"Solving mysteries from the Waterloo campaign…" Topic

"On June 12, 1815, Maréchal Soult, major-général of the Armée du Nord, inexplicably changed Napoleon's final concentration orders for the Armée du Nord. Of all the correspondence Napoleon sent the army in June of 1815, this was the only order that had been explicitly demanded be kept secret.

Had Soult not mangled Napoleon's orders, the Army would have advanced on June 14, the anniversary of the Battles of Marengo and Friedland. The Namur-Nivelles road would have been seized. There would have been no major battles south of Brussels.

There would have been no battle of Waterloo…."
Main page
link

Amicalement
Armand

A very interesting project. See the Media forum for this;

TMP link

see also

Lenient : Etudes historique et stratégiques – La solution des Énigmes des Waterloo (Fr)

link

Treachery, betrayal, incompetence (by everyone except, of course, Bonaparte), misfortune, conspiracy – the list of excuses grows ever larger. Will the Crapauds – and the TMP francophiles – ever admit that they were beaten by better opponents?

ConnaughtRanger – I very much doubt it…

"Better opponents," I would say, is neither here or there.

However, they were defeated.

I like the lesser, more in-action information that answer (leave unanswered) mysteries like the 69th had both colours at Quatre Bras instead of the alleged Regimental colour only. The Grenadiers a Cheval's supposed 'walk from the Mont St Jean battlefield at the collapse of the whole army. and the 'biggie' that the 'Guard died at Waterloo' rather than got its biggest kicking and ran away, fell apart and then died. There's also the Houguomont, La Hay Saint, the 18,000 at Hal, Grouchy and the 'six English Squares ridden through and over controversies.

But if Napoleon admirers and apologists like pedalling excuses and bringing them to the table for lively debate, then I'm all for it.

Paul :)

Had Soult not mangled Napoleon's orders…There would have been no major battles south of Brussels.

This part seems a little strange. The whole point of marching between the Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies was to quickly bring them to battle and defeat them in detail. With a huge Austro-Russian-Allied army poised on the Rhine, Napoleon needed victories, not a sight-seeing tour of Belgium. 'No major battles south of Brussels' would have been pretty disastrous.

This part seems a little strange. The whole point of marching between the Prussian and Anglo-Allied armies was to quickly bring them to battle and defeat them in detail.

Exactly, it was the whole point of all Napoleon's operations: to, by manoeuvre, temporarily gain a numerical advantage and pounce. Given the overall Allied numerical superiority, the whole campaign was a very risky affair anyway.

As 4th Cuirassier would no doubt put it, the interesting question isn't why Napoleon lost at Waterloo and Ney was defeated at Quatre Bras: the question is how Blucher managed to lose at Ligny.

@ConnaughtRanger

There is a certain body of opinion that, for some reason, has a great deal of trouble accepting the critical significance of British participation in the wars against Napoleon, and constantly tries to minimise it.

The trend over the last 20 years or so to overstate the value in 1815 of every contribution other than Britain's is the most laughable example. The ineluctable fact is that in 1815, the only army that won every battle it fought was that led by the British commander-in-chief. It is because this awkward fact takes so much explaining away that so much ink has been spilt. In fact, the military history of the 18th and 19th centuries in general presents this view of the world with some large problems.

I actually wonder if those who big up the prowess of the Austrians, Prussians, Spanish etc are carrying out some kind of prank against history. Let's take the worst army of the era and screw with the historical record to argue that it was the best. Hence we get monographs on how fantastic the Prussian staff / skirmishers / light cavalry / musket was, none of which is ever reconciled to the historical record where the results say 'er, not really'.

@Whirlwind
The Prussian 1815 is explained I think by a number of factors. One is that Prussia had got into the habit of being tactically defeated most of the time by the French. Confronted by numerically similar French forces, the Prussians would lose, unless the Russians or British were there. Having Austrians on the field sometimes helped. This backstory has to have had an effect – not necessarily at the command level, but at the rank-and-file level, where an expectation of defeat would definitely not have been misplaced.

