"WWII: Operation Sledgehammer" Topic

US Army Chief of Staff Marshall wanted to build up US forces in Britain and strike for the continent as soon as possible, before the end of 1942. Was Marshall right?

Was Dieppe?

No!

Marshall was wrong.
Kaiser Bill once said that if the British landed on the Baltic coast that he would have sent a policeman to arrest them.
We learned from Torch and Anvil how much we didn't know. Those lessons were badly needed.
Just imagine a corps under Fredenhall. In France. Uh… No.

No.

OK Lets look at the plus and Minus

Plus

No Atlantic wall.
Lots few German divisions , but can be easily reinforce quickly
Forcing the Germans to make some hard choices of either hold in Russia or France.
Vicky France might have changed sides.

Minus

Lack of training, but most of the divisions used in OL not form yet.
Air superiority and no large HVy. Bomber force to open holes in dung in Germans.
Shortage of landing craft and covering Naval forces.
Haven't won the battle of the Atlantic yet.

Dieppe was planned by Monty and was the British way of showing the US what might happen if everything goes wrong ( no air cover, Not taking a port, limited Naval cover, No easy way to get tanks ashore, and untrained troops).

I agree that the plan was flawed, but it lead to long protracted campaign in the Med. that wasn't worthy the cost.

Well, if the Germans were in dung, they might have come out smelling worse.

Dieppe was planned by Monty and was the British way of showing the US what might happen if everything goes wrong ( no air cover, Not taking a port, limited Naval cover, No easy way to get tanks ashore, and untrained troops).

How many more times is the Monty myth going to be perpetuated? Dieppe was Mountbatten's operation. Monty was involved only in the initial planning and recommended the operation be abandoned, after that his involvement ceased. The operation was strongly supported by RAF fighter command who hoped to draw out the Luftwaffe fighters and destroy them. Bomber Command was less keen and the Navy wouldn't risk anything bigger than destroyers. The Canadian government was pushing hard for Canadian troops to be committed which is why they got the job, nothing to do with the Brit's pushing the colonials into the firing line, another enduring myth.

These sort of options are easily explored in the various strategic boardgames covering WW2. Third Reich and Hitlers War to name but two.

Any vaguely competent allied player will rapidly realise that a 1942 invasion is suicide.

It is possible in Quartermaster General, but requires a good degree of luck in the card draw.

On one hand a 1942 invasion of France was simply not feasible. That said, by putting the idea out there so early, the US identified that they wanted to invade France and win the war in Northern Europe.

That said, the way things bogged down (or were bogged down) in the Med by a variety of political and military factors is a whole separate discussion.

As noted above, the invasion of Africa was an invaluable learning tool to the US forces. How much more attention should have been paid to the Med can be pointlessly debated forever :)

A 1942 invasion was probably a bad idea, but one in the fall of 1943 was certainly possible. There's still no Atlantic Wall, the German Army is actually weaker than at any time before 1945, and the Sherman tank is better than anything the Germans have in France.

The problem with any sort of seaborne invasion in NWE in Autumn/Winter 1943 is the weather. Endless successions of Atlantic storms piling up the channel, which really restrict the available window to April-September at best.

Raids? yes. A million men and all their equipment by sea? no.

In real time the US Army had two Inf Divs in the UK by the end of 1942 (1 & 29), with five more arriving over the last half of 1943 (2, 5, 8, 9 & 28). There were about 12 more in the first half of 1944.

There were two Armd Divs in the last few months of 1943 (2 & 3) and four more in the first half of 1944 (4 thru 7).

The deployments would have needed to be heavily reworked to improve the number of formations in the UK for an earlier assault landing than June 1944. That then impacts on everything else coming over the Atlantic as there was a finite amount of shipping space for men and materiel.

Reduced resistance on the coastline quite likely, but married with reduced ability to reinforce and replace losses as compared to summer of 1944.

Gary

There may not have been time to build the "Funny's" which certainly reduced the British losses in the beach landing. Similarly what about the Mulberry Harbors, they were needed even if they got damage in the storm. Planning takes a long time as does developing the specialist hardware.

I think they should have waited untill the late 80s those tomahawk missiles would have made short work of the German defences. Then send in Apaches to cover the amphibious landings. And A-10 to take out the tanks from above. Once the Bradleys are in France they'll make short work of the remaining German armor.

