"Field Marshal Haig: a man much misunderstood?" Topic

"Field Marshal Haig has gone down in history as the general who callously sent hundreds of thousands of Tommies to their deaths – one of the 'donkeys who led the lions'. But, through their analysis of Haig's diaries, Gary Sheffield and John Bourne have arrived at a rather different view of the war leader

Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig has had the unenviable reputation of being the worst British general of all time, a bone-headed "donkey" who threw away the lives of his men in futile attacks. In many ways, the debate has now moved on from such stereotypes. Certainly, a revolution in the historiography of the First World War has occurred over recent years…."
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Amicalement
Armand

One of the key issues to understanding WWI on the Western Front is that though they were losing men in tremendous battles full of fire and steel with very high casualties, for a long time nobody was actually losing the fight.

The Germans sat high and dry in their trenches, built to resist all but the most formidable of assaults, while the Allies may have been bloodied they were still more than capable of fighting.

With the Germans holding Belgium and a portion of France hostage there was a reason to continue to fight. If the Allies had brokered for peace, the Germans would most certainly have made major demands, priming Europe for yet another cycle of war sooner or later. The logic was one of "We came this far, we might as well try to finish as best as we can, if only because of those we lost already."

The British suddenly had to field more officers in a single war than there had been in total since the restoration of King Charles II.

To command them they appointed Haig, a man, who like many others had his strengths and shortcomings.

Haig was fairly intelligent, he was not intelectually curious, being more a man of tradition and sticking to ideas formed at some point in life. While he would never come up with new military theories on his own, he understood the potential of new weapons, though he also had a strong nostalgic streak that tended to push him to believe that once the dreadful war was over, things would return to normal and the next war would be a "proper one" with all the dashing of cavalry charges, bold Tommies holding the thin Khaki line and artillery being the musical background of battle.

He had to oversee the largest army the British Empire had ever mustered and had to deal with a myriad of organizational and technical problems and seems to have performed at least adequately.

Some of his quotes have been taken out of context to create the image of a man who was completely out of depth and had zero understanding of modern warfare. Rather he was a commander who soon realized that whatever romance had been attached to war at this point had drowned in a shell crater some time in late 1914. He promoted reforms such as upping the number of machineguns and deploying them into separate units that could be deployed very rapidly to defend a gap in the line or exploit a breach. He did push for the use of tanks and complained to the government that his forces lacked the right kind of artillery and ammunition to fight a perpetual siege rather than field campaigns.

In the 1915-1916 period he was tied to launch unprepared offensives though he personally would have preferred to postpone such operations until his armies were better trained for the job.

Even his most glorious failure did not happen for lack of trying. He had to act, as the French were desperately holding onto Verdun. The British had hoped that the biggest bombardment in history might ease the way for the infantry. The first day turned out to be a black day for the British army, but almost immediately afterwards the telegraph, telephones and runners had to do triple duty to implement all the changes they had learned from that first day.

I've yet to find a single military answer to the problems Haig and his peers faced. A few will suggest some fancy flourish, invoking the ghost of Rommel as if he ever overcame strong defensive positions with a headlong rush of his panzers (note, he didn't, only a concentrated assault worked) or the classic "They should have sued for peace" which for a lack of an actual defeat seems rather silly.

Given the urgency of the situation at Verdun, Haig could not have sit back and decide to postpone operations as he had indeed originally intended, awaiting better conditions. But as with so many other generals, he had no final control over where and when to fight.

Haig has often been accused of being a callous, cold man who didn't even dare to look his men in the face, but he did visit soldiers and he was so shocked by what he saw that his doctor suggested he avoid trying again. He could have gone on an extensive tour of every regiment and battalion, which would have kept him busy for the better part of half a year doing all but shaking hands and talking to the men.

He was accused of sitting in a chateau while his men faced horrible conditions. But what would putting him in a half-submerged dugout in the front line under permanent shelling and expect him to lead an army of over 2 million men fighting over an area roughly 150km wide actually accomplish ? Would he really have won the battles if had been standing on a tank, waving a sabre and commanding at best a battalion or two of troops in a battle involving several divisions ???

