"When can a commander ignore orders" Topic

There are a number of issues that perhaps are independent.

For instance a real march coloum of say Roman legionaries may be ten miles long, that will take a considerable amount of time to form up in battle order. That is just basic time delays.

As has been said not all orders are the same. As the been said starting a pre defined action is simple, Any thing from waving a flag to a command like Panzer March. More complex orders take more time and are more likely to be misunderstood. This distinction is important.

As has been said breaking the line is against the rules. There may be a reason for that rule that it allows the enemy to get at a flank.

It is important that if this is the case the rules reflect this vulnerability. If it is well, reflected then the player breaking the rules is likely to Get courts Mashaled (made to buy a round) for losing the battle for failing to do as told. Our own experience is that with well integrated rules too much opertunism results in disaster.

I think the more likely scenario is the subordinate doing something useful because they have more knowledge/less consequence for insubordination than a real subordinate.

So if a subordinate (either player or non-player) has orders to advance but can see troops on the flank, there is a temptation (and motivation) to change orders. There would be relevant factors to consider like the tolerance for initiative of the individual CinC or the military system operated under, the personality (if known) of the subordinate, and the game rules being played.

Cheers,
John

John Edmundson nails it. Changes of order by wargamers is always made with unrealistic insight into the situation (10 mile general) and will usually be based on better info than is available – this is what command and control orders should reflect.

Sparta,
There may be a fundamental flaw in your systems. We always represent at most troops not in visible range as markers with a few dummies thrown in to add confusion. If they have not moved just mark them on the map. This takes away a great deal of the Gods eye view and makes sub generals more prone to make mistakes, being opportunist when that is bad news.

I think the more likely scenario is the subordinate doing something useful because they have more knowledge/less consequence for insubordination than a real subordinate.

John:
Yes and no. I think it depends on the commander and the army culture.

Two Allied column commanders refused to respond to the French attack up the center at Austerlitz [which outflanked them] because it wasn't part of their orders.

Bernadotte was nearly court martialed for following his original orders October 14, 1806, leaving Davout alone, and then failed to reach his march objectives because of poor roads.

Then, the second day of Gettysburg, Hood wanted to take the Round Tops. Longstreet refused, saying he had to follow the original order when had his right flank brushed them to the west. Even so, Law's right brigade ended up on Big Round Top when Hood was wounded. His act stretched the battle line to the point that Kershaw and Robertson's brigades broke up in an attempt to stay joined with the brigades on their flanks [or Emmettsburg Road for Kershaw's brigade.]

During the attack, Barksdale left the battle line to take the Union in flank. The decision was so spur-of-the-moment, he left his regulating regiment, the 21st MS isolated in the center of the CSA line. Longstreet had to move Wofford into the gap to correct the problem. Hood was wounded, Barksdale was killed.

Neither officer was ever court martialed, let alone chastised for their actions.

Such issues can be seen as part of Organizational characteristics, which would be interesting to game.

Bernadotte was nearly court martialed for following his original orders October 14, 1806, leaving Davout alone, and then failed to reach his march objectives because of poor roads.

Which in fact – he did reach his march objective – he was at Apolda in the later afternoon – as ordered – and bagged a complete Prussian fusilier battlion.

It took him a lot of effort to get there, not even the genius of war, Boney did know that Davout had to fight the Prussian main army.

Bernadotte left Davout isolated and in danger of being overwhelmed.

Bernadotte was not engaged on 14 October, but spent the day marching between the two battles. The orders to go to Dornburg were out of date because of the overall situation and because Davout was engaged with the main Prussian army. It was Bernadotte's duty to support Davout, not go south to Dornburg.

For a soldier, which Bernadotte was supposed to be, it is a reprehensible act of treachery.

And, yes, it took a lot of effort to stay out of the fighting on 14 October. Bernadotte was lucky not to have been destituted.

Apolda was not Bernadotte's assigned objective-Dornburg was, which Bernadotte reached at 1100 on 14 October. And he had ignored the smoke and roar of Davout's battle behind him as he leisurely marched from Naumburg to Dornburg.

Bernadotte reached Apolda around 1600 and wrote to Berthier that his arrival there had 'saved' Davout. Bernadotte's conduct, or misconduct, was near-treasonous and he was very lucky to escape punishment.

Napoleon did not know of Davout's situation until it was reported to him by one of Davout's ADCs about 0900 on the 15th.

VW and B views make my point with Bernadotte's actions and the Army/commander's responses… the questions of insubordination, acting on orders and not…and the consequences. Yes and no.

