"Was d'Erlon's defeat inevitable at Waterloo?" Topic

Up to the morning of the 18th Napoleon's strategy was still intact. At the start of the campaign he figured on driving a portion of the Prussians out of the way somewhere around Gembloux, then turn on Wellington's army. He was taken by surprise when the Prussian army concentrated at Ligny so quickly. But even though they weren't defeated decisively, they were apparently driven out of the way, and he could then deal with the Allied army. He probably figured Wellington wouldn't remain at Quatre Bras so long as they did. A combination of the two allied armies moving up aggressively and getting inside Napoleon's strategic loop, and poor coordination between Napoleon, Soult, Ney and Grouchy, and a cooperative resolve between Wellington and Blucher did the French in.

I'm always a bit bemused by this "the Prussians weren't defeated decisively at Ligny" view. If you read German historians, they similarly argue that any 1792-1815 defeat that wasn't Jena wasn't a lost battle at all, it was "inconclusive" or "indecisive".

In reality, 1813 battles such as Luetzen and Bautzen were so "inconclusive" that the Prussians had to sue for an armistice, and couldn't resume hostilities until Austrian armies and more British money and weapons arrived.

Ligny strikes me as rather similar. For all we hear about the Prussian army's miraculous powers of recovery between 16 and 18 June, let's not forget that the Prussian corps on which the brunt of the fighting at Waterloo fell was the one that hadn't been at Ligny, and hadn't had to recover from it. The one on which the brunt of the fighting at Wavre fell was the one that had been least involved at Ligny.

The force that matched to Waterloo was led by the distant IV Corps because I and II Corps, who were much nearer the critical battlefield, were simply not in good enough shape after Ligny to fight another serious battle again. Bulow went past them and did the heavy lifting, with I Corps following to attack Wellington's left (whoops) and II Corps following IV Corps.

If Wellington hadn't held on at Waterloo, the Prussians would have been utterly sunk. The French would then have eviscerated all four of their Corps, and the survivors would have been stuck between two victorious French armies, their supply lines severed and with no intact formations.

In that situation, I reckon Napoleon would have let Wellington run north-west to Antwerp and evacuate. He could then have swung north-east and, along with Grouchy, simply bagged the entire Prussian army as prisoners, Ulm-stylee.

After losing the whole C team in that way, would Prussia really have sent the B team west after it as well, probably to share its fate? And if not, would Russia and Austria really have persisted with the war?

Thinking about it, wasn't d'Erlon's attack a repeat of Austerlitz, with d'Erlon taking the role of Soult in attacking the heights?

First you distract the enemy's attention to a flank.

Second, he thins out the centre.

Third, you chuck everything at the part of his line he's just weakened.

Did Soult have anything to do with the planning? Is that how he and d'Erlon understood what was wanted?

More like Eylau surely? With D'Erlon taking the place of Augereau?

Not really like Austerlitz. That battle was more like a boxer baiting and dodging his opponent's left hook, then hitting him in the gut while he's off balance. Waterloo does have a high similarity with Eylau. The two sides were of similar strength, the main attack by Augereau failed badly, and the cavalry was the only thing left to attack with. Unfortunately at Waterloo Napoleon had Blucher instead of Davout coming up on the right.

@marshalGreg

I also understand there are some books on their way with the French perspective.
It would be good to find out their view and how it might confirm or counter Packe's and Kempt's view of that situation. For example I have seen something ( can't sight) but the heads of D'Erlons central two columns were in the process of deploying out at the one or both of the hedges.
IE the second battalion of the columns were marching to a flank to place battalions in line side by side for a 4 battalion, closer supported line of battle. If true-how far did it get before being hit/repulsed or just panic'd?

The change of formation was called 'rompt par le queue'. It was actually carried out from the rear of each brigade rather than the second battalion. It would have been familiar to all French officers, as would the formation of battalions in successive lines.

The campaign would have been interesting if Wellington had retreated nearer to Brussels. The Prussian II Corps was still in decent shape, having lost about 5,600 men at Ligny.

Don't be so hard on the Russo-Prussian army in 1813. They were outnumbered 2:1 in the Spring. The Prussian army wouldn't have been able to stand alone against Napoleon if Wellington gave up Belgium (of course neither would Wellington's army) but the Russians and Austrians didn't need the Prussian army, just the drive of their commanders.

Oh yes. The lessons of Vietnam, back to Barbarossa, are that you can win every battle on the field, but still lose out if the other folk do not know they are beaten…or are prepared to hold out longer than you are.

