"Greene the Crab" Topic

…General Greene was George Washington's favorite commander. He's also Southerners' favorite Yankee, having run Lord Cornwallis and his redcoats ragged during their Southern Campaign of 1778-1781. You will lose count if you try to tally up the number of towns and counties bearing his name today…

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"…having run Lord Cornwallis and his redcoats ragged during their Southern Campaign of 1778-1781."

Um-: Augusta, Briar Creek, Savannah, Charleston, Camden, Waxhaws, 2nd Camden..? Not all Cornwallis, of course (nor all Greene), but – did he mean 'Southern Campaign of 1781'?

Since Greene didn't assume command of the Southern Army until after Camden in August 1781 and wasn't in the south until then, the dates are wrong.

Greene was successful in the south after assuming command from Gates and although he never won a battle he crippled three British armies and forced the British to abandon their posts in the interior of North and South Carolina. At the end of the war the British only occupied Charleston and Savannah and that was thanks to the Royal Navy.

And after being tactically victorious at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781 and losing one-quarter of his army, Cornwallis withdrew to Wilmington and then to Virginia and eventually surrendering at Yorktown in October 1781.

Cornwallis did have the misfortune of losing two subordinate commands before the blood-letting at Guilfored Courthouse-one at King's Mountain and the other at Cowpens.

It is poorly worded, but is still arguably correct. Most people would consider that the British (redcoats) second campaign to recover the southern colonies began in late 1778 when Campbell attacked Savannah and ended either in 1781 with Eutaw Springs or in 1782 when the effort to break Wayne's blockade of Savannah failed. The word "their" seems to be referring to the British campaign and not just the portion of the campaign between Greene and Cornwallis.

"Most people would consider that the British (redcoats) second campaign to recover the southern colonies began in late 1778.."

They would indeed but the British operations were successful up until King's Mountain in October 1780, and The Cowpens in early 1781 was the first serious setback.

So neither Greene, Mel Gibson nor anyone else was running Cornwallis, or anyone else, "ragged" before 1781- and after that the term is debatable (although we might agree everyone was unquestionably "ragged")

I don't think Cornwallis 'withdrew' to Virginia. He sought a more profitable area of operations, having learned to his cost that British expectations of a Loyalist base in the Carolinas were a busted flush. Attacking the economic heartland of the colonies in Virginia was a better proposition. Unfortunately for him, and the British imperialist cause, that proved not to be so.

"Depend on it. Militia will not do any good without regular troops." Sounds like something some here might attribute to Washington, or perhaps to Greene after GCH. The quote is from the British commander at Camden in October, 1780 describing the royalist militia.

He also said "Our officers of militia are not near so active as the rebells." Cornwallis's advance on Charlotte NC was not opposed by Continentals, but Cornwallis had a hard time. This is primarily due to two factors, disease and the guerilla campaign being waged by rebel militia in South Carolina and Georgia.

Between Waxhaws and Camden there were at least a half dozen significant actions (400 or more men) fought by unsupported rebel militia in South Carolina alone. Between Camden and Kings Mountain there were at least four more. Then between Kings Mountain and Cowpens there were another four, plus a large number of smaller actions. In these actions the rebel militia was engaging Royalist militia, Provincials and regulars of the 63rd and 71st regiments. Rebel militia unsupported by Continentals defeated British forces commanded by Tarleton, Ferguson, Wemyss and Hanger.

Cornwallis began his advance on Charlotte with the 23rd and 33rd foot and the Volunteers of Ireland. He was later reinforced by the 71st and the British Legion. The rest of his forces were tied down in garrisons or going after rebels in northeast and western South Carolina and Georgia, or were with Ferguson, or were sick. The destruction of Ferguson's command at Kings Mountain wasn't just a blow to royalist morale. It stripped Conrwallis of troops that he desperately needed.

Conrwallis wasn't being "run ragged" by a series of battles fought against Continentals. His army was being slowly bled dry by disease and the guerilla campaign. It wasn't until after Leslie joined Cornwallis in late 1780, and his army received some replacements and the disease season passed that Cornwallis was strong enough to move against Morgan and Greene. Then Cornwallis was run ragged, but in chasing Morgan and Greene's forces to the Virginia border.

Greene appreciated what Gates did not-to cooperate with the partisan bands of Pickens, Marion, and Sumter, to which Greene sent Continental support when he thought it necessary, would help the main army and also dissipate Loyalist support for Cornwallis.

