"Did Napoleon's Marshals Betray him at Fontainebleu " Topic

….IN 1814?

"On 4 and 6 April 1814, at Fontainebleau, the marshals Ney, Lefebvre, Macdonald and Moncey put pressure on Napoleon to agree to abdicate. The reasons they gave? Continuing the fight risked leading to greater misfortunes, indeed a civil war, and at the same time Paris had fallen, and the Senate had voted for the Emperor to be deposed. Napoleon threatened his subordinates, bidding them to "summon the army". Ney is said to have retorted: "The army will not march!" And to Napoleon's threat, "the army will obey me!", Ney (so the story goes) threatened back: ‘the army will obey its commanders". The result of this face-off (which was probably less violent than the legend would have us believe) was that Napoleon drew up a declaration in which he consented to abdicate. This episode is called "the betrayal of the marshals". These men were undoubtedly thinking about their own futures in demanding his abdication, but we cannot deny their military insight, nor their understanding of the political situation, nor even a certain regard for French national interests. On the other hand, when Marshal Marmont defected with his army corps (on 5 April), he very probably hastened the Emperor's fall. And since his title was Duc de Raguse, the French language coined a new verb "raguser", in other words "to do a Duc de Raguse" or simply "to betray"."
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Amicalement
Armand

Enough is enough – I'm with Marmont.

Follow the link and you will experience the response that many of us got in our teenage years in our amorous pursuits.

"Is that it?"

"it did not last as long as I expected"

This is not one of Tango's best. (Bless him though. Without him………..?)

Waterloo 1970, the fillum, (movie to our cousins across the pond) did it better

Well… Each one is free to choose the heroes he wants… (smile)

Amicalement
Armand

Enough is enough – I'm with Marmont.

By Fontainebleau it was a case of the writing being the wall: "MENE, MENE, TEKEL, UPHARSIN"

As for being with Marmont, put me more in the camp with Blucher as to what should have happened…

It seems pretty trendy to victimize people like Marmont, he up to that time put his life more than one times at risk for Boney, and was badly wounded as well, to say he betrayed – whom?
He took on responsibility for the French nation.

Kubricks film on Napoleon would have been better …

They made the right choose. Blucher and the Czar were willing to settle past wrongs with a heavy hand if they didn't.

I am also w/ Marmont. He did what needed to be done.

Here's an interesting paper on the subject:

PDF link

I think they had to do it.

I really dispute the word "mutiny;" it is entirely too fraught with bias and emotion. More realistically, the marshals, victims of poor communications and their apparent lack of ESP, simply stopped at Fontainebleau and spoke truth to power, as pundits are fond of saying these days.

And we all know the marshals in April 1814 were the second string, as it were, but I think had Davout been present, or Massena in his heyday, or Lannes, they would also say that enough was enough.

For those who continue to pillory Marmont, I would suggest that they should also look askance at the rapidity with which Ney rallied to Extremely Fat Louis…It is also true that a number of marshals, even some of the most loyal, were already grumbling in late 1808 and through 1809 that perhaps Napoleon was going a bit too far and much too long with the whole "war thing."

Sometimes it reminds me of Alexander's generals telling him to stop because they were going no further. (Napoleon going on further into Russia reminds me of Alexander also.)

Marmont's treachery (and the violation of his oath of service)
was done by cooperating with Talleyrand, who had been sacked by Napolepon in 1807 for avarice and he was in contact with Napoleon's enemies, foreign and domestic. He wanted a France where he could live in luxury and where he could take people for all they were worth.

That Marmont listened to his nonsense characterizes Marmont as both stupid and easily influenced. And Marmont's corps was taken over to the allies by some of its commanders who were in cahoots with Marmont. And this happened after Napoleon agreed to abdicate in favor of his son with his wife as regent. Marmont's treason ruined that plan and brought the Bourbons back which none of the marshals wanted, except perhaps Marmont.

The timeline here is critical to understand what actually happened and when.

The timeline here is critical to understand what actually happened and when.

Indeed:

Late March: Napoleon heads east in what he believes is a superb strategic move. The Allies pull a beautiful number on him and strike for Paris while Napoleon is busy 'painting pictures.'

March 30th: Battle of Paris; Joseph Bonaparte, that shining jewel of Napoleon's famous meritocracy, orders Marmont & Mortier to surrender the city, and then runs away.

