The following comments on the article might be helpful:
‘…If the militia system was successful in the opinion of those who claim it had led to victory in the revolution, why was there a desire to set up a regular army both during the war and after it in a society that was apprehensive of this kind of army? Also, why was it necessary to make such a far-reaching reform in the structure of the militia?'
These are excellent questions and one of the answers is that the militia did not have the term of service that the Continentals did and the other manpower resources of the states were enrolled in the state lines (or regulars) which did not operate under Continental authority. These were two main reasons why Washington could not recruit the Continental regiments up to strength. That made periodic reliance on the dubious qualities of the militia a requirement to take the field against the British and their German auxiliaries.
‘The genius of this nation is not in the least to be compared with that of the Prussians, Austrians, or French. You say to your soldier ‘Do this!' and he does it; but I am obliged to say ‘This is the reason why you ought to do that'; and then he does it.'-General Baron von Steuben.
‘Under von Steuben's guidance the Revolutionary War soldier became a first-class fighting man in the best European tradition. Contrary to popular tradition, he did not hide behind trees and stone walls to pot at enemy formations. With exceptions such as Kings Mountain and various routs, he met the British Army on its own terms in open fields and drawn up in line of battle. He learned to make savage bayonet charges, and in such famous attacks as Stony Point and the assault on the redoubts at Yorktown, he charged with an unloaded weapon, relying solely on cold steel. By the end of the war the Continental was no longer just the citizen with a gun. He was a hardened campaigner. He knew his weapons and he knew his drill. He could face the enemy under any and all circumstances. He knew how to throw up fortifications and how to obtain shelter. His independent spirit remained but he knew the military hierarchy and how to recognize it by insignia-and he knew the deference due it. He was, in short, the master of all the miscellaneous hardware and gear of military life, the basic tools of the Revolution.'-Harold Peterson
Washington believed that "to place any confidence upon militia is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff" and he wasn't alone in that assessment.
Washington described the militia as "badly officered and under no government. They come in you cannot tell how, go, you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment."
Nathaniel Greene, who was driven to anger in the Carolinas, described them as the "locusts of Egypt" indicating that "they wasted the countryside without performing any useful duty. In battle they usually broke and ran as soon as things got dangerous."
The Continentals themselves described the militia as ‘long faces' based on their attitude and reluctance when called up for duty.
‘The military history of the American Revolution can be divided roughly, both chronologically and regionally, into two main stages. The first period began with the aborted American attack on British strongholds in Canada at the end of 1775, and ended in October 1777 with the British general Burgoyne at Saratoga. After this the war moved to the southern colonies until the capitulation of the British forces in Yorktown in October 1781.'
This is not correct. The ‘first period' began with Lexington and Concord as well as Bunker Hill which preceded the American invasion of Canada. The battles of Saratoga were not the last of the main actions in the northern theater. Monmouth occurred in 1778 after the winter at Valley Forge. And the French alliance occurred in 1778 based on the victory at Saratoga and the American performance at Germantown which also impressed the French.
‘The defeat at Saratoga transferred the strategic focus of Britain to the colonies south of the Potomac River.'
The strategic ‘focus' of the British changed with the French alliance as well as with the loss of Burgoyne's army at Saratoga. In effect, the alliance changed the Revolution to a global war and the British were forced to send troops from North America in order to defend their possessions in the Caribbean. This depleted their overall strength against the Americans which undoubtedly forced the British to reevaluate their strategy against the Americans. The South seemed vulnerable and forces were sent from New York to invade the southern colonies.
‘In May 1780 Charleston (South Carolina) was taken, and Washington tried to send his army, which was encamped around the city of New York, southwards in an attempt to strengthen the militia forces.'
Where is the evidence that Washington ‘tried to send his army…southwards'? In point of fact a small army under Gates was sent southward to assist Charleston and when they found that Charleston had been taken were badly defeated at Camden in August 1780.
‘…Prussian Emperor…'
The Prussian monarch was not an emperor, but a king. There is a difference and the Hohenzollerns had previously been electors and at the beginning of the 18th century were ‘elevated' to the rank of ‘King in Prussia.'
‘The development of the Prussian army under the command of Frederick the Great is therefore crucial.
To whom? The Americans were more influenced by the French, especially the writings of de Saxe and Guibert, than the Prussians. Prussian ‘influence' only became noticeable with the coming of von Steuben to Valley Forge and the training of the Continental Army. And the training that was developed by von Steuben for the Continentals was a mixture of British, French, and Prussian methods, not merely Prussian.
Moreover, from the end of the seventeenth century the American colonies were involved in European conflicts, mainly between Britain and France. Thus, the colonial settlers found themselves fighting side by side with British regular forces, winning appointments as officers, and being exposed to the fighting methods of a regular army.'
The influence of a British army in North America was only evident from the French and Indian War. That was the first time that British troops were sent to defeat the French in any numbers. The British ‘policy' toward the American colonies was one of ‘benign neglect' with the Americans being responsible for their own defense against the French and Indians in the series of wars up to the French and Indian War (1754-1763).
‘The geo-strategic situation of Prussia was somewhat similar to that of the colonies in North America.'
This is at best a stretch. The comparison with Prussia is weak and is probably non-existent. In short, the analogy is incorrect.
‘Prussia soldiers were mostly native born recruits called up to join the army, often by compulsion, on a territorial basis.'
Before the assumption of Frederick the Great to being King of Prussia, the ratio of mercenaries to native born Prussians in the Prussian Army was one to two; after Frederick deliberately developed it to just the reverse. The Prussian kings had always relied on mercenaries to keep up the strength of the army, and Frederick the Great increased the numbers of foreign mercenaries in the army.
‘[Washington] did aspire to built a national army acting in accordance with the principles of warfare that were designed by Frederick the Great.'
Where is the evidence of this statement? What principles of war were ‘designed' by Frederick the Great? He inherited a first-class army that was built by his predecessors and he won only about half of his battles.
Washington's model for the Continental Army was the British army, not the Prussian or Frederick the Great.
‘The weakness of the American army was demonstrated clearly in the battle of New York in the summer of 1776. After this battle Washington refrained from direct confrontation with the British army on the battlefield.'
Washington fought the British army on the battlefield at Brandywine and Germantown, both in 1777, and at Monmouth in 1778.
‘…in June 1778 the first regular battle between the Continental army and the British army took place at Monmouth Courthouse, ending in a victory for the Americans.'
Again, both Brandywine and Germantown in 1777 were ‘regular battles.' And Monmouth was a drawn battle at best and the British both protected their large convoy and fought a successful rear guard action and got away.
‘Although the militia forces had defeated the British Army at the battle of Saratoga…'
The main battles of the Saratoga campaign, Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights were fought mainly with Continental units, not militia. These were stand-up fights which forced Burgoyne to surrender. They were not fought by militia.
paints brigs for the British fleet.