Another factor is that Prussia had changed sides so often and capitulated so often – to France in 1794 and 1807, to Russia in 1812 – and been someone's b1tch in betweentimes so much. The constant changing of borders, and what amounted to a "German" civil war for the previous 10 years or so, gave its army obvious challenges of national cohesion throughout the period that nobody else faced to quite the same extent. In 1815, this manifested as anti-Napoleon Germans (the Prussians) and anti-Prussian Germans (the Saxons) all in the same dysfunctional army, with the latter mutinying and having to be sent home.

The defeat at Ligny was essentially because Blucher was arguably an overpromoted lieutenant-colonel, and Gneisenau was a pi55poor staff officer. Blucher was fine at leading cavalry charges and rallying broken troops with his formidable personal example, but he didn't know a decent position from a hole in the ground and should not have commanded anything bigger than a battalion or perhaps a fortress. Gneisenau was an overly-political lightweight who neglected to keep his ally informed of his own movements, including the crucial point that he had uncovered the road to Nivelles. One of the most-frequently quoted but least-frequently parsed Wellingtonisms is his "Napoleon has humbugged me" comment, when he found out only at midnight on the 15th that the French were already at Quatre Bras. This was a road Steinmetz was supposed to be masking. Wellington was aghast at how deeply the French had penetrated his position. This should not have been possible with proper communication from his ally, and it damns Gneisenau, who came close to blowing the entire campaign by his omissions on the 15th.

The Prussians very nearly blew it again on the 18th by sending their most distant corps to Waterloo even though two others were nearer. The only way this decision makes sense is if I and II Corps were so badly damaged by Ligny that they weren't fit to fight at Waterloo. In other words, although they would have got there quicker, there would have no point in their doing so. To admit this undermines the narratives of miraculous recovery and the Prussians coming to Wellington's rescue, so this gets airbrushed from the hofstory.

On any objective reading of the facts, it was in fact Wellington who rescued the Prussians on the 18th (and the 16th for that matter), as is obvious if one considers what would have befallen Blucher if Wellington had not held on. With I and II Corps wrecked at Ligny, III Corps wrecked at Wavre, and IV Corps (in this alt-history) wrecked at Plancenoit and left to face not just 10,000 of Napoleon's army but all of it, Blucher would have had succeeded in trashing all four of his Corps in four days, with the survivors trapped between Napoleon and Grouchy, and the former positioned between himself and Wellington. Who rescued who, again?

@4th Cuirassier,

The thing about Ligny though is that it is hard to point to any of those factors, exactly. Ligny wasn't Waterloo, but it wasn't a terrible position. Prussian soldiers fought very hard. There were plenty of successes at the minor tactical level. Blucher had concentrated more men on the critical spot than Napoleon had. And yet they lost.

@ Whirlwind

If you look at 1792 to 1814, or even 1813 to 1814, pitting 84,000 Prussians against 68,000 French was a recipe for surefire defeat.

A favoured Prussophile statistic is that there were eventually 50,000 Prussians on the field at Waterloo. Yes there were, but they were contained for most of the time by 10,000 rising to 16,000 French.

Ligny was a poor position in Wellington's judgment. Knowing no more than that, I'd suggest that as he was one of IIRC only two undefeated battle captains of the era (Davout being the other), he was probably correct. Actually, as Napoleon reckoned the Ligny position worth attacking with inferior numbers and half the day gone, we can add his view of its demerits to the scales too.

Of course, defended by another army, Ligny might have been a better position.

There is no mystery, just a reality. Orders are generated from plans, and no plan survives contact with reality. Reality therefore rarely fits the narrative put on it. If not by the paricipants at the time, then certainly not by the armchair general at a couple of century's distance. Warfare is a complex business, and generalship an imperfect art with more than it's fair share of fortune in it.

The real mystery for me is why we continue to play the "cudda, wudda, shudda" game when there is eye witness testimony a-plenty and a great drama to unfold. Napoleon and Wellington both rank amongst history's Great Captains, but that doesn't make them infallible. Neither does criticising your allies, blaming your subordinates or denegrating your opponents make your hero's conduct any better or change the result.

