"Most over rated commander in the American Revolution" Topic

A beer and pretzels question; who do you think was the most over rated commander during the war? What I am looking for is someone who is held up as a great commander but as you look at their actual records was not so much. So, not looking at a Gates. No one thinks he was a great general. Good at logistics (what was needed when he took over at Saratoga), but hopeless on the battlefield leading men.

Banastre Tarleton

If you want to go by the criterion of winning battles, Greene has very few victories. Yet he won the war in the South. If this is a beer argument, set him up.

Let me nominate Cornwallis. He won a lot. His losses were disastrous. Second Trenton saw him outsmarted by Washington (another possible nominee) which lead to Princeton.
He won at Guilford Courthouse, but so Pyrrhically (is that a word?) that he retreated to Yorktown.

Ok. Who's buying the next round?

I agree with the OP.
If someone was never rated all that highly to begin with, he should not count. Rall only got command at Trenton because more senior Hessians were either wounded or sick. Shoot! He didn't even have a "von" in front of his last name.

Burgoyne? Please. He is always regarded as a symbol of hubris and failure. Should not count.

Charles Lee

Arguing from beer, who rated Charles Lee highly?
He too has a record of disaster.

The OP is asking for someone "who is held up as a great commander".
Note the tense of the verb. "IS". I'm assuming he means today, not in 1775. But that's the beer arguing.

Lee was "not politic" and he was pretty much set up for failure at Monmouth. Otherwise, what did he do apart from getting captured?

As far as the Rebels, why not Wayne? Yes, he had character and enthusiasm--but apart from Stony Point, what did he do that was brilliant?

Granted, his post AWI career was better.

From a tactical stand point I would nominate George Washington. He had overly complex battle plans (or his commanders carrying out the orders were sub-par) that didn't succeed very often. But he was a brilliant at saving his army and that to me makes him a great strategic commander based on his "Victory Conditions".

Do we have a list of highly rated commanders? It feels to me that the AWI had a lot of great personality's but very few and far between quality commanders. I think that makes for an interesting period.

Chris

Grant. Even as bad as he was, he was still over rated. :-) LoL

Howe, possibly. But it's worth noting that Washington may hold the award for Fastest Learner, while Greene's battles do exactly what successful general's battles are supposed to do--bring you closer to winning the war.

One of the hazards of miniatures gaming is that it tends to focus attention on winning battles rather than winning campaigns and wars. I think of it as Tiger Tank Syndrome.

One of the hazards of miniatures gaming is that it tends to focus attention on winning battles rather than winning campaigns and wars.

Too often true, but it doesn't have to be. I usually set up the victory conditions in my AWI games so that the American side is almost certain to lose the battlefield, but can still be declared the "winner" if they cause enough damage (or too many hangups, or foil the original objective, etc.). Winning battles isn't always about defeating the other army outright.

- Ix

Yellow Admiral, from a gaming stand point I agree with you regarding applicable victory conditions. I think the hard part is keeping the players informed about victory conditions. For the Americans, they can be losing but if they keep their army intact (maybe not so important for the Militia), delay/high casualties for the British they still win even if they don't hold the battlefield.

Chris

Interesting discussion, and I agree, there are times when winning the battle is not winning the war. It is also good to see Winston/OFM back in the mix here. I always value his commentary in this area.

Most over-rated at the time = Colonel Robert Rogers!

Over-rated enough to be hired by the Crown to form a new unit, and so bad as to be forcibly retired while the war was still in progress.

In popular media, probably Ethan Allen. (Hate to say that, as he was a boyhood hero of mine, due to a somewhat overblown biography I read back then.) But I don't think among actual history buffs he's viewed as anything other than a fortunate blowhard.

Honestly, I think most of the commanders have, in history, settled out into a generally correct view of their abilities, so that I don't think any are seriously that over-rated anymore. You get minor debates, but those tend to wind down to details that wash out in the end (as Washington's overly complicated battle plans not really harming his overall strategic vision and ability to inspire and keep his army together).

Maybe Tarleton, but that's been colored by the "Bloody Tarleton" appellation, making him a person whom Americans perhaps wanted (and want) to be over-rated. But certainly he did lose big when it counted the most (Cowpens).

The interesting thing is how some of the "failures" on the British side then went on to be very successful in other wars. Is that a case of having learned from their mistakes in America, or of being in conflicts/situations more suited to them, or facing even less competent opponents later on? Or were the American opponents really that much better? (And the debate goes on…)

What a great topic!
Keep it coming!
(I totally agree with Ethan Allen, by the way.)

Patrick Ferguson. He invented a new type of rifle that was so good it was immediately abandoned, and the experimental corps he set up was disbanded. (I exaggerate…)
Then he screwed the pooch at Kings Mountain.

Ethan Allen for sure.

Washington, at least early in the war. His war council kept him from making some disastrous decisions.

Cornwallis. First, he always had to take the best troop available. See Brandywine. In the south, to invade North Carolina he did the same and left Rawdon with the second string to hold everything. Tactically a one trick pony. Put your head down and march forward. No out flanking, just straight ahead. And he pulled his punches when a decisive action could have had serious results. See Green Springs and second Trenton.