UscCha
"There may be a fundamental flaw in your systems. We always represent at most troops not in visible range as markers with a few dummies thrown in to add confusion. If they have not moved just mark them on the map. This takes away a great deal of the Gods eye view and makes sub generals more prone to make mistakes, being opportunist when that is bad news."

That is an ok system. But enememy troops visible to some may not be visible to others who can still make decisions based on what they see (the player can)

"But in RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE wording, when can the PLAYER ignore the orders the brigade is operating under, and have a sub-command react?"

There are so many possible variables involved, as the 58 previous answers show, that it is really difficult to give a standard answer.

Clausewitz talking about the 1799 campaign in Switzerland notes the difference between the French and Austrian armies and their resulting relative capability of independent action, of the kind which was frequently necessary with so many small forces being spread among the mountain valleys. Essentially the Austrians were brought up in a tradition of duty and responsibility and accountability to their noble superiors. Their default response, then, when unsure what to do, was to wait for an order from above. They were therefore very passive and excessively cautious. The French, by contrast, with their revolutionary ideology of breaking the rules, defaulted to action and aggression, occasionally being excessively rash, but mostly outmaneuvering the Austrians.

How do you reflect that in a wargame? One approach is to give individual players lovingly crafted personal victory conditions so that when there is a team of players on each side, subordinates' personal goals do not always tally tidily with their commander's. Our annual Xmas games run by Mark Smith are superb examples of this:
link

But it isn't practical to do that every game. I favour the activation roll approach noted by others in previous responses above, as used in various rulesets in various forms, including in Bloody Big Battles (BBB). In our 1799 case, in a BBB scenario the French would be generously endowed with General figures who add +1 to the activation rolls for units under their command and within their 6" radius. The Austrians would not only have far fewer Generals – probably just one on the table – but would also be handicapped with a Passive rating, taking -1 off all their activation rolls.

This lets the dice take care of all the usual variables – the effectiveness or otherwise of local scouting, how good a commander's larger intelligence picture is, whether or not he feels like taking a given gamble at a given moment – and also allows incorporation of both the army-level doctrinal differences and representation of particularly good or bad individual historical commanders.

And if you really want fog of war, you have to play some form of Kriegsspiel. But again, that's a time-consuming luxury most of us can't afford every week down the club.

Dunno if that helps!

Chris

Bloody Big BATTLES!
link

Clearly Bernadotte was seeking to follow his orders as they appeared but there was an element of order/ counterorder / disorder (averted).

The order to move on Dornburg comes from Berthier to Murat (commanding the advance guard) issued at 09:00 on the 13th but only received by Bernadotte at 16:00 on that day.

The 15:00 order was received by Davout and Bernadotte at 18:00 causing both to halt any movement of their corps. Both commanders made the same interpretation, not just Bernadotte.

At 22:00 on the 13th the famous order was issued. This was received at 03:00 on the 14th. This reiterates the expectation that Bernadotte should be at Dornburg.

As neither Napoleon or Davout expected meeting serious opposition around Auerstadt there was no imperative for these corps to operate together. Davout issued his orders to his division commanders before meeting with Bernadotte. If he was concerned about the forces he was facing I would have expected him to meet Bernadotte first.

The order is vague "if you are together you COULD march together". The fact that the order starts with "if you are together" suggests that Berthier or Napoleon had lost sight of I Corps, perhaps not surprising given the focus on concentrating about Jena.

In the fog of war and associated friction there will be mistakes and missed opportunities. For the French in 1806 they made fewer mistakes and were able to react more speedily to developing events.

A great example for this is Porter and his V Corps at second Manassas. link

Here he first decides not to implement his orders (29th) due to enemy forces unknow to the C in C. With the orders reiterated for the 30th he obeys them only to have his command rolled up by a flank attack.

The indignity comes later with his court martial. Exonerated 16 years later due to a change in the political scene.

I suggest Bernadotte was victimised as part of building the Napoleonic myth (and he wouldn't be the only one).

Just curious- did Davout ever express an opinion, publicly or privately, on Bernadotte's conduct on the day of Auerstadt?

I remember reading somewhere that Napoleon watched Bernadotte leading his troops in a minor action shortly thereafter, and saying to the staff around him, "Some day, that long-nosed Gascon will overreach himself," which suggests to me that he had diagnosed the cause of the previous delay as malice or intrigue, rather than incompetence or cowardice. But I can't say that I have ever heard of an opinion coming from the man most personally affected, Davout.

with hindsight – Boney dished out the critics to Bernadotte because he failed to see that the main army wasn't in front of him.

Bernadotte did just obey orders, which he had to do, he could either march behind Davout of via Dornburg, there he was closer to
Dornburg – he chose that way.