Perhaps one day soon we can feed all this data into an AI program, perhaps a little bit like Holmes that the police use? Only when we let the analytics do the leg work might we cut through the noise and fluff and get a truly warts and all view.

So… if Blücher does not push with all his strength his recent defeated Army … even against Gneisenau's opinion or severe doubts … in aid of his Brtish allied … Wellington would equally have won in Waterloo?…

Amicalement
Armand

There is a certain body of opinion that, for some reason, has a great deal of trouble accepting the critical significance of British participation in the wars against Napoleon, and constantly tries to minimise it.

Unfortunately I think I suffer from this inability:
I do believe that the subsidies of Great Britain played a significant role in financing the wars against Napoleon.

On the other hand the number of British troops (incl. KGL) was never great enough to conquer Paris. Britannia had a fine little army in Spain and Portugal, but was absent from battles like Wagram, Borodino, Dresden and Leipzig (except from some Rocket batteries afaik).
Wellington was a fine General, no doubt. But he did not fight where it mattered the most before the 100 day campaign. And there he was lucky that Blücher was Marschall Vorwärts, a French hating old hussar.

cheers

But he did not fight where it mattered the most before the 100 day campaign.

The Peninsular Campaign can be said to have lasted from the 2nd May Uprising in 1808 until the first removal of Napoleon in April 1814 – pretty much six years non-stop. With the exception of Austria's three month stand in 1809, it was the only place where anyone was actually fighting Napoleon at all between 1808 and mid-1812.

Exactly my point: a long inconclusive war, a nuissance for Napoleon, not more. The British army was incapable of defeating Napoleon. The huge combined armies of Austria, Russia and Prussia were needed to defeat Napoleon and invade France to end the Napoleonic Wars. Britannia had a small highly trained army, but the development was clearly from small armies in the SYW to huge armies with mass conscripts. France forgot this in 1870 and had to pay for it.
cheers

And much of that fighting between 1808 and 1812 was being done by the Spanish…and the Portuguese were frequently fighting beside their British allies.

Like dogtail I also suffer from that inability. Except that I would rephrase it to say I have trouble accepting the overemphasis of the British participation in the Wars against Napoleon. And I suppose my insistence on phrasing it that way is proof of my condition.

Without the forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nassau and Brunswick Wellington's Army is over 20,000 men smaller. Without Blucher's army Napoleon can employ not only Lobou's corps and the Young Guard, he would also have Grouchy's troops. My money says Wellington would not even have fought at Waterloo under those conditions.

The Royal Navy, the British pound, the British Army and British diplomacy were all important in bringing down Napoleon. Working alone though they weren't decisive. Look at the record of British solo efforts on land: Evacuated after Maida, checked in the Netherlands, forced to evacuate in 1809. The British working along side or in conjunction with strong continental allies are much more formidable than when George III's forces have to act alone.

a long inconclusive war

Actually it ended with the French evicted from Spain and Wellington's forces invading Southern France. That's pretty conclusive…

a nuissance for Napoleon, not more

You might want to look up how many troops this 'nuisance' tied down at critical moments, not to mention the accumulated wastage due to combat, disease, invalids etc. Even after being pillaged as part of Napoleon's 1813 rebuild, the French forces in Spain still soaked up the wrong side of 200 000 troops. To put that into perspective, those troops would have doubled the size of the French army at Leipzig.

France forgot this in 1870 and had to pay for it.

Not sure what you're saying here…the effective armies of 1870 were regulars and recalled reservists. The 'mass conscription', whether in the shape of the Landwehr or the fairly useless Garde Mobile were hardly battle winners.

Without the forces of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nassau and Brunswick Wellington's Army is over 20,000 men smaller

*shrugs* And how does it look for Napoleon in 1809 or 1812 without all his Germans, Poles, Italians and all the other bits? And how does he fare once they're mostly gone? What does Blucher's famous Army of Silesia look like if you take away the Russians? And how did he do at Ligny without them?

