"Bennigsen as a general?" Topic

What are your opinions on Bennigsen as a general?

I, personally, like him. Okay, I am a bit puzzled that in 1806/07 he retreated after each "victory", but generally I found him to handle his battles very well, with the exception of Friedland, of course (maybe due to his illness?).

What do others think?

What I have read indicates that Russian politics played a big part on how Bennigsen could choose whether or not to fight. But I am not very well read in Russian Napoleonic history. I am sure someone else will have a more knowledgeable opinion with more information.

He strategically surprised Napoleon by coming out of winter quarters, and came close to beating him at Eylau, so props for those. But he was then so comprehensively pwned at Friedland that you have to wonder if he just got lucky previously.

Levin August Bennigsen (1745-1826) was a Hanoverian officer who left the Hanoverian service in 1764. He entered Russian service in 1773 as a field grade officer. He served against the Persians, Poles, and Turks earning some distinction. He was promoted to Brigadier General in 1787 and to General in 1802. He was involved in the murder of Paul I. He served against Napoleon in 1806-1807, in 1813, and again in 1813. The next year he commanded the allied forces who faced Davout but was not successful. In 1818 he retired to Hanover.

From the Biographical Sketches in the Esposito/Elting Atlas:

''A pale, withered personage of high stature and cold appearance, with a scar across his face.' Bennigsen had vague glimmerings of strategic ideas, but always flinched at the crucial moment. Clumsy tactician. Plans usually too complicated for successful execution. Physically brave. Thoroughly mercenary; untrustworthy as a subordinate; unreliable as a fellow commander; always intriguing.'

Bennigsen's after action reports were unreliable, as he claimed victories and successes when he had been defeated. He led his army into a trap at Friedland and it was nearly destroyed by the French because of it.

But didn't he fight at Friedland because the Tsar demanded he fight the French somewhere?

His performance is quite reasonable also in 1813, his actions were severely hampered by russian politics and interventions.

Bennigsen fought at Friedland because he chose to..and he chose badly.

And he fought with a river at his back to boot.

His performance is quite reasonable also in 1813, his actions were severely hampered by russian politics and interventions.

How so? He faced Davout at Hamburg, which was a mismatch. Bennigsen was not a general of Davout's caliber.

How so? He faced Davout at Hamburg, which was a mismatch. Bennigsen was not a general of Davout's caliber.

That isn't quite fair, there were no generals of Davout's caliber except maybe Wellington and Napoleon.

The Elting / Esposito atlas is good for the maps, the text is poor, I would not use the text as reference, outdated as well. I would not rely only on the text and base any judgement on it alone, cross checking, is usefull.

Bennigsen was not that bad – neither brilliant either, he did give the French – even Boney hard fights, Eylau springs to mind, also Golymnin, Pultusk, Heilsberg, Guttstadt, he was considered to replace Barclay, but then Kutusov was chosen. He fought well at Tarutino, fought at Groß Görschen, Bautzen and Leipzig , besieged Torgau and Magdeburg and then Hamburg.

He published some interesting memoirs.

Was he a general of Davout's caliber, I don't know, Davout is overrated, a good corps commander but then he never took – Hamburg the exception, the burden of operational warfare on his shoulders, like Marmont, Soult, Massena, Eugene – or indeed Bennigsen.

COntrary to some opinions Davout, in my humble opinion, was one of the better Generals of this period. His execution, the caliber of his Corp, and more led him to be well respected.

Davout also built two armies.
The giant grand armee that invaded Russia was his doing and he rebuilt an army after Napoleons return.
So he could do it all.

Regarding the Esposito/Elting Atlas, a new edition was published in 1999 by Greenhill and it is a much better volume than Chandler's Campaigns.

It is the best operational study of Napoleon's campaigns. The Recommended Reading List is invaluable for further research.

Davout is not overrated. He was one of the two best marshals in the Grande Armee, Berthier being the other (Berthier was indispensable to Napoleon's methods of making war and was the best chief of staff of the period).

His corps was always the best trained and equipped in the Grande Armee and was compared to the Guard is training, discipline, and morale.

He defeated the main Prussian army in 1806 while outnumbered two to one; he also won on his own at Eckmuhl in 1809.

I think it's difficult to asses generals like Benningsen, or most Russian generals, for a couple reasons. First, it's tough to separate their ability from that of their staff. A general can have a cracking plan, but a poor staff that makes execution of said plan difficult to impossible. Second, relying on secondary English sources tends to slant pro-French and doesn't always make use of original language primary sources so getting a three dimensional assessment is difficult.

