"Osprey books on American Revolution and FIW" Topic

It's well known that some of the Osprey books on the American Revolution are first rate. Some… not so much.

Since most wargamers start out with Osprey books to get a grounding in a period, it would be nice to know which are recommended, which are to be avoided.
I'll admit that I used to take an Osprey as gospel. Then I found out differently. I won't name names, since I'm no expert. Just a fan of history.

Which authors are to be trusted, which avoided?

I'm asking about all of them. The MAA, Elite, Warrior, Campaign, etc.

Going out on a limb here, I would venture a guess that Rene Chartrand knows his stuff.
I think his Campaign book on Quebec 1759 is what all wargamer's reference books should be modeled on.

I hope this thread catches on, because I wonder the same thing!

I have a number of Rene's books and all are terrific. (In fact he lives across the river from me…)

The Campaign 'New York 1776' is not impressive.'Philadelphia' is good. IMHO
Currently waiting to read 'Monmouth.'

In general there is a big problem with all this series. The original illustrations tend to be of a standard better suited to a boys' comic or model soldier packaging. The battle maps are frequently confusing, with the central section of a two-page spread lost in deep tight bindings.

Those bindings are good

I wish the front covers weren't taken from a plate already in the book. Such a wasted opportunity for an additional plate.

The maps can be very confusing. The maps are trying to convey too much information. Several maps with one overlay would work better. But it would probably make the books more expensive.

"King George's Army 1740-1793" 1 & 2 by Stuart & Chappel are a waste of time for AWI gamers.

David Nicolle for his Crusades and Arab Dynasty titles.

I'm asking specifically for AWI and FIW titles.

I've heard a number of people, whose opinions I respect, say that the Camden and Guilford CH books have a lot of informational errors.

Winston:

I'll have to respectfully disagree with you regarding Rene and some of his Osprey books (not all). His book on the Braddock/Fort Necessity campaigns are not up to his standards, nor is his Quebec book. I find the Stuart Reid book on Quebec superior.

Fort Necessity won't even stock Rene's Osprey book.

Todd Braidsted is "the" most knowledgeable person on Loyalist uniforms. The fact he did not write it is a pity for us all.

Anything by Brendan Morrisey is first rate. Some of the other Rev War Osprey books are not so good. The combined book by Reid and the fellow whose name I can never remember is very good on uniforms – especially the American uniforms. He is under rated, IMO.

For both of these get the Canadian Wargamers books/rules. They are excellent (for information, rules are OK) & cheap. On Military Matters sells them. Francis Parkman's Montecalm & Wolfe is the classic history & is free online. I liked the Osprey FIW book on the war (the series with a red cover.)

The Guilford Courthouse Osprey is terrible. The National Park Service won't stock it because it is so inaccurate.

You can't go wrong with anything by Rene Chartrand as far as I'm concerned.

The National Park Service respectfully disagrees.:-)

"The combined book by Reid and the fellow whose name I can never remember is very good on uniforms – especially the American uniforms. He is under rated, IMO."

As long as he resists including photos of himself in the work…

42flanker – agreed

I have all of them and they vary. Brendan's are all first rate. I probably go back to them the most.

Having said that, I manage to find something useful in every one of them. If you buy them used, they can be found for under 10 bucks. Not a huge investment. Besides, there is so much information out there now, that you can just make up your own mind, using the Osprey book as a piece of the puzzle.
I have about 45 of them from F&I War up until the War of 1812 and enjoy them all. Are they the last word? No, but what is? Just another tool in the toolbox for me.

It's not like there's a glut of companies publishing Uniform Books out there.

David Nicolle for his Ottoman books

Did David Nicole write any Ospreys on the American Revolution or French and Indian War? No?

I must agree with 42Flanker's observation on Stuart Reid's self portraiture – especially if he happens to be wearing a kilt!

Reid's books are generally very good across the period.

Nicolle's principal AOE is Muslim armies of the mediaeval and Renaissance periods.

Unless the Arabs did discover America first…

All Morrisey campaign books are very good. I have all of them in my collection.
I would collect all of the MAA uniform series, both weak and strong. Other ranges like Warrior may not be worth the money or they may be depending on your needs.
Enjoy the research. It is a vital part for you to be able to enjoy the hobby.