Moral outrage for good tactics does no make …

Was Haig the best man for the job ? Definitely not
Was he adequate ? Mostly yes

Other men would have done better under the same conditions, like I said he was not the most flexible of people, he lacked the spark of genius and insight better generals have. He was a good organizer, and a diligent caretaker for the army under his command, trying his best given the conditions. He could had and should have done better on some points, but he was hardly a donkey leading lions.

Patrick that is an outstanding analysis of the situation regarding higher command during the First World War.

I would make a similar argument in defense of General Pershing and the A.E.F..

Too many people look at the First World War without considering the enormous tactical, technological, political, and social changes that were occurring at the time.

Historians often talk about the "revolution" in warfare that occurred during World War Two. I believe that far greater change and innovation occurred during the First World War.

Many thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand

But he wasn't as innovative as the German high command in adapting to the changing nature of warfare, content to fight a static war of attrition rather than try new tactics, such as the utilization of stormtrooper assaults.

A whole generation was lost as a result.

Sorry, as noted even in wiki Haig appears to have been quite eager to adopt new technology and find ways in which to lessen the number of casualties.

He was very interested in tanks and pushed their adoption and use.

And ultimately the British losses were proportionately far less than those of France or Germany.

The French were doing exactly what the Germans did in 1918, except they implemented the changes in 1916, one of things that helped them hold onto Verdun and even push back the Germans in the last stages of the battle.

French companies had aside from the riflemen who were lavishly equipped with grenades, a section of rifle grenadiers and Chauchat teams as well as light mortars like the Crapouillot providing close support. French units attacked using fire and movement and units supporting each other to suppress the enemy.

The British retrained their troops in late 1916 and into 1917 their improved tactics and equipment were perfected by the Canadians at Vimy Ridge.

It was the Germans who were a bit slow, much of the developments of 1917 were concentrated mainly in the building of better defensive networks and improving artillery, it wasn't until after they extensively studied what seems to have gone wrong at Verdun (lack of portable machineguns, units still operating in larger formations, too few NCO's to lead smaller units) that they retrained their forces in time to launch the big offensives of 1918.

While Haigh was not given to much outward display of emotion the fact that the BEF took better care of it's men than just about any other army in the war once the intial troubles caused by logistics and the massive army expansion suggest that casulties aside he was not indiffrent to their general wellfare. (Compare to the French who had to go through the mutinies to institute reforms change the way the French soldiers were treated. The Germans for all their talk of leadership and kamradschaft were rather segregated in a lot of ways and the unequal treatment of officers and men was one of the things that eroded the cohesion of the units in the end.)

And last but not least Haigh pretty much worked himself to death after the war to look after the interests of the veterans who were repaid poorly for their service and hardship.

Patrick R, can you suggest an English language source (or sources) for the evolution of French tactics? I have a reasonable amount of material on the British and the Germans but so far have found nothing on the French.

I have to say almost all of my sources are French, there were quite a few magazines and publications in the last few years from publishers like Histoire et Collections.

I have not found a comprehensive book on the subject though I have one or two specials that did illustrate the various changes they made.

The French had a very interesting setup in 1914. They had introduced the first modern bolt action rifle, but it was a compromise design and already obsolescent by 1914.

Their artillery suffered from a similar problem, they came up with an advanced 75mm gun but most development hit a low after that and they had a critical lack of heavy guns in 1914.

They had one of the best machineguns of the war in the shape of the Hotchkiss, except for a very bad ammo feeding mechanism. It was much lighter and much more versatile than the Maxim guns and thanks to an excellent heavy barrel setup could keep up fire quite effectively.

French doctrine already figured firepower into the mix and troops were expected to either fight in open order or from cover, only to join up and concentrate for the final attack, preferably with the bayonet.

Many officers tended to forget about the open order and fighting from cover and preferred to send their men forward, with most officers leading from the front, resulting in heavy casualties in the junior officer corps in 1914-1915.

The French fairly quickly implemented changes, they initiated production of a very fine 155mm heavy gun, perfected new ammo and better fuses for the 75mm, introduced the Chauchat which, while not a great weapon, provided useful fire in combat, especially when used in numbers and they were quite handy on the advance, more so than any other weapon before the introduction of the BAR. The highly tapered Balle D which looks like a rocket was a huge problem for such a firearm and magazines were highly curved to allow the cartridge to fit.