One of my big "what if" of the war was If Cornwallis after Guilford Courthouse had marched back to South Carolina and not Virginia. All of his regiments has big numbers of replacements and reinforcements at Charleston so all his veteran regiments would be rebuilt and resupplied.

Hey folks, I'm new to the blog….My pick, even tho he was only a Colonel / Brig. Gen. would be Daniel Morgan. He took command and got his troops into Quebec, even tho it failed. Hassle the British thru New Jersey in the winter of 1777. Strike the deadly blows against the British right at Saratoga. And won the rout over Tarleton at Cowpens….Pretty good success rate.

I think it's interesting that, on the British side, you see so few AWI names showing up in the wars of the French Revolution. "No Flint" Gray has a good run in the Caribbean, and Cornwallis serves in India and Ireland, but Tarleton was only four years older than Tom Picton and six years younger than Thomas Graham. Benedict Arnold was only 52 when Britain and France were again at war. Bad as things were for Britain in the 1790's, no one seems to have thought giving either of them a command would improve matters.

seems to me the British considered the colonies a backwater post so most Brit commanders didn't have alot going for them in the 1st place

Tarleton was in Parliament, in a faction opposed to Wellsley (Wellington).
Arnold was … a traitor. Convenient to use versus the Americans, less so against "real" enemies.
Their absences against the French are rather easy to explain.

Thomas Sumpter. Stupidly wasted his men's lives on disastrous, frontal assaults against dug in troops on several occasions.

He also refused to come to the aide of Greene when requested.
By all accounts, a thoroughly disagreeable man, with too high an opinion of himself.
All of Greene's attempts at massaging Sumpter's massive ego failed and he was never able to co-ordinate with Sumpter, as he was with Pickens. Pure pride overruled common sense.

Yet, he generally gets lumped in with both Marion and Pickens, as a savior of South Carolina. Both of them were superb military leaders. Sumpter was not.

What say Ye, Winnie?

How about Benedict Arnold, often called the greatest battle commander of either and each side?
At Saratoga, it looks like he simply ordered charges by men who were already in position. I see no great maneuvering on his part.
Valcour Island? The great advantage of his fleet was its mere existence. The British were strategically delayed by building to counter his fleet. His fleet was heavily outnumbered in the actual battle itself. He lost many good men giving battle when they could have merely faded into the wilderness, mission accomplished. (Thanks to Supercilious Maximus for putting that bug in my ear. )

After he turned coat, what did he accomplish? Raids mostly. The British wouldn't trust him with anything more important than raids.

@Nevinsrip. I read the Road to Guilford Courthouse. Yes, Sumter does seem like a nasty piece of work.
"Fort Sumter" is a prime example of the American habit of naming forts and based after unworthy personages.

Benedict Arnold was one of the most energetic and dogged military commanders I've read about. He may not have been a brilliant captain of maneuver, and he often arrived at a battle worn past the point of sufficient strength, but wherever he went he seemed to be everywhere, so often happened to be at the right place at the right time. That is a valuable resource in war, especially for a desperate gamble on a shoestring like the revolution.

- Ix

Yellow Admiral, from a gaming stand point I agree with you regarding applicable victory conditions. I think the hard part is keeping the players informed about victory conditions.

I have usually resorted to counting VPs. I know it's abstract and some players complain about having a "boardgamey" victory mechanism, but in fact it's very useful and allows players to plan and track their own progress through the game. When done right, it can also keep a battle in question right to the end of activities.

- Ix

I agree with George Washington's nomination if (big if) we are looking at performance on the battlefield – and he didnt learn his lessons, repeating similar mistakes again and again…

If, on the other hand you are rating these commanders in terms of their broader political/strategic leadership… well that would be a whole different story, and GW would get the best of the best award!

Odd dichotomy:)

"Patrick Ferguson. He invented a new type of rifle that was so good it was immediately abandoned, and the experimental corps he set up was disbanded."

Well, not really his fault. He was wounded at Brandywine and the decision to disband his corps and not implement wider use of the rifle were decisions made "higher up."

Captain Johann Ewald on Benedict Arnold.

On his opinion of his generalship. When Arnold ordered the Ewald to land and drive off American militia;
"this little trick left me with no great opinion of General Arnold's judgment, ordering men without bayonets to land and attack an enemy equipped with bayonets, especially since the light infantry was just as close to them as I was."

His opinion of his turning traitor;

If [Arnold] really felt in his conscience that he had done wrong in siding against his mother country, he should have sheathed his sword and served no more […] Gladly as I would have paid with my blood and my life for England's success in this war, this man remained so detestable to me that I had to use every effort not to let him perceive, or even feel, the indignation of my soul.
— Hessian Captain Johann Ewald

23rd. That is because Captain Ewald was a man of integrity.

Paul Revere?

