Allow me to expand on what I see as a possible reason why we make certain assumptions that are not relevant to the actual problem.
The OP assumes that one highly capable general could have made a difference, to which I disagree for reasons I highlighted earlier. Simply put Germany was not equipped to fight a war with the three most powerful nations on earth. Even solely fighting the USSR was a dicey proposition at best.
When WWII is viewed it is often a subjective view. Simply stated the idea that the front plate of a Panther is mostly impervious to enemy gunfire or that the Me 262 had jet engines under its wings directly translates to the operational and strategic level, where the perceived advantage should become a force multiplier and therefore mean that the Germans were superior.
There are thousands of anecdotes that tell of Germans pulling off amazing stunts in the closing days of the war again with the implication that they remained in control of everything until the Germany army somehow collapsed around May 1945 and the standard narrative is that it could have gone wrong right up to the last minute and we barely eeked out a victory against a superior enemy.
No the real question should be "How the hell did the Germans manage to last that long against superior enemies ?"
The "Panther factor" ceases to exist at a certain level. I like to bring up the example of the wargame counter. In some games a US armoured division has a higher factor than a German Panzer division, especially in the later years, despite having "better tanks"
But the armoured division is an extremely effective combined arms fighting force, flexible and well equipped. If properly used it can beat a German panzer division. It doesn't even matter if they win by straight killing more panzers or by simple attrition. US armoured divisions usually were able to recover much faster from combat losses than Panzer divisions did.
The British in the desert took nearly a year to figure out how to operate a modern combined arms force, tanks were not cavalry, or could not replace infantry. Infantry was vulnerable without armoured support and anyone caught without air or artillery support was going to have a bad day.
But even if the Germans seemed to have their combined arms tactics worked out and used mobility to their advantage they fared very poorly against well-defended positions they couldn't flank. Tobruk caused Rommel a serious problem by denying him most of the tricks in his box and his army wasn't prepared to take a strongly defended position. Same with El Alamein, where the British forced Rommel to fight on their terms, something he would try to apply in Normandy, but failed to implement.
Ironically it might be our own Wargaming nature that enhances our myopic tendency to focus on extrapolating the very familiar tactical features we know so well from our own games directly to the operational level an area which is much less known and possibly less understood at a fundamental level.
Time was against Germany, its crippling lack of resources was its doom no matter what. Though many still wish to believe that you need only a few more victories here and there the situation would be completely reversed and the last allies would end holed up in the last redoubt somewhere around Oregon …
Another factor in this kind speculation is that assumption that the antagonists of German remain static and oblivious to the situation and that any predicted result becomes a fixed result that cannot be reversed.
Versus major structural problems we can assume that Rommel may have done better than other Generals, but better may mean winning one more battle and still lose the war.
To have any chance of winning, Germany should concentrate their efforts on two things, delivering a crippling blow to the Red Army and secure the oilfields to make sure it can at least continue to fight a while longer.
But if after three quarters of a million dead, 1.3 million wounded and 3 million prisoners and MIA the Red Army can still punch you in the nose before the gates of Moscow what can Rommel do more to cripple the Red Army.
It may well be that if we had a few hundred universes to spare and run the scenario over and over we may find that when it comes to France and the USSR the Germans were at the peak of their luck when it came to winning as much as they could get away with.
Ultimately the factor to do better in Russia does not lie with putting Rommel in charge, but increasing the odds the USSR gives up and a reduced reaction from the USA settling for a cold-war scenario until the German regime collapses on itself or a shooting war erupts again.
I fear that a man like Rommel might not be enough to overcome strategic reality, he may change things, but not in those areas that matter much more in the greater picture.