Morale at the front (these days back home) is everything. I simply cannot believe that Wellington would have left a holding unit at Mt St Jean and marched to Wavre to save Blucher, had history required it.

Indeed, he would have been dismissed as insane, unless it worked of course.

We are way off the question I posed. but this is what happens in any conversation and that is brilliant. Any discussion evolves and moves on. All that is missing is a North Yorkshire Pub and a bowl of chips (US Fries)

The greatest weakness of the Armee du Nord was its general staff. And that was Soult's fault. He was not really suited to be major general and chief of staff for many reasons, one was probably that he was lazy.

Berthier proved to be irreplaceable. He was the preeminent chief of staff of the period and created the most efficient general staff in any army.

Napoleon could have made Bailly de Monthion major general and chief of staff and given Soult a field command. He could have efficiently led the pursuit of the Prussians after Ligny and that would have left Grouchy as commander of the Cavalry Reserve which most likely would have stopped Ney's taking control of the heavy cavalry.

Bailly de Monthion was relatively young and if he was appointed chief of staff Napoleon would have had to promote him to marshal. Vandamme should also have been made a marshal if for no other reason than his nose was out of joint when Grouchy was promoted.

Austerlitz and Waterloo are not similar battles.

At Austerlitz, Napoleon fought a defensive/offensive battle and suckered the allies into attacking his right flank after he gave up the Pratzen Plateau before the battle started.

Davout fought a skillful delaying action on the right flank at four-to-one odds, buying Napoleon time to launch the main attack with Soult.

And Soult did not have the majority of the army with him. Bernadotte's and Lannes' corps were on the French left flank, and one of Soult's divisions (Legrand) was under Davout's control.

No, the two battles are not alike at all, especially regarding the outcomes.

The arrangements of d'Erlon's divisons for the attack at Waterloo have always perplexed me. The Column of division by battalion is very odd formation to say the least. I cannot recall in all the literature I have read of ever seeing such a disposition before. In my mind I think the formation adopted was the primary reason the French lost the battle of Waterloo.

Here is the formation adopted by Donzelot's Division:

link

Donzelot's division consisted of 8 battalions. Each battalion was deployed in line one battalion behind the other. Here are the problems with this formation:

• The entire division had only one battalion that could fire. I guess the thought was that it might be able to swing battalions to the right and left to the front upon contact with the enemy. Of course we know that did not happen.

• In terms of march, it would be at line rate. That is to say, the flexibility and quickness of a column of divisions was lost. The formation would therefore have sustained greater casualties from artillery fire during the approach as it would have taken longer to get there.

• The density of the formation meant the it would sustain more casualties on the approach than a more common formation.

• It had no second line. Typical practice had been to advance in multiple lines. This allowed battalions in the second line to fill in where needed as front line battalions were either routed or compelled to withdraw.

• Deployment distance. The distance between the lines was very close. This meant that none the battalions in the division could adopt another formation (square, column, etc.). They all had to remain in line. I think this more than anything else was the biggest problem.

• Inflexibility. So, if the leading battalion is routed (as it was), it will disorder the one behind it, and so on making a complete mess of the entire division. There was absolutely no way of control to growing disorder.

While certainly, the divisions of d'Erlon achieved local success against the English and Dutch infantry units initially, the surprise attack by the English heavy cavalry spelled disaster for the divisional columns. Unable to form square anywhere meant they were doomed.

I suggest that had d'Erlon adopted a more traditional formation, the results would have been very different. I offer as an example a possible order mix formation that could have been adopted by Donzelot's Division. There are certainly others:

link

Here are the advantages of such a formation:

• The front of the division has two battalions and 4 companies that could fire. This more than double the fire.

• In terms of the march approach, the leading battalions indicated in line in the diagram would have originally been in column of divisions. Just before hitting the crest, the two battalions in the center would deploy into line to engage the enemy. This would have allowed the division to approach the ridge much quicker than actually happened, reducing casualties

• The density of the formation is substantially less than that adopted by d'Erlon again reducing casualties on the approach.

• This formation has a second line. The distance between the 1st and 2nd lines is several hundred yards allowing adequate time for the second line to react to situations occurring in the first line This allows battalions in the second line to fill in where needed as front line battalions were either routed or compelled to withdraw or react to a cavalry breakthrough.

• Flexibility. In this disposition, every battalion could ploy into any formation needed to suit the emergency of its particular situation.