March 31st: Surrender of Paris. Every sane person now realises that it's all over.

March 31st: French Senate selects a provisional government tasked to clear up the mess and end the bloodshed. Marmont wisely and courageously agrees that it's all over, and starts negotiations to neutralise his troops, although he later decides not to go through with the plan.

April 2nd: French Senate votes to depose Napoleon, abolishes his dynasty and releases all French citizens from their oath of loyalty to him. Negotiations for peace begin. Talleyrand takes the firm line 'Bonaparte or the Bourbons' and expertly bats away any attempt at a fudge.

April 4th: The Marshal's Revolt (or Counselling Session, if you prefer); The Marshals explain to Napoleon that it's all over.
Napoleon tries to place his son and wife on the throne in his place. The Marshals take the offer to the Allies. It fails the laugh test, even with the Austrians. The Tsar politely points out that no-one can trust Bonaparte not to treat the Regency as a ready-made puppet government.
Just for added laughs, the Marshals have picked up a puzzled Marmont on the way to Paris. In his absence, Souham neutralises his troops; they march away behind the Loire.

April 6th: Senate declares the restoration of the Bourbons.

After: Napoleon abdicates unconditionally, and signs the Treaty of Fontainebleu – the latest in a very long line of agreements he won't bother keeping.
He spends the rest of his life constructing a stab-in-the-back myth that blames alleged 'treason' for his downfall in 1814.

characterizes Marmont as both stupid…

Marmont was actually one of the very few Marshals capable of thinking for himself and effectively handling independent operations. Hardly the definition of 'stupid'.

Oddly enough – contemporaries did not regard Marmont as stupid but brilliant – like Joseph Sulkowski, now Brechtel, here another memoir to be read.

Marmont had the guts, as other marshals as well to finish off a dictatorship which was destroying France, Boney was not France, and above Boney were the interests of la patrie, France could be happy to have such men as Marmont, Ney and others.

The Bourbons would be back anyway, it was megalomaniac to think that they would put on the throne one of the descendants of Boney.

April 4th: The Marshal's Revolt (or Counselling Session, if you prefer); The Marshals explain to Napoleon that it's all over.
Napoleon tries to place his son and wife on the throne in his place. The Marshals take the offer to the Allies. It fails the laugh test, even with the Austrians. The Tsar politely points out that no-one can trust Bonaparte not to treat the Regency as a ready-made puppet government.
Just for added laughs, the Marshals have picked up a puzzled Marmont on the way to Paris. In his absence, Souham neutralises his troops; they march away behind the Loire.

I suggest you read Caulaincourt, who was there. The marshals convinced Napoleon to abdicate and he abdicated conditionally for his son. The marshals took that proposal to Alexander and it was the defection of Souham and some of the other generals in Marmont's corps to the allies that convinced Alexander that the French army was not behind Napoleon which was not true. The VI Corps marched into the allied lines, not behind the Loire and the troops and junior officers did not know that was going to happen. That is what ruined the idea of Napoleon abdicating in favor of a regency for his son. The marshals were furious with Marmont over his treachery and were now forced to accept the Bourbons which they did not want. And, no, the Bourbons return was not inevitable. Marmont's and Talleyrand's treachery made it happen.

Again read Caulaincourt.

Marmont was a skunk of the first order. Napoleon's calling him an ingrate was right on the money. What he did was dishonorable and unworthy of a soldier and commander.

I suggest you read Caulaincourt, who was there.

I cannot understand what you imply with this statement? More than Caulaincourt were there – so what? Any yes – before you ask me, I red Caulaincourt.

Also in 1815 Boney abdicated for his son taking over, well loss of realism and underestimating pygmies.

Sorry, but I have viewed Caulaincourt as an easily influenced--or duped--lightweight interested only in promoting himself at others' expense and placing blame on others for his own shortcomings.

His memoirs or whatever one likes to call them covering his period in Russia with Napoleon, and particularly sledding back to Paris with Napoleon and a lot of warm bear rugs, is a case in point.

Stupid? Caulaincourt wrote that book himself.

I suggest you read Caulaincourt, who was there

The same Caulaincourt who 'forgets' to mention that Marmont accompanied the commissioners to Paris….despite being the one who invited him along?