Of course, Napoleon had to rely on forced contributions of troops from his 'allies' due to so many of his own men being tied down in Spain…

And how does it look for Napoleon in 1809 or 1812 without all his Germans, Poles, Italians and all the other bits?

Do I ever deny the contribution of those bits in the context of the Napoleonic Wars as a whole? Even in 1805 Napoleon has a division of Dutch troops, plus Swiss, Bavarians and Italians working with or for him. As his wars wear on, at least through the end of the 1813 campaign, Napoleon relies even more heavily on client and allied states.

My comment as that of dogtail's was addressed to the specific claim made by 4th Cuirassier. I do not believe we are refusing to accept the significance of British participation. I think we are more correctly evaluating it than he is. Good as Wellington was and as good as the armies of King George III were, they alone did not win a decisive victory against Napoleon at Waterloo, and they would have been unlikely to do so if they had tried. It took a joint effort, just as it took a joint effort to bring about Napoleon's abdication in 1814. The role of the other actors should be acknoweldged.

The French army in 1870 had a good core of professionals, but it could not match the numbers of german conscripts, that is all I wanted to say.

Wellington was an excellent general, the british soldiers were excellent soldiers and still are.

But if La Grande Armee would have found a way to cross the Channel, do you seriously doubt the outcome?

"First, catchee monkey…"

To be clear I'm talking specifically of the significance of British participation and especially of Wellington's leadership in 1815. I get terribly bored of hearing all about how Wellington couldn't have won without the Prussians, when in fact, the opposite is far more relevant. If Wellington hadn't held on at Quatre Bras, there wouldn't have been any Prussian army to march from Wavre. It would have been marching south, disarmed and escorted by its French guards. Without British money in 1815 the Prussians wouldn't have had an army to lose.

The Prussians lost both 1815 battles they fought alone. They were on the winning side only once, funnily enough when Wellington was there. Without him, they lost. We know this because we can look at the other battles of 1815 and see them do so. Ligny: superior numbers, own choice of ground, beaten in what – four hours? Wavre: two bridges to defend; lost both; Grouchy withdrew.

If Wellington had not managed to retrieve all their errors, and had lost at Waterloo, they would have their 1815 army destroyed in four days flat. You can see this trend of needing a competent ally and / or a huge numbers advantage as far back as you want to: 1814, 1813, 1807…

Prior to 1815, the picture of the significance of British participation is not all that different. Of the continental powers who took the field against Napoleonic France, they all did so because British support or, if lacking it, they got defeated.

The continentals had the huge armies, we're always told. British armies were quite small, so immaterial, we are told. So why couldn't these huge armies defeat, or even mobilise against, the French without British support?

As far as I'm aware, there aren't any exceptions to this. Russia in 1812, the 1813-14 campaign, etc, aren't exceptions. Because British support was keeping Spain and Portugal in the war, that's 250,000 French soldiers (and roughly the same number of casualties) who had to be kept in the field but who weren't fighting in Russia or central Europe. Yes, British troops were absent from Wagram, Borodino, Dresden and Leipzig. On the other hand, because the Peninsula, so were 250,000 French. How do those battles look for the allies with another 250,000 French on the battlefield?

That's just the military angle. The economic / political angle is also significant. Britain's ability to generate finance was completely unmatched. Likewise manufactures; nobody in Europe could have produced the millions of muskets and hundreds of thousands of uniforms to supply to allies. The fact that Britain was still in the field at all, undefeated and implacably anti-Napoleon, made her a beacon for nationalists in every defeated European country that had been humiliated by Napoleon. If you were a proud Russian in 1811, or a Prussian in 1812, or an Austrian in 1809 or 1813, there was always someone to turn to who had money and weapons, who wouldn't welsh or turn on you, and who would actually reliably fight.

We hear a wearisome amount about Maida and 1809 and whatnot. So what? Why don't we hear just as much about French failures in the West Indies, Mauritius, India (via Egypt remember)? Why don't we hear about the pitiful Prussian, Russian, Austrian, or Spanish naval contribution against France? Britain was a naval power, with several hundred thousand men tied up in the navy and merchant marine, generating the wealth that paid for the wars, and taking risks similar to those taken by soldiers. Britain would put her money where her mouth was as an ally which included invasions she should probably not have undertaken. But as the Peninsula shows, persistence pays off.

