"Artillery in Effective Musket & Rifle Range" Topic

Senarmont started with guns placed on both flanks of Dupont's division with a reserve behind it. It was a decision of the moment…one that was questioned by Victor and allowed by Napoleon 'to see what he [Senarmont] could do', not some major change in in French Military History. All kudos to Senarmont for what he and his gunners did, but considering how many times that kind of artillery advance for any distance was done at that scale [the can be counted on one hand], we aren't seeing some brilliant military innovation as much as an extension of existing practices already in place.
Certainly, the French were aggressive with their guns [and had a 'doctrine' of supporting them], often successful, sometimes not so much, before and after Friedland.

And your conclusions are wrong. And the evidence supplied to you in the other thread years ago definitely shows that your conclusions are wrong.

Perhaps reading the material on Senarmont here might help you:

link

…Senarmont took the initiative and conducted a concentrated use of batteries to attack an enemy who was withdrawing…

The Russians were not withdrawing. They may have planned to do so as they failed to defeat Lannes, but they had to cancel those plans when the Grande Armee showed up. The Russians had defeated Ney's main attack which was when Dupont advanced and Senarmont supported him. Then Senarmont took the initiative and attacked the Russian center with Dupont supporting him. That is the key to the action-the artillery was no longer the supporting arm but the supported arm and Senarmont's concentrated fire destroyed the Russian center.

a comment form Zhmodikov

Who and where? Senarmont at Friedland? As soon as General Bennigsen had learned that the main forces of Napoleon approached the battlefield, he ordered all battery (heavy) artillery to be brought back over the River Alle (Bennigsen L. A. von, Mémoires du Général Bennigsen, Paris, 1907, t. 2, p. 201). It was before Senarmont had formed his battery. So, when Senarmont's battery opened fire, the Russians had already removed their heavy artillery from the front and were preparing to retreat. The Russian Guard fought before the town only to slow down the advance of the French and to allow the other Russian troops to retreat safely through the streets of the town and across the bridges.

Napoleon won the battle of Friedland simply because he had concentrated more troops at the battlefield than Bennigsen had. There were hundreds of guns at the battlefield. How could anyone believe that the battle was won by a battery of 36 guns?

Alexandre Heroy

If we are to be "using all of the source material", would that not include Russian sources?
For example, the after-action report of the Russian Horse Guards, quoted at length in their regimental histories is rather explicit:
- fresh columns of French advanced from previously hidden positions – with infantry, cavalry and a large battery of no less than 30 guns – Dupont's division was the most threatening
- prince Bagration ordered up the Life-Guards Ismaylovskiy, Semyonoskiy and Konnyy (Horse) regiments
- the Horse Guards advanced very rapidly against French cavalry – assumedly La Houssaye's dragoon division attached to Victor's corps – and this compelled them to turn back despite their larger numbers – which indicates to me that the dragoons were about to get taken by a flank
- the Horse Guards then opened up their formation (from column of half-squadorns or column of squadrons to two divisions I would think, likely operating separately) and took on a French infantry column in co-ordination with bayonet counter-attacks being delivered by the Sankt-Peterburgskiy and Pavlovskiy Grenadiers
- the counter-attacks seemed to be going pretty well, but the Horse Guards received Benigsen's order for the army to withdraw and re-formed to cover this
- they never charged the French guns, and – as their officer casulaties are individually described – only about 1/3 of their casualties were from artillery fire
- these casualties from artillery are listed as contusions and impact wounds from parts of shells – the 4th squadron being the hardest hit – from which I would say that the French howitsers that would be typically posted on the flanks of a French gun line did fire shell at the the Horse Guards as they went in to attack the French infantry, getting some degree of enfilade penetration on the nearest Russian squadron
- the total casualites for the Horse Guards in the battle were rather typical for a major engagement : 3 offcers and 52 other ranks killed or mortally wounded, 13 officers an 64 other ranks wounded, 28 other ranks missing (tpyically un-horsed and captured) – total 160 all ranks all casaualties, about 20-25%
The Ismaylovets saw more of the French battery, and recorded more substantial artillery casuallities. The Semyonoskiy regiment appears to have been behind their colleagues and did not get much engaged before the order to withdraw.
Interestingly, total Russian casulaties as reported in Russian sources, both primary and secondary (and these to include Imperial, Soviet and modern writers) are rather lower than as reported in French sources – the number of killed or mortally wounded for the whole battle is more like 4000 men.
So, if we are to believe that some 4000 men and several Russian units were "destroyed" (however defined) by artillery fire from general de Sénarmont's guns, may I please ask that someone say which Russian units these were? Upon a quick scan of Russian sources, I just could not find any reports which could be readily thus interpreted. But I would be happy to look some more.
Amicalement,
- Alexandre

And the evidence supplied to you in the other thread years ago definitely shows that your conclusions are wrong.

Perhaps reading the material on Senarmont here might help you:

link

? A 1895 biography three great artillerists, Douot, Senarmont and Eble. On the pages where the link to me, Senarmont is described as brilliant, valorous and that he wrought fearful damage on the Russians with his guns at Friedland…the crews suffering frightful losses.

I didn't see that the text and quotes said anything about his maneuvers being unique, unprecedented, or any comment among the three biographies even suggesting he was seen as an innovator in artillery practices among the three great artillery officers.