Might just be me, but could not follow your links. Both just took me to the same Facebook page (mind you I am a total IT ignoramus)

I thought your posting really interesting. The Deployment Distance argument particularly. Suggestion is that some did manage to form squares and certainly all the Union Brigade accounts speak of taking significant losses to musketry just before closing with the infantry.

I guess I always thought the lack of immediate cavalry support was the mistake, but thought the cramped field might have forced that. A bunch of Cuirassiers over by LHS would not have helped most of d'Erlon's gents. The rest of the cavalry seem to have been way back or well to the East. Fine for a counterattack after d'Erlon's attack is broken, but bit late by then!

Sorry about my previous post with the errant url's. I'll have to figure out how to fix that. I posted the pics on our facebook page for my 57eme reenactmant group. Obviously, it did not work.

I don't think MDavout's tactical solution works at all. There are lots of reasons:

1 – It was cramped as it was. Having Marcognet's division attack on a 2&2/3 battalion frontage would have occupied nearly half the space of the British front.

2 – Time-and-time again attacks in French "traditional formation" had failed during the wars, partly because of the French attackers not deploying in time.

3 – The French speed of attack does not seem to have been a problem on the day anyway, possibly because they weren't trying to align multiple battalions in line anyway.

4 – The problem this idea "solves" – lack of firepower – was not the problem on the day. The problem was that the French, in the one area they had some marginal success, were disordered by the firefight and crossing the hedge.

5 – If the French had attacked in this manner and left no room at all, then the British would have been in 2-deep line to face them (no possiblity of French cavalry attack)

6 – The cavalry attack was based on speed and surprise. The French supports, no matter what formation they were in or how they were arrayed, would have been swept away by the rout of the initial units.

7 – The only thing that might have happened is if the French were deployed in sufficient depth and space, then the rear units might have held firm. In this case, the overall benefit would have been to the British cavalry – much less chance of their attack getting as out of hand as it did.

8 – D'Erlon's improvised formation did quite well for a French infantry attack on a British position, all things considered. Trying to quickly swamp the British with numbers wasn't an obviously terrible idea. The problem was that he was facing good infantry in a covered and protected position at the beginning of the battle before they had been worn down.

Interesting thought that rear units holding firm might have been an advantage to the allies and esp the Union Brigade. The whole thing about "Galloping at Everything" was that they thought they were on towards Paris unopposed…..if stopped by the surviving French.

Yes

Wirlwind – thanks for the response. Let me take your points one at a time.

1 – It was cramped as it was. Having Marcognet's division attack on a 2&2/3 battalion frontage would have occupied nearly half the space of the British front.

You are correct in terms of the space. Using the formation I conjectured, the advance would have to be made (excluding Quiot) with 2 divisions. Donzelot on the left and Marcognet on the right. Duruttes' division would advance behind Marcognet. Once past Papelotte it would oblique to the East thus flanking the Allied line. Jacquinot's Lt Cavalry division would be able to swing further to the right flank.

2 – Time-and-time again attacks in French "traditional formation" had failed during the wars, partly because of the French attackers not deploying in time.

I don't know exactly how to respond to this other than to say the French seem to have won more often than not. They were at times employing Order mince, Order mixte or Order profond. Not the formation used by d'Erlon.

3 – The French speed of attack does not seem to have been a problem on the day anyway, possibly because they weren't trying to align multiple battalions in line anyway.

Possibly. But, I can't help but think that a division with its battalions in line marching uphill in the mud with the next battalion 4 or 5 paces behind is going to be more difficult.

4 – The problem this idea "solves" – lack of firepower – was not the problem on the day. The problem was that the French, in the one area they had some marginal success, were disordered by the firefight and crossing the hedge.

The French will have far more muskets to bring to bare. It's a matter of mathematics. I contend that their fire would have been more effective and perhaps have caused more disorder on their opponents.

5 – If the French had attacked in this manner and left no room at all, then the British would have been in 2-deep line to face them (no possiblity of French cavalry attack)

You will have to elaborate on this for me. I'm not following what you mean?

6 – The cavalry attack was based on speed and surprise. The French supports, no matter what formation they were in or how they were arrayed, would have been swept away by the rout of the initial units.

Surprise – yes, Speed – not so much. The mud affected everybody including horses. Accounts suggests that the English cavalry had to negotiate between the intervals of their infantry and deal with the mud. Their rate of advance was much reduced.