@ Musketballs
The Peninsular Campaign can be said to have lasted from the 2nd May Uprising in 1808 until the first removal of Napoleon in April 1814 – pretty much six years non-stop. With the exception of Austria's three month stand in 1809, it was the only place where anyone was actually fighting Napoleon at all between 1808 and mid-1812.

It's at times like this I wish there was a like button.

Britain was also fighting the French economically and navally at the same time.

@ Bill N
I have trouble accepting the overemphasis of the British participation in the Wars against Napoleon.

Go on then Bill. Which historians over-emphasise this and why are they wrong?

This sounds eerily reminiscent of the German "The British think they won Waterloo because Waterloo Station" claim we hear from time to time.

@dogtail
But if La Grande Armee would have found a way to cross the Channel, do you seriously doubt the outcome?

If – to secure the necessary Channel passage – a French fleet had fought a battle against a smaller British one in say October 1805, what do you think would have happened? Oh, wait….

@dogtail
But if La Grande Armee would have found a way to cross the Channel, do you seriously doubt the outcome?

Err, yes.

Napoleon wouldn't be the last to Frenchman to overstretch himself in that regard, I believe WSC referred to a chicken and neck analogy used by a later analyst. Some chicken. Some neck.

The UK possessed considerable resources, particularly if it had used the Irish Establishment. It is to be remembered that, despite all that Scum of the Earth talk, one of the reasons that the British Army maintained it's reputation was the influx of high quality personnel from the Militia.

Despite later civil unrest, the natural islander xenophobia at the time would make it highly unlikely that there would be much support.

A better chance might have been Ireland, if this time they had used fewer drunks and criminals and better quality ships. However, there is a very real risk of ending up sitting in the hinterland beyond the pale and cut off by the Royal Navy.

So, as Shakespeare said through the words of John of Gaunt

"This fortress built by Nature for herself
Against infection and the hand of war,
This happy breed of men, this little world,
This precious stone set in the silver sea,
Which serves it in the office of a wall,
Or as a moat defensive to a house,
Against the envy of less happier lands,
This blessed plot, this earth, this realm, this England,"

It is likely this was quite a popular sentiment at the time, as it still is in some quarters today.

I will need to be 102 to see the millenium celebrations in 2066, so fingers crossed! Therefore it really has been a very long time since someone actually pulled it off, and I think Napoleon was missing a Tostig or a Harald Hadrada

for Ligny, Grouard wrote two good articles

link

And Wellington was able to reconquer Spain. And he did it remarkably quickly as well. No other nation could have managed to secure the French retreat in only 5 years.

As soon as Napoleon and his army would have set foot on England, the whole affair would be easily settled by

-a scientific manoeuvre: get the british cavalry into attacking vour lines, open the ranks and the cavalry will not stop before they reach Bombay äh Calais

-a clever public campaign: paint the coach of Nappy red and write "Better healthcare" on it

-a public vote to break free from Brussel excuse me Hannover

Wellington would have chosen a defensive position in the Mountains of Great Britain, which enabled Ney to choose between becoming the mayor of London or go to Scotland and reincarnate The Bruce.

cheers!

And Wellington was able to reconquer Spain. And he did it remarkably quickly as well. No other nation could have managed to secure the French retreat in only 5 years.

Against a quarter of a million Imperial troops? No one else could have done it at all .

Britannia had a small highly trained army,

Big enough to take the fight to the French and beat them almost every time, and even in rare defeat, they held together.

The Royal Navy, the British pound, the British Army and British diplomacy were all important in bringing down Napoleon. Working alone though they weren't decisive. Look at the record of British solo efforts on land: Evacuated after Maida, checked in the Netherlands, forced to evacuate in 1809. The British working alongside or in conjunction with strong continental allies are much more formidable than when George III's forces have to act alone.

