"Real Naval War Gaming" Topic

I thought this was pretty interesting and could have some use in a game.

In World War Two, WATU was formed to test convoy escort tactics in the Battle of the Atlantic, using wargaming. The results were palpable.

YouTube link

Wolfhag

Saw a documentary on the Discovery channel a few weeks
back about the WATU.

Results were amazing.

There is an important moment in WATU's operations that was not only pivotal, but a very common moment in military wargaming:

A very experienced and respected admiral plays the WATU game and is trounced by a civilian 19 year-old girl--three times!

He was embarrassed and angry…similar things happened to the Japanese admirals playing out a wargame of the Midway campaign before it started. Some mid-grade officers playing the US sank several Japanese carriers using a similar strategy to the actual US fleet in the battle…

Unlike the American admiral who accepted the importance of the result, swallowed his pride and ordered the WATU tactics to be instituted, the Japanese ignored the wargame results rather than 'lose face' and made no adjustments to their battle plan.

The American admiral trusting the wargame results is a far rarer outcome in the history of wargame use during the last two centuries.

I heard that the Japanese carriers in the game were actually sunk by B17s (or another account says simply by Midway Island planes) and the ref rightly ruled against that result.

McLaddie, the admiral involved in the Western Approaches Tactical Unit ("WATU") incident was Sir Max Kennedy Horton, GCB, DSO & Two Bars, SGM, his opponent was eighteen-year-old WREN Janet Okell. Although some 5,000 allied officers did the course, WATU was a Royal Navy operation commanded for most of its existence by Captain Gilbert Roberts, RN and staffed by WRENs. You may find this article of interest (the Horton/Okell incident is referred to on pages 12-13):

PDF link

The USN did not generally collaborate directly with WATU but set up the the Submarine Chaser Training Centre and the Atlantic Fleet ASW Unit in Boston. The RN and USN findings were later combined in the Joint Atlantic Convoy Instructions.

22nf Foot---a fascinating article on WATU---many thanks for sharing!

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Earnest King's Response to Operation Drumbeat

At the start of US involvement in World War II, blackouts on the U.S. eastern seaboard were not in effect, and commercial ships traveling the coastal waterways were not travelling under convoy.

King's critics attribute the delay in implementing these measures to his Anglophobia, as the convoys and seaboard blackouts were British proposals, and King was supposedly loath to have his much-beloved U.S. Navy adopt any ideas from the Royal Navy.

He also refused, until March 1942, the loan of British convoy escorts when the Americans had only a handful of suitable vessels. He was, however, aggressive in driving his destroyer captains to attack U-boats in defense of convoys and in planning counter-measures against German surface raiders, even before the formal declaration of war in December 1941.

Instead of convoys, King had the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard perform regular anti-submarine patrols, but these patrols followed a regular schedule. U-boat commanders learned the schedule, and coordinated their attacks to these schedules.

Leaving the lights on in coastal towns back-lit merchant ships for the U-Boats. As a result, there was a period of disastrous shipping losses—two million tons lost in January and February 1942 alone, and urgent pressure was applied from both sides of the Atlantic. However, King resisted the use of convoys because he was convinced the Navy lacked sufficient escort vessels to make them effective.

The formation of convoys with inadequate escort would also result in increased port-to-port time, giving the enemy concentrated groups of targets rather than single ships proceeding independently. Furthermore, blackouts were a politically sensitive issue—coastal cities resisted, citing the loss of tourism revenue.

link

No American officers attended the WATU course. The American commander (Ernest King) HATED the Brits.

We just ran a WATU wargame in the Western Approaches command bunker in Liverpool--and it was just as amazing as it sounds: link

Unlike the American admiral who accepted the importance of the result,

@22ndFoot:

Yep. My apologies to all RN members, past and present. I know WATU was all British, I had my mind on the American/Japanese wargame and screwed up.

Dynaman8789:

The Japanese played the game through more than once, so the B-17 incident could have happened. The one I am talking about is the American players' strategy to sit off north of Midway and surprise the Japanese carrier force.

Again, the real issue is how seriously/constructively the military takes the results of such wargames or do they ignore them because they don't fit their preconceived strategies for success.

I think historically they ignore them based on not fitting their preconceived strategies for success and the politics of the day. There are many examples from ancient times to today. I chalk it up to human nature and wanting to be right. It will always continue to be that way.

Wolfhag

I chalk it up to human nature and wanting to be right. It will always continue to be that way.

Maybe so. You've been involved in such exercises. That lack of faith in simulations or the misuse of them does limit their value.

I am thinking of the simulation 'discussion' in the hearing at the end of the movie. Sully Simulations only work if they are built on the right information.