Right on, Rudy. Considering that Osprey might issue one or two books a year concerning the AWI, it seems like no brainer to me.

Hello Winston Smith!

I think all the Osprey books are a great value for what they seem to be designed for. I see them as simply a quick and easy basic entry into a given period. If your looking for better or more accurate details it's still a great jumping off point. To obtain better or more accurate details then you should be looking at other sources.

Some periods I just want the basics and their great. Others I'm looking for more, but still often use them as my first point of reference.

I'm not aware of another resource that covers almost every period of military history. Once you get deeply into these two periods (AWI & F&IW) then their value is limited. It's all a matter of how much research you are after.

Best regards,

Glenn

So the problems with some of these books is that they can perpetuate wrong information, which some people often take as gospel.

I don't have any of the books in front of me, but two things come to mind – in Chartrand's Quebec book, he refers to the center (hat) companies in British regiments as "Fusiliers." No, that is incorrect. They were hat or center companies.

In another, he opens the work suggesting that if the French had just fought the F&I war in the Canadian way (????????) they might have won. Say, what?

I believe in his 1755 campaign book he states that the Canadian militia, after running away at Braddock's Defeat, came back to the fight. Of course that assertion is not backed up by any evidence, and flies in the face of every book every written about the battle, including the most recent outstanding one by Preston. I'm not saying it didn't happen, but I am saying is that if you are going to make such a significant historical statement, perhaps good to back it up with a source.

I am told by some who have worked for Osprey that over the years the publisher has gotten lazy and cheap. Some authors of said series have complained that the money isn't much per book, perhaps discouraging more serious historians from writing them. I still can't figure out why Chartrand was asked to write the book on Loyalists instead of Braisted. Makes no sense, other than the publisher already had a relationship with Rene. I was told by another Osprey author that he was asked to write a book on a subject he knew nothing about, but again, they had an existing relationship with him on other works that he was more expert on.

As in anything, buyer beware – and that's the problem, most buyers aren't educated enough to know a good one from a bad one.

Huh.
Because Chartrand's Quebec campaign book had maps, flags, uniforms and text, I thought it was crackerjack!

Regarding Osprey books, I thought an awful lot of authors got quite a few books out of the same shoebox full of file cards.
I've also noticed a few, naming no names, who have ventured beyond their field of expertise.
Going way back to early Ospreys, I've always had a problem with public domain pictures. Like 1830 Dragoons representing Cowpens. But they're free, and aren't hurting anyone.

Aside from the odd vocabularly choice here or there, the Quebec book is absolutely brilliant for wargamers. I wish Osprey published many others like it!

Their FIW books I refer to a bunch I hope aren't too far off on the wargaming-useful details:

Fort William Henry 1755–57, Ian Castle

Ticonderoga 1758, Chartrand

Highlander in the French-Indian War 1756–67, Ian MacPherson McCulloch

They've been the biggest help in the fewest number of books acquired to help me figure out which units I want to build for general New York gaming.

Supplemented with the Kronoskaf website for painting details. I know they have a few odds and ends of mistakes, but until such time as someone publishes a better single-source painting guide, that will remain my go-to.

From someone who actually wrote several:

On the subject of illustrations, the poor quality is entirely down to Osprey and its miserly attitude to picture budgets, and copyright fees in particular. In essence, unless an author wishes to bankrupt himself, or finds a good, reliable source of inexpensive contemporary works (eg Independence National Historical Park for Continental Army portraits), there is no alternative to cheap, nasty and invariably anachronistic clip-art. Ironic when you consider that the BEV (Bird's Eye View) and Plate artists, and the map-makers, all make (considerably) more money out of the book than the poor author.

Hello historygamer!

"In another, he opens the work suggesting that if the French had just fought the F&I war in the Canadian way (????????) they might have won. Say, what?"

I think he is referring to what the French called "La Petite Guerre" which is generally translated as "little wars". The French had been using this style of warfare for about a hundred years prior to the F&IW. Today we would refer to this style of warfare as "commando raids or special forces". Some see the "Petite Guerre" as used by the French, French Canadians and their Indian allies in North America as the breeding ground for "Skirmish Tactics" that would later embrace the Napoleonic Wars.

