"The WW2 soldiers France has forgotten" Topic

"The fall of France 75 years ago is conventionally seen as a moment of abject national disgrace. But today some insist the French military has been wronged – and that the hundreds of thousands of French troops who fought in the Battle of France deserve to be honoured, rather than forgotten.

It all took less than a month. Faced by the onslaught of Hitler's tank divisions – the notorious Panzers – the French army collapsed and Prime Minister Philippe Petain capitulated…."
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Amicalement
Armand

It is interesting when you visit the Musee d'Armee how little there is on 1940

It's really kind hard to put any sort of good spin on it.

Agree with you Frederick!.

Amicalement
Armand

Interesting article, although founded on a new myth, the 90/100 000KIA in May-June 40. The 90 000 dead number is probably right but with important corrections: around 60 000 real KIA for the WHOLE 1939-40 campaign and 30 000 deceased in German stalags between 1940-45.

There were several "Panzer panics" in the French Army, mostly in the B reservist units, the worst in quality and without real AC weapons and/or training. The great bravery displayed at Hannut, Stonne, or Dunkirk show the main weakness: an amazingly inept Hq unable to seize opportunities given by tactical success to change them in a strategic victory by destroying or isolating the german Panzerwaffe.

Finally the French lack of fighting spirit, or cowardice, as the main reason for France's fall, is a myth created by Pétain himself (see his adress on the 20th june). A convenient way to exonerate his fellows generals' responsabilities and his own as he had still a central influence in French outdated doctrine.

Interesting article, although founded on a new myth, the 90/100 000KIA in May-June 40. The 90 000 dead number is probably right but with important corrections: around 60 000 real KIA for the WHOLE 1939-40 campaign and 30 000 deceased in German stalags between 1940-45.

Robert Forczyk in ‘Case Red' contradicts that statement, writing that the French Army lost 92,000 killed and 250,000 wounded between 10 May and 25 June 1940.

Well … I think bottom line … the French, the UK, Belgium, etc. forces were out classed by the Germans'. With their "revolutionary" concept of Blitzkrieg i.e. mobile combined arms warfare. Some other armies talked about it but couldn't execute in reality. Others may have still been fighting the last war, some could say.

I'd say we are the victims of a post-war narrative "Of course we knew exactly what we were doing." written by the Germans after the war and never really questioned until the actual archives showed up a few decades ago.

We have to go back to 1914 and the "Schlieffen plan" to cut across Belgium and break through to Paris. For various reasons the Germans fail to do so, but still hold a significant amount of economically vital French territory and most of Belgium. So rather than try another stab at Paris the Germans figure they are in a superior position, dig in and let the enemy try to take it away from them until they are exhausted and sue for peace.

We learn a few major lessons from the Great War immediately established in 1918 :

1) European powers can raise enough troops and keep them in the field almost indefinitely, allowing them to man a defensive line that runs across their entire common borders.

2) Such defences are easy to hold and reinforce, while they are resistant to high density artillery barrages and very difficult to take with infantry assaults.

3) Grabbing a piece of land, fortifying it and sitting on it doesn't constitute a victory. The enemy is willing to bleed to take it back, especially if they know they have you surrounded and can starve you out with a blockade.

4) You can take fortifications, but it takes a very strict methodical approach of combined arms and it's never a cakewalk.

5) Once you do achieve a breakthrough, you must have the means to continue the advance, motorized transport trumps everything else.

6) Tanks and planes help, but they are not war-winning weapons, they do not have the capacity to decide a battle on their own.

Now 5) and 6) were taken to heart by all armies. They all vied to motorize and add more tanks to their arsenal, but the designs of the 1920's are hardly impressive, the same time the French figure out that they have serious problems :

1) They may not have allies in a future war with Germany, they must therefore be able to hold out on their own.

2) Germany has the larger population, in a war of attrition, Germany is likely to win.

3) French industry and coal are concentrated on a vulnerable border with Germany and would be the first areas conquered in times of war. Therefore everything must be done to keep the Germans at bay.

4) Even if we do build forts, they are not invincible and can be taken no matter what. Their purpose should be to buy time to reinforce the army and launch counter-attacks against Germany and threaten her own industrial base in the Ruhr. Therefore France needs an offensive army as much as it needs a defensive line of forts.

So French plans are made at a time where tanks, planes and trucks only allow for methodical advances, bounding forward under an artillery umbrella at the pace of the infantry in General with the option for mechanized cavalry to launch well-aimed attacks to disrupt enemy forces.