I may have missed it in my quick translating, but I didn't see it anywhere in Senarmont's Bio. or the introduction or conclusions. Douot seems to get more attention than Senarmont. They all were great artillerymen, no question.

I still hold to my view. The link doesn't address the issue I raised, let alone recognize it as an issue.

Read the primary source material in the book. It might help understand Friedland and Senarmont's action there better.

he didn't even say it himself, see his after action report in

see Les Deux Généraux de Senarmont by Girod de l'Aine, in Revue d'Artillerie, April – Septembre 1891, Paris et Nancy, 1891, by the way also here it is stated that Victor gave the permisson to Senarmont to re unit almost all artillery of 1er corps despite the resistance of the divisional commanders and also the part of Dupont attack is well mentioned.

By the way, the legend that Senarmont was the first to produce an unique tactis of artillery is created by Favé – who ignores all the work of battalion guns, though not a concentrated as those two batteries of Friedland fame and tactics of artillery officers of other nations as well.

Summary of the action at Friedland, 14 June 1807:

Friedland began early on 14 June with Lannes delaying action against Bennigsen. He sent couriers to Napoleon to keep him abreast of the action and to request reinforcements. Once the army was assembled, Ney was designated to be the main attack on the French right flank against Bagration. This attack was defeated and Ney's corps was routed with the exception of two regiments that stood firm.

Dupont advanced on his own initiative in the center supported by Captain Ricci's artillery battery. The 9th Leger was in square behind Ricci.

Senarmont, the chief of artillery of I Corps to who both Dupont and Ricci belonged, saw an opportunity for his artillery and secured permission from the corps commander, Victor, to advance with the entire corps compliment of artillery, 36 pieces.

He formed two batteries of fifteen guns each on either side of Dupont and kept the other 6 pieces in reserve. As the artillery advanced against the Russian center, they outpaced Dupont and advanced alone and on their own, stopping to fire as they advanced by bounds.

Senarmont finally stopped 120 yards from the Russian position. By now, the artillery was in one 30 gun battery because of the terrain and they opened fire on the Russian infantry and knocked over 4,000 of them in 25 minutes, destroying the Russian center.

They were attacked on their left flank by Russian cavalry and seeing the danger, Senarmont shifted the guns and fired two quick volleys of canister which ruined the Russian cavalry charge. Dupont defeated the Russian infantry to his front and the Russians broke and headed into Friedland and the bridges to get across the river.

Senarmont continued to advance as did Dupont. Ney had also rallied his corps and attacked again, and the Russians were driven into the burning town.

With the main attack defeated, Senarmont seized the initiative with his artillery and became the main French attack, supported by Dupont and later Ney. That is why I characterized Senarmont's action as the ‘de facto main attack.' It wasn't planned, but was a tactical improvisation by Senarmont. Victor had no idea what he was going to do and neither did Napoleon. Napoleon actually sent General Mouton to find out what was going on and Senarmont bluntly told him to go away.

When he reported back to Napoleon, he told Mouton to let it be. For Senarmont's action at Friedland, the I Corps after-action report as well as Senarmont's own after-action report are valuable primary source material, as is Senarmont's letter to his brother written 12 days after the action. Senarmont walked the area of the action and saw the heavy Russian losses and it should be noted that it is easy to tell dead from artillery rounds against those killed by musket fire. Artillery wounds can be quite spectacular.
Further references are Yermelov's memoirs in which he remarks on the heavy Russian casualties from French artillery fire and there are excellent secondary accounts of the action by James Arnold (who used both Girod de l'Ain and Vigo-Roussillon as references), John Elting, and AF Becke, all of whom agree that Senarmont's artillery attack was if not the decisive action of the day, was a decisive action of the day.

Artillery fire by either canister or roundshot is very deadly at close range.

More information on the subject:

In a letter to his brother on 26 June 1807, twelve days after Friedland, Senarmont stated: 'the position of the enemy showed 4,000 dead on this spot alone. I lost the chief of my staff, Colonel Forno, killed by a ball at the end of the action. I have had three officers and sixty-two gunners hors de combat, and a charming horse wounded under me; I fear I shall not be able to save him.'

Here is an excerpt from AF Becke's study on the Battle of Friedland in 1807:

'It was a salient moment in the evolution of tactics of field artillery. At last it was able to maneuver independently and handled by a great gunner it played a decisive part in the attack, mastered the hostile batteries, smashed up the infantry to place the crown on its great tactical achievement. Senarmont's maneuver emphasizes…that both the technical training of the personnel of the battery and the tactical handling of the guns are interdependent, and must be so if the arm is to be strikingly successful on the battlefield and if the battery is to be used by its commander as a single weapon of many barrels to hit, to hit at exactly the right time and to hit with annihilating effect.'

'Senarmont unfailingly selected the correct target to engage. At first he employed his 30 guns in counterbattery work, and concentrating them in turn on the dispersed Russian batteries he silenced their batteries by a heavy converging fire from his superior number of guns. Then limbering up he went into deadly range and blew away the Russian infantry with his case shot.'