Nobody – not even the almighty Boney could know that Davout would have to face the Prussian main army, the conception of a superb battle plan was that the Prussians would be cut off completely from their line of retreat.

When Boney read the report of Davout he accused him to have had double visions, he still then was under the impression that he had fought the Prussian main army at Jena.

Bernadotte is a classic victim of Napoleonic propaganda and even worse a scapegoat for the post mortem Boney groupies.

Interesting to report that several weeks later the left wing of the French army comprising Ney's Corps, Bernadotte's Corps and Bessieres was all under Bernadotte as the more senior commander. Hardly the treatment you would expect for someone under a cloud.

Wasn't Ney under a bit of a cloud after Jena?

They [the Austrians] were therefore very passive and excessively cautious. The French, by contrast, with their revolutionary ideology of breaking the rules, defaulted to action and aggression, occasionally being excessively rash, but mostly outmaneuvering the Austrians.

How do you reflect that in a wargame? One approach is to…

Hi Chris:

There are any number of ways [sub-systems and mechanics] to portray that organizational difference, only limited by the designer's imagination.

The only test is whether it actually captures anything of the command situation for the players. In the Austrian system, you can depend on the commanders to follow orders, even when impractical, while with the other, commanders will take the initiative when practical…and impractical or simply grand-standing. In one system you didn't want to stand out with any even slightly controversial decisions, while in the other, you wanted the spotlight for advancement to that 'Marshal's Baton.'

For instance, Ney at Jena mentioned. He basically collected all his elite troops [some 6,000], force marched them to the battlefield and inserted them into the center of the line, leaving the rest of his corps miles behind--all without orders. Napoleon had to act to save his bacon. Why did Ney do it? He "didn't want to miss the battle."

As I said, there are lots of ways to simulate that command situation… it just has to reasonably model the decision-dynamics and command issues faced by the actual leaders the players represent.

I can see why that didn't go over well.

Honestly, the best way to replicate the crazy things subordinates can do is to use actual people as subordinates: only then can we truly allow for the full spectrum of human behavior. I have always liked the mechanics of the"Empire" series, combining order activation, staff and commander ability, and actual players.

I realize that's kind of a dodge- but one of the greatest challenges for a set of rules is, "can it replicate the weird stuff around the edges, and the one-off events," and that's all but impossible. Just make the guy who's pissed at you play Bernadotte- it's easier than another hundred pages of rules.

"Hi Chris:
There are any number of ways [sub-systems and mechanics] to portray that organizational difference, only limited by the designer's imagination."

Hi Bill,

I never said there weren't. I thought I was answering LH's OP by (a) citing a historical situation where one side generally shouldn't be allowed to use initiative to the extent of disobeying orders and the other side often should; and (b) suggesting two ways of reflecting that; and (c) advocating the merits of one in particular that lets the dice plausibly decide when a player can and can't use initiative – and in a RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE way per the OP.

That's not to exclude other ways of doing it. For instance, I've had some good games in years gone by with Sam Mustafa's "Grande Armee", in which some generals may be characterised as Cautious or Rash and default to those behaviours if the C-in-C doesn't spend enough Command Points to control them. One of many ways to skin this particular cat.

Chris

Hello Last Hussar!

Good stuff, now the water starts to get even darker.

The first problem is the composition of your brigades. Are they historic or the usual fictional stuff seen in most wargames. I've been told by some GMs that those four battalions are my Division. So your now stuck trying to define the flank of a brigade of varying shapes and sizes.

Second problem, at what point can the 200 foot general declare he can even take action, never mind what his orders are. Keep in mind that he can generally see his flanking force long before they get there. Can he not justify his actions by sending out scouts, etc.?

Third problem in order to change his orders/take initiative, etc., his orders must be clearly defined. That means a written set of orders that were either originally written or given verbally. Without this you will never be able to pin down the creative player or even establish an elusive line to cross.

Fourth problem, you will need a detailed list of circumstances for every level of command that allows them to use their initiative, etc.

Fifth problem, what penalties are there for the player who breaks the rules? In reality the commander could simply order his men to do whatever he wants. If things turned out good he was rewarded, if not he was punished.

After wrestling with "orders" for over 20 years we realized that an ironclad system was just not practical in a game that needed to be easy to learn, fast to play and very, very low on debate/controversy. When we switched to Polemos rules sold by Baccus6mm (designed for 6mm but can be used with most scales) we found the perfect solution. Orders are included in what is called "Tempo", which represents:

"The army that has the Tempo sets the pace of the battle. Tempo embodies the confidence, will and drive to succeed that guides all successful armies. That includes everything an army needs to function such as gunpowder, ammunition, discipline, morale, cohesion, experience and orders. All of these factors have been combined into a Tempo Point (TP) system."