That being said, without the existence of the main army and the Continentals of that army, the efforts of any and all militia would have come to naught. Greene understood this and the blood-letting at Guilford Courthouse along with the defeats at King's Mountain and Cowpens were the factors that made Cornwallis decide to withdraw first to Wilmington and then to Virginia. For all intents and purposes he was driven out of the Carolinas leaving the British to fight two more battles and be bled white.

And it should be noted that Morgan retired after Cowpens and the command of the American light troops, which became Greene's rearguard in the 'race to the Dan' was given to Otho Holland Williams, who to my mind was much better a commander than Morgan for that type of mission. He performed his mission in a masterly fashion.

Greene was fortunate in his subordinate commanders, such as Williams, Kirkwood, Howard, and others for they ensured that Greene's army was well-led and well-commanded.

"That being said, without the existence of the main army and the Continentals of that army, the efforts of any and all militia would have come to naught."

You can reverse that and say the same thing about the Continentals. Without the Militias, the 300 odd Continentals would have been destroyed at Cowpens and the other half of Greene's army would have eventually met the same fate.

"And it should be noted that Morgan retired after Cowpens and the command of the American light troops, which became Greene's rearguard in the 'race to the Dan' was given to Otho Holland Williams, who to my mind was much better a commander than Morgan for that type of mission. He performed his mission in a masterly fashion."

Yes. Williams was an excellent officer. Among the finest in the entire Continental Army.

Morgan was never a consideration to command the rearguard of Greene's army at the race to the Dan. He was bedridden with sciatica after Cowpens and retired. So, why would you make that comparison?

What evidence to you have to back up the opinion that Williams was a better commander for that type of mission?
Williams did indeed, performed masterfully.

What proof can you offer that Morgan could not have done the same masterful job? And why make the statement?

Greene was blessed with the Officers you mentioned.

You left out Huger, William Washington, Harry Lee and Mel Gibson.

Morgan would have been 46 at Cowpens.
He had accompanied Burr on the Quebec campaign. His body had taken on that march as much abuse as would have sidelined men half his age. He stayed with the army until the decisive victory at Saratoga. He then "retired", due to his sciatica, and lack of promotion due to his indifference to politics. There was a lot of that going around after Saratoga, with Gates being given all the credit.
He came out of retirement after Gates' disaster at Camden. Greene certainly recognized his ability and gave him a command commensurate with his considerable talents.
Cowpens has been called a "perfect" battle plan. He used the disparate parts to the best of their talents, particularly the militia. Could Williams have commanded militia any better than Morgan did at Cowpens?
Morgan again retired, again mostly due to his sciatica, having nothing to do with his ability. As Bill said, I don't see how anyone could have done a better job.

Being a tough old bird, he came back again to command troops in the Whiskey Rebellion.

"That being said, without the existence of the main army and the Continentals of that army, the efforts of any and all militia would have come to naught."
You can reverse that and say the same thing about the Continentals. Without the Militias, the 300 odd Continentals would have been destroyed at Cowpens and the other half of Greene's army would have eventually met the same fate.
"And it should be noted that Morgan retired after Cowpens and the command of the American light troops, which became Greene's rearguard in the 'race to the Dan' was given to Otho Holland Williams, who to my mind was much better a commander than Morgan for that type of mission. He performed his mission in a masterly fashion."
Yes. Williams was an excellent officer. Among the finest in the entire Continental Army.
Morgan was never a consideration to command the rearguard of Greene's army at the race to the Dan. He was bedridden with sciatica after Cowpens and retired. So, why would you make that comparison?
What evidence to you have to back up the opinion that Williams was a better commander for that type of mission?
Williams did indeed, performed masterfully.
What proof can you offer that Morgan could not have done the same masterful job? And why make the statement?
Greene was blessed with the Officers you mentioned.
You left out Huger, William Washington, Harry Lee and Mel Gibson.

You are repeating the ‘myth of the militia.' If the Continental Army was allowed to be larger, and one of the main reasons it was not was because the militia and the state lines were given greater pay than the Continentals. And their terms of service were much shorter. Therefore, recruits were attracted to the militia and state lines instead of the Continentals. The militia could not, with few exceptions, stand up to British and German regulars in open combat. The Continentals could and did, many times to their detriment, such as the disaster at Camden when the Maryland division stood and fought and the militia ‘ran like a torrent.' The North Carolina militia did it again at Guilford Courthouse. With competent officers, which were not always available, the militia could be made to stand and fight it out, as the Virginia militia at least attempted to do thanks to the efforts of General Stevens and some of his officers.

‘Reversing' the comment does not ring true, but strikes me as merely an excuse for the militia. There is good reason that the Continentals referred to the militia as ‘long faces.'