A nice 'solo' record for the French should be forthcoming too

But if La Grande Armee would have found a way to cross the Channel, do you seriously doubt the outcome?

So how long do you think Napoleon would need to land say, 100,000 men, 20,000 horses and 400 artillery pieces, ammo and other supplies? Perhaps your 'whatif' requires more than 100,000 or less even, where the British forces would just crumble at the sight of Napoleon's slowly extending gut and his (not so vaunted as history would show against the British) Imperial Guard when it showed up on Clacton beach.

The British army would then not have been so little. The Militia and Yeomanry was a well-trained force (as their personnel showed when serving in the regular regiments), who would have bulked out the British home army to about 150,000, and your 'whatif' scenario would see Napoleon in the Tower along with his sidekicks and a huge pile of captured French bonnets, shakos, fusils Oh! and eagles, on display in Hyde Park. I reckon also that the surviving, thrashed French (and allies) soldiers would be sent back home in British ships as they had been from where was it? Oh yes! Egypt four years earlier…And this is as likely as any other 'Whatif' that is posted by the run-of-the-mill, historical personage/personnel, lover

I see that the Seven Years War has been mentioned. What about the War of The Spanish Succession too? Any chance of outlining the allies of the French to those of the British in those wars? If there was one war say from the starting point of the Battle of the Dunes in 1658 where two armies campaigned (in Europe) against each other without the inclusion of allies and/or bankroll, please show…

Makes one wonder how 'Emperor' Napoleon would have fared with a homogenous army anywhere he or his generals fought, especially in the Peninsula or in Russia.

Paul :D

How many men drowned when Bonaparte insisted on holding a review of invasion troops at Boulogne (or wherever it was)?

…or what a british army would have accomplished fighting 1812 vs. Russia, or what a British army would have accomplished 1813 in Leipzig fighting Prussia, Russia and Austria…
The whole structure of the British army is obviously so different from the mass armies of the other Great Powers in Europe that I cannot understand why it is so difficult to see that "critical significance" is a stretch, period. While its tactical superiority is astonishing, and the operational art Wellington showed in the Peninsular deserves praise, the British army did not defeat La Grande Armee in France, Germany, Austria or Russia. Others did that.The British army ws incapable of Napoleons Campaigns like 1805 or 1806, it was not structured for that kind of fast warfare over considerable distances.
cheers

I bet a lot of french drowned, and I bet Napoleon did not give a damn, cause he could lose a lot. The revoltionary army could lose a lot, that is why they could fight differently. That isn´t something new. But if you only look at what the British army did and don´t try to recognise how many soldiers actually fought vs France, you don´t get the real picture.

cheers

The continental armies consistently failed against Napoleon all the way through until late 1813. Not coincidentally, this is about the time by which the effects of France losing 250,000 men in Spain and maintaining another 250,000 there were starting to bite.

It's interesting that Austria, Prussia, and Russia all lacked direct military assistance in 1805 to 1809 and all were defeated and forced to sue for peace. Spain received that assistance – and fought on.

@4th cuirassier
I could argue that Spain was a country, where the new strength of French warfare could not be realized for several reasons, just like in Russia, but I know that I will not be able to change your opinion that the British army, Navy and society was (and is?) in any way superior to anything else in the world. Reminds me of the stubborness of the British soldier in combat, so there was and still is a need for that in the world.
Three cheers!

I could argue that Spain was a country, where the new strength of French warfare could not be realized for several reasons

That's one way of looking at it – the other is to consider Spain a country where the weaknesses of Napoleon's system were cruelly exposed.

A Bonaparte 'king' who struggled to make the French take him seriously, let alone his nominal subjects.

A country in which 'war on the cheap' was a non-starter. Either there was nothing to 'requisition', or taking it simply fuelled the local guerrilla, with all the usual consequences.

An overly-competitive senior leadership suddenly required to co-operate for the common good. As if…

A dearth of confident leaders able to effectively think for themselves, instead of relying on constant guidance from above.

A compulsive micro-manager sat in Paris, bombarding his hapless Generals with impractical or outright impossible orders and plans.