'Senarmont does not deserve praise simple because he massed 30 guns, but because he seized the right moment to do so and then concentrated their fire on the right target. In his able and eager hand the artillery succeeded where the infantry had failed; and closing up to the Russian infantry he placed an overwhelming barrage on the selected spot until all resistance had been broken down and the French infantry were once more ready to attack, then the guns ceased firing and the infantry immediately delivered their assault, Senarmont following up with his guns to bring aid to them should they once more meet with opposition they could not overcome singlehanded.' -pages 41-43.

Senarmont asked permission from his corps commander for control on the field for the corps'36 guns. As some were assigned to the infantry divisions, he had to get permission from Victor, his corps commander, to pull the guns from the divisions, which undoubtedly irritated the division commanders.

He didn't tell Victor what he intended as far as I can see. Napoleon was apparently shocked when he saw what Senarmont was attempting and sent Lobau to find out. Senarmont none too gently told Lobau to go away. When Lobau reported back to Napoleon, Napoleon told him to leave Senarmont alone.
See A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, by Esposito and Elting, Maps 79-82; Becke's article on Friedland; Girod de l'Ain's Grand Artilleurs; Yermelov's memoirs; and James Arnold's Napoleon's Triumph. I've quoted or taken information from Becke, the Atlas, and Senarmont in a letter to his brother.

And, again, there is primary material in Grands Artilleurs by Girod de l'Ain.

…by the way also here it is stated that Victor gave the permisson to Senarmont to re unit almost all artillery of 1er corps despite the resistance of the divisional commanders and also the part of Dupont attack is well mentioned.

That information has already been posted some time ago as well as here again.

'It was a salient moment in the evolution of tactics of field artillery. At last it was able to maneuver independently and handled by a great gunner it played a decisive part in the attack, mastered the hostile batteries, smashed up the infantry to place the crown on its great tactical achievement.

This is English Major Becke writing in 1917 first in A. F. Becke, 'Friedland, 1807', Journal of the Royal Artillery, vol. 44, 1917, pp. 90–2. and later a small booklet Friedland

What is important is that no French writer before Becke including Senarmont's biographer you reference in 1895 says anything like this:

"It was a salient moment in the evolution of tactics of field artillery."

You'd think a French book on the Grand Artillerists would want to mention such a momentous event. Silence.

The fact is, Historians echoing Becke's view are not seen [often referencing Becke] until AFTER Becke's work, 1917.

Kevin, you are welcome to agree with Becke's assessment in hindsight, but I don't see any of the French military men making such a claim until after Becke wrote.

If Senarment's artillery attack was so 'salient', it is curious that it is used so little by the French afterward and certainly isn't seen for the rest of the 19th Century.

Nor would the folks on this tread be having such a hard time finding examples of artillery being moved up to 'effective' musket and rifle range.

in case one troubles to read the original sources in French, one will detect quite a few different versions, even like the letter of Sénarmont to his brother, one will see a different report of the diary of 1er corps, a different one of Sénarmont.

Also how badly Becke comes to grips with artillery terms :

Then limbering up he went into deadly range and blew away the Russian infantry with his case shot.'

– Sénarmont say quite a different thing – he moved his guns by prolonge – I was wrong in assuming they were man handled.

Also where did Sénarmont claim that he used case shot?

He also did not have as Brechtel claims – using Becke? – 3 officers and 62 gunners as casualties but 3 officers and 52 gunners and one has to add colonel Forno.

For that reason I always prefer to check the primary source without relying on works like Becke.

According the Sénarmont he well explained to Victor what he planned – one has to just check the the report of Sénarmont.

And yes I agree not even one contemporary said anything of an iron salient.

Victor is praising the Division Dupont and how many casualties it inflicted to the Russians, the claim that Sénarmont was the only one causing casualties, the alleged 4000 – is not correct.

Also one has to be careful to take this number seriously without reflection, there the Russians claim to have lost 4000 casualties all together in this battle.

I am looking forward to hear from Brechtel what Vigo Rousillon had to say about all this, there he listed him as one of the sources used.

The Russian Army was already retreating, the French artillery of Sénarmont was placed well and without any doubt played an important role in causing casualties, the decisive attack was performed by the excellent Dupont.

Taking a look at two books that cover Friedland, one a credible secondary publication and the other Russian General Yermelov's memoir, some of the conclusions stated above regarding Senarmont's artillery action at Friedland as well as the inaccurate idea that Bennigsen was retreating when Napoleon attacked are contradicted definitively.

First, the inaccurate idea that Bennigsen was retreating:

All quoted material is taken from Napoleon's Triumph by James Arnold.

On the subject of the Russians trying to retreat before the battle:

‘[Napoleon] could not understand Bennigsen's dispositions. Why would that general offer battle in a position divided in two by the Mill Stream with a large river to his rear? Napoleon expected Bennigsen to retreat momentarily. Instead the Russians remained motionless.'-221.

‘Throughout the morning Russia battalions, squadrons, and batteries had crossed the bridges over the Alle and shuffled through Friedland's narrow streets to take station on either Russian wing. By noon there were 65,500 men on the French side of the river. Major General Olsufiev's Fourtheenth Division and elements of Golitsyn's command, some 10,000 men in total, remained on the Alle's right bank along with most of the artillery's heavy guns.'-223.

‘There was scarcely a moment during the day when any of their principal officers appeared to look to victory or even to fight for it. The utmost they appeared to expect or hope for was to repulse the enemy.'-British Colonel James Bathurst-224.

‘…Bennigsen concluded that the day's combat was over and that he could wait until nightfall to begin his retreat.'-224.