Local commanders have limited Tempo and can't deliver an effective attack without getting additional Tempo from superior commanders or the C&C. Responding to local enemy activities is possible but can't be sustained without getting support from superior commanders. So a rudimentary command system is in place without having to write a detailed set of rules. It also solves a host of other nitpick problems that have plagued miniature rules for years such as movement, brigade formations, etc.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Bill,
I never said there weren't. I thought I was answering LH's OP by (a) citing a historical situation where one side generally shouldn't be allowed to use initiative to the extent of disobeying orders and the other side often should; and (b) suggesting two ways of reflecting that; and (c) advocating the merits of one in particular that lets the dice plausibly decide when a player can and can't use initiative – and in a RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE way per the OP.

Hi Chris. Happy New Year in Merry Ol'England.

I wasn't suggesting you did. I was simply following up on what you wrote by noting that there were many, many ways of accomplishing a good representation of the command issues you noted…and that the bottom line for all of them was which worked [i.e. which modeled accurately the historical dynamics targeted.]

Hello Chris!

"How do you reflect that in a wargame?"

For us, very simply we don't.

Painting entire nations with "very passive and excessively cautious" or "aggression…….excessively rash" is what is called by some as "National Characteristics". In the 70s – 80s and even into the 90s it was pretty common in a lot of rule sets. Some new rule sets even contain them. I assume from your comments that BBB has it in some form.

In the 90s some people like myself thought that "NC" rules just didn't feel right, couldn't really be substantiated and didn't seem to have any real influence on why historical battles were won or lost. Rules then started to appear that didn't contain any "NC". The hobby seemed to have moved on.

We have not used "NC" for at least 25 years and have been able to clearly see the causes for winners and losers which are generally, good/bad battle plan, good/bad execution of battle plan, ability to respond to the changing dynamics of the battle, composition of an army including experience, training and leadership skills.

Best regards,

Glenn

National characteristics or doctrine and culture?

I think reflecting doctrine and culture is valid in a set of rules.

Hello Mike!

I think the words stated by Chris could apply to anyone. Attaching them to a specific country seems to be NC.

I'm hard pressed to find a battle where doctrine and culture were the deciding factors. If they did play a part then I would write it into the scenario. Trying to incorporate them into a rule set where the buzz words are "RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE" would not be an easy task.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Glenn,

Nice to be talking with you again. (And btw thanks for your kind comments on Baccus forum the other week.)

"I assume from your comments that BBB has [National Characteristics] in some form."

No; I can see why you might assume that, but it doesn't. It just has integrated mechanisms that can accommodate factors that some might call "doctrine and culture" which I think overlap with what you call "composition of an army including experience, training and leadership skills". These enable forces to be represented appropriately for any given historical scenario.

"If [doctrine and culture] did play a part then I would write it into the scenario."
To take the 1799 case I cited as an example, if for the sake of argument we accept Clausewitz's characterisation of the difference between the opposing armies, could you explain to us how the Polemos Tempo mechanism would reflect a case such as that? Or would you need some scenario special rule each time?

Chris

To not assume NC or differences in doctrine and culture is just as absurd as the poor characteristics of the 80´s. Often the cukture comes thrigh in actions rather than fighting prowess (as was usually the case in the 80´s rules). If you want to figt 1870 and makes the command and control equal for the two armies, you will not have a game that has any resemblance to the historical events, the same goes for somthing like 1805. We have to accept that is you want simple fast solutions, you are ususally giving up on something.

Sparta +1

Hello Chris!

The pleasure is all mine, both in talking to you and recommending BBB.

It's a bit of a problem. Your statement referring to Clausewitz is a generalization that refers only to the Austrians and French in a joint Austrian-Russian campaign of 1799 against the French. It's further fragmented by its reference to Switzerland and only to Austrians and French when they were "unsure what to do". Polemos like almost every rule set is not designed to deal with that kind of minute detail. So if it was determined to be a critical detail for the Austrians or French in a 1799 Switzerland battle it would have to be a scenario specific rule. Having fought most of the major battles of 1799 a number of times I've never encountered this situation. Presently I'm not losing any sleep over having to tackle this problem.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hello Sparta!

I don't think anyone is advocating that we should ignore doctrine and culture or that command and control should be equal for two armies.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hi Glenn,

Maybe my question wasn't clear enough (perils of writing while insomniac, sorry). How about this version:

In a battle where one army is clearly superior to the other in terms of command and control, how does the Polemos Tempo system reflect that? (I'm genuinely curious, as I've never played it.)

