Professor Murray's, for which he cites William Forsyth, History of the Captivity of Napoleon at St. Helena; from the Letters and Journals of the Late Lieut.-Gen. Sir Hudson Lowe, 3 vols. (London: John Murray, 1853), 1:76–77, 184, 186.

Jomini had plenty of combat experience, didn't he?

Chris

Did Clausewitz cite Montholon as his source for that episode?

Yes.

Jomini had plenty of combat experience, didn't he?

No. He was a staff officer, and not a very good one at that. He failed as a corps chief of staff and as a military governor. He never commanded troops and began his 'career' in the Grande Armee as a volunteer ADC for Ney.

He was also a deserter and a renegade.

You're defining combat experience very narrowly, aren't you? If I'd been a staff officer present at the battles of Jena, Eylau, Luetzen and Bautzen, among others, I think I'd be claiming I had combat experience of a kind that could be relevant and useful if I was going to write about strategy and generalship.

Competence and loyalty or otherwise are different questions.

Chris

Jomini failed as a chief of staff especially when he helped Ney botch his flanking attack at Bautzen.

Jomini also failed as a military governor twice in Russia-at Vilna and Smolensk.

Being under fire is one thing. Sitting and watching is another. And I don't believe that Jomini was ever wounded or that he either led anyone into the fire or directed troops to do anything.

Berthier, on the other hand, did.

For an excellent article on Jomini see 'Jomini-Disciple of Napoleon' by John Elting in Military Affairs, 1964. There is a shorter version of that article in John Elting's The Superstrategists.

I am no Jomini expert and I have no axe to grind either way. I get what you're saying about staff vs field command, etc. I was just making the point that in the context of the present discussion, the sweeping generalization that Jomini had no [relevant] combat experience was misleading.

As for staff roles, competence etc: things can be learned from sitting and watching, and from making mistakes. This too can be relevant experience.

Chris