Tanks are limited by their track life and are therefore not suitable for dashing offensives. Feeling that they can hold off the Germans by closing the door on Belgium, the French stick by their doctrine.

Now the German side starts off on another foot. They begin from the defensive point of view that they could be attacked from two sides at once and need to move troops rapidly from one front to another.

The Germans who do look ahead at a future offensive war realize that such a conflict hinges on one thing. They have to strike a decisive blow, attack the enemy, bypass their defenses and break through at all costs before they can recover. This is the strategy they used in 1918, but which failed for various reasons, support and supply being two major ones. The Sturmtruppen bypassed defenses and rushed forwards to catch defenders by surprise, but failed because they could not follow up this rapid advance.

Now the Germans begin to work in earnest on offensive plans right at a time where tanks and planes are becoming increasingly better, the generation built in the 1930's having the speed and track life to move far beyond and much faster of what the tanks of the Great War were capable of.

But the exact way the Germans are going to strike is still a problem, some believe that they must go through Belgium as in 1914 and try to look for a gap in the enemy forces. Other believe it's better to launch an all out attack on the Maginot Line and break through as fast as possible using every method in their arsenal. After all they had defeated the forts of Liege and Antwerp, they could defeat the French forts too.

Hitler settles on a compromise, troops will try to launch an attack in a sector that is not heavily defended like the Ardennes.

And it's not so much "Blitzkrieg" or a French lack of fighting spirit, but a decisive moment, the kind that had eluded the Germans in 1914 and lead to a "hold and see" attitude.

This comes as a complete surprise to the Germans and they are terrified that Rommel rather than hold a bridgehead actually made it to the coast leaving the flanks of their armoured spearhead wide open. So if the French fail to see the sudden attack the Germans start to panic and order their troops to reinforce the corridor, but allied counterattacks are scattered and cannot break the encirclement. It's only when they feel comfortable enough to resume offensives that the allies get a chance to retreat to Dunkirk.

The whole "We knew exactly what we were doing and Hitler ruined it." Is a fabrication by Halder after the war. Hitler and his generals conferred on all matters and he most often deferred to them only making major decisions if there was a deadlock. The Wehrmacht must attribute the success of 1940 to Hitler just as much as they did to its own generals, but post-war this was changed for "reasons of honour and politics."

The Germans only come out as victors because of a daring plan, success beyond their wildest dreams and an allied failure to respond to the threat in due time. All other efforts become haphazard and much too late to save the situation and France is not entirely beaten in battle, it offers an Armistice, just as the Germans had done in 1918 in the hope to salvage what's left.

While the French may have taken logical conclusions and were not blind to changing conditions, they kept on the wrong side of innovation, while the Germans were far too ambitious in what their army could actually achieve. They will continue to win victories against unprepared opponents until 1942 only to lose the initiative and begin a long hard battle for survival.

5) Once you do achieve a breakthrough, you must have the means to continue the advance, motorized transport trumps everything else.

Yes that is a key factor with blitzkrieg. Remember one of the UKs first employment of tanks in large numbers in 1917 at Cambrai. link
They broke thru but could not exploit, etc., their success. For a number of reasons.

6) Tanks and planes help, but they are not war-winning weapons, they do not have the capacity to decide a battle on their own.

Any weapon systems are only as "good" as the troops employing it and the abilities of their Leadership …

Good thread Patrick!.

Amicalement
Armand

A fascinating campaign that I have studied at length. When looking at German success, I would break it down into at least three levels. At the tactical level, the Germans and French were generally even: when the best German troops met the best French (Gembloux, Stonne) the result was usually inconclusive. When the best German troops met the worst French (Sedan) the result was a predictable win for the Germans. At the strategic level, the Germans gained no political capital from the battle of France. The war went on; while they had knocked France out of the war the Germans were unable to use the victory to gain peace with Britain. It was probably at the operational level that the Germans had a marked advantage over the Allies. Quite simply, their operational plan was better and was executed by enough daring junior officers to overcome the High Command's fears and the halting responses by the Allies. The German plan sought decision; the Allied plan sought to hold and seek decision later. Similarly, the Luftwaffe's effects were operational in nature as their main effort was shifted from key point to point, and interdicted the battlefield to allow tactical success.
Best book I have read lately on the struggle is Robert Forczyk's "Case Red', which, despite the title, covers the whole campaign.