Where does that leave Benningsen? Not sure. He gave the French all they wanted on more than one occasion, but got hided on others. In my own rules, I rate him as average with a poor staff.

Cheers!

It is the best operational study of Napoleon's campaigns. The Recommended Reading List is invaluable for further research.

Chandler is discussing the operational art of war much better, but then the atlas is about commented maps for that it is almost indispensable.

No, it is by far not the best, for that I recommend Béraud – the reading list – I agree a good start.

Davout was without any doubt an excellent corps commander and organizer, his insight in the beginning of the campaign of 1809 where chief clerk Berthier was helpless – show insight in operational warfare, still he did not command an army like Marmont in Spain – so it is difficult to asses his skill about the operational art of war.

He defeated the main Prussian army in 1806 while outnumbered two to one

In case to gain a balanced view about the battle of Auerstedt – I recommend reading Bressonnet and Jany, the Prussian CiC was mortally wounded early in the batte and from that on, the main army acted helpless, each to his own, un – coordinated.

The main Prussian army had quite a few problems in organization and training, and the king was the titular head of the army. After Brunswick was mortally wounded, the king hesitated to take command of it in the middle of a battle. He did indeed demonstrate bravery, but he was not a commander.

Comparing Chandler's campaigns and the Esposito/Elting Atlas, the main differences are that the Atlas is written much better and is more accurate. Chandler's version of the operational art is more confusing than enlightening and he tried too hard to systemize Napoleon's method of making war.

More on Bennigsen:

From The Russian Officer Corps in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 1792-1815 by Alexander Mikaberidze, 35:
‘Bennigsen was an over rated general. Brave officer, he showed no tactical or strategic abilities in 1806-1807 and 1813 campaigns. Despite his claims to victories, the battles of Pultusk and Eylau were draws at best. At Heilsberg, he lost consciousness and other senior Russian commanders conducted the battle. At Friedland, he chose disadvantageous positions that led to heavy Russian casualties. Bennigsen was very ambitious officer and able courtier, who easily navigated in the court politics. His three-volume Memoires du general Bennigsen, published in Paris in 1907-1908, contain fascinating details on the Russian operations in 1806-1813 but often embellish facts.'

This is from the last paragraph in the bibliographical entry in the reference. And the author is a Russian speaker.

More on Davout:

‘Of the Marshals, Davout was the only one who always maintained strict and exemplary discipline, and, however much his despotic rule was the curse of every country he occupied, history will in due course do justice to his virtues. Above self-seeking as his character was, he never took the veriest trifle for himself or his establishment. He made prompt payment for everything beyond what was due him as a Marshal for his big household and staff, and enforced the same conduct on the generals subordinate to him. He kept his supply officers strictly to heel. He never accepted table money or presents of any kind himself, and was careful to see that none of his subordinates did. He wrung the requirements of his forces sternly and inexorably out of the provinces, but he was equally inexorable in punishing every high-handed exaction; and a crust of bread thrown away might easily have a death sentence for its sequel. The provinces in which he held command always felt secure in his incorruptible sense of discipline. But his suspiciousness, that made him see an enemy of the Emperor in every non-Frenchman and always scented conspiracies, and his blind devotion to Napoleon, whose orders he carried out with relentless severity, made him hated everywhere.'-Ferdinand von Funck, Saxon staff officer attached to the Imperial Headquarters.

More on Davout:

‘Of the Marshals, Davout was the only one who always maintained strict and exemplary discipline, and, however much his despotic rule was the curse of every country he occupied, history will in due course do justice to his virtues. Above self-seeking as his character was, he never took the veriest trifle for himself or his establishment. He made prompt payment for everything beyond what was due him as a Marshal for his big household and staff, and enforced the same conduct on the generals subordinate to him. He kept his supply officers strictly to heel. He never accepted table money or presents of any kind himself, and was careful to see that none of his subordinates did. He wrung the requirements of his forces sternly and inexorably out of the provinces, but he was equally inexorable in punishing every high-handed exaction; and a crust of bread thrown away might easily have a death sentence for its sequel. The provinces in which he held command always felt secure in his incorruptible sense of discipline. But his suspiciousness, that made him see an enemy of the Emperor in every non-Frenchman and always scented conspiracies, and his blind devotion to Napoleon, whose orders he carried out with relentless severity, made him hated everywhere.'-Ferdinand von Funck, Saxon staff officer attached to the Imperial Headquarters.