The "Bleu Horizon" a bluish gray turned out to be more effective than commonly thought as some work had been done on the effectiveness of camouflage. It was never designed to allow men to "blend in with the sky" when cresting a hill. It was made of durable fabric and quite practical in the field.

The Adrian helmet was not as good as the British or German helmets, but it gave adequate protection, though it had a serious weak spot in the area where the badge was fixed to the helmet with two holes and a sufficiently hard impact might get through and hit the forehead.

The French adapted their tactics though they retained the desire to keep the offensive spirit of the troops going. As a result they became victims of their own success. The new tactics tried in 1916 gave good results and after Verdun the French were eager to launch a counter-attack to show the Germans the way out of France.

Bolstered by initial success the French army bogged down for lack of the ability to sustain offensives beyond the first or second line of defense which combined with a ruthlessly aggressive commander like Nivelle resulted in French soldiers becoming despondent. Especially because Petain who had championed firepower over relentless assaults (his motto was "Le feu tue." – Firepower kills) had managed his troops in a better way. Nivelle's more callous approach resulted in the French soldiers refusing to go on another senseless offensive for little or no gain. Note that many soldiers expressly said they would stand and fight in their trenches to the last man if need be, but refused to go on the attack.

The French quickly adjusted, extending leave for the men (some soldiers barely had a few days off since they had arrived on the front years earlier) better food and the officers who understood that they would have to wait and build up their equipment for a new well-planned offensive gained the upper hand. The Allies forced a joint command and the promise of American aid strengthened their resolve that they could launch a new major offensive by 1918-1919 and compound all the lessons learned.

The Germans launched their own offensive in the hope to break the allies and essentially bled their own forces to death leaving only skeleton units of second and third rate troops to hold the line.

Another major addition to the French arsenal was the FT-17. Used in large numbers they proved very effective in providing close support in the attack.

The French army was somehow handicapped in 1914 by a number of weapon designs and a doctrine that called for aggression whenever possible that did not translate well in the protracted, high attrition fighting of trench warfare.

Weapons like the Chauchat already prefigure the simplified production of weapons like the Sten or the M3 Grease Gun. While problematic, the French seem to have taken better care of their weapons and considered parts like the magazines utterly disposable, while the questionable conversion by the Americans made a tricky weapon even worse. But it was not the quality of the weapon, but mass production (nearly 300k made) and widespread concentrated use that made all the difference.

Thank you Patrick R. So much of what is available in English only deals with the British or German perspective. The recent literature finally is giving a more nuanced view of the British tactical advances. While this comes as a welcome contrast to the earlier emphasis on the Stosstruppen, it still leaves the study of the tactical evolution of the other powers woefully lacking.

The first British C-in-C was General John French. Haig was appointed to replace French. It is possible that Grierson, had he not died suddenly en route to Maubeuge in 1914, might have been appointed ahead of Haig. Grierson had been the only other serious contender for the role.

Haig was more than "fairly" intelligent. Far from being "not intellectually curious", Haig read widely – in German and French as well as English. He was very well versed in German operational and tactical methods before the war. Haig played a key role in improvements in training. This was an early indication of his ability to oversee significant organisational changes.

On the eve of war, Haig was one of only two people that predicted a long and protracted war. The other was Lord Kitchener.

Haig was not a "man of tradition" who only stuck "to ideas formed at some point in life". Prior to becoming C-in-C, Haig oversaw the Battle of Neuve Chapelle in 1915. The BEF achieved an early break-in but then delayed the reinforcement of success. Nevertheless, the scale and speed of the break-in was considered so impressive at the time that General Joffre ordered that the after action analysis should be circulated throughout the French army as an exemplar.

During his time as C-in-C, Haig managed the ever-increasing scale of British operations. During the planning processes, Haig would read and retain the details of all planning documents from brigades through to Army levels. He engaged in planning meetings with groups of his commanders as well as individuals. Throughout these meetings, he would constantly pose questions and require his commanders to think more thoroughly about their plans. This style was well suited to raising the standards of his commanders in a systematic way. It also enabled him to appreciate the potential for the likes of the tank in advance of its introduction on the battlefield.