Cheers,
Chris

Hello Chris!

Some Polemos rule sets structure Tempo slightly differently.

The basic concept is you can rate your low level commanders (often brigadiers) according to your perception of their capabilities. In most of the rule sets you have three choices, often called Decisive (best), Capable (average) or Plodding (poor). They have inherent Tempo values of say 2 Tempo points, 1 Tempo point and 0 Tempo points, respectively. The game has a menu of items such as movement, attacking, brigade changing formation, recovery, etc. that shows how many Tempo points are required to execute those functions.

The commanders of both armies have a preset amount of Tempo points that can be enhanced with a dice roll. After a bidding process to decide who goes first the net amount of Tempo points left is used by the commanders to reflect their control over their subordinates.

So if your convinced that one army has a better command control system then the other you simply give one side more Decisive commanders and the other more Plodding commanders. The beauty here is that you can tilt the scale to any degree that you want. The hard part is actually trying to determine if in fact there were any major differences between two armies and if so did it have any effect on the actual battle, or not.

Does this help? If not just fire away and I'll do my best to try and clarify it for you.

Best regards,

Glenn

Thanks, Glenn. OK, that sounds sensibly simple yet subtle.

Chris.

Hi Glenn: Hope your New Year is Merry and Bright. I have been out carousing, but I did want to respond to your interesting and thoughtful list of problems in representing command.

The first problem is the composition of your brigades. Are they historic or the usual fictional stuff seen in most wargames. I've been told by some GMs that those four battalions are my Division. So your now stuck trying to define the flank of a brigade of varying shapes and sizes.

This is the first and only one I don't understand. The flank of a brigade is going to be in the same place regardless of the number of battalions….Or division for that matter.

Second problem, at what point can the 200 foot general declare he can even take action, never mind what his orders are. Keep in mind that he can generally see his flanking force long before they get there. Can he not justify his actions by sending out scouts, etc.?

While it is true that wargamers see a lot more than their historical counterparts, the local commander did have a better sense of what is going on compared to the CinC back a mile. That isn't new. That situation is the reason that brigade and division commanders had very clear parameters regarding decision-making--what they could and couldn't do. Players should be under those same parameters with lower commands.

Third problem in order to change his orders/take initiative, etc., his orders must be clearly defined. That means a written set of orders that were either originally written or given verbally. Without this you will never be able to pin down the creative player or even establish an elusive line to cross.

This has always been an issue with game orders… within a game system they have to be far more explicit than they usually were in real life. Again, that was often because there was a set limit already in place to what subordinates could do on their own 'initiative.'

Fourth problem, you will need a detailed list of circumstances for every level of command that allows them to use their initiative, etc.

That was the same problem faced by armies in every age. I don't find that to be necessary because again, many of those circumstances have been 'covered' by those set of decision-making parameters made by armies to address that very problem.

Fifth problem, what penalties are there for the player who breaks the rules? In reality, the commander could simply order his men to do whatever he wants. If things turned out good he was rewarded, if not he was punished.

Which rules? The game rules or following orders? And the 'things turned out good, so he was rewarded' scenario didn't necessarily occur. There are ways to have player consequences for not following orders. They don't have to be complicated.**I can explain if you want.

After wrestling with "orders" for over 20 years we realized that an ironclad system was just not practical in a game that needed to be easy to learn, fast to play and very, very low on debate/controversy.

You realize that you have just described the goal of most all military 'systems': Iron-clad, easy to learn, easy to remember, very low on debate/controversy.

What game rules do you know of that are 'iron-clad'? Does that mean written so they are tight, without controversy or rules that players can't break? [as if ]

After wrestling with "orders" for over 20 years we realized that an ironclad system was just not practical in a game that needed to be easy to learn, fast to play and very, very low on debate/controversy. When we switched to Polemos rules sold by Baccus6mm (designed for 6mm but can be used with most scales) we found the perfect solution. Orders are included in what is called "Tempo".

I've played the napoleonic version and have some thoughts on Tempo, but I'd be interested in how you see the system compares to historical dynamics of particular battles.

Hello Bill!

All the best to you and your family.

Thanks for taking the time to make some comments and ask some questions.

1. The problem arises with the position and formation of a brigade. If it's on the end of a line is it not automatically on a flank. If it's say composed of four battalions with three facing frontally and the one on the end is turned facing right, where is the actual flank of the brigade. Better still you have four battalions two are facing frontally and the other two are facing right. The best one is a staggered line in echelon. So for a player to claim he is being outflanked you need to establish exactly what that is.