I'm not certain that the pre-treason Arnold is comparable as a leader to the post-treason Arnold. Before his act of treason (or at least before Peggy Shippen), Arnold was a fervent man dedicated to the cause of Independence and Liberty. He was more than ready to place himself in harm's way at equal measure to his men, and truly expected no more of them than he was willing to do himself. As such, he possessed that quality known as "moral authority" which is absolutely essential to effective leadership. His men believed he knew what he was doing, and they followed him willingly. He was also driven to succeed and convinced of the correctness of his approach (at times too much so). But after his ill-treatment by political opponents, and his ill-use by Horatio Gates (who was given a victory he'd done little to achieve, to a great extent via Arnold's actions), Arnold lost this fervor, a crippling blow to any qualities of leadership he still retained. And upon his treason, he lost all moral authority with anyone. He had neither the fire of a just cause, nor the respect of anyone whom he might have commanded, despite having "joined their side." At that point his potential as a military commander was utterly gone, and there would be nothing he could do to regain it. As such, there was never any possibility of him having any further military success. In his case, an assessment of his post-treason career cannot be reflective of his performance prior to his fall; there was simply no further possibility of success to measure.

As for the former actions, there are a few too many "wanted horseshoe nails" in those incidences to really know whether or not another commander could have had more success, or developed superior plans (much less actually carried these out). He almost *did* achieve his goals in Canada, and while yes, his naval battle at Valcour Island was devastating to his fleet and his forces, I don't think one can truly argue that not giving battle would have resulted in the same crucial result— the delay of the Saratoga campaign by another year. That's a "what if" argument that in the end is pure speculation. What Arnold *did* do certainly *did* result in that absolutely necessary delay. Arguing otherwise is like saying, "If we had ham, we could have ham and eggs, if we had eggs."

"If only" that bullet in his leg had been an inch or two in a different direction, he would have bled out, and there would be state Capitals named after him.

"Let me nominate Cornwallis."

I would agree if it hadn't been for his post AWI career. he did very well in India.

I nominate Henry Clinton. kept claiming he could win the war and when given command realized what his superiors had been dealing with and pretty much caved. Repulsed at Fort Moultrie, didn't move to reinforce Burgoyne beyond West Point, and didn't reinforce Cornwallis in Virginia. just my thoughts.

I will stand by Banastre Tarleton. The only real battle he fought while in command was Cowpens and it was a miserable disaster. He was great against militia, unarmed civilians and troops trying to surrender but up against well trained and well led regulars, he comes up short.

Charles Lee, the bombastic egotistical blowhard.

Agree about Clinton and especially Tarleton. As for Charles Lee I cannot get the image of him from the musical Hamilton out of my head (I'am a general Wheeeeeeeeee!)

"Light Horse" Lee is also on my list. Never really sure what he did that rated his legion and him elite. Possibly because he (like Tarleton) wrote a self serving memoirs. He bungled the Paulus Hook operation. His actions at Guilford and Eutaw Springs are questionable. And parading prisoners in from of Ninety Six during the siege was just rude and stiffened the resolve of the defenders.

For a very good discussion of his role at Eutaw I would highly recommend the book " Eutaw Springs: The Final Battle of the American Revolution's Southern Campaign"

I think Arnold's role at Saratoga has been exaggerated to make Gates' reputation worse. Some of the newer books about Saratoga are correcting the balance. See Luzader.

On first Saratoga and his role please see the following article (from yours truly) link

For the second battle remember Arnold arrived onto the field after Poor, Learned and Morgan/Dearborn broke the British line and the British were in full retreat. He did join the men against the Balcarries redoubt. Which got a lot of good men killed. He then left the and joined the attack, in progress against Brymann redoubt. Two Massachusetts regiments had worked their way up to the redoubt and were going "over the top" so the redoubt was captured before Arnold grabbed a dozen men and entered the redoubt from the back. Colonel Brooks and the Massachusetts men get little credit sad to say.

Ethan Allen.

Cornwallis. First, he always had to take the best troop available. See Brandywine

To be fair, that wasn't up to Cornwallis. In 1776 he was given command Howe's Corps de Reserve which was formed by for the New York campaign. The Reserve at that time consisted of the Grenadier battalions, initially four then three, plus his own 33rd & the 42nd. Meanwhile, the three light infantry battalions were in a separate brigade under Alexander Leslie, although both elements could be found operating in close proximity, for instance at Long Island and Brandywine Creek

At Brandywine Creek under Howe's orders, Cornwallis had command of the attack columns, which included the two remaining Grenadier battalions, ditto Light Infantry plus jägers, but also a brigade of Hessians and a line brigade, the 4th (including the 33rd). The 42nd were kept by Howe in reserve.

In the south, to invade North Carolina he did the same and left Rawdon with the second string to hold everything.

It was, surely, sensible for Cornwallis to compose his field army of the most seasoned, effective troops at his disposal. Meanwhile, Rawdon did well enough at Hobkirk's Hill with the troops at his disposal

Tactically a one trick pony. Put your head down and march forward. No out flanking, just straight ahead. And he pulled his punches when a decisive action could have had serious results. See Green Springs and second Trenton.

Given the terrain, did Cornwallis really have much option at either Camden or Guilford CH?

At Trenton, Cornwallis certainly showed misplaced confidence, indeed complacency, in waiting till the next day to 'finish off' Washington.