Now what tells us all this about his skill about the operational art of war or independent army leader compared to other French marshals and generls?

Nothing, because from Hamburg apart he never commanded armies or had an independent command in a campaign.

After Brunswick was mortally wounded, the king hesitated to take command of it in the middle of a battle. He did indeed demonstrate bravery, but he was not a commander.

Scharnhorst as chief of staff of Brunswick failed badly – instead of advising the king, he commanded a division when the leader was wounded. FW III was out of his wits and in no way able to deal with the situation. This clearly shows the catastrophic leadership problems of the Prussian Army.

Chandler's version of the operational art is more confusing than enlightening and he tried too hard to systemize Napoleon's method of making war.

I cannot agree on this, I didn't find him confusing, at least he tries to explain, he is not so dogamtic as Camon, whom your
ecommended to read in an earlier thread, otherwise I recommend Béraud who beats anything published in English hands down.

As to Bennigsen, I will revise my opinion and go along with Bagration 1812 view – who expressed them very well.

I don't see him as negative as Mikaberidze, for more see the other thread.

Davout's country house is now a school in suburban Paris
link

his insight in the beginning of the campaign of 1809 where chief clerk Berthier was helpless…

More nonsense about Berthier being a 'chief clerk'? He was the best chief of staff of the period and one of the great chiefs of staff in military history.

The operational 'confusion' at the beginning of the campaign of 1809 was Napoleon's doing, not Berthier's.

How so? He faced Davout at Hamburg, which was a mismatch. Bennigsen was not a general of Davout's caliber.

Did Davout do much except hold Hamburg? Pretty much the situation of St Cyr at Dresden, except the latter was rather hung out to dry.

More nonsense about Berthier being a 'chief clerk'? He was the best chief of staff of the period and one of the great chiefs of staff in military history.

What you call nonsense is a fact, Berthier was certainly a great help for Boney, but he played no part in operational planing and was nothing more than a clerk, an important one, I agree.

For more – Vachée, Béraud, Foucart, Colin, Coppens, de Philipp discuss this topic very well.

It is a 'fact' that was perpetrated by Jomini out of malice, and he was a failed chief of staff.

Berthier created the staff that Napoleon employed and the idea that Berthier did no operational planning is wrong.

It was Berthier that organized and led the Army of the Reserve across the Alps in 1800, planned the move of the Grande Armee from the English Channel and across the Rhine in 1805, planned the second Danube crossing in 1809, and planned the huge concentration for the invasion of Russia in 1812.

There are some interesting comments on that move in von Brandt's memoirs. There are also some interesting remarks on Berthier in von Funck's memoirs.

The officers and commanders who vouched for Berthier's skill as a staff officer and chief of staff included Napoleon, Thiebault, Custine, von Funck, the Duc de Lauzan, Baron Lejeune, and Scherer. All of the above either knew Berthier or worked with him.

The idea that Berthier was nothing more than a 'chief clerk' merely highlights the idea that those who maintain that fallacy know nothing of staffs, staff work, and what a chief of staff does.

Did Davout do much except hold Hamburg? Pretty much the situation of St Cyr at Dresden, except the latter was rather hung out to dry.

For Davout, see The Iron Marshal by Gallaher. Davout held Hamburg against all comers.

How was St Cyr 'hung out to dry'?

It was Berthier that organized and led the Army of the Reserve across the Alps in 1800, planned the move of the Grande Armee from the English Channel and across the Rhine in 1805, planned the second Danube crossing in 1809, and planned the huge concentration for the invasion of Russia in 1812.

And he also fought the battles as cic ? He helped to execute the orders Boney issued -as a good clerk should do.

There are some interesting comments on that move in von Brandt's memoirs. There are also some interesting remarks on Berthier in von Funck's memoirs.

Both Funk or Brandt offer interesting memoirs but I fail to see in what way they claim that Berthier did plan and execute the operational art of war, that remained the domain of Boney.

And it has already been stated the level of planning that was done for 1800, 1805, 1809, and 1812 by Berthier and his staff most certainly was on the level of, and capable of waging, the 'operational art of war.'

And it should be noted, as Thiebault certainly did, that a chief of staff runs the general staff.

Did Davout do much except hold Hamburg?

See Napoleon's opinion in Correspondence vol 27, letter of 2nd March.