2. Absolutely, but for a player to claim he is being outflanked you have to establish exactly what the "clear parameters" are. Then you can start to work on what the unclear parameters are.

3. Yeah, that's my point if you are going to concern yourself with changing orders then you have to establish a system that is much more explicit then in real life. This is generally where the wheels fall off the cart on most game order systems.

4. Yes, we might know that, but some players won't. I think you need guidelines.

5. Game rules. The biggest problem is your not suppose to know what the other side's orders are. So how do you even know if he's not following them. Usually another great debate when trying to use conventional order systems in games.

I'm not talking about rules being "ironclad", just the order system. I don't think an "ironclad" rule system or order system is possible.

I find that Polemos and Tempo make me think and act differently from conventional games. Those thoughts and actions seem to reflect or mimic some of the pressures that historical commanders may have had, but obviously not the same at all.

The first is I'm forced to actually think about the dynamics of a Brigade and not so much the individual battalions or regiments within it. When should/can I move it, how should I move it, what formation should I be in for the various tasks that confront me. How/when should I deploy for defence or attack. I think these are real problems that historical Brigadiers faced. Traditional games only pay lip service to Brigades as the rules generally force you to focus on individual units and allow you to move them as if it was every man for himself.

Second is the Divisional commander. In this roll you again lose the individual unit concept and have to focus on similar problems as a Brigadier but more so. You have to try and figure out how two or more Brigades can operate together as an effective force and constantly monitor their actions. Traditional games just boil down to, oh I have to put more guys over there.

Obviously the roles of Corp, Army and C&C compound all of this.

Tempo becomes the tool that makes the magic happen (reflects orders, ammunition, cohesion, etc.). It puts pressure on the entire command system as Tempo is a limited resource. It limits what you can do effectively. So your forced into developing a plan of action. Good plan well served with Tempo, good tactics, movement, etc., good chance of success. Bad plan with limited Tempo, bad tactics, poor movement, etc., good chance of failure. I've never played a miniatures game before that clearly puts such an upfront commitment on the players. Everything depends on good planning and execution. Polemos also cleverly puts a constant pressure on you as situations change from turn to turn. So although a different kind of pressure it does give the players a sense of real life problems. Real commanders had to struggle with their dwindling resources as a battle progresses, so do Polemos players.

Hope this explains things a bit better, if not just fire away.

Best regards,

Glenn

Glenn:

Thanks for the explanations.

I still don't see the issue with flanks. A refused flank is still the end of the brigade or division, just at a different angle…protecting it. When is the end of a brigade [the last stand in a line or last battalion] not a flank?

About not knowing the opponent's orders. A table represents from 1 to 6 miles in length and maybe 1 to 4 miles deep, depending on the scale. I can only speak to 19th century battles, but once within that area, once you could see the enemy [about 2 miles away], generally you could see their actions, the direction of movement. Just before entering artillery range to contact, most all movement was directly at the enemy. The common practice was to select a point and use it as a directional guide to keep the lines perpendicular to the enemy/objective of the advance. There was very little the enemy didn't know about friendly objectives at that point. [excuse the pun].

Obviously, the army orders, covering the major objectives of the entire battle wouldn't necessarily be known, but even then many battles occurred around mutually recognized objectives.

So, the question becomes where players get to know the enemy's orders/movement and how is that in keeping with what actual commanders could learn visually and know.

Line-of-sight becomes very important. What is nice about linear warfare and those initiative parameters I mentioned, if there is no line-of-sight between a unit and the enemy, then that unit can respond to that enemy presence. That is very much an experience commanders had. Watching an enemy unit he can see from his higher, more distant position move against the local friendlies who remain unaware of their presence.

For instance, Clausel at Salamanca watched British cavalry maneuvering against several battalions from the other side of a rise, out of sight of those battalions. He sent an order to those battalions to form square. Luckily for the battalions, the order got there in time.

In a game system with those historical initiative parameters, a brigade commander could do the following and only the following without orders:

1. temporarily halt the brigade
2. Refuse a flank
3. Have battalions form square [halting the brigade]
4. Change the formation of the brigade from line to column or vise versa as long as the line of attack or defense remained constant.

Anything else required an order. A complete withdrawal was a chancy decision without orders.

That's it. Napier, commanding a single battalion[52nd] at Corunna, didn't even have those options. His main job was to make sure that his flanks remained joined with adjacent battalions and order was maintained. He reports that the end [flank] battalion next to him had refused his flank, but everything else, including deploying skirmishers or attacking the village to his front required an order from Moore.

I think the 200 foot general is certainly a real issue. To tackle it, even marginally requires asking questions about what the actual commander could and did know, when and why before a real comparison of game system to reality can be made.