The Emperor had enjoined Savary to enter the forest and get close enough to Friedland to see the bridges and thus see if the Russians were retreating. Savary provided the incredible intelligence that indeed the bridges were crammed with troops but that they were all crossing to the French side of the river.'-228

‘Bennigsen recognized that the situation had become more threatening. He decided that a daylight retreat would be too dangerous and clung to his hope that the French would not attack.'-230.

‘[Bennigsen] ordered Bagration and Dokhturov, both of whom had come to speak with him, to return to their commands and retire to a more compact line closer to Friedland. He also ordered his heavy artillery to retreat across the bridges, probably with the idea that the infantry would follow. It was the right decision. And artillery salvo, repeated three times, told Bennigsen that he was too late.'-230.

French massing of artillery before Senarmont's artillery attack:

Massed artillery:

‘On the French left, Mortier's chief of artillery had massed thirty-two cannon. This grand battery pelted Gorchakov's men with deadly accurate fire. In the center, guns deployed along the wooded elevation northeast of Posthenen contributed a steady bombardment…The sudden volume of noise shook the Russian gunners from their lethargy. Unprepared, they reacted slowly. A Russian cavalry trooper wrote that the Russian artillery did join in, the sounds of the artillery exchange were ‘like a strong thunder' sending shocks through the spine.'-232.

‘Until this point, only Dupont's divisional artillery, commanded by Captain Ricci, had engaged. ‘the gunners were full of ardor; they had discarded their overcoats and rolled up their sleeves, because of the heat.''-238.

The usual practice of employing artillery was to mass it (massing being using two or more companies). Senarmont took that one step further and was also employed later at Wagram, Lutzen, Ligny and on other fields, depending on the mission and the terrain.

To be continued:

Part II:

Senarmont's action, again from Arnold:

‘Thirty-eight-year-old [General of Brigade] Alexandre Senarmont commanded the I Corps artillery. He had held a similar post with the now dissolved VII Corps and at Eylau demonstrated what aggressive artillery tactics could accomplish. Senarmont rode to Ricci's battery to compliment the gunners for their resolute conduct. He told Ricci that his men were performing ‘as if they were on a firing range.' Senarmont saw that Dupont's advance had stabilized Ney's front and that the VI Corps was beginning to rally. He also saw an opportunity for his artillery.'-240.

‘Senarmont perceived that if he deployed his batteries in two wings, he could obtain a crossfire against Bagration's infantry. Toward that goal, he divided his guns into two batteries and a reserve. Major Raulot commanded a fifteen-gun battery on the left…Colonel Forno commanded another fifteen-gun battery that included Ricci's divisional battery…Senarmont's guns had three missions: defend Victor's front; silence the opposing Russiajn artillery; and support the advance of Ney and Dupont. The range to the nearest Russian formations was between 400 and 500 yards.'-241.
‘…The absence of opposing cavalry and the fact that the Russian infantry partially obstructed the Russian artillery's line of sight allowed Senarmont to attempt an aggressive maneuver. After two salvos, he ordered his gunners to prolonge their pieces two hundred yards closer to the Russian infantry. Russian resistance was formidable. The heavy guns across the river pounded Forno's wing. Forno went down with a mortal wound. His second in command fell with a serious wound leaving Captain Ricci in direct command of the battery.'-241.

‘While Senarmont rode back and forth between his two wings to supervise both batteries, the era's supreme artillerist observed his actions with alarm. Napoleon dispatched Mouton to restrain Senarmont. Senarmont replied irritably, ‘Leave me and my gunners alone, I am responsible for everything.' When Mouton reported to the Emperor, Napoleon laughed and said, ‘There is one unpleasant fellow; let them be.'-241.
‘…two Life Guard regiments again stood in the front line with the Pavlov and St Petersburg Grenadier regiments in support. The guardsmen saw jagers running through the fields, some heading for their own line, the balance fleeing toward the Alle's protective river bank…the Russian horse artillery abandoned its position and retired toward Friedland. A cloud of smoke approached beneath which the Life Guards beheld Senarmont's guns. A jager captain standing behind the Izmailovsk Life Guards watched the Russian artillery bombard the French guns. Battalion cannon, positioned in the intervals between front rank battalions, adding their canister fire. But the French artillery response was overwhelming: ‘In the Pavlov Grenadier Regiment whole files fell to the ground, but its line did not waver and held on, in spite of the large gaps in it because of loss of men.''-242.

‘After firing twenty salvos, Senarmont saw that the target still stood. He called for closer action and ordered his gunners to prolonge their pieces to within 120 yards of the Russian line, which now stood athwart the funnel between the Mill Stream and the Alle River. The front was so narrow that Senarmont's two wings merged into one line of thirty guns. Some of Dokhturov's guns on the north side of the Mill Stream turned and opened fire against Senarmont's gun line. From the opposite side of the Alle, a battery enfiladed Senarmont's line. Senarmont reported that some of the Russian guns ‘were at very close range, including one battery on the hill near the river turn…which decimated our ranks.' Senarmont instructed his gunners to ignore them and concentrate on the infantry blocking access to Friedland. The French gunners paid a heavy price for their single-minded focus, losing eleven killed and forty-five wounded during the battle. Senarmont's horse was shot out beneath him, one of the battery's fifty-three horses that perished. But the French return fire destroyed the Russian line. In a letter written to his brother twelve days after the battle, Senarmont related that ‘during the next twenty-five minutes occurred the most terrible canister fire that I have ever seen. We shaved, and that is the term, their masses which disappeared and then reformed instantly.''-243-244.