'Monsieur Duc de Feltre [Clarke], send many agents, by way of Denmark and Germany, to the Prince of Eckmuhl, to make him aware of how unfortunate it is that with his army he lies blockaded by inferior forces, and does nothing for La Patrie. Of what importance is Hamburg when the war is at the gates of Paris, and the armies which should be surrounding him come to swell the number of our enemies here? Give him the order to leave his position, fall on the enemy detachments and destroy them completely – they don't have even half of what he has – and so force the enemy to send considerable forces against him.
Send up to thirty agents. Denmark offers many opportunities for this and a trading centre like Hamburg has many residents in Paris.
Write the same thing to General Lamarois*, his mission is to unite with the Prince of Eckmuhl and force the enemy to send significant forces against him.'

*Besieged in Magdeburg

It was Napoleon who assigned Davout to Hamburg in the first place, and then ordered him to turn over the command of his I Corps to Vandamme who then joined the main army.

Davout then organized the XIII Corps with which he campaigned from Hamburg, attempting to support Oudinot against Berlin but he had to withdraw when Oudinot was defeated and any offensive operations were out of the question.

Davout was actually besieged in Hamburg early in November 1813 when the XIII Corps became isolated from France and he received his last instructions from Napoleon dated 5 November on 11 November. The instructions given were to retire into Holland, but by that time Davout was isolated and had to defend Hamburg.

Davout was besieged by no less than twice his own numbers at least and held out against every allied assault until after Napoleon abdicated and he was given new instructions by the new government. The last Russian attack, using white flags as a ruse, was done on 20 April, after Napoleon's abdication.

The first official communication from did not come from Paris until 5 May and Davout did not give up until General Gerard arrived with orders from the Minister of War.

The 2d March letter above appears to be out of touch with the overall situation and the fact that both Magdeburg and Hamburg were under siege and outnumbered.

See John Gallaher, The Iron Marshal, Chapter 13, pages 273-297.

Now what tells us all this about his skill about the operational art of war or independent army leader compared to other French marshals and generls?

Davout's operations before the commencement of the campaign of 1809 as well as his operations around Ratisbon and Eckmuhl after the war began definitively demonstrate Davout' mastery of the operational art as well as showing him to be an excellent tactician.

And it has already been stated the level of planning that was done for 1800, 1805, 1809, and 1812 by Berthier and his staff most certainly was on the level of, and capable of waging, the 'operational art of war.'

The statement is your opinion of course – to which you are entitled, as I am for mine.

And it should be noted, as Thiebault certainly did, that a chief of staff runs the general staff.

Naturally – for that reason he is a chief off staff, but he is or should be much more involved – as to discuss the operational art of war with his cic, they both should be mutually exchange ideas and reflect on them.

Poor Berthier, and I give him full credit for that, tried to do this again and again, but in vain, his advice was ignored (as for the Russian campaign) so Boney pushed him into the desk clerking, which was an important stop.

I see no reason trying to debate with you further, in case you don't see any quote you are back on my stiffle list.

>>What are your opinions on Bennigsen as a general?

Funny, this entire thread forgets the elephant in the room- Bennigsen had been commanded to leave St.P as he was the most senior officer/ general present at the assassination of Paul.

The whimpering coward Alexander couldn't allow his primitive emotions or be subject to coercion by them, to be sparked by seeing those he knew were there, and his obvious own guilt about the act, planned weeks in advance.

As much as he hated the previous regimes, both his father and Grandmother Catherine The Great (who had her husband assassinated as well), his own upbringing, predominantly by her, caused his greatest anguish and manic behaviour, he emulated them considerably.

His co-conspirators whom he came to despise- all of whom he politely sent away from St.P to sinecures; Pahlen et al, to the Caucasus to Siberia (a la Paul did with people he disliked or confronted him) as he established his 'benevolent' reign in 1802.

Bennigsen was re-employed and, practically, did nothing. He became default C-in-C in 1807 when Kamensky fled on campaign, a 69yo nearly blind and shaking with fear at the prospects of waging war again.

Neither Buxhowden after Austerlitz, nor Bennigsen, who hated each other as well, were effective commanders. Of course the fauning pansy-footed Russian 'social' regime like so many other nations, produced a crop of incompetents.

Alexanders pretence at 'enlightenment' became just the opposite.

Some aditional info, not related to my opinion:-
Refer: link for a somewhat overtly optimistic morass of disinformation.

"Bennigsen is a non-starter. As Alexander Mikaberidze notes, he is overrated."
TMP link

and here:
TMP link

regards
d