When Montcalm arrived in "New France" he was advised that formal European style battles would not win the war in North America. He should avoid those style of battles. The "Petite Guerre" had kept the British at bay for a hundred years. The additional French troops that he brought would simply allow them to reinforce their defensive positions and increase their "Petite Guerre".

I don't think that advise would have worked in the long term. The size of the force that Wolfe brought upped the game and would sooner or later produce a European style battle unless the French were able to adopt an unassailable siege or fortress plan combined with "Petite Guerre". Those thoughts or plans if fully adopted seem to have fallen apart with the loss of Louisburg.

Hope this helps explain it better.

Best regards,

Glenn

I think as well, History Gamer, that an exact quote from the Chartrand books you mentioned would allow us to evaluate this a bit more dispassionately.

Did David Nicole write any Ospreys on the American Revolution or French and Indian War? No?

Winston, would you like my opinion on which Osprey author gives the best run down on the Aztecs? Lol.

…..in Chartrand's Quebec book, he refers to the center (hat) companies in British regiments as "Fusiliers." No, that is incorrect. They were hat or center companies.

Wow, that's your example of perpetuating wrong information that some people may take as gospel? Assuming you are correct, and I have no reason to question that, it sounds like a minor misstep instead.

In another, he opens the work suggesting that if the French had just fought the F&I war in the Canadian way (????????) they might have won. Say, what?

That doesn't sound like perpetuating wrong information. It sounds like proffering an opinion. An opinion that I happen to disagree with. As for the rest I think Glenn sums it up nicely.

'La petite guerre' 'la guerrilla'

'Low intensity operations'

Didn't the French call their "center companies" fusiliers?
If I'm wrong, it won't be the first time.

I'll make another leap.
Suppose that Chartrand is correct about le "petit guerre" being the key to victory. It had worked quite well for most past wars.
And suppose Montcalm had upped the ante by bringing a bunch of regular regiments with him.
Then Pitt says, "So that's your game, eh?"
The Royal Navy can transport more regiments than that. So, Plains of Abraham. It's not an even battle.
I may or may not be right. But it's an opinion.

Didn't the French call their "center companies" fusiliers?

Didn't fusilier become the name of the regular troops in the French army? To whit: Stuart Reid has a book named, "British Redcoat vs French Fusilier". The description of it on the Osprey site is:

"Providing a unique glimpse into the experiences of regular British and French infantry during the French and Indian War, Stuart Reid reveals what it was like to fight in three battles at the height of the struggle for Canada: La Belle-Famille, the Plains of Abraham and Sainte-Foy."

I think the confusion stems from "fusilier" meaning something slightly different in the British armies. They originally guarded the artillery trains and kept the civilian drivers in order.

Barnes, R M (1972). A History of the Regiments and Uniforms of the British Army. Sphere Books. p. 28.

Just for interest, in Prussian armies of this time, the fusiliers were originally the Life Guard troops, or the "Leibgard zu Fuss".

As for the success of continued French guerilla warfare, I have my doubts. Since the mid 1600's the population of New France was never more than a tenth of the English speaking colonies. Guerilla warfare may have worked for a while because New France was such a huge territory. But once Britain decided to act against the large urban centers of Quebec City, Trois Rivière and Montreal, the War was effectively over.

Other issues could include Vaudreuil's incredible corruption, where monies sent for fortifications and military equipment were stolen and spread amongst the Governor and his cronies. Also the French underestimated the Royal Navy's ability to negotiate the (then) treacherous waters of the St Lawrence, outside of Quebec City and the Isles around Montreal. The river has been heavily modified since then.

Yes, 'fusiliers' originally had a specialist role in the British army, despite the term being borrowed from the French who in contrast came to use the term to refer to the standard, battalion companies ('hat', 'centre') of their infantry.

I believe the Prussians confused the issue entirely by using the term to describe regiments dressed in metal-fronted mitre caps (similar to their grenadiers) although lower in height (like British fusilier regiments) but with a role that approximated light infantry.

Once again the dastardly English steal a foreign word and change the meaning!