In short, your opinion regarding the militia is wrong.

Morgan stayed with his command and the army as a whole until either 8 or 10 February, depending on the reference. He wasn't bedridden for those three weeks, but active in the field. It was also mentioned that Morgan left the army, not because of being sick, but because he did not agree with what Greene wanted to do after Cowpens. If that is true, then Morgan was wrong, Greene was correct, and Greene picked the right commander for the rear guard in the retreat to the Dan River.

Morgan was Greene's original pick to command the rear guard, but begged off and left the army between 8 and 10 February (Cowpens was fought on 17 January).

My opinion regarding the relative merits of Morgan and Williams as commanders is based on a long study of the campaign and the different opinions and abilities of the two officers. It is a conclusion based on professional study.

Morgan would have been 46 at Cowpens.
He had accompanied Burr on the Quebec campaign. His body had taken on that march as much abuse as would have sidelined men half his age. He stayed with the army until the decisive victory at Saratoga. He then "retired", due to his sciatica, and lack of promotion due to his indifference to politics. There was a lot of that going around after Saratoga, with Gates being given all the credit.
He came out of retirement after Gates' disaster at Camden. Greene certainly recognized his ability and gave him a command commensurate with his considerable talents.
Cowpens has been called a "perfect" battle plan. He used the disparate parts to the best of their talents, particularly the militia. Could Williams have commanded militia any better than Morgan did at Cowpens?
Morgan again retired, again mostly due to his sciatica, having nothing to do with his ability. As Bill said, I don't see how anyone could have done a better job.
Being a tough old bird, he came back again to command troops in the Whiskey Rebellion.

I thought that Morgan was with Arnold in his attack on Quebec while Burr was with Montgomery's command and was with him when Montgomery was killed at the outset of his attack on Quebec.

All of the troops under Arnold underwent incredible hardship on the march on Quebec.

Morgan was with the Main Army where he was ordered to organize his provisional rifle corps and then Washington sent him to reinforce the Northern Army.

Morgan ‘retired' because of sour grapes at not getting promoted.

Morgan was an excellent combat leader and his victory at Cowpens was the only battle of annihilation that occurred during the war.

Otho Holland Williams excelled at every mission he was assigned and his command of the Light Corps after Morgan quit the Southern Army clearly demonstrated his tactical and overall strategic skill keeping the British from interfering with the Southern Army during the retreat to Virginia. I don't believe that anyone could have done that better, including Morgan. As for Williams being able to defeat Tarleton we can never know. However, his service during the Revolution is not surpassed by anyone of his rank and abilities. He was one of the plethora of talented commanders that Greene was blessed with in the South.

In short, your opinion regarding the militia is wrong."

Proof?
So far, all I see is opinion.

"Long faces"? So what does that prove. That troops in the army were unhappy? Do you have a source that states that the Continentals went around smiling all day, with a happy face?

Gee Kevin, unhappy soldiers!There's real news!!!!

By looking at the manpower rolls of the Continentals Army, there were NEVER enough Continentals to beat the British.

Without the militia supplements, the Continentals would have been crushed by sheer numbers.

Your opinions of Morgan are again based on your interpretation of why he retired, not facts.

"Morgan was an excellent combat leader and his victory at Cowpens was the only battle of annihilation that occurred during the war."

Really, Kevin? Look up a battle at Kings Mountain and get back to me.

And the reason for not enough recuits for the Continental Army have already been given.

'Long faces' was given to the militia by the Continentals because they were unhappy about being called up to serve.

I notice that while you demand facts to support my comments, you provide none.

What are your references for the militia in comparison to the Continentals?

Your own words apply to your postings on the militia and the Continentals: 'Proof? So far, all I see is opinion.'

Interpretation is based on facts.

These might be useful:

-Military Uniforms in America, Volume I edited by John Elting.

-American Army Life by John Elting.

-The Encyclopedia of the American Revolution by Mark Boatner.

-Citizens in Arms by Lawrence Cress.

Your ideas and conclusions about the militia are incorrect and you have not supported your 'ideas' with any evidence.

"Interpretation is based on facts."

Please provide these "facts" with evidence to support them.
Your word alone does not make them "facts".

You made the original statements. I just refuted them. The burden of proof is upon you, my good man.

I see you completely glossed over the battle of Kings Mountain where an entire army was annihilated. In fact, at Cowpens Tarleton and many of his Dragoons escaped. Few escaped at Kings Mountain. Perhaps later, they made good their escape, but they were captured first.