I am not quite sure what is meant by "he would never come up with new military theories on his own…". Specifically, I am not sure what is meant by 'theories'. There were standard principles that were well accepted and have withstood the test of time. It was the application of these principles that required adaptations ahead of the enemy, as well as the ability to detect and neutralise the constant adaptations applied by the enemy. Haig ensured that the BEF got better and better at understanding what the German army was up to tactically on the battlefield. By the time of the Battle of Third Ypres, for example, the British were able to understand in real-time how the German immediate counter-attacks would be mounted and from where.

Another example of Haig's ability, which has been grossly misunderstood, is his capacity for what is called scenario-planning. Haig rigorously ensured that his commanders planned for major success in an assault as well as failure. The Battle of the Somme is a classic example, where Haig is accused of setting objectives that were too distant and too unrealistic. Because these objectives related to cavalry exploitation, many have accused Haig of being wedded to outdated nostalgic notions. A detailed review of the planning process shows, however, that Haig predicated the use of cavalry on the total collapse of German resistance, not on the ability of the assault troops to batter their way through. Learning from the Neuve Chapelle example, Haig insisted that Rawlinson take this option into account. At the same time, Haig knew exactly what the immediate objectives were and what would be done in the event of complete failure. He had reviewed all of these plans in meticulous detail.

I agree that he "oversaw the largest army the British Empire had ever mustered and that many of his quotes have been taken out of context to create the image of a man who was completely out of depth and had zero understanding of modern warfare". As noted earlier, he knew before the war started that "whatever romance had been attached to war… had drowned…".

I agree that there was no "single military answer to the problems Haig and his peers faced". To those "few [who] will suggest some fancy flourish…", we only have to look at how amazed people were with smart bombs dropping down ventilation shafts in the First Gulf War and then look at the situation all these years on – there is no 'fancy flourish' when it comes to war, especially all-out war between major powers that will not give in. There has been mention of Stosstruppen as an example of Haig's inability to appreciate innovation. Actually, German writers referred to British troops as 'Sturmtruppen' in their writings of the time – testament to the similarities in assault tactics.

As to whether Haig was the best man for the job, it was clearly the case at the time. I respectfully disagree that he was "not the most flexible of people, he lacked the spark of genius and insight better generals have." He was "a good organizer" precisely because he had the intellect and the right "spark of genius" for the situation. A lesser person would have been overwhelmed by the sheer scale of the task, let alone maintain the level of adaptation and improvement in the British and Dominion armies throughout his time as C-in-C.

My Grandfather recalled seeing Haig whilst he was serving on the Western Front. My Grandfather understood from experience (which he talked about after the war) that the Germans were a formidable enemy. He knew, as many did at the time, that it was going to take dogged determination as well as skill to overcome their resistance and to free Belgium and northern France. Haig's appearance and manner with the troops inspired them, providing that strong sense of leadership without the need for embellishment or flourishes.

Robert

With respect to the French, not only had they had introduced the first modern bolt action rifle but also the first automatic rifle. The latter caused a significant stir in the German High Command before the war. It was not possible to field the automatic rifle in the war because of the tight restrictions on military spending imposed by the French Government. Artillery development was hit by the same problem, not by any lack of technological advances to parallel the development of the soixante-quinze. French industry produced some excellent heavy guns before 1914. The Schneider 152 mm howitzer M1910 was a superb example but Joffre could not get the funding to replace the outdated heavy guns before August 1914.

The Hotchkiss medium machine gun was excellent, as mentioned. The ammo feeding mechanism was not 'bad'. The metal feeder strips could be clipped together to provide continuous feeds. This did not overcome the major issue, which plagued all machine guns at the time. Rapid continuous fire was simply not practical because of the problems with ammunition supply and rapid barrel overheating, even with water-cooled systems. All nations deployed MGs in sections to ensure a more continuous level of fire. Guns could take it in turn to fire. This level of redundancy helped get over the issue of stoppages too.

Pre-war French doctrine definitely focused on firepower and manoeuvre before the war. The notion of all-out attack has been grossly mis-represented over the years. As mentioned, French troops were expected to either fight in open order or from cover, including digging trenches or other forms of cover. There is the record of an Englishman, who trained in the French army before the war. He mentions all of these aspects in his historical account. The use of the bayonet was predicated on fire superiority.