A complete inability to match the British sea-power that effectively turned every inch of the Spanish coastline into a theatre of war, and granted the British a massive advantage in strategic mobility.

the British army did not defeat La Grande Armee in France, Germany, Austria or Russia. Others did that.The British army ws incapable of Napoleons Campaigns

Neither did the Russians, Austrians or Prussians in the Peninsula. Quoting you: 'Others did that.' Anyway, actions speak louder than words and the truth is that on almost every engagement between The British and imperial French, the French lost, even in rearguard actions. Britain was the only nation constantly at war with Napoleonic France, gaining results and beating the French. Old Nappy's last experience he had in the Peninsular was to see his much vaunted Guard Chasseurs a Cheval take a slapping before he B*****ed off, never to return (he failed to take the hint). Take the British out of the equation and Europe is doomed to his dictatorship. Add the British, and France is pushed back to her own borders and her own counsel.

Ja, the British were always beating the French.

While getting beat by the British France won several wars.

The British way of warfare was totally different from the French cause they have different means.

Frederick the Great defeated the Austrians several times, but he could not win the SYW with his army. His army was incapable of going into the heartland of Austria and dictate a peace on his terms.

The British Navy was able to disrupt tradelines, the British money made the continuation of the fighting vs. Napoleon possible. The continental system was the beginning of the end of Napoleon
I repeat that
The continental system was the beginning of the end of Napoleon.

Winning a War is different from winning battles.

Unfortunately due to time constraints I am no longer able to continue in this debate, so I happily agree to disagree with
anybody who thinks that Britannia should rule the world.

Ende der Durchsage

Surely the whole point of the Napoleonic Wars was that, barring some freak, only a Grand Coalition of all the powers opposed to France could defeat it? I see no need to choose between them, especially to say it was mainly down to Britain (obviously untrue) or that they were peripheral (equally untrue).

It is to Napoleon's great credit as a strategist and general that he could often divide his enemies, or overwhelm them so quickly that they couldn't combine. It is to his great discredit as a strategist that he didn't see the value of creating peace treaties that would be generous enough that the defeated party wouldn't want to throw it off ASAP.

Anyway, we have come a long way from the solving of the mysteries of Waterloo…

dogtail

Unfortunately due to time constraints I am no longer able to continue in this debate, so I happily agree to disagree with
anybody who thinks that Britannia should rule the world.

I know what it is, it's the "we could have gotten away with it if it wasn't for those pesky English" Scooby-Doo-esque feeling that many Napoleon and hoard fans have against the 'spoiler' British.

Perhaps Napoleon should have ruled the world? He wanted to rule Europe with his nepotistic ways pervading all he surveyed, something that Britain did not want to do.

And just to make things clear. Britain did not win the war on her own (as France didn't win her wars alone either) but her involvement (Like the US in WWII) ensured final victory with the use of finances, supplies and as importantly, military excellence. Battles do not necessarily win wars but they go a long way in contributing towards it.

There is only one person I would choose to rule the world: the jewish barber from Tomainia. But he said he does not want to be a ruler…

Unfortunately I don´t understand the sentence with scooby-Doo-esque

On the second of May I wrote

I do believe that the subsidies of Great Britain played a significant role in financing the wars against Napoleon.

You wrote that the involvement of Britain ensured(sic!)* final victory with the use of finances, supplies and military excellence

I wrote

Wellington was an excellent general, the british soldiers were excellent soldiers and still are.

So I will add that I thing the British supplies played a signifanct role in enabling the Allies of Britain to win the war versus Adenoid Hynkel excuse me Napoleon.

*I am more of a Clausewitz fan boy while I guess you prefer Jomini. That´s allright!

@dogtail,

Unfortunately I don´t understand the sentence with scooby-Doo-esque

In the US kids' cartoon Scooby-Doo, when the villain is caught, he or she usually says "And I would have got away with it (i.e. the crime), if it wasn't for you pesky kids!".

Dibble attributes the same to modern-day Bonapartists:

"He (Napoleon) would have won, if it weren't for those pesky Brits and their gold".