I've war gamed at Div/Corp level to Plt/Co. with various board games in the past. Very interesting campaign, one of my favorite to study and game …

Just out of interest, and without stealing the thread, most would know that there is no decent history available in English of the Campaign of the Belgian Army in 1940. I have translated de Fabribeckers 'La campagne de l'Armee Belge en 1940' into English. Let me know if you are interested in purchasing a copy. Contact me on mgkmilsims@gmail.com

If you do know of another detailed history in English, please don't let me know – the translation took a long time!

I was thinking of buying "Belgium in the Second World War" by Jean-Michel Veranneman. Have you an opinion on that book?

I have that book. It is a very general account and quite disappointing in my opinion. The maps are sketches, and with little detailed information. The 18 day campaign is covered from pages 27 to 51 in a 205 page book. I cannot comment on its coverage of the rest of the war as I stopped reading at page 51….
To be fair to the author, the book covers Belgium's experience in the whole of the war, not just the 18 day campaign.

Thanks for that. I read the synopsis so knew that it covered the country's wartime experience, but maps that are just sketches is a little off-putting.

The whole approach of the article is so typically French…

For starters it is entirely self focused – "It was we, the French, who fought this battle…" who wrote it? some latter day De Gaulle?

The facts are that the Campaign was saw two quite different plans by the Germans. In Fall Gelb it was a completely allied effort that completely failed, not just "the French". The Belgians, Dutch and the BEF didn't do much better (any better?) than the French.

Secondly, the article does not contest the very sound premise that Horne based his assessment of French morale: severe political division within the Third Republic. This wasn't a myth and neither was the sabotage inflicted upon the war effort by the French communist party – acting on instructions from Moscow. The French army was an army of mass conscription and reflected the strengths and weaknesses of the society from which it came. Therefore more than a few French regiments and divisions were filled with disaffected and unenthusiastic troops – a point that Horne makes very well and which this article glosses over by referring to some nebulous statistics about tanks and aircraft and men lost by the Germans. Big news flash – not all of these were destroyed by the Frogs. The RAF got half of those planes for a start, a good proportion of those tanks were not destroyed, but damaged only and easily and quickly repaired. Once again the Poms and the Belgians got more than a few of these, just as they accounted for many of those 50,000 KIA as well. Relying on these sort of nebulous numbers does not refute Horne's argument in any way.

@William Ulsterman
"destroyed by the Frogs."
Showing our bias here, aren't we?
There was never any proof that the few Communists sabotages had a noticeable influence on the campaign.As for "disaffected and unenthusiastic troops ",which army doesn't hold any in its ranks? Do you think morale is a set characteristic at the start of the game, errmmm, sorry, campaign? Each and every major combattant of WW2 suffered this kind of panic, the post-Cobra 1944 Wehrmacht had nothing to envy the Fall Gelb French Army. An Army which recovered pretty fast from the Fall Gelb shock, and was able to offer a strong resistance in June, an effort which ws doomed however by the losses suffered in May?
Witjout minoring the role of the French allies in the campaign, most of the fighting was unquestionably done by them, as well as mùost of the KIA and tank losses inflicted on the Germans. The reason of thedefeat is, as Fanch said, the terrible performance of the FRench HQ, who played from the starts into the hands of the Germans (to the point that it is not unplausible to suspect some foul play here, the case of General Hunzinger, commander of the 2e Armée, is quite troubling).

Foxbat – Horne records plenty of evidence of sabotage and dissatisfaction within the French army – the wrecking of an entire run of Char B tanks and Dewointine fighters is cited – given that these were the best weapons the French had in 1940, I would not be so quick to dismiss that as minor. Next you have French army reference to the mysterious staff officers that gave orders for withdrawl at the Semois River and then again at Sedan. You also have repeated references of the British infantry regiments who encountered French civilians sniping at them. Some of these could be dismissed, but there are so many that I doubt all were panicky errors by the Poms. Also, the lack of corporate unity in the French army meant that it just fell apart when it came under stress – at Sedan the French infantry ran away from German infantry, not panzers. That is a direct example of the lack of fighting spirit – the BEF didn't do this, nor did the Belgian army.

Frogs – yep – that's what they are, just like the British are the Poms.