I respectfully disagree that "officers tended to forget about the open order and fighting from cover and preferred to send their men forward…". All officers struggled to understand when fire superiority had been achieved in an assault. There are numerous examples on all sides (for example in Bloem's account on Mons) where an assault was ordered because the enemy firing line went 'quiet', only to erupt when the final attempt to close was initiated.

The best-trained French officers and soldiers suffered serious defeats around Rossignol, for example, not because they 'forgot' to how to assault but because they were outmanoeuvred by the Germans, who had better intel from their division-level cavalry. The French Government refused to invest in significant increases in training areas and opportunities before the war. Unlike the Germans who held large corps-size manoeuvres throughout the various districts for several years before the war, the French really struggled to achieve anything remotely similar. Time-and-again, this deficiency caused serious problems in the first weeks of the war.

The French army was handicapped in 1914 by the lack of Government investment in heavy artillery and capacity for large unit training. The latter compromised the ability of large units to cooperate together effectively in the field as well. The weapons that were in use, including the bolt action rifle and Hotchkiss MMG, were more than a match for the Germans. Even the much maligned French cavalry carbine was an excellent weapon, as evidenced by the performance of 9th Cavalry Division against two German infantry divisions in the Battle of Longlier (20 August, 1914).

I am travelling at the moment but, when back home, will post some references to material in English (though most of my references on French tactics and performance are in French and German). I will also pick up on French later war tactics in another post.

Robert

One of the most pressing issues of the French officer corps and the French military in general was a relative lack of follow up for reservists that translated into problems with freshly called up troops.

Unlike the Germans who had regular training and refresher courses, the French had a much more lax system due to limited budgets and a serious underestimation of a future war's requirements.

If you look at the pack of the average French soldier in 1914, he might have a shovel or a pick and many had things like folding saws, hammers, hatchets and other tools. Unlike other armies where anything but summary trenches and very basic field works were meant to be built by specialists, much was expected to be built by the troops themselves and while the "Position Magnifique" of 1870 was seen as a mistake it was not entirely taken from the table.

Mediocre training and a general unspoken attitude of "When in doubt, charge" combined with the situation in August to October 1914 almost inevitably saw many French officers like Lieutenant Charles Péguy leading from the front, telling their "enfants" to give it one more push, often with fatal results.

The deadliness of 1914 was not due to foolish officers sending their men to be massacred in one feel swoop, it was a consistent attrition rate combined with prolonged fighting over weeks and months that caused so many deaths. Most officers quickly learned that attacking at any cost was not a good option, but they often found themselves in a position where there were no other choices, as they were swept forward by the others in a game of action and reaction.

Prior to the war, the French had regular training and refresher courses but there were significant gaps due to the limited budgets. As with most countries, there was basic training earlier in the training 'year'. New intakes would be brought up to speed with individual skills and disciplines. Higher level unit training progressed from section level up to company then regiment levels. Finally, there would be higher level manoeuvres but not to the same degree as the German training because of the lack of space available due to the budgetary constraints.

Joffre understood what the requirements would be for the future war. He pushed hard to get more money for training grounds, heavy artillery, etc, etc. The Republican Government refused to invest heavily. It was a political decision primarily, not a military one.

Once war became inevitable, the process of mobilisation began in earnest. Regular and some reserve/territorial divisions took to the field. There were several weeks before most divisions saw any real action. The time was used to re-acquaint non-regulars with skills such as marksmanship and basic manoeuvres.

Mobilisation continued as more and more men were called to arms over subsequent weeks. Many were fed into existing units, making up for losses in the heavy fighting of August and September. These men received additional training once they joined their respective units; training that often took into account the lessons learned already.

Other men went into the new divisions that were formed. The quality of their higher level trained varied considerably. Whilst GQG issued numerous 'lessons learned' instructions, the implementation of these lessons was heavily dependent on the increasingly inexperienced, lower quality officers and NCOs that lacked battlefield experience. It should be noted that these problems were not specific to the French army. Haig was aware of similar problems in the BEF throughout the period before the winter of 1914/15. Given his background in promoting training, Haig maintained his concern that training should be systematic and thorough.

Robert