There is no doubt that some French units in the first line would have been broken, just as those in the 1st line of d'Erlon's divisional columns were broken. But here is the difference. In the latter case, entire divisons were disordered and routed because the first line was broken. In the former case, as the second line (deployed in divisional columns), deployed several hundred yards to the rear and would be able to form square. The English cavalry would have been shot up pretty badly. Moreover, Milhaud's cuirassiers, deployed to the rear of d'Erlon's corps would have made short work of the English cavalry charging through the intervals between the squares.

7 – The only thing that might have happened is if the French were deployed in sufficient depth and space, then the rear units might have held firm. In this case, the overall benefit would have been to the British cavalry – much less chance of their attack getting as out of hand as it did.

As I just noted, Milhaud's cuirassiers, deployed to the rear of d'Erlon's corps would have charged and likely destroyed much of the Union and Household brigades.

8 – D'Erlon's improvised formation did quite well for a French infantry attack on a British position, all things considered. Trying to quickly swamp the British with numbers wasn't an obviously terrible idea. The problem was that he was facing good infantry in a covered and protected position at the beginning of the battle before they had been worn down.

I'm not buying it, The better half of 2 and half infantry divisions destroyed for no gain. You are not going to win a battle that way.

MDavout:

A couple of clarifications for you (only where they seemed necessary):

2 – I mean "failed against the British".

4 – They *might* have pushed back four battalions on the main position instead of the two they actually did (or they might not – one of the whole points of French infantry tactics was to avoid the extended firefights which happen when two lines start exchanging volleys). Either way, this does not solve the main problem.

5 – There is some evidence that some British battalions were in 4-deep line at Waterloo for parts of the battle and naturally would not be if the French were attacking in a wider line.

6 – Ah okay. I get what you mean. I thought you were imagining the supports were a lot closer. If not and there was plenty of time to form square, then the British cavalry probably don't charge down the slope. So you probably lose less French infantry (they may have panicked in the rout anyway), but on the other hand, the Allies (probably) don't lose their heavy cavalry reserve. This is the same as 7.

8 – It was always going to be very difficult for the French, since time-consuming and attritional strategies were both out – as I was trying to get at with No.2, the French attack here did rather better than many others had in the Peninsular War. And as it happens, the French did gain the loss of 2 Allied cavalry brigades. Since the French cavalry was superior anyway, that isn't a negligible advantage.

However, the "genius" of Wellington at Waterloo was that he simply had to not make any horrendous mistakes to win.

Here are the images I was trying to link to earlier (unsuccessfully) The first is Donzelot's actural formation.

link

Here is a suggested ordre mixte he might have used.

link

Thanks for your patience.

Now they work as links now and the immediate reaction is the second makes far more sense. Was there the width for this? I suspect so actually.

Hope that provokes more debate.

Thanks

I would just like to say that for a complete ignoramus in terms of infantry formations of this period, I am finding this discussion very interesting- although I have to read the posts multiple times, with my lips moving, following text with my finger and using pennies for battalions.

Hello deadhead!

I think Whirlwinds excellent post below captures the critical reason for D'Erlon's failure.

"8 – D'Erlon's improvised formation did quite well for a French infantry attack on a British position, all things considered. Trying to quickly swamp the British with numbers wasn't an obviously terrible idea. The problem was that he was facing good infantry in a covered and protected position at the beginning of the battle before they had been worn down."

This is further embellished by Mark Adkin in the "Waterloo Companion", on page 347 he states:

"That this attack failed was due to the combination of four factors. They were:

- The generally ineffective French artillery fire due to the Anglo-Allied units being behind the ridge, with infantry lying down and cavalry dismounted.
- The considerable damage inflicted by even the few guns on the dense, tight formations in which the French advanced.
- The steadiness and fire discipline of the six or seven battalions of British infantry that checked the advance just behind the crest.
- The perfect timing of the cavalry counterattack by the Union Brigade, which caught the French totally by surprise as they staggered around in the smoke and confusion, uncertain what to do or where to go."

So that is what appears to be the cause of D'Erlon's failure. It was the actual situation. Change the situation and you can possibly change the outcome. Which to me means D'Erlon's defeat was not inevitable at Waterloo.

Best regards,

Glenn

Quite unrelatedly, I've just been reading Mike Snook's two books on Isandlwana and Rorke's Drift. A point he makes very well is that you can see evidence of the value of skilfully-directed, disciplined fire in where the casualties were. An 1879 company with breechloaders had the firepower of a whole 1815 battalion, and could hit from further away. The stopping power of this was visible in the heaps of Zulus brought down in rows 400 yards out, clearly the results of first-class fire discipline.