Well, the dastardly English appropriated, or had foisted on them, a good deal ofthat particular foreign lingo- and yon Louis XIV was a fairly dominant figure. Despite being rather diminuitve in height….

But, essentially, yes.

Sorry, still away from my books. Had to meet with staff at the newly redone Yorktown museum. Also had to look at a site in Gloucester.

My point was it was irresponsible to toss such a ridiculous throw away line in his work. A line more akin to fantasy than responsible thought. The fusilier reference I can't explain. As I said, I preferred Reid's work on the campaign. Opinions may vary. :-)

My point was it was irresponsible to toss such a ridiculous throw away line in his work. A line more akin to fantasy than responsible thought.

So no opinions allowed in historical works? I don't mind as long as the author makes it clear when he is opining. But I don't have the original Chartrand quote, so I'll defer to you

The fusilier reference I can't explain. As I said, I preferred Reid's work on the campaign.

And that's fine. But it seems both Reid and Chartrand use the term "fusilier" in the same manner.

Opinions may vary.

Yep. And nice to see them formed in a civil manner.

My point in agreeing with Chartrand about the "Canadian way" was that it had worked fine for years.
Upping the ante with regular regiments from France, along with a General who fought that way, was counterproductive when the British could ship many more.

Whether is was stand up European style battles like Plains of Abraham or St. Foy or guerilla type hit and run battles, I doubt the forces of New France ultimately had a chance. Once Britain decided to wrestle control of New France away, it became a foregone conclusion. France also needed to control the St. Lawrence, which proved too difficult against the worlds premier naval power.

I'll disagree with Chartrands opinion (if HG is correct and that's actually what he wrote). And I don't believe expressing an opinion or speculation makes anyone a bad historian.

So looking over both the Reid and Chartrand books, both have things to recommend them. Chartrand's book is from the Order of Battle series, which makes his mistaken identity of British center companies – which he repeatedly refers to as "fusiliers" a serious faux pas. I did not see Reid refer to the center companies of British regiments as fusiliers, as someone previously noted. Can you cite a page or pages for that?

In regards to Chartrand's Monongahela book – part of a campaign series – the book opens with this statement:

"As will be seen, these early battles ended in utter defeat for the Anglo-American troops at the hands of the "French and Indians", (sic) generally seen since as barbarous enemies by generations of American and British historians. However, closer examination of the "French" show most of them to have been native-born Canadians, and the "Indians" to have been independent peoples won over by their long-standing diplomatic ties with New France. Further, it becomes clear that the "French and Indian" method of fighting was no lucky accident but a conscious tactical doctrine which, ironically, was ignored in France while, after the disaster at the Monongahela, it was eagerly adopted by both British and Americans."

Wow. Where to begin with that whopper?

"As will be seen, these early battles ended in utter defeat for the Anglo-American troops at the hands of the "French and Indians",

Selective memory. While Sir William's drive was blunted at Lake George, in fact the colonials creamed the French, Indians and Canadians in a defensive battle. Later, the French and Canadians were ambushed by the follow-on force adding insult to injury.

"However, closer examination of the "French" show most of them to have been native-born Canadians, "

Again, not true. The commander of the French force at Braddock's Defeat, was in fact, French. He was from Paris IIRC. Further, many of the Colonial French Marines were also from France, some from other European countries (e.g., Holland). The French Canadian militia fled. This battle was largely an Indian victory. See Preston's outstanding book on the subject.

"Indians" to have been independent peoples won over by their long-standing diplomatic ties with New France."

Half truth there. The Ohio country Indians preferred English trade goods, reputedly better and cheaper. The English traders were run out by Great Lake Indians allied to the French. The Indians in the area weren't too happy about that and later deserted the French cause. In short, the Ohio country Indians were largely coerced into supporting the French, not wooed diplomatically. Shawnee excepted.

"…it becomes clear that the "French and Indian" method of fighting was no lucky accident but a conscious tactical doctrine…"

Umm, New France (Canada) had very limited military capability. In fact, most Canadian militia were used as muscle, not military units. Nothing wrong with that. They were not professional soldiers. The Colonial Marines, often led by French Canadian officers, had some frontier ability/experience, but the military tactics referred to were largely Indian tactics carried by… Indians. Very few Canadians took to the frontier, except with either Colonial Marines or French regulars. Once the Indians largely deserted the French cause in 1758/59, New France had little hope of surviving.