‘No troops could endure such losses indefinitely. Accordingly, the Ismailovsk Life Guard and the Pavlov Grenadiers attempted a desperate charge. The life Guards suffered terribly with its first battalion losing about 400 men out of 520…'-244.

‘As a last resort, Russian cavalry attempted a charge against Senarmont's gun line. A trooper who participated in this effort recalled that no one knew where they were supposed to go because, ‘We saw nothing before us but flames and smoke.' Two salvos of French canister repelled the cavalry charge. Victor had capitalized on Senarmont's artillery advance by moving some of Village's Division to support the guns. He also sent in Lahoussaye's Division. The fresh dragoons easily drove the already defeated Russian horse back toward Friedland.'-244.

Comments from Yermelov's Memoirs, edited by Alexander Mikaberidze:

Note 52 on page 98:

‘Now it was becoming clear that the Russian army had failed to annihilate Lannes' corps. Bennigsen could still have safely retreated across the Alle before the arrival of Napoleon's army but the initiative swung away from the Russians with the arrival of Napoleon.'

Note 53 on page 98:

‘According to Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, ‘The Russian gunners were surprised by the sudden appearance of the French 36-gun battery' and failed to react in time.'

Note 55 on page 100:

‘During the battle, General Senarmont organized two companies of 15 guns, with six pieces in reserve, and placed them on both flanks of Dupont's division. As the French advanced, Senarmont outpaced the infantry and opened fire at Bagration's troops from close range. His guns initially fired at 600 paces, then moved as close as 300 paces. The Russians tried to capture the French battery but the French virtually wiped out entire regiments; the third battalion of the Life Guard Ismailovsk Regiment alone lost 400 men out of 520.'

Yermelov referred to Senarmont's large battery as a ‘ghastly battery' because of the damage it was causing at close range.-page 100.

Yermelov also states that ‘…instead of defeating and annihilating a weak enemy corps, which could not have been reinforced in time, we lost a general battle.'-page 100.

I love the way you've flooded the post with narrative and descriptions of Senarmont's hugely destructive action but fail to address the two points raised by me and VW:

1. Who thought that Senarmont's action was so unique, so new as to be a 'Salient moment' in Artillery Tactics, and

2. The Russians hadn't decided to retreat?

Note 52 on page 98:

‘Now it was becoming clear that the Russian army had failed to annihilate Lannes' corps. Bennigsen could still have safely retreated across the Alle before the arrival of Napoleon's army but the initiative swung away from the Russians with the arrival of Napoleon.'

Noted two pages before Note 55 on page 100. It would seem that Napoleon's arrival was what determined the Russians' decision to retreat… Senarmont was just 'encouraging' them in that retreat.

For Napoleonic's, why would you want to deploy so close. The artillery would be at risk for no increase in effectiveness?

I am looking for instances in which it is claimed that artillery deployed within effective musket or rifle range. Can anyone please name some ( other than Senarmont's claims for Friedland ), with a source for that (primary for choice)?

I mean, I am all for the discussion going the way it will, but I really did ask for not Friedland . I see no point in going over this for the umpteenth time (at least, I am assuming that is what is behind the sea of grey).

I am not interested what Arnold says, I am interested what Sénarmont himself says – and he did not say what Arnold claims –

Brechtel omits to quote that Victor send infantry to support the artillery closely with one battalion of infantry when threatened by Russian cavalry.

It is also interesting to read the battle report of Victor himself.

Vigo-Roussilon, as suggested by Brechtel, submits a completely different story.

Sénarmont's comments very well about his action, he was pleased that he could do the commanding itself – nowhere he claimed to have established a new tactic neither – and it wasn't a salient movement of artillery, it was the usual infantry – artillery support attack which was already employed in earlier battles, like Austerlitz.

According to Sénarmont himself

officers
killed : 1
wounded : 3

Gunners :

Killed : 10
wounded : 42

Horses

Killed : 53

Officers horses killed, that of Sénarmont, chef de battalion Bernard, Lieutenants Bouvier et Houdart, there he lists them seperatley those 4 could add up to the 53 mentioned.

It is pretty obvious that secondary sources written in English are embellishing the whole story.

Whirlwind

I hear you – see my last two comments…

On the original subject (and Senarmont, I suppose), there's the tricky subject of the 17 French guns taken at Talavera. A number of these were taken the infantry retreated while the guns were still moving up – we can forget those. However, sources indicate that a number were pushed up close to the redoubt during Leval's second attack and were abandoned when the infantry retreated again. Jourdan is quoted by Oman as noting that the guns were unable to withdraw because most of the horses were killed, and further as describing the deployment as 'imprudent'.

On Friedland (if we must)

link

Several British journals at the time quote from the 'Royal Extraordinary Courant' published in The Hague on 25th June. According to that, 'In a small space, ten Russian Generals were found killed or wounded, in the midst of three thousand soldiers in the same situation.'

With respect, I'd suggest that 3000 found killed *and* wounded in that area is far more plausible than 4000 dead, which, as Un Ami pointed out, would account for every Russian killed or mortally wounded in the entire battle.