Flip back to Waterloo and I now wonder if d'Erlon's formation was at least in part chosen to obtain the same advantages of fire discipline for his own battalions. The frontage was the frontage was the frontage. There's no clever way to fit more men, on foot or on horseback, into it. Divide it by 22" (56cm), double it, and that's how many men Wellington would have in his firing line.

That's also the maximum d'Erlon could have had, but depending on formation, it could have been a lot fewer. Doctrine was that when a battalion went forward in column, it left enough space either side of itself to deploy. If we suppose that the frontage available between LHS and Papelotte was six battalions wide, I Corps would have had six battalions in its front line no matter what the adopted formation. Advancing in column of divisions they'd have been outgunned something like three to one. This was a recipe to get shot up badly, or always had been.

If d'Erlon instead ignored doctrine, advancing perhaps in battalion columns packed close enough together to make their fronts continuous, he can now match roughly the numbers of defenders firing. But he would now have three battalions who need to co-ordinate their fire, opposing one British battalion that's a unitary entity and has one mind directing its firing. I suggest that in such an encounter, notwithstanding roughly equal numbers of shooters, the line has a decisive command and control / fire discipline advantage over the columns. This is without considering that the relative thinness of the line makes it less vulnerable to return fire.

The formation d'Erlon adopted may thus have been about having a single formation front each division, foreseeing a firefight of line versus line which he would win by feeding more and more lines forward.

He could have had his following battalions in column, but there'd have been no speed advantage. The whole thing would have had to move at the pace of the slowest. Such a formation would have been a drawback if the enemy infantry were more numerous than expected, it would have been more vulnerable to artillery, and it might not necessarily have been any safer in the event of cavalry attack. The first the rear units knew of cavalry was when it came through the leading battalions. Between the lack of warning and these guys running for shelter past and through you, it's possible but far from certain that being in column would have made any difference.

It also doesn't follow that more cuirassiers would have made a difference. They might but equally (up to a point obviously) they might have got routed too…

Obviously the cavalry counterattack was the deciding blow, but it's hard to think of a best approach for the French, or one that would have worked. The battlefield was small, with no good avenues of approach. My thought, of course based on hindsight, would have been more of a heavy skirmish distraction against the main line with attacks to capture La Haye Sainte and maybe the hamlets on the eastern side so that the main line could come under closer and gradual pressure. Instead of a gradual attack in stages, something Napoleon often did, he went for something intended to end the battle more quickly.

Something that was also different for Napoleon in this battle was that he had no flanking force(s) coming in from a different direction, though of course that's his fault.

instead of sending Grouchy for hunting a ghost, he could well have used this fore to deliver a crushing defeat to Wellington's army.

As for Drouet d'Erlongs attacking formation, the French system of the early Napoleonic Wars, like used at Austerlitz and Jena / Auerstedt would have been at least more solid, that the phalanx like formation he did use at the battle of Belle Alliance

I think it's very interesting that some of us have taken the path that D'Erlon's formation was the major cause of his defeat. While both Whirlwind and Mark Adkin don't seem to support that. Whirlwind states "D'Erlon's formation did quite well". Mark simply says "The considerable damage inflicted by even the few guns on the dense, tight formations in which the French advanced", without any reference to the actual formation. Would his comments have been any different if the French had attacked in columns, squares or mixed formations? Doesn't sound like it. The French guard attacked in square and failed as well.

Most Napoleonic wargamers were brought up on the idea that certain formations at certain times are the cornerstone of Napoleonic warfare. I certainly was, but yet I've never actually read anything historical to confirm that. Some units have been caught changing formation and others have been swept away after becoming disordered or unable to return effective fire, etc., but rarely is there anything substantial that actually faults the formation itself. As far as I can tell in the vast majority of situations units were in the correct formation for the situation at hand. So why do a lot of players still think that playing rock, paper, scissors is the cornerstone of Napoleonic warfare?

About 20 years ago a new wave of gaming hit where units were always thought to be in their correct formation for the situation at hand. Why not, as they usually were. This greatly improved the speed of games. A lot of time was no longer being wasted by players mulling over every units formation and every potential enemy unit that could attack it.

Today we even have brigade games where one size fits all and formations are generally not reflected at all.