I, for one, choose to believe what I was tv-programmed to believe!

If it's not on tv (or cinema), it simply didn't happen. And if what you read or witnessed doesn't match up with that, then you clearly must have misread or mis-remembered it.

Dan
PS. Most people seem to do that these days, for things that happened a few centuries ago and even with much more recent events that they themselves might have witnessed with their own eyes. :)

You made the original statements. I just refuted them. The burden of proof is upon you…

You disagreed with what I posted; you didn't refute anything as you provided no sources to do so.

I gave you four sources to support my contention regarding the militia.

You have countered with nothing but opinion.

If and when you read the references or actually offer source material, then we can talk.

"Morgan was an excellent combat leader and his victory at Cowpens was the only battle of annihilation that occurred during the war."

How can anyone take you seriously when you make a statement like that?
Google the Battle at Kings Mountain and see if you wish to retract that mis-statement. Get back to me on this.

I'll also direct you to the Kings Mountain NPS site where you can lean that there was more than one battle where an army was annihilated.

"I gave you four sources to support my contention regarding the militia."

You gave sources? Where? Page numbers and quotes please.

You recommended 4 books.

I'll do the same for you.

The Road To Guildford Courthouse…Buchannan
A Devil Of A Whipping….Babits
Nothing But Blood and Slaughter: The Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume 2 1780…Kelly
Long Obstinate and Bloody….Babits

Perhaps the you'll come to understand the vital role the militia played in the Carolinas. Particularly SC.

If and when you produce the references or actually offer source material, then we can talk. Until then, read up on Kings Mountain.

I've read the sources you listed. Have you read the ones I have listed?

It seems to me that you don't understand that without the Continental Army, no matter what the militia did or did not do, the US would not have won. Further, without the performance of the Continental Army, the French would not have come in on the side of the US. And without the French the US would not have won.

Neither Washington nor Greene, nor a host of other Continental commanders, had a high opinion of the militia. Some of the militia did very well; most did not and what you are championing is nothing more than the repetition of the old militia myth to the disparaging of the Continentals.

Long Obstinate and Bloody….Babits

Babits had a co-author, Joshua Howard, and he deserves to be mentioned as the co-author.

You gave sources? Where? Page numbers and quotes please.

Right here-in the post 1 Sept, 1103 AM. Didn't you read the posting? And if I did list the quotations and page numbers, would you actually look them up?

Further, you can try The Book of the Continental Soldier by Harold Peterson which is also very helpful.

You are recreating revisionist history of the worst kind with your emphasis on the militia in the War of the Revolution and that gives a distorted picture of what actually happened.

I do not read Bill's comments as "repeating the myth of the militia". Rather it is challenging your myth of the Continentals. The idea that the Continental Army won the AWI without the very significant assistance of the militia is not supported by the historical record. The notion that if less resources had been devoted to the militia, the rebels would have been able to produce a much larger and more effective Continental army is a fantasy. It was a team effort. It had to be a team effort.

Since this post is about running Cornwallis ragged, look at just the period that he was in the Carolinas. During the time from Waxhaws until Gates gave Morgan command of the light troops there was only one significant action in South Carolina involving Continentals, Camden. At Camden the Continentals in Gates' line were outnumbered by Cornwallis's army 2:1. Virginia could not have supplied him with more Continentals so soon after Charleston and Waxhaws and neither could South Carolina. Perhaps North Carolina could have given him a few hundred if they had raised new Continental troops rather than militia. Even with those troops and state line forces Gates still would have been outnumbered by around 3:2. Does anyone see Gates pulling off a victory with those odds against Cornwallis?

When Greene implemented his plan Cornwallis didn't feel he was strong enough to move against Greene or Morgan until Leslie reinforced him. Leslie provided the troops that allowed Cornwallis to occupy Wilmington. Leslie provided around 40% of the troops that Cornwallis had with him at Guilford Courthouse. I think one company from Leslie's command may have ended up at Cowpens.

It's not a simple case of either/or, Continentals or militia.
I hesitate to differ with those who actually lived during that time.
It was very much a political choice, with those with Federalist leanings favoring a standing army (the Continentals won the war!) and the Democratic Republicans favoring the militia.
Russel Weigley in The American Way of War makes a strong case that these attitudes carried through right up to the Great War.
How many Regulars fought in the Civil War? Spanish American War? World War I? It's a tribute to "the Pentagon" that the army was able to use enthusiastic volunteers. And of course, conscription.
In almost every American War, politicians elbowed aside the standing army and fought almost exclusively with militia. Was the 20th Maine a standing army unit, or militia? Arguably pure militia.