And then has Alexander greeting him with the news that Marmont has taken his corps over…when in fact this happened during the night and the commissioners only found out the next morning? And Marmont, of course, was with them the whole time…

And then has a scene where Marmont suddenly appears in Paris, smirking and hi-fiving his new friends…a total fabrication.

Ultimately though, even Caulaincourt can't hide the unpalatable truths, no matter how much fog he tries to lay – that the regency was never a serious proposition for the Allies, and it was rejected outright as soon as the commissioners arrived in Paris with the proposal.

Oh, and MacDonald was there too – and offers a far more reliable account from the French side than Caulaincourt.

Interesting what MacDonald had to say about the morale of the French Army, much different to the usual Boney propaganda stuff.

There were senior staff officers, including among the marshals, who could on occasion speak truth to power.

I assume the same was true for those who from time to time told Wellington what they saw from their perspectives.

Berthier, Davout, and the imperial aides-de-camp (Rapp, Savary, et al) routinely would offer advice, solicited or not, to Napoleon when they believed he needed it.

There was opposition among the general officers about the Russian campaign, and Berthier and others recommended in early 1813 that Napoleon should withdraw half of the troops in Spain and send them to face the Russians and the Prussians. Good advice not taken, unfortunately. That might have kept the Austrians in line and given Prussia second thoughts.

Berthier, who was not the commander of the Army of Germany in 1809, 'recommended' quite bluntly that Napoleon's presence early in the campaign was needed as the correspondence he was sending to Berthier was confusing as he was using both couriers and the telegraph and the correspondence was not arriving in sequence.

At the end of the Russian campaign after Napoleon had left for Paris, it was Berthier who urged Eugene to take command of the remnants of the army and who then 'urged' Napoleon to confirm the appointment. Murat had been in placed in command, but he left without permission and went home after Napoleon had left.

Regarding the abdication in 1814 and Caulaincourt's, Marmont's, Ney's, and Macdonald's part in it, see Caulaincourt's memoir, entitled No Peace With Napoleon, which is named as Caulaincourt's third volume of his memoirs. Chapters V, VI, and VII are helpful.

The bottom line is that Marmont was present with the other three when Souham marched the VI Corps into the allied lines obeying Marmont's orders. The subordinate officers and the troops had no idea that Souham was doing that and that Marmont had ordered it after talking with Talleyrand. Marmont should have told Talleyrand no, or better, have him arrested or shot for conspiring against France and Napoleon.

Lannes was absolutely correct when he told Talleyrand to his face that he was nothing but excrement in a silk stocking.

The same Caulaincourt who 'forgets' to mention that Marmont accompanied the commissioners to Paris….despite being the one who invited him along?

According to the reference listed above, that is an inaccurate statement.

Berthier, Davout, and the imperial aides-de-camp (Rapp, Savary, et al) routinely would offer advice, solicited or not, to Napoleon when they believed he needed it.

There was opposition among the general officers about the Russian campaign, and Berthier and others recommended in early 1813 that Napoleon should withdraw half of the troops in Spain and send them to face the Russians and the Prussians. Good advice not taken, unfortunately. That might have kept the Austrians in line and given Prussia second thoughts.

Berthier, who was not the commander of the Army of Germany in 1809, 'recommended' quite bluntly that Napoleon's presence early in the campaign was needed as the correspondence he was sending to Berthier was confusing as he was using both couriers and the telegraph and the correspondence was not arriving in sequence.

At the end of the Russian campaign after Napoleon had left for Paris, it was Berthier who urged Eugene to take command of the remnants of the army and who then 'urged' Napoleon to confirm the appointment. Murat had been in placed in command, but he left without permission and went home after Napoleon had left.

I fail to see any connection with the abdication of 1814

According to the reference listed above, that is an inaccurate statement.

Musketballs just pointed out the deficiencies of Caulaincourts memoirs in that topic, one has to read more than just Caulaincourt.

MB was incorrect, which is why I referenced the relevant chapters.

I fail to see any connection with the abdication of 1814

I was responding to MaggieC70's posting.

Caulaincourt's memoir, entitled No Peace With Napoleon, which is named as Caulaincourt's third volume of his memoirs. Chapters V, VI, and VII are helpful.

Do you mean the volume 3 of his memoirs in French?
Or in case no – the English translation in two volumes?