I find that Polemos and Tempo make me think and act differently from conventional games.

I guess it would depend on what you see as 'conventional' games. Grande Armee, Warmaster Ancients and other games using 'command pips' mechanically operate much like Tempo points.
How do you see the Polemos operating differently [unconventionally]?

Hello Bill!

My first point was intended to cover the fact that our hobby is constantly receiving new players. Many of them have no idea what a Brigade is. Even a number of seasoned players are vague on this. So if this formation is being identified as a key formation in your rules you might need to clearly define exactly what it is, how it is structured, what it can do (including your four points) and where are its flanks, etc. This flies completely in the face of LHs main objective which are RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

For me conventional games are what some call "old school games" or games that are based on battalions with company bases that change formation as often as they can. The game design often has little focus on formations above the battalion or regiment. These all operate and play very differently from Polemos, where the focus is from the top down. Some refer to Polemos as a "new school" game.

Best regards,

Glenn

Glenn, just like a battalion manoeuvres it's companies in fairly fixed patterns so will a brigade manoeuvre it's regiments and battalions.

For a division then does the commander form the brigades side by side, one brigade up with the others in reserve and so on.

I fear new players might not want to accept the constraints that might go with this especially if you introduce regulation battalions and invertion.

My first point was intended to cover the fact that our hobby is constantly receiving new players. Many of them have no idea what a Brigade is. Even a number of seasoned players are vague on this. So if this formation is being identified as a key formation in your rules you might need to clearly define exactly what it is, how it is structured, what it can do (including your four points) and where are its flanks, etc. This flies completely in the face of LHs main objective which are RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

Glenn:
Does it? So, RULES FRIENDLY AND PLAYABLE game sets don't define what a brigade is, what they can do, how they are structured in the game or where flanks are? That is, if doing so "flies completely in the face of LHs main objective."

Thank you for clarifying 'conventional' games for me.

I fear new players might not want to accept the constraints that might go with this especially if you introduce regulation battalions and inversion.

Mike:
And why do you think that is? Considering all the constraints that a new player would have to deal with playing ANY wargame [have you played Polemos, Napoleon's Battles or Grand Armee?]. Assuming it was all new, how is one constraint all that less distasteful than another? Think of all the play 'constraints' in Settlers of Catan or Querkle. Why do players put up with them?

Two reasons, they are fun and ALL games are built on behavioral constraints.
As for gamers who have been raised on 'conventional' wargames in Glenn's vernacular, they will be uncomfortable with anything out of the ordinary, any 'new' constraints…like those found in Polemos.

It all depends on what gamers are looking for. The Thread issue is one of historical representation. Once we have that, THEN we can think of ways of making it palatable to "new gamers."

If players find rules constraints on their play 'annoying', there is more going on than just the constraints themselves. How many are there, how often do they come up in play, how clearly are they presented in the rules… are they challenging and fun or simply boring, etc. etc. etc.?

To offer an analogy that might or might not fit. Those Radio Control weekend flyers who bought their planes ready to fly find all the issues with building an aerodynamically sound model annoying, boring and something they avoid.

Yet there is a whole hobby build around making such models…Even so, the majority of RC flyers are weekend flyers. No one has suggested that airplane kits need to avoid aerodynamic 'constraints' in building the models to make them more palatable to weekend flyers.

Hello Mike!

Yes, I'm aware that battalions, regiments and brigades generally move in patterns.

From what I've been able to understand generally the position of Brigades on the battlefield often flows from the top down. Some armies even had individual battalion positions predetermined. So the Divisional commander may or may not be able to form up his Brigades in any way he wants. The most common one that I've noticed is for one Infantry Brigade to form up in a single line and the second behind in the same formation.

New players to Polemos seem to come in two groups. The first is completely new so they have no idea what restraints exist. The second group of experienced players are split into two other groups. The majority that see the rules as a breath of fresh air and are very happy to play games that aren't bogged down with having to change formation every turn for every unit. The minority that simply can't get past the idea that the cornerstone of Napoleonic warfare (in their view) is changing formation for every unit, every turn. The minority has never been any more than a couple of players.

Polemos actually has a sort of quasi default regulating unit. The rules encourage Brigades/groups to move together in the same formation. To change formation or split off from the Brigade/group takes time and requires the use of Tempo. The movement of all groups or single units also requires the expenditure of Tempo. The supply of Tempo is often limited.

Best regards,

Glenn

Hello Bill!