The fighting record of the Belgian army after a poor start was pretty good and they had AT weapons that were more than adequate. The BEF also did well when it fought. I stand by my remarks that you cannot accept at face value the figures used by the article to justify that the French army of 1940 fought hard across the board because it did not. Even in June during Fall Rot the performance of the French army was patchy – hard fighting on the Aisne was completely let down by the feeble effort at St. Valery and the account of the 51st Highland division of how the French infantry fought shows that not every French division was interested in resurrecting French honour.

The Germans in 1944 fought much harder and much better than the French army of 1940 – as evidenced by the way they stopped the western allies on the frontiers of Germany and in the Netherlands – there is no equivalency between the two. The German HQ in 1944 was a complete disaster, worse in many ways than the French GHQ in 1940. Yet the German army redeemed the situation through the fighting qualities of its troops – something the French army did on a regular basis in 1914-18, but wasn't able to do in 1940, because their army was a mixed bag and there were always units that let the side down.

Basically, the Froggies in 1940 were like their current Rugby team – a few good athletes, but basically a politically riven bunch, quite unable to work together constructively and prone to caving in when the opposition gets serious.

The Froggies of WW1 were like their Rugby sides from the 1970's and 1980's – completely different from the current mob and a whole lot tougher and meaner.

I take serious exception at William Ulsterman's use of the terms "frogs" and "froggies". Regardless of what the French army did or didn't do, these are ethnically derogatory terms that I would have hoped would not appear on this board.

Thanks you, Ferozopore, that's exactly as I had understood the term. I've been acquainted long enough with the English language to know exactly what it means.

"You also have repeated references of the British infantry regiments who encountered French civilians sniping at them. Some of these could be dismissed, but there are so many that I doubt all were panicky errors by the Poms. "

Conspirationnit bullcrap. This just shows the real value of the work you are quoting, and I feel very safe to dismiss it altogether. A1s for Fall Rot, I stand by what I said : Saint Valery, actually Saint Valéry en Caux, is in Normandy, in case you didn't know, so well behind the Aisne at a time the breakthrough was made. Yopu also should read more on 1944, to see just similar examples by the German Army.

And you should read more on 1944 : what saved the Germans was the fact that they had more space to run, in fact, the whole of France, and still had Germany behind, while we had lost our heartland after Fall Rot.

Regarding the sabotage, serious authors regard them as mostly unconsequential : a few DEwoitine 520 and Chars B did not change the outcome of the campaign. Regarding the Dewoitine, the sabotage was quickly spotted, and fixed before it could cause injuries.

Between Sedan and Namur, we only had 3 Type B divisions that were jumped on by 3 PzKorps, supported by artillery and Stukas. So the collapse was foregone before it even started. And yet, even here, our troops accounted well of themselves at Monthermé, holding Reinhardt for a whole day before being overwhelmed.

"Next you have French army reference to the mysterious staff officers that gave orders for withdrawl at the Semois River and then again at Sedan"
You must be speaking of Hunzinger, CO of the 2e Armée, who ordered his forces to fall back on Isnor to prevent his left wing from being flanked, widening the gap and giving more space to Guderian. He suffered no ill from his blunder afterwards,as he was te French necociator for the Armistice, and later appointed to head the Ministry of war, and died in a plane crash under Vichy, all events which certainly cast some doubt on his honesty. Annie Lacroix-Riszpoints to the fact one of his top aides was a member of te Cagoule, a secret right-wing cryptofascits organoisation before the war. But stranger things have happened.

"interested in resurrecting French honour."
Last I heard, it was never ruined in the first place. This is but a fake creeated by Petain to absolve himself and his GHQ cronie's of all responsability in the defeat. In fact, the main proponents of the legend of the 1940 French cowardice are the Vichy Regime people, who went so far as to try the members of the socialist led Front Populaire government at Riom, to their utmost confusion. So I'll grant Mr Horne this excuse for having fallen to it.

I was under the impression that the term "Frog" was coined by the French aristocracy and referred to the mass of the French people. So similar to the term pleb from the Latin plebeian. "Qu'en disent les grenouilles? – What would the frogs think?" being a common phrase at Versailles in the 18th century. Is the term "Frog" more or less offensive than Pom or Limey, Yank, Digger, Kiwi, Eyetie, Nip or Kraut?

Wel, I am learning something I did not know.

link

It's in French, sorry. But I still think the origin hardly matters regarding whether the tem is commonly derogatory or not. I don't think "Pom" is a&s derogatory down under, but maybe I am mistaken. At any rate, sorry for the way the thread is derailing off topic because of my being a bit touchy.