I will stand firmly by my assertion that Caulaincourt was first and foremost self-serving, egotistical, and an accomplished liar and deflector when anything got too uncomfortable for him.

For those of you with a strong working knowledge of the relevant diplomatic shenanigans on all sides during this era, you have doubtless seen that Caulaincourt, despite his vaunted claims of speaking Russian--French was spoken in diplomatic circles in St. Petersburg and by Russian aristocrats, BTW--he was pretty much Talleyrand's flunky, and sailed much too close to the wind in his post.

Further, some of the conversations he claimed he had with Napoleon when Napoleon told him what he thought of a whole roomful of folks, almost all of it unflattering, is largely a product of Caulaincout's imagination and his desire to seem "important," and above the petty fray and squabbles of court and military life.

I think, based on a lot of ancillary sources from both French and other primary sources, military and diplomatic, that Caulaincourt was generally a poseur and a bit of a jumped-up fraud.

Ever wonder why he didn't publish these "memoirs" during the Restoration when his opinions would have had a generally welcoming audience? But then there would be all those folks who recognized how many howlers he was telling, and would no doubt make their contempt quite public. Since he was allegedly such a dedicated note-taker, he could have completed his view of things before he died.

I'm done here. Let's just say if this guy was on fire, I wouldn't on him to put it out.

Yes, we're working off two different books here.

My examples came from Caulaincourt's Recollections, published in the 1830's, in 2 vols by Comtesse d'Eilleaux.

Of the 3 volume Hanoteau work, published in the 1930's, I've currently only read the second volume on Russia, so I'm not really in a position to discuss what Caulaincourt says differently there.

Hope that clarifies things a little.

The bottom line is that Marmont was present with the other three when Souham marched the VI Corps into the allied lines obeying Marmont's orders.

Correct that Marmont was in Paris with the other 3 commissioners when the troops marched. Incorrect that Souham was 'obeying Marmont's orders'. Quite the opposite – before leaving Essonne, Marmont instructed Souham to do nothing until he returned. Before the Commissioners reached Paris, Marmont saw Schwarzenberg and arranged to cancel the convention. The above is so well known that even Madame Junot accepted it. It's truly difficult to understand where your version is coming from – is Caulaincourt v3 the only source for it?

Marmont should have told Talleyrand no, or better, have him arrested or shot for conspiring against France and Napoleon.

Leaving aside the issue of whether Talleyrand & co could seriously be described as 'conspiring against France' for deciding to head off pointless bloodshed and devastation…
Not sure Marmont had the chance – IIRC, the Decree of 2nd April was sent by messenger, not hand-delivered by Talleyrand.

Has anyone read George Nafziger's The End of Empire: Napoleon's 1814 Campaign?

The book contains a concise chain of events regarding Marmont's treachery and treason, and their consequences-Chapter 21, pages 500-506.

Leaving aside the issue of whether Talleyrand & co could seriously be described as 'conspiring against France' for deciding to head off pointless bloodshed and devastation…

‘War is an evil thing…but to submit to the dictation of others is far worse…Freedom, if we hold fast to it, will ultimately restore our losses, but submission will mean permanent loss of what we all value…To you who call yourselves men of peace, I say: You are not safe unless you have men of action on your side.'-Thucidydes.

‘War is an evil thing…but to submit to the dictation of others is far worse…Freedom, if we hold fast to it, will ultimately restore our losses, but submission will mean permanent loss of what we all value…To you who call yourselves men of peace, I say: You are not safe unless you have men of action on your side.'-Thucidydes.

Well, that's actually more of a 'Not-Thucydides'. It's a heavily-modified internet-friendly quote that captures little of the essence of what Pericles (or his ghost-writer) says, and obviously none of the context. Given that the speech from which those snippets are extracted runs to 4 1/2 pages, that is hardly surprising.

A key thing to bear in mind, of course, is that Thucydides did not personally witness many of the speeches he reports, and says he cannot remember the precise details of those he did. He therefore cheerfully admits making them up according to what he believes should have happened. This need not unduly concern us – indeed, this may be the sort of history-writing with which you are most comfortable. So on to the speech itself.