A unit was only as good as its training and leadership. Where it was good, the unit was good. Where it was lacking, the unit sucked.
Morgan knew exactly what he was dealing with. He knew the militia would run away. He gave them permission to run, and told them exactly when they could run, and where they should run to, where they should rally, and what he expected of them after they rallied. Now THAT is a brilliant General, and I don't think anyone could have done it better.
Every single biography that I have read of Morgan says he went home after Cowpens because of his health. I've never read anywhere that it was because his nose was out of joint.

"You are recreating revisionist history of the worst kind with your emphasis on the militia in the War of the Revolution and that gives a distorted picture of what actually happened."

According to you. To ignore the contribution of so many thousands of Militiamen who were killed, wounded or captured during the AWI, is pure folly. It exposes you.
But what should I expect from a person that thought that Cowpens was the only time an army was destroyed in the Revolution.
I am not refuting that the Continentals were the backbone of the Revolution. Of course they were.
But the militia were also heavily involved. It's not either or. It was combination of the two that won the war.

And I own 4 of the books you mentioned. I don't have one of them but I have read it. You're not the only one who reads.

Nose out of joint can be perty painful, I reckon..

"You gave sources? Where? Page numbers and quotes please."

Right here- in the post 1 Sept, 1103 AM….

I confess, having looked I am unable to see any page numbers or quotations there.

And if I did list the quotations and page numbers, would you actually look them up?

Oh, I see. Right…. well, you could always give it a try.

Meanwhile, I thought inserting the date of publication of the books cited might be instructive:

1 Sept 2018 11.03:

These might be useful:

-Military Uniforms in America, Volume I edited by John Elting.[1974]

-American Army Life by John Elting. [1982]

-The Encyclopedia of the American Revolution by Mark Boatner. [1966]

-Citizens in Arms by Lawrence Cress.[1982]

01 Sep 2018 5:23 p.m.

You recommended 4 books.

I'll do the same for you.

The Road To Guildford Courthouse…Buchannan [1997]
A Devil Of A Whipping….Babits [1998]
Nothing But Blood and Slaughter: The Revolutionary War in the Carolinas, Volume 2 1780…Kelly [2004]
Long Obstinate and Bloody….Babits [2009]

Rather it is challenging your myth of the Continentals. The idea that the Continental Army won the AWI without the very significant assistance of the militia is not supported by the historical record. The notion that if less resources had been devoted to the militia, the rebels would have been able to produce a much larger and more effective Continental army is a fantasy. It was a team effort. It had to be a team effort.

What 'myth of the Continentals' are you referring to?

Again, both the militia and the state lines hindered recruitment for the Continental Army. That's fact. And the militia too many times did not help in the field but either ran or failed to show up. And they many times showed up not properly equipped, used Continental resources and took them with them when they 'departed.'

A 'team effort'? Really? If that is so, then why all the problems with the militia, including running away in large numbers as at Camden and Guilford Courthouse, leaving the Continentals to fight on alone? Perhaps you could explain that 'phenomenon'?

Perhaps this will help in the discussion:

Washington's opinion of the militia was clearly stated in that the militia ‘come in you cannot tell how; go out you cannot see when; act you cannot tell where; consume your provisions; exhaust your stores; and leave you at last in a critical moment. Overall, Washington believed them to be a ‘broken staff.'

Further, he was convinced that the militia would never acquire the steadiness under fire that the Continentals acquired Washington, among his myriad problems in New York in September 1776 was plagued by militia that ‘ran like a torrent.' He stated that ‘the militia instead of calling forth their utmost efforts…great numbers of them have gone off; in some instances, almost by whole regiments.'

Washington later continued ‘Men just dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life-unaccustomed to the din of arms…' and facing regular troops, especially experienced regular troops, ‘makes them timid and ready to fly from their own shadows.' Interestingly, Washington praised the efforts of the militia in the northern department during the Saratoga campaign, stating that the militia had ‘shut the only door by which Burgoyne could retreat…'

Still, in the battles of the Saratoga campaign it was the Continental Regular who, as always, bore the brunt of the fighting and the casualties finally defeating the British offensive at both Freeman's Farm and Bemis Heights and forced a British army to surrender.

Unfortunately, some in Congress still believed in the efficiency and reliability of the militia, based on an erroneous assessment of the Saratoga campaign and disagreed with Washington's judgment that a large regular army was what was needed for the war.