To that end, the French cause was really lost at sea, not land. Once the French fleet was defeated and turned away in 1760 the war in that theater, for all practical purposes, was lost for France. This according to Fred Anderson (Crucible of War) in a recent talk attended by one of my friends.

Ironic that it was the French fleet that would defeat the English cause at Yorktown years later – though in turn, the French fleet in the Caribbean was finally defeated by Rodney.

I'm not saying Chartrand is a bad historian, though clearly these works are not his best efforts. :-)

I did not see Reid refer to the center companies of British regiments as fusiliers, as someone previously noted. Can you cite a page or pages for that?

No because you misrepresented what actually was written. Please reread what I wrote on Sept 29 and Sept 30. No one wrote that Reid referred to British center companies as fusiliers. However, it is totally understandable why a Francophone would use the term "fusilier" to be used as "line troop". Both Chartrand and Reid use "fusilier" to describe French line troops. To me that is a peccadillo.

I agree with your assessment of the inability of New France to ever hold off British military advances.

My mistake if I misread your reference.

I respectfully disagree that giving him an out as a Francophone. He certainly knows the difference, especially since I would bet serious money that he knows the British army at the time had specific fusilier regiments such as the 23rd, etc.

I gladly acknowledge Mr. Chartrand as an expert on the period. My point was that some of these books are not his best work, which in turn is kind of the problem for many Osprey books.

Again, not true. The commander of the French force at Braddock's Defeat, was in fact, French. He was from Paris IIRC.

The French commander of Fort Duquesne was Claude-Pierre Pecaudy de Contrecœur. He was born in Contrecœur, Quebec.

He dispatched Captain Daniel Liénard de Beaujeu to fight Braddock. Beaujeu was born in Ville-Marie, Montréal.

Hope that helps.

Dumas.

Contrecœur never left the fort.

Beaujeu was killed early in the fight.

And to be completely accurate, it really was an Indian victory that some French Colonial Marines happen to participate in.

Beaujeau was hit in one of the first volleys. The French/Indian force began to fall apart until Jean Daniel Dumas (French regular) rallied them.

Approx. 100 Canadian militia fled back to the fort.

Ironically, the overall French commander only expected to delay the British, not defeat them. As HG points out, the Preston book is key to understanding what went wrong.
link

Re: Fusiliers. That is a specifically French term for center companies. The British did not use it, unless they were talking about actual "Fusilier" regiments, e.g., the 5th, 23d, etc. Even then, the hat companies were still referred to has hat/center companies.

I believe that in certain of the three Fusilier regiments, since all ranks were fusiliers, they were organised with was a Right Flank and Left flank Company, instead of 'Grenadier' and 'Light Infantry,' with the centre companies in the middle.* Obviously, no 'hat companies,' since, officially, all wore the fusilier cap.

There was a tendency to assert that all fusiliers were the equal of grenadiers.

{*The Foot Guard regiments adopted this approach once all were authorised to wear the bearskin cap}

"There was a tendency to assert that all fusiliers were the equal of grenadiers."

By who? Wargamers?

Hello historygamer!

"To that end, the French cause was really lost at sea, not land."

I don't think anyone will dispute that control of the sea was a critical step to victory. However, even before Montcalm accepted his command I seem to recall that senior commanders had been offered the post and refused it. Their review of the situation indicated that the Government of France was not prepared to commit enough resources to win the war. Victory was just not possible without a much larger commitment of men and equipment. It was seen by them as a lost cause and they advised Montcalm accordingly.

After taking up his command in New France Montcalm asked for reinforcements and he was denied.

Regardless, what would the outcome of the war been if the French had won at Quebec or even been able retake Quebec after St. Foy?

My take would be if anyone really lost the war it was the French Governments lack of commitment to provide enough resources at the start of the war or even after Montcalm's request. Without proper resources in place the losses at sea and on land where simply stepping stones to defeat.

Best regards,

Glenn