The speech was (per Thucydides) delivered by Pericles after the outbreak of the Great Plague in 430 BC, and obviously before Pericles himself died of it – ie before the war itself had lasted even two years. More sensible heads at that point looked at the devastation being wrought and concluded that the chance of Athens winning a victory were irreparably damaged. They called for peace to be negotiated, which Pericles opposed.

‘War is an evil thing…but to submit to the dictation of others is far worse

Pericles' actual words: 'If one has a free choice and can live undisturbed, it is sheer folly to go to war. But suppose the choice was forced upon one – submission and immediate slavery or danger with the hope of survival, then I prefer the man who stands up to danger than the man who runs away from it.'

Pericles then goes on to point out an unpleasant truth to the Athenians – that they themselves voted to go to war. This is a key point to bear in mind here; Athens is a democracy. Pericles could not just decide to go to war with the Peloponnesian League – he is a demagogue, not a dictator. The people have had to approve each step along the way. He develops that point at length in his speech, basically accusing the Athenians of lacking moral fibre for voting for a war, then wanting out at the first setback. He strengthens the point by stressing that the Athenian Navy – their pride and strength – is still intact and with it their true power.

Pericles' points obviously bear no real comparison with the Bonapartist despotism, with its central control, totally censored press and all-pervasive police apparatus. The French people did not vote to invade Spain, or invade Russia, nor were they given a chance to vote on any of the Allied peace offers made throughout 1813 and 1814. We should also note that at the time Pericles is speaking, Athens is weakened, but not yet seriously threatened. This is hardly the case in 1814, when Paris has fallen and Napoleon's army is a ragged remnant facing 250 000 battle-hardened Allied troops. It's game over, basically.

Freedom, if we hold fast to it, will ultimately restore our losses, but submission will mean permanent loss of what we all value

Pericles actually says: 'Remember, too, that freedom, if we preserve our freedom by our own efforts, will easily restore us to our old position; but to submit to the will of others means to lose even what we still have. You must not fall below the standard of your fathers, who not only won an empire by their own toil and sweat, without receiving it from others, but went on to keep it safe so that they could hand it down to you.'

This essentially captures what is at stake here, a couple of years into the war. The enemy war aim is to achieve the dissolution of the increasingly over-mighty and belligerent Athenian Empire, not to destroy Athens itself. When Pericles talks about 'freedom', he means the freedom of Athens to dominate other states under the pretence that their empire is some kind of defensive alliance. When he talks about 'submission', he means agreeing to allow the tributary states to go their own way. It's a matter of perspective, really…

Needless to say, none of this has any relevance to the situation in France in 1814. No-one was fighting for what their fathers built: Napoleon had destroyed that a decade previously and usurped all power. Nor was there an empire to lose or bargain away – it was already lost and allied armies were pushing into France from all directions.

To you who call yourselves men of peace, I say: You are not safe unless you have men of action on your side.'

Pericles actually says: 'Your empire is now like a tyranny: it may have been wrong to take it, it is certainly dangerous to let it go. And the kind of people who talk of doing so and persuade others to adopt their point of view would very soon bring a state to ruin, and would still do so even if they lived by themselves in isolation. For those who are politically apathetic can only survive if they are supported by people capable of taking action. They are quite valueless in a city which controls an empire…'

The third string of Pericles' bow: having tried collective guilt (*You* voted for this war!) and emotional blackmail (What would your fathers think?), he now goes for pure fear…'All those people you've oppressed for decades…you think they're just going to forget all about it…what you gonna do when they come knocking at the door?'

Well in 1814, they had indeed come knocking at the door. And the required revenge? Dethrone Bonaparte and…well, that's it really. Borders of 1791, no occupation, no reparations…just ditch the warmonger and we'll be happy and go home. Louis XVIII was willing to forget everything…even the regicides got a free pass the first time round.

TL:DR – With quotes, context is everything.

It is really sad but not an unexpected blinkered viewpoint thrown at Napoleon by the Nap haters when they call him a 'warmonger'. They just can't accept that it was the allies who refused a chance of peace in 1815, not Napoleon. The allies were the warmongers, just as they were on other occasions. But for some, it is obvious easier to throw the blame, for everything, onto one person. Historically inaccurate, but when has that bothered the blind Nap haters. LOL

Well in 1814, they had indeed come knocking at the door. And the required revenge? Dethrone Bonaparte and…well, that's it really. Borders of 1791, no occupation, no reparations…just ditch the warmonger and we'll be happy and go home. Louis XVIII was willing to forget everything…even the regicides got a free pass the first time round.