Yes, I think so. I don't recall ever seeing a rule set that has that level of detail. So in my mind to include that amount of detail indicates to me an extensive set of rules that doesn't match my understanding of RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

Best regards,

Glenn

McLaddie, there is so much in today's world that has to offer instant gratification, from pre-built planes to squash racquets with a bigger sweet spot making it easier for new players to get into the game. This I understand and accept as much as I can.

I suppose the issue it to recognise we have easy rules for beginners and something more challenging for the grognards.

The problem is that once players have got used to games with "zippy" battalions it is difficult to deny this way of playing with rules more based on the challenge of generalship.

Hope this does not appear patronising, rather a bit of thinking aloud.

The problem is that once players have got used to games with "zippy" battalions it is difficult to deny this way of playing with rules more based on the challenge of generalship.

Hope this does not appear patronising, rather a bit of thinking aloud.

Good evening Mike:
Nope. And the same for me. Just thinking out loud. So, the actual problem might be years of conditioning wargamers with 'zippy battalions' rather than simply annoying constraints. What happens is gamers who like 'zippy battalions' come to the hobby and those who do, leave…or certainly don't get the rules they want.

Yes, I think so. I don't recall ever seeing a rule set that has that level of detail. So in my mind to include that amount of detail indicates to me an extensive set of rules that doesn't match my understanding of RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

Hi Glenn:

"…to include that amount of detail indicates to me an extensive set of rules"

Why is that? Polemos has ten steps to the turn sequence where most have half that. The Tempo system has a lot of detail.

Point being, I think 1. you are assuming the rules would have to be extensive to address those conditions and 2. simply because you haven't seen a set of rules cover those brigade issues doesn't mean other rules don't have 'that level of detail.'

Polemos has 20 combat modifiers for the Marechal de l'Empire scale and for General de Division50+ modifiers for five different categories of combat and one for Testing charges. Then there are 26 more modifiers for Bombardment, Firing and Pursuit.

That is a lot of detail, isn't it? But the Napoleonic Polemos is a fairly easy game to learn, right? …I am assuming that kind of detail doesn't violate your idea of RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

Fine. So, couldn't a rules set with similar detail in other areas still be RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE?

That isn't a criticism of Polemos. I am only trying to point out that 'extensive detail' and RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE need to be seen as relative and fungible, not binary.

The other issue are the actual mechanics and how they represent. Again, the issue isn't 'how much detail' is included, but how well the chosen mechanics [simple or complex] do to model reality. Complexity isn't necessary to do a 'better' job than simple rules depending on what is being represented. Quality over quantity of 'detail' is the issue here, and the determiner of 'accuracy' in modeling the realities of combat. For example:

Yes, "Polemos actually has a sort of quasi default regulating unit."

You don't have to designate a regulating unit or have 'extensive rules' to capture some of the dynamics that are part the Napoleonic system of movement.

Hello Bill!

"But in RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE wording" LH is not looking for rules friendly and playable rule sets.

Best regards,

Glenn

Good Sunday morning to you, Glenn:

I wasn't responding to Last Hussar's wording, but yours referring to "That amount of detail":

Yes, I think so. I don't recall ever seeing a rule set that has that level of detail. So in my mind to include that amount of detail indicates to me an extensive set of rules that doesn't match my understanding of RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE.

"But in RULES FRIENDLY and PLAYABLE wording, when can the PLAYER ignore the orders the brigade is operating under, and have a sub-command react?"

Getting back to the original Thread question, if the player is supposed to be operating within a particular army organization, the the question really is:

When could a period commander [at whatever level of command] ignore orders?

Implied is an ability to ignore orders with in the rules of engagement rather than simply deciding to do something else and damn the consequences.

And of course, what were the military consequences if they did?

Glenn and others brought up the question of National Characteristics.

In one early battle Wellington personally ordered a brigade of Guard cavalry to charge and the commander refused to his face, telling Wellington that he didn't answer to him because he was a guard unit. There were no repercussions that I've I've every read. The incident is mentioned in Rory Muir's book on the tactics and Experience of Napoleonic Warfare.

National Characteristics did influence battles in a wide variety of ways.

In one early battle Wellington personally ordered a brigade of Guard cavalry to charge and the commander refused to his face, telling Wellington that he didn't answer to him because he was a guard unit. There were no repercussions that I've I've every read. The incident is mentioned in Rory Muir's book on the tactics and Experience of Napoleonic Warfare.

Didn't something similar happen to Massena at Fuentes d'Onoro with the Imperial Guard cavalry he had been loaned from the Army of the North?

National Characteristics did influence battles in a wide variety of ways.

Which ones and just as importantly, how much?

Hello Bill!

Yes, I know you were and I'm certainly flattered that you were. It just seemed that we were starting to drift too far off topic.

Best regards,

Glenn