Is the term "Frog" more or less offensive than Pom or Limey, Yank, Digger, Kiwi, Eyetie, Nip or Kraut?

That surely depends upon the context in which these terms are being used, and probably the intent of the person using them. At this point in time I had hoped that civilised people had got beyond labels such as Frog, Pom, Kraut or Nip, but maybe, in the case of King Billy, we haven't.

Again, I think the French, UK, Belgium, Dutch Forces did as good as expected. When it came to the German Blitzkrieg technical superiority, etc. The Germans had planned to go to total war, the Allies were just reacting to the very aggressive Germans not vis versa. And generally they didn't "react" very well.

Foxbat – Fall Rot involved the Germans attacking across the Aisne and the Somme. St Valery is not behind this line at all. The 51st Highland division and two divisions of the French army surrendered to Rommel at St. Valery within days of Fall Rot commencing – therefore what are you talking about?

Fall Rot took place AFTER Fall Gelb – what are you talking about when you say you had no place to run to? The Frogs had the entire area of Vichy France! That's nearly half the country to retreat and/or keep fighting in. That isn't "no room".

Have you even bothered to read Horne at all? I take it you have not. Horne himself quotes Weygand, who succeeded Gamelin in 1940 saying that it was important for the French army to fight on after Fall Gelb (not Fall Rot) in order to resurrect French Honour. That's the Frog Commander in Chief saying that.

If you read Horne you would know that Gransands Corps at Sedan reported that an unidentified staff officer at Semois told the French cavalry to scarper and the same got reported at Sedan itself – was this an ex post facto justification to the collapse? Maybe, but this is what the French Officer Corps were reporting at the time.

Next, Sebang Montefiore in his epic "Dunkirk: Stand to the last man" which was a critically acclaimed study of BEF and French armies in Fall Gelb has many references to the accounts (unit histories) of British infantry regiments recording civilian sniping. Now, I agree that some of them should be viewed critically, but there are just too many to discount out of hand.

At Sedan in 1940 the French had the 55th and 71st Divisions in pre-war fortifications facing the 1st, 2nd and 10th Panzer divisions across a formidable water barrier, which stopped the Germans being able to deploy their tanks – this was no lay down misere for the wehrmacht – which the Germans well knew. In 1940 tanks couldn't cross a creek, let alone a river. The Germans had to send in their infantry first. At Montherme the French had an entire Fortress division (the 102nd), a regular army formation against the 6th and 8th Panzer Division – once again in some quite formidable fortifications. Then at Dinant Rommel's 7th Panzer division crosses the Meuse against the 18th French Infantry division – the Germans don't have overwhelming numbers on their side, from 12th through 15th May 1940 and I haven't mentioned the 5 Cavalry divisions and couple of Cavalry Brigades that the Germans have fought in the Ardennes before they even reached the Meuse itself.

Lastly, are people really that fragile, on a wargamer's forum no less? On this forum we regularly speak of the most heinous historical acts of slaughter and villainy.
Are you going to get upset by some Orange Mick, who marches up & down the street banging a big old drum in his spare time, calling a spade a spade?

If so, beware, for coming are the days when people more sensitive than yourself will want to prohibit even the mere mention of the historic events we discuss here, because they will inevitably infer terms such as "genocide", "fascism", "collaborator", "ethnic cleansing" and the like, which will upset many. The best protection against this is a tough skin – I know I put mine on before I go out and bang my drum.

I dont really think the French lost as much as the Germans won. The Germans beat them like a drum at every level from HQ down to squad and platoon. Why? Simple the Germans had been seriously preparing for war and this invasion for almost 5 years while the French had been half heartedly thinking about it, lulled into false confidence by believing their own propaganda about the Maginot Line. Typical example of what happens when the Last War encounters the Next War face to face.

Cheers!

PS. And please stop with the Political Correctness Crap. There has to be at least one place left where people can debate openly and tell it like it is!!!

I do not go that far Lee 494 – there are plenty of examples of superior French performances in 1940 on a divisional level – for example the Spahi Brigade on the River Bar. The effort of the 14th Division on the Aisne in June 1940 was also outstanding and better than what the Germans offered. Interestingly both of these were regular army formations. The French had been preparing for the war as well – since 1920 in fact.

But as we see … the French and probably most of the Allies involved in '39-'40 did not prepare well enough per se overall, etc.