First, the old slur that Napoleon was a warmonger is just not true.

Second, the Bourbons refused to pay Napoleon's pension which was a trigger for him returning in 1815. The Bourbons violated the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleu.

Third, the Bourbons treated the army, especially the officers, badly which caused resentment against the monarchy.

Not a good start for the Bourbons who had 'returned in the enemies' baggage wagons.'

First, the old slur that Napoleon was a warmonger is just not true.

His deeds show otherwise he enjoyed de faire la guerre – even Rapp thought so, it is in his memoirs.

Third, the Bourbons treated the army, especially the officers, badly which caused resentment against the monarchy.

they had to downsize the army, but in 1814 they were ready to forget almost everything.

With regard to the alleged treatment of Napoleonic soldiers of all ranks from 1814 and especially after Waterloo, there are some interesting articles here:

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While there is plenty of evidence that the future Charles X and his White Terror boys deliberately sought out Napoleonic veterans of all ranks to beat up and otherwise retaliate against, and true that many were placed on half-pay, to say that all Napoleonic veterans were badly treated after 1815 is not true. Some were, but most weren't. For all his faults, Fat Gouty Louis 18 did try to at least put out the appearance of being rather fair to the former soldiers, and did manage to restrain his awful brother from committing his excesses.

Thanks for that MaggieC70

It may just be Orson Welles, or just the incredible uniform styles of the First Restoration, but I have always been a huge fan of Louis XVIII (I love the Louis Who Sweats gag).

Ok, not the fittest. Not the brightest. Arguably not the bravest (but he did have a certain sang froid, on occasion, during the "Hundred Days"). But a far better character (and therefore monarch) than his family and immediate followers.

I have never yet found a biography in English. If no such thing, a major omission.

The French army in 1814 had to be downsized as the wars were apparently over. And the process actually began sensibly. Then the regimental organizations and traditions were scrambled and veteran officers were put on half pay in order to allow nobles to have their places, even those who had served against France.

The returning prisoners of war were usually sent home to wait for their back pay and might be assaulted by royalist gangs on the roads.

The returning garrisons who had not surrendered until the abdication of Napoleon were sometimes badly treated, especially their commanders such as Davout or Lemarois.

The Bourbons also spent lavish funds 'reestablishing' the Maison du Roi which was worthless as combat soldiers. In short, they were a waste of money. And Louis, Artois, Angouleme and Berry as well as their retinues and supporters, engaged in behavior which alienated both the army and many of their 'subjects.'

One thing stood out and was of critical importance-the French army was not happy and that spelled problems for the Bourbons.

I have never yet found a biography in English. If no such thing, a major omission.

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Oh thankyou…thankyou…..how did I miss the first one especially?

Deadhead, I'll read the Louis XVIII bio if you will. I agree that he had a quality or three, and in comparison with his brother Artois, the duc Angouleme, and that ridiculous Marie-Therese, among many others [de Polignac, delusional and waiting in the wings for his Big Chance] he manages to salvage something.

Second, the Bourbons refused to pay Napoleon's pension which was a trigger for him returning in 1815. The Bourbons violated the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleu.

I highly doubt that Napoleon invaded France and picked up troops to go get his money.

But without the income he could not fund his sojourn in Elba. Without his Garde Imperiale protection he felt he was at all kinds of threat from the locals and pirates. Withholding the money put him in an impossible position as an exile there. So it was a "trigger"…a major one for him personally.

Second, the Bourbons refused to pay Napoleon's pension which was a trigger for him returning in 1815. The Bourbons violated the terms of the Treaty of Fontainebleu.

Article III of the Treaty of Fontainebleu simply states that Napoleon is granted 'an annual revenue' etc.

The dictionary definition of 'Annual' is 'happening once per year'.

However, given that Napoleon actually stayed on Elba for less than a year, he could be on a sticky wicket claiming the Bourbons owed him anything at the moment of embarkation.

They weren't going to pay the pension as promised. That is a violation of the treaty.

They weren't going to pay the pension as promised.

Are there sources in text available who confirm this believe – who stated this in detail??

It is in Swords Around a Throne, so it must be true (Discuss).

OK, I might be teasing…….