Nathaniel Greene, thought the militia equivalent to the ‘locusts of Egypt.' When mustered, the militia came in without the required weapons or equipment, took what they needed from Continental stores, and then left and went home when the mood struck them.

This belief was not only shared by most of the Continental senior officers, but was reinforced for Greene by the behavior of the North Carolina militia at Guilford Courthouse in March 1781. Not only did the North Carolinians run from the advancing British infantry, whether or not they had fired upon them as ordered, but they ran completely from the battlefield.

British opinion of the militia was twofold: first, they held them in general contempt as soldiers because they did not stand up to British regulars in the field. However, they did consider them to be an ‘armed constabulary' who could and did police areas where no other authority existed. In that role, and in the role of partisans, especially in the southern theater, they could be effective against the British lines of communication.

Effective American commanders, such as Greene understood the value of partisans and their operations and carefully coordinated them with the main southern army, reinforcing them with regular troops when necessary.

However, without the existence of the Continental Army, the militia lacked the ability to confront British units on their own. Piers Mackesy, writing about the American Revolution from the British perspective claimed that it was the Continental Army that defeated the British, not the militia.

References used for this short essay:

-American Army Life by John Elting.
-Correspondence of George Washington to John Hancock, Samuel Huntington, and Landon Carter, as cited in This Glorious Struggle: George Washington's Revolutionary War Letters by Edward Lengel.
-The War for America by Piers Mackesy.
-Citizens in Arms by Lawrence Cress.
-Correspondence of Horatio Gates to Charles McGill cited in Rebels and Redcoats: The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It by George Scheer and Hugh Rankin.
-The Battles of Saratoga by John Elting.
-The Continental Army by Robert Wright.
- Washington's General: Nathaniel Greene and the Triumph of the American Revolution by Terry Golway.
-With Zeal and Bayonets Only by Matthew Spring.
-A People Numerous and Armed by John Shy.
-Long, Obstinate, and Bloody by Lawrence Babits and Joshua Howard.

From The Book of the Continental Soldier by Harold Peterson:

‘Under Von Steuben's guidance the Revolutionary War soldier became a first-class fighting man in the best European tradition. Contrary to popular tradition, he did not hide behind trees and stone walls to pot at enemy formations. With exceptions such as King's Mountain and various routs, he met the British Army on its own terms in open fields and drawn up in line of battle. He learned to made savage bayonet charges, and in such famous attacks as Stony Point and the assault on the redoubts at Yorktown, he charged with unloaded weapons, relying solely on cold steel. By the end of the war he was a hardened campaigner. He knew his weapons and his drill. He could face the enemy under any and all circumstances. He knew how to throw up fortifications and how to obtain shelter. His independent spirit remained but he knew the military hierarchy and how to recognize it by insignia-and he knew the deference due it. He was, in short, the master of all the miscellaneous hardware and gear of military life, the basic tools of the Revolution.'-20.

From American Army Life by John Elting:

‘No other American army has suffered so grimly and so long, or achieved so much.'-35

‘On active service, the militia (or ‘Long Faces,' as the Continentals called them) often were more of a hindrance than a help. Washington described them as ‘badly officered and under no government. They come in you cannot tell how, go, you cannot tell when, and act you cannot tell where, consume your provisions, exhaust your stores, and leave you at last in a critical moment.' Maj Gen Nathaniel Greene compared them to the ‘locusts of Egypt' because they wasted the countryside without performing any useful duty. In battle they usually broke and ran as soon as things got dangerous.'

‘The militia had to be used in large numbers, however, because of the weakness of the Continental Army. In states like New Jersey that were fought over repeatedly, militiamen acquired appreciable military skills and were very effective in harrying British foraging parties and detachments. They were also useful in suppressing Tory activities, and militiamen formed the guerilla bands of Francis Marion and other partisan leaders in the Carolinas. In the end, the militia were very certain that only their skill and courage had won the war.'-25.

Every single biography that I have read of Morgan says he went home after Cowpens because of his health. I've never read anywhere that it was because his nose was out of joint.

See The Encyclopedia of the American Revolution by Mark Boatner.

A unit was only as good as its training and leadership. Where it was good, the unit was good. Where it was lacking, the unit sucked.

That is exactly true. The point with the militia, is where did they get their 'training and leadership?'

Morgan knew exactly what he was dealing with. He knew the militia would run away. He gave them permission to run, and told them exactly when they could run, and where they should run to, where they should rally, and what he expected of them after they rallied. Now THAT is a brilliant General, and I don't think anyone could have done it better.

