"Logistics and the British Defeat in the Revolutionary War " Topic

"When war erupted in the American colonies in 1775, the British Army was unprepared logistically. Compared to the logistics organization of the rebelling colonies, the British logistics system was, on the surface, the epitome of efficiency. Faced with a 3,000-mile line of communication across the Atlantic Ocean, Britain ensured that its soldiers were reasonably well equipped and never starved. Indeed, a logistics feat of this magnitude would not be repeated for over 150 years, until the Allied invasion of North Africa in World War II. However, significant shortcomings in the resupply system did exist, and before they were identified and corrected, they contributed significantly to the British Army's defeat.

An analysis of how Britain supplied its army, both from home and in the colonies, demonstrates how the presence, or absence, of critical commodities affects military operations. Ultimately, the lack of sufficient reserve supplies, combined with cautious generalship, insufficient transportation, widespread corruption, and the lack of a coherent strategy to maximize the potential support of British loyalists in the colonies, ensured British failure. These factors forced the British Army to fight a guerilla war—the only kind of war that the upstart United States could hope to win.

The British experience in the American Revolutionary War holds particular relevance for today's military. Even though there have been enormous changes in military technology and organization over the last two centuries, U.S. forces still struggle with many of the same issues that plagued the British resupply effort. Logisticians in a force projection army still confront the challenge of supplying forces over enormous distances, overcoming resource constraints, and relying upon host nation support. Most importantly, military operations still suffer when logistics is not planned in detail…."
Main page
link

Amicalement
Armand

This is a generally sound article (which I have seen and read previously), but it dwells too much on the issues of getting supplies to America from Britain. The crucial problem was getting supplies from coastal depots into the hinterland. The Cornwallis Papers include reports demonstrating that Charleston was bursting at the seams with all sorts of supplies, but getting them to where they were needed was another matter entirely. One issue was insufficient carriage (wagons, carts and horses) and another was the hostile hinterland. Cornwallis, with his relatively small field army, ended up choosing to live off the land. For the main British army in New York, this was not an option, meaning that its realistic radius of operations was quite circumscribed.

Thanks!.

Amicalement
Armand