The British made a significant contribution for sure, tying down large numbers in Spain for as long as they did, bankrolling other nations' efforts and ultimately leading the allied force that inflicted the final defeat on Napoleon.

Nevertheless, I do believe possible to acknowledge this without straying into the realms of silliness, although you'd never think it from reading some of the posts in this thread and countless others in similar vein. If you believe the more jingoistic posts, then Napoleon was an idiot, the French army was rubbish, and the massive casualties inflicted on the French by the Austrians, Russians and Prussians were just the icing on the British cake. 50-60,000 French casualties at Aspern and Wagram, 450,000 lost in Russia, another 70,000 lost at Leipzig, tens of thousands lost in over 20-30 non-Peninsular battles between 1809 and 1815…pfft…a trifle compared to the awesomeness of His Dukeness*, no matter what forces could have been brought against British forces in Spain had they not been tied up with the aforementioned "affaires des postes".

The silliness gets so deep when it comes to Waterloo that a pair of hip-waders could well be needed to negotiate it. The Prussians weren't needed at all, apparently, and never mind the fact that Wellington only gave battle because Prussian assistance had been promised, and never mind the opinion of the commander on the ground who wrote: "I should not do justice to my feelings or to Marshal Blucher and the Prussian army, if I do not attribute the successful result of this arduous day, to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them.". Best to ignore that, along with Wellington's claim that he had never been "…so close to being beat" and that had the Prussians not been there, Napoleon would have had another 15,000+ men to hurl against the Allied line. Bah, what would a 19th century general know, compared to a 21st century keyboard warrior? The very idea! As for the difficulty of the battle itself. No problem, all Wellington had to do was turn up and collect the win; the French never had a cat in hell's chance. It's ironic that claims like this actually denigrate Wellington's achievement rather than puff it up, which appears to be the intention.

Aren't there enough real issues to discuss with regard to this era without hallucinating jingoistic ones?

(*It's not my intention here to mock the Duke himself (who was of course an extremely able general and an intelligent, complex man) but rather the caricature of him that appears to be presented by his admirers – ironically – who peddle the image of a faultless superman; complete with cape but with the underwear still underneath his breeches, having not yet caught up with superhero fashions.)

Could I ask, when was the last time somebody posted such opinions?

@42flankers
Of course you might ask. But if you look for yourself it might be clear to which posting(s) holdit refers to.
Of course we can discuss the exact wording and intention of some postings, but it will not lead to anything usefull.

As holdit points to there are indeed issues we can discuss to acchieve a better understanding of history.
Everybody has an opinion, and to differ in opinions makes life more interesting. But there are subtle differences in voicing opinions,as you might know dot dot dot

cheers!

football/soccer fans sometimes know better than some members of the forum
YouTube link

So 'Holdit' care to post links to such utterances? If you have them, perhaps I could help by expanding on them for you

Paul :)

@ holdit

Who has said any of that?

@4th cuirassier
Make a guess…

"…all Wellington had to do was turn up and collect the win; the French never had a cat in hell's chance."

No, really: where;when?

ConnaughtRanger, dibble and co

Dear of dear. What is the matter with you people?
Admirers of Napoleon readily accept the final defeat at Waterloo, just as they accept the defeats at Aspern Essling and at Leipzig. That is history, that is fact, it can't be changed.

The real problem seems to be with the Welly-Brit admirers and apologists. You know who you are! Unlike Aspern-Essling, where Napoleon was defeated by one enemy-Austria, at Waterloo the Brits had to be rescued by the Prussians. Without the arrival of the Prussians which you all know the Duke was desperate for, Napoleon may not have lost the battle. And had Welly lost he would have been panned for placing his troops in such a position.

The fact is, hard for Welly and Brits admired to accept I suppose, is that the Brits needed help in the form of the Prussians, who, luckily for them stuck to their word and arrived in time. That is fact, that is history, you can't change it and certainly not with immature insults thrown at the Great man. That just makes Napoleon admirers laugh. So accept history, the allies won (note the word allies) and the Brits needed help at Waterloo.

Enjoy the period, the Napoleonic period.