No one is disputing Morgan at Cowpens. The bottom line is without the Continentals at Cowpens, Morgan would have lost. And that is the point of the discussion on my part.

And it should be noted that he emplaced his units with a river at their backs, so there really was no place to run to. Now that is brilliant.

It's not a simple case of either/or, Continentals or militia.

I completely disagree. The issue is just that simple.

It was very much a political choice, with those with Federalist leanings favoring a standing army (the Continentals won the war!) and the Democratic Republicans favoring the militia.

Russel Weigley in The American Way of War makes a strong case that these attitudes carried through right up to the Great War.

How many Regulars fought in the Civil War? Spanish American War? World War I? It's a tribute to "the Pentagon" that the army was able to use enthusiastic volunteers. And of course, conscription.

In almost every American War, politicians elbowed aside the standing army and fought almost exclusively with militia. Was the 20th Maine a standing army unit, or militia? Arguably pure militia.

The last war the United States fought with militia was the War of 1812.

For both the Mexican War and the Civil War the units raised outside the Regular Army were volunteers enlisted for a fixed term-in the Civil War it was generally three years for many of the volunteer regiments.

The regular army was not 'elbowed aside' but after the War of 1812 formed the core of any army raised by either volunteers or conscription. And those troops were trained before being sent into action. The 20th Maine was first commanded by Adelbert Ames, a hard-nosed regular, who knew his business. The Iron Brigade was trained and led initially by John Gibbon, another regular army disciplinarian.

Militia went to way of the dodo after the War of 1812 because it was generally useless and not worth the trouble.

The myth of the Continentals is, as stated above and on other threads, that the Continentals could have won the war without the very significant contribution of the militia.

Focusing on the major battles in the southern campaign ignores just how much the strategic situation was affected by minor actions. While Washington and Lee played parts in this at times, the major player was the militia. Since this is about Greene running Cornwallis ragged let's look at Guilford Courthouse. Take the militia out of the picture. North Carolina might have been able to put a few hundred Continentals in the field in late 1780 to early 1781 if they hadn't been fielding militia. There would have been no more Continentals from Maryland or Virginia beyond what was in the field, and South Carolina couldn't have raised any. Cornwallis would have had a much larger field army without the losses at Kings Mountain and Cowpens, and without the need to leave so many troops garrisons to deal with the rebellion in South Carolina. There was a good chance the Continentals would have been wiped out…if they chose to fight at all.

Even if you assume that Cornwallis just shows up with the troops he had and Greene shows up with his Continentals things are not much better. Cornwallis showed up at GCH with a much larger force than the Continentals Greene had. Many of the losses that bled Cornwallis's army at GCH came in the encounters with Greene's first and second lines. Parts of Cornwallis's army never make it to the showdown with the third line. Because of the fighting with the militia those that do are not able to mount as coordinated an attack on the Continentals. So instead of what could have been a disaster for the rebels, Greene walks away with a close run thing.

Could Greene have done better if the North Carolina and Virginia militia had instead been trained Continentals? Sure. Militia are not Continentals though. They are not supposed to stand toe to toe with British regulars in a close range fire fight on an open field, or stand up to a bayonet charge by an equal or superior force. A commander who expected otherwise risked getting what Gates got at Camden. Morgan at Cowpens understood what his troops could do, and adjusted his tactics accordingly. The bottom line isn't that without the Continentals Morgan would have lost at Cowpens. The bottom line is that by properly employing BOTH his militia AND Continentals, along with some helpful mistakes by Tarleton, Morgan was able to win a major victory at Cowpens.

You are missing the point. The reliance on the militia, in part enforced by Congress, inhibited recruiting by the Continental Army which kept the Continental Army under strength and that made using the militia by the Continental commanders a course of action that they didn't like or agree with.

The militia were a drain on the Continental Army, not an advantage.

There is no 'myth' of the Continental Army. The myth is that the militia were essential to winning the war when a larger and trained Continental Army would have had no need to use them in pitched battles.

Winston, I agree that the debate is colored by the politics, both at the time and subsequently. Unless we want to wade through a very long discussion on the American Constitutional Convention and Ratification, the early American contest between the Federalists and the Democratic Republicans and even some 20th century politics it is probably best not to go there.

That issue is not part of this discussion and is out of the period.

So instead of what could have been a disaster for the rebels, Greene walks away with a close run thing.

If the North Carolina militia had done what Greene asked them to do in the first line, the battle could have been an American victory. Instead, they ran and kept on running away from the battlefield beyond the Continentals in the third line.

The last war the United States fought with militia was the War of 1812.