Back to the question of artillery in effective infantry range, particularly Civil War artillery, Paddy Griffith in his Battle Tactics of the Civil War, has a whole chapter on Artillery Tactics, Chapter 7. He even identifies at least one attempt to push forward guns a la Senarmont which failed.

He tackles the question of artillery versus infantry in the chapter. His conclusion is the image of artilleryists being shot to pieces is that that image is entirely overblown and rarely happened.

There are a number of times that artillery was pushed forward close to infantry. In the above mentioned Talavera battle, the British artillery moved forward 18 guns close to the flank of an attacking French column. The line actually deployed in a line that was nearly perpendicular to the French and British lines. There is a description of the action in Ayde's Bombardier and Pocket Gunner 1813.

There is a description of the action in Ayde's Bombardier and Pocket Gunner 1813.

I am having trouble finding it in the book. Any hint as to where it is, exactly?

Whirlwind:

Page 19 of the 1813 edition.

link

Thanks McLaddie. I am very confused though: surely any such movement would have placed them right in front of, and showing their flank to, Sebastiani's infantry?

I'm kind of wondering if Adye has a confused version of the crisis of the battle after the Guards and KGL were driven back after their pursuit of Lapisse's and Sebastiani's first line.

The sources mention that Holcoft had the guns on the Cerro de Medellin (Rettburg, Heyse and the 2 Spanish guns) brought round to enfilade the flank of Lapisse during the extended firefight with the French second line. However, no-one suggests this required any great movement on their part.

Well according to the Royal Artillery account, this was later and required gathering guns from several locations.
(RA: Lawson's Company, Sillery's Company, Elliot's Company)with six guns apiece.)

And yes, Whirlwind, it does have the gun line offering a left flank to the general French battle line, which may be why there is a drawing of the positions. The Royal Artillery Journal gives a fairly detailed account including one of the British battery [brigade] commanders[Sillery], who was suffering intestinal problems being forced to relieve himself out in between the two battle lines in full view of the British.

The point of the artillery action was when Sebastiani's right column attacked the British Foot Guards and the 83rd Foot. The French were driven back by the Guards, but during the pursuit, the Guards were taken in enfilade by a French battery and thrown back in confusion, while Sebastiani's columns returned to the attack. [The column shown in the diagram.]

Wellesley brought up the 48th Foot, behind which the Guards were able to reform, and the dangerous French counter-attack was held and repelled. The guns were brought up before a battalion of the 48th and supported their counter-attack.

One of the problems with the British army was that artillery AARs didn't go to the Army commander, but to the Artillery commander and then to the Ordinance Department… so Wellington may never see them though the overall Artillery commander was noted in Wellington's AAR.

I see, that makes more sense. The schematic in Adye looked more to me like it was referring to firing into the flank of Leval's Division, hence my disbelief. It makes a lot more sense if there is supposed to be a gap of 600-700m between the end of line L-E and the unfinished redoubt at point F.

From Rory Muir's Life Of Wellington site:

link

'Possibly Cameron's brigade was able to blunt Lapisse's second advance, or perhaps Lapisse was overly cautious, anxious about being taken in the flank by the British infantry and guns on the Cerro de Medellin and by the sight of Cotton's cavalry in front: he may have halted his advance until Sebastiani had broken Mackenzie and during this halt his regiments may have lost heavily to the allied guns. There is some support for this idea in Eliot's Treatise on the Defence of Portugal published in the following year: ‘At the same time, 18 pieces of cannon, which Colonel Robe, of the Royal Artillery, had formed in oblique direction, were brought to bear on the flank of the enemy's column, and occasioned great destruction by the fire of spherical case shot, or Colonel Shrapnell's shells, both as they advanced and when they had retreated beyond the reach of musketry.' (p 239) Eliot was present at the battle, but one would expect, and like, more evidence to support this claim. In the end the question must be left open, but Lapisse's advance was halted and his men did lose heavily and the bravery of the 1/48th is not an adequate explanation.'

This presumably was Adye's source?

Elliot: actual page is 209

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The 1813 edition of Adye's "Bombardier and Pocket Gunner" was "revised and corrected" by William Granville Eliot, who had been at Talavera with May's company of artillery.

So the source for this information is certainly Eliot.

There is a long discussion of the action and Sillery's actions in the Journal of the Royal Artillery involving several artillery officers, but at the moment I don't have access to my files so I could say which issue or page. That series of letters also includes Eliot's diagram.

So there is some corroboration of Eliot's narrative. Certainly, one battalion of the 48th wasn't going to stop the entire French column without some help. It was a desperate situation for the British. Wellington had to pull the 48th out of line and march them to the threatened area to 'plug the gap'.