Once you get past formations as being the cornerstone you start to see the real issues of Napoleonic warfare. Some of which were mentioned by Whirlwind and Mark Adkin.

- Good infantry, not worn down in a covered and protected position.

- Ineffective artillery fire/effective artillery fire.

- Good steady infantry with fire discipline/unsteady infantry with poor fire discipline.

- Good timing of attacks upon shaken, disordered, troops/bad timing of attacks against troops in good condition.

- The overall cohesion of a unit and it's morale, training, experience and leadership.

So why do so many of us see formations as the cornerstone? Is it just conditioning?

So why do so many of us see formations as the cornerstone? Is it just conditioning?

No, it plays its part, for that reason I resent one size fits all games constructions, the French took great effort of how to stage their units in brigades and divisions, at least their glory days, it is a pity that all rules writers are unaware of this.

von Winterfeldt: +1

the French took great effort of how to stage their units in brigades and divisions, at least their glory days

Why do you think that they stopped doing this?

So why do so many of us see formations as the cornerstone? Is it just conditioning?

For a few reasons, I think:

They are a very visible phenomena
They were used to explain (partly) why the French had such a hard time against the British in tactical combat (the "line vs column" and the "cavalry vs square" debates, even though both begged more questions than they answered)
The things which historians have been interested in aren't always the things which wargamers have been interested in, so there have been periods in which the tactical mechanics of what went on on the battlefield have been neglected or looked at quite superficially.

There is also the element that von Winterfeldt alluded to. I don't think anyone argues that formations were irrelevant, but rather that:

they weren't as decisive as some wargames rules make out
the effect size of using different formations is not well understood by anyone
because the mechanics of early C19 warfare require that a degree of time be expended on them, doesn't mean that unit formations by themselves they were *that* important: it just means that is one of the things which unit and formation commanders could use to positively influence the battle whilst actually in it.

I think wargamers also obsess too much about troop types. Why do we slavishly mount cavalry figures all together on cavalry bases? Commanders of the day picked the appropriate troops for the task. Bases should logically contain random infantry, cavalry, and artillery figures.

When refighting Waterloo it's entirely appropriate to use infantry figures to represent Ney's heavy cavalry assault. He used whatever troops made sense so it makes no sense to second guess by slavishly using cavalry to depict cavalry. Prussian Landwehr cavalry, Chasseurs a Pied of the Guard – all the same thing, people. Just troops with weapons.

@4th Cuirassiers,

Use of regulating battalions and resupplying troops with ammo were serious concerns of tactical commanders at the time. I am happy leaving them out though, and most rules do, because they don't seem to have comparatively favoured one side over the other. Is that okay?

Why do you think that they stopped doing this?

The decline in quality in officers and soldiers, additionally they lost their skill in all arms attack, like the Germans in WW2.

The reading of Foucart, Campagnes de Prusse et de Pologne, first volume, pp. 700 – 711 is essential, the volume is available for download.

Those are the fundamentals about tactical thinking.

Of course all other aspects – as training etc., play an equal importance, but training or the lack of it – influences battle field tactics as well, Marmont complained that only this regiments of the Marine artillery could deploy in line, the rest of his regiments couldn't in 1813.

Tactical formations are essential for me at least, because they will determine how your troops will occupy a certain amount of space and how to unfold and to deploy them.

@vW

Do you have a link for the Foucart download? I thought I downloaded it years ago but cannot trace a copy on my pc.

it is on Gallica, here a link, there are other volumes as well

link

@vW

Thank you for the link. I am now busily translating pages 700 to 711!

Gentlemen, thanks for the feedback.

I'm clearly in the camp that thinks brigades and their formations/deployments/movement etc. are of the greatest importance. Yet most rule sets pay very little if any attention to them.

Instead the main focus of most rule sets has generally been on individual battalions and their formation. Most rule sets let every battalion change formation every turn. Giving the games a rock/paper/scissors dynamic that seems to be about as far away as you can get from real Napoleonic warfare. When in reality most battalions spent the entire battle in one maybe two formations.

Everyone knows that battalion formations have value, I just think that the real cornerstone of Napoleonic warfare is brigade formations. So I rarely play (and certainly do not enjoy) brigade games where a single base does everything. I also don't enjoy games where battalions are constantly changing formations and must always be on guard for every enemy unit that can also change formation and obtain a rule advantage when they attack you. They are all what I call upside down games.

I agree the lay out of brigades and the division was very important.