What do you call the National Guard? Militia.
Weigley argued that the National Guard was a continuation of the militia vs Regulars argument.

There is no 'myth' of the Continental Army. The myth is that the militia were essential to winning the war when a larger and trained Continental Army would have had no need to use them in pitched battles.

Nice rhetorical trick there. You call something a "myth" to deny its truth.
Where was this "larger and trained Continental army" supposed to come from? Congress could barely afford the troops it was pretending to support as it was.

Kevin it is you that are missing the point. You start with the assumption that the total pool of resources the American rebels used in the AWI could have been devoted to the Continental army. For a number of reasons, some political, some logistic, some demographic, some military and some financial, the resources that could have been devoted to raising and maintaining the Continental army were not much larger than those actually used for that purpose.

The units and replacements that Virginia, Maryland and Delaware supplied to the Continental army in 1779-early 1781 was close to what those colonies actually could have supplied. North Carolina did choose to forgo raising Continentals for a time in 1780, but when it switched back they couldn't raise many. South Carolina and Georgia could raise none at all after Charleston until they had been largely cleared of British troops. The larger Continental Army that would have allowed Gates and Greene to avoid using militia on the battlefield wasn't going to happen unless Washington released more troops from his main army.

Babits and Howard cover the issue of the North Carolina militia at GCH. It isn't as clear cut as you present it.

Kevin, you are also begging the question that standing in the battle line was all the militia did.
They did an excellent job of keeping Patriot territory Patriot, suppressing Loyalist activity. One of the reasons the British campaigned in the South was the "myth" of Loyalist support. Patriot militia kept that from surfacing.

So, have I got this right? The militia were useless. Except when they weren't.

Pretty much.

Nailed it exactly 42.

…you are also begging the question that standing in the battle line was all the militia did.

Incorrect. You may want to read, or reread as the case may be, the essay that I posted.

They did an excellent job of keeping Patriot territory Patriot, suppressing Loyalist activity. One of the reasons the British campaigned in the South was the "myth" of Loyalist support. Patriot militia kept that from surfacing.

But if they didn't have an army in being, thanks to Greene and his Continentals, they would not have succeeded. It was the Southern Army that kept them in business.

So, have I got this right? The militia were useless. Except when they weren't.

Pretty much.

Nailed it exactly 42.

Except that the three of you have not sourced anything you have stated/believed/opined. You are merely giving your opinion. Source it, and then it will be a legitimate argument. Otherwise, it's just words.

"It was the Southern Army that kept them in business."

Except for the fact that there was no Southern Army after Lincoln surrendered.
It was Pickens, Sumpter, Marion and their ilk, who kept the South from collapsing.

Not the Continental Army, who stupidly backed themselves into a corner and were forced to surrender, en masse.

Gates was enroute to the South with his command. It had departed for Charleston in April 1780, arriving in theater in July. Lincoln's surrender of Charleston took place in May 1780 before Camden.

Greene reorganized and reformed the Southern Army after Camden and after he replaced Greene.

And there were militia in the Charleston garrison who were paroled and sent home by the British after promising not to take up arms again. The Continentals were sent to the prison hulks.

It wasn't the army which made the decision to defend Charleston and endure a siege, it was their commander, Lincoln. You might want to take a look at Carl Borick's A Gallant Defense: The Siege of Charleston, 1780.

And I'm still waiting for an explanation concerning Kings Mountain.
Or don't you consider that an "annihilation"?

Or are you purposely ignoring the subject, due to the glaring error you made?

Given the economic and financial straits the Congress and the states were in at the time, how COULD more Continentals have been raised?
You can't just name a newly raised unit the 5th North Carolina Continental Regiment and expect them to show up knowing bayonet drill.
This is like claiming the US Army "should have had Pershings at DDay" without acknowledging the manufacturering, shipping, development details, etc.
It was economically impossible to have more Continentals at the expense of militia.

And I'm still waiting for an explanation concerning Kings Mountain. Or don't you consider that an "annihilation"?

I don't consider it on a par with Cowpens by any stretch of the imagination. It was a large bushwhacking tree-to-tree fight with revenge driven murder of prisoners by the victors. The term 'lynching' comes from the aftermath of King's Mountain, named after one of the American commanders.

You can't just name a newly raised unit the 5th North Carolina Continental Regiment and expect them to show up knowing bayonet drill.

Where do you think the two new Virginia Continental regiments that fought well at Guilford Courthouse came from?

Except that the three of you have not sourced anything you have stated/believed/opined.

Well, actually, yes. You see, I asked a question and my source was this thread.