For variety, here is an episode from the Hungarian War of Independence, 22 January 1849:

"Toward 11:00 a.m. word arrived in Schemnitz from Oberst Collery that he had actually advanced out of the Gran valley on the 21st through Hámor, but that he had been prevented from debouching through the Hadritsch [Hodruša-Hámre] defile onto the Schemnitz plateau by a much larger enemy detachment with 6 guns. Feldmarschall-Lieutenant Baron Csorich therefore immediately detached 2. Bataillon H.v. Nassau in that direction, so as to support Oberst Collery if necessary. However, he had meanwhile been attacked on the 22nd by an enemy column approaching from Heiligenkreuz comprising three companies of Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 2, one battalion of Nógrád volunteers, a squadron of Husaren-Regiment Nr. 9 and a 3-pounder battery including two 7-pounder howitzers, led by the rebel Oberstlieutenant Pustelnik, Görgei's chief of staff. A quick decision was needed here! Oberst Collery fell upon the enemy appearing in his rear with two companies of jägers, the three pioneer platoons and the troop of cavalry, while he had two E.H. Stefan companies keep in check the enemy detachments posted on his front toward Schemnitz. The brave jägers shot down the gunners as they were preparing to open fire, and in a trice seized the guns. Then, with as much speed as audacity, they also thrust against the three companies of Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 2, who scattered and fled back toward Zsarnócz in wild rout, carrying the Nógrád volunteers with them. The four 3-pounder guns and the two 7-pounder howitzers remained in the jägers' hands. Pustelnik was seriously wounded and taken prisoner, and died in Schemnitz soon after. The enemy artillery commander lay dead. In addition, 31 men and 28 horses were captured."

(My translation from "Der Winter-Feldzug 1848-1849 in Ungarn
unter dem Oberkommando des Feldmarschalls Alfred Fürst Windisch-Grätz")

It is not clear from this whether the Hungarian guns were actually deploying in rifle range, or whether they just did so incautiously close enough that the Austrians, responding uncharacteristically quickly, were able to advance and fire on the gunners before the guns were ready to fire. It does appear that the guns were sufficiently far forward of their supports to be shot down and overrun by the jaegers before the Hungarian infantry supports could intervene.

Either way, it appears to illustrate the unwisdom in general of deploying guns close to enemy infantry.

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
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bloodybigbattles.blogspot.com

Something akin to that Jager actions is this one found in Augereau's Corps Jena AAR:

Report of the 16e legere:

"The regiment advanced (in a column) left in front (laqauche en tete) towards the woods: the third battalion advanced into the woods in skirmishing order (en tirailleurs); the two first, marching still in column, went past the right of the [Isserstadt] woods and deployed in the plain (a meadow would be better for there was no 'plain to the right of the woods) at musketry range from the enemy artillery…This line formed, they commenced an active and well-aimed fire; marching then toward the enemy line, they approached to pistol range [@ 40 yards; they threw themselves into skirmishing order (se precipitant de la en tirailleurs) and seized (pied a pied) energetically 11 pieces of artillery."

The Prussian guns at that point had no infantry or cavalry support. I have another account of a French grenadier battalion doing the same thing to charge a gun line.

This is English Major Becke writing in 1917 first in A. F. Becke, 'Friedland, 1807', Journal of the Royal Artillery, vol. 44, 1917, pp. 90–2. and later a small booklet Friedland What is important is that no French writer before Becke including Senarmont's biographer you reference in 1895 says anything like this:
"It was a salient moment in the evolution of tactics of field artillery."
You'd think a French book on the Grand Artillerists would want to mention such a momentous event. Silence.
The fact is, Historians echoing Becke's view are not seen [often referencing Becke] until AFTER Becke's work, 1917.
Kevin, you are welcome to agree with Becke's assessment in hindsight, but I don't see any of the French military men making such a claim until after Becke wrote.
If Senarment's artillery attack was so 'salient', it is curious that it is used so little by the French afterward and certainly isn't seen for the rest of the 19th Century.
Nor would the folks on this tread be having such a hard time finding examples of artillery being moved up to 'effective' musket and rifle range.

The after action reports of both Senarmont and I Corps are available. I don't see why in the middle of the wars and in the Bourbon aftermath, which was hostile, sometimes in a virulent and deadly way, anything would be written analyzing what Senarmont and other French artillerymen did in combat. That does come later with historians up to and including today.

The most telling impact of Senarmont's attack on tactics took place on other fields, such as Lutzen, Raab, Ocana, Wagram, Ligny, and Waterloo. Mimicry is the best form of flattery and the French artillery dictum was ‘get up close and shoot fast.'

I love the way you've flooded the post with narrative and descriptions of Senarmont's hugely destructive action but fail to address the two points raised by me and VW:
1. Who thought that Senarmont's action was so unique, so new as to be a 'Salient moment' in Artillery Tactics, and
2. The Russians hadn't decided to retreat?

Obviously the French did as they repeated the tactic or some variation of it as already shown. And it has been clearly demonstrated that the Russians were not retreating and if they were planning to had to stop when Napoleon showed up. Perhaps you should reread the excerpts from Arnold's book?

Note 52 on page 98:

‘Now it was becoming clear that the Russian army had failed to annihilate Lannes' corps. Bennigsen could still have safely retreated across the Alle before the arrival of Napoleon's army but the initiative swung away from the Russians with the arrival of Napoleon.'

Noted two pages before Note 55 on page 100. It would seem that Napoleon's arrival was what determined the Russians' decision to retreat… Senarmont was just 'encouraging' them in that retreat.

The Russians had to stand and fight as shown. Senarmont's attack broke the Russian center and forced them to retreat, disastrously as it turned out.

There are a number of times that artillery was pushed forward close to infantry. In the above mentioned Talavera battle, the British artillery moved forward 18 guns close to the flank of an attacking French column. The line actually deployed in a line that was nearly perpendicular to the French and British lines. There is a description of the action in Ayde's Bombardier and Pocket Gunner 1813.