They landed successfully in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy without any specialist equipment at all.

They landed successfully in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy without any specialist equipment at all.

Not the same thing. The Normandy defences were considerably more formidable than anything the allies faced in the Med.

Not in 1943 they weren't. Only the ports had any significant fortifications then.

They weren't in 1942, unfortunately just like 1943, the troops weren't available either. D Day was delayed until there was a fair chance of success.

Gunfreak,

Great idea but the Germans had all the rocket experts. They were well ahead of us with the first cruise missile, the Buzz Bomb. They might have had Tomahawk missiles by the 60s.They would be manufacturing their missiles in a factory just outside of London.

Just remember it wouldn't be just the troops in Britain in 1942. It would have also been the Torch landing force that would have gone to Britain.

What tells me that they weren't ready was Kasserine Pass. Those same American troops would have been the ones hitting the beeches in France. It would not have been pretty. The American Generals were too cocky. Kasserine took them down a peg.

Also keep in mind that waiting till 1944 gave the Allies time to established Air Superiority over Europe.

Marshall acted on the idea that the Russian Front could break at any moment. It wasn't until after Kursk and knowing that there was now a steady stream of Lend-Lease going into Russia combined with secure oil fields and claims by Stalin that the situation was now under control that they relented on going fast and hard to take the Germans by surprise.

Of course this means the Germans got time to try to implement defenses, and build up troops in France, but it was nothing compared to a well-prepared and properly implemented invasion force in 1944.

Not in 1943 they weren't. Only the ports had any significant fortifications then.

Exactly and the allies needed a port. The ports round the med weren't and fell quickly. Without a port it is likely the Germans could have built up strength quicker than the allies. Added to that is the Luftwaffe is still a formidable force in 1943.

They THOUGHT they needed a port for a successful invasion, but in fact, with the loss of Mulberry A and the massive damage to Cherbourg, the Allies got along without a real port until well after the breakout from Normandy. They were still bringing the bulk of the troops and supplies in over the beaches into the fall of 1944.

Yeah, because we had developed specialized ships to haul tanks to the beach and deploy directly into combat if need be.

Those LSTs didn't exist before early 1943, and weren't available in quantity before the end of 1943.

The mulberry B ran for a considerable time after the loss of the first one so yes they were important. Loss of both may have been catastrophic.

They were still bringing the bulk of the troops and supplies in over the beaches into the fall of 1944.

Yes and that directly affected the allies ability to wage war. Hence the allied ground to a halt in early fall of 44.

True, but it did not affect the success or failure of the invasion itself.

The mulberry B ran for a considerable time after the loss of the first one so yes they were important. Loss of both may have been catastrophic.

There was another 'port' that was never used. Check out 'Operation Chastity' and Quiberon Bay

Here is a pretty good book on the possibility of a successful 1943 invasion:

link

I've read it (a few years ago) and the author does make a good argument. The landing craft were available in sufficient numbers and the German Army, following the disasters at Stalingrad and in North Africa, was at a low ebb of strength. As I recall there was only a single beat-up panzer division in France, equipped with Panzer IIIs at that point.

What a pity Walter Dunn wasn't on the staff in 1943, he could have told them how it should be done at the time.

Hey, who among us here has NOT had an opinion about how this or that military operation could not have been done better?

Take away Monday Morning Quarterbacking and a third of all TMP posts would disappear :)

And Dunn simply reports the situation. How many landing craft were available, how many divisions and tanks on both sides, their readiness levels, etc. etc. Read it and make your own decision.

I disagree, using the benefit of hindsight and a knowledge of facts unavailable to the planners of the day, then saying it should/could have been done differently, is very arrogant and disrespectful. This isn't alternative history, it's "look at me, I'm better than Ike and Monty"

So you are saying that historical decisions cannot be criticized or even analyzed to see if there were any alternatives? I guess that makes every soldier who tries to learn from history arrogant and disrespectful.

No, I'm not saying that. Discussing something and declaring the decisions of the day were wrong are two different things. Anyone who uses the benefit of hindsight to say that the best military minds of the time were wrong is arrogant. With hindsight no wars would ever be fought and no divorcee would ever have got married. I've over 30 years in the military, while I argue tactics a lot, strategy is best left to the experts.