From Eliot's Defense of Portugal, 209:
‘At the same time, 18 pieces of cannon which Colonel Robe of the Royal Artillery, had formed in an oblique direction, were brought to bear on the flank of the enemy's column, and occasioned great destruction by the fire of spherical case-shot, or Colonel Shrapnel's shells, both as they advanced and when they had retreated beyond the range of musketry.'

No matter how many times you say it and from how many different directions you take, there is nothing similar between the British artillery employment at Talavera in support of a defensive action, and Senarmont's artillery action at Friedland which was an attack on the Russian center.

The only similarity between the two actions is that artillery was massed, and that was an acknowledged artillery tactic is artillery was to be effective against an enemy. In short, competent artillery commanders had massed their guns for years. Attacking with them was something new and quite effective.

Note 52 on page 98:
‘Now it was becoming clear that the Russian army had failed to annihilate Lannes' corps. Bennigsen could still have safely retreated across the Alle before the arrival of Napoleon's army but the initiative swung away from the Russians with the arrival of Napoleon.'

That states that the Russians could not now retreat as Napoleon was present with the main army.

Noted two pages before Note 55 on page 100. It would seem that Napoleon's arrival was what determined the Russians' decision to retreat… Senarmont was just 'encouraging' them in that retreat.

There is nothing in that footnote that indicates that Senarmont's action 'encouraged' them in retreating with the exception that Senarmont was destroying Russian infantry regiments with his close-range artillery fire and retreating because of Senarmont's action.

It is interesting how you 'misinterpreted' the footnotes.

From A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars by Vincent Esposito and John Elting, Map 79:

'Bennigsen-his troops sagging from night marches on empty bellies, his artillery ammunition dwindling-had seemingly decided to stand on the defense until dark and then withdraw.'

So, it appears that Bennigsen might have attempted to withdraw after dark, but he had to cancel that idea when Napoleon and the main army showed up.

From Map 80:

'Bennigsen had no forewarning of Ney's coming attack, but his observers in the Friedland church steeple had cautioned him that the French were constantly being reinforced. At some undetermined point he seems to have decided that it would be well to withdraw as quickly and quietly as possible. As a preparatory measure, he began shortening his front, resting his left flank on Sortlack and his right on a brickworks beside the Alle. However, his order to withdraw to the east bank-if ever actually issued-had to be canceled when Ney's attack pushed out of the Forest of Sortlack. Instead, Bennigsen ordered all of the cavalry and most of the infantry still on the east bank across the Friedland bridges to reinforce his battle front.'

So it is quite evident that Bennigsen was not withdrawing but stood to fight and reinforced his army across the Friedland bridges after Napoleon and the main army appeared on the field.

I'd suggest that 3000 found killed *and* wounded in that area is far more plausible than 4000 dead, which, as Un Ami pointed out, would account for every Russian killed or mortally wounded in the entire battle.

The Russians left 11,000 dead on the field and had a further 7,000 wounded. The Russian field army was shattered and decisively defeated at Friedland and was nearly destroyed.

Senarmont walked the ground after the action that his artillery had engaged the Russian center.

If you are interested in taking a read on what short range artillery fire did to troops in formation I recommend a study of the Battle of New Orleans in 1815 (The British at the Gates by Robin Reilly) at which the American artillery caused most of the casualties and in something of a horrific manner as bodies were in pieces and there is also a vivid description of incoming artillery fire in Coignet's memoirs regarding the devastating Austrian artillery fire against troops in line by a 200-gun artillery battery.

In short, competent artillery commanders had massed their guns for years. Attacking with them was something new and quite effective.

No – attacking infantry with guns was nothing new – it happened all the time before – for example battalion guns.

About the Russians – my sources say something differently to your opinion.

I cannot find in Coignet's memoires any mention of a 200 Austrian gun battery neither

attacking infantry with guns was nothing new – it happened all the time before – for example battalion guns.

Were they massed? Do you understand what massing artillery actually means? Battalion guns supported infantry. Mounting an artillery attack with a massed battery was a new tactic. And it had nothing to do with battalion guns.

About the Russians – my sources say something differently to your opinion.

You've been provided with source material, and you have provided none to support your 'opinion.' It should also be noted that Bennigsen's after action reports were inaccurate, and that is being charitable.

The Russian casualty figures for Friedland I found in the Esposito/Elting Atlas on Map 82. I'd trust that over any Russian claims after the action.

I cannot find in Coignet's memoires any mention of a 200 Austrian gun battery neither

It was at Essling and the Austrian artillery according to Coignet numbered fifty pieces, pages 176-180 of the Greenhill edition.

It should also be noted that the Austrians, under Oberst Smola, massed a 200-gun battery at Essling and that was what undoubtedly was firing on the Imperial Guard infantry.

Ah yes – 50 cannons – so Coignet didn't state anything about a 200 gun battery. And Smola – a 200 gun battery, well I have to cross check on this and won't use Elting.

Go ahead and let us know what you find. It was the largest artillery concentration in one battery during the period.

Perhaps this will help:

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See page 9 where the text mentions 192 guns massed by Smola at Essling. I have seen other